добих јутрос мејл са малим, интересантним чланком са википедије о Тhe Remote Monitoring and Deployment Solutions
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FinFisher (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FinFisher)
даљим читањем сазнајемо да је цена софтвера негде око 300к евра, и да је наша мала, поносна и на европском путу непоколебљива заједница купила ФинСпај (па ако неко може да схвати шта ће србији овакав 'алат' нек ми отвори очи...тајна преписка мрке и бекуте? ивичине сексуалне авантуре (онли 18+)? вучићеви планови за економски опоравак србије кроз призму ослобађања косовског баласта?)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FinFisher#Gamma_International:_Corporate_Enemy_of_the_Internet (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FinFisher#Gamma_International:_Corporate_Enemy_of_the_Internet)
а оно што смо одувек знали гардијан и вашингтон пост од јуче тврде: прате фејс, епл, гугл (http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=06&dd=07&nav_category=78&nav_id=720694)
Čita i Gugl sve što pišem preko njega, kao i FB, pa pokušavaju da mi prodaju koješta. Slično verovatno i vlast™, reaguje na ključne reči...
Za naše pojma nemam, Džon je DB, on će ti kaže :!:
Naši prate jedni druge ko sa kim razmenjuje mejlove i ko prati kakve akcije na berzi, stanje neke banke na dalekim sunčanim ostrvima gde se gnezde kanarinci ... Nije tu zanimljiva sitna boranija što naručuje kineske džidža bidže preko neta.
Све се прати и бележи, а сад ће моћи да се класификује и у фолдере ставља. Злу не требало. Згрешиш нешто, а пандури би да притом још и неког друкнеш, кликну на фолдер - охохо! Шта то имамо овде? Тад и тад си подржавао Црвене Кмере, тад и тад си тражио плаћеног убицу за Ђулета Ван Гога, тад и тад си кудио власт и хулио на цркву... Е сад можемо да се договоримо, а можеш и да мало береш кукуруз, лежиш у прдекани или волонтираш у каквом црквеном хору. Па бирај, другар!
:twisted:
možete slobodno da nastavite da guglate fraze tipa 'pas jebe ženu' jer izgleda da veliki brat (za sada) još uvek ne prati tu vrstu (potencijalnih) prestupnika.
s druge strane, ako ste guglali svinjetinu (pa čak i "man fucks pork/swine"), možda već imate fajl kod vb-a!
evo liste fraza čiju pretragu i uopšte upotrebu na netu prate:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/reuvencohen/2012/05/26/department-of-homeland-security-forced-to-release-list-of-keywords-used-to-monitor-social-networking-sites/2/ (http://www.forbes.com/sites/reuvencohen/2012/05/26/department-of-homeland-security-forced-to-release-list-of-keywords-used-to-monitor-social-networking-sites/2/)
Наравно да имам фајл, па ово су најзанимљивије ствари за гуглање! :lol:
Obama Is Checking Your Email
prajsles!
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2F24.media.tumblr.com%2F9d68a07e6efa817a27b1da2341df9441%2Ftumblr_mo3lqdzU7p1sumx0go1_1280.jpg&hash=cd240568022b630e3a30be781e530b9b45cfca96)
http://obamaischeckingyouremail.tumblr.com/ (http://obamaischeckingyouremail.tumblr.com/)
Ovaj Edward Snowden, što je razotkrio PRIZMU (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_%28surveillance_program%29), mnogo liči na mene. Jel' da?
http://youtu.be/5yB3n9fu-rM (http://youtu.be/5yB3n9fu-rM)
Oću da volontiram u crkvenom horu, Nemam sluha ali imam dobru volju. Volim Obamu, Ameriku i smataram kako imamo najbolju vlast na svetu koja se brine o dobrobiti gradjana.
Nešto nemam snage da laže... Ovaj, da budem iskren u potpunosti i moram trknuti na neki sajt NVO, koliko da vidim šta je potrebno napisati radi političke korektnosti.
PS Poštovani Nadziraču, ovo su moja iskrena uverenja i nemaju veze sa tim što neko laže kako ti gledaš šta ja pišem i što potajno posmatram sajt sa najnovijim vestima Vlade Republike Srbije.
Vaš Ja
Halo! Laže vas Aleksije. Hoće samo da se infiltrira i da vas raskrinka. Pa, posle da traži azil na Islandu ili na Jamajci.
Molio bih da se ne obazirete na pripadnike (navodno penzionisane) određenih službi koji se pravdaju da sve što bi rekli ne mogu reći jer su pod zakletvom. Time se sami deklarišu kao vredne i odane pčele radilice od vremena onih (zna se na koja se ONA vremena misli), preko vremena skorijih do ovih. Njihov cilj je da nas poštene demokrate, ljude vizionare, širokih shvatanja i uskih pogleda, koji mislimo samo i isključivo na dobro i za dobro ovog naroda (koji ne ume da misli jer je nedfinisana masa) dakle, nas, buduću i sadašnju intelektualnu elitu koja svim snagama uvodi vrednosti Zapada, slobodnog tržišta, demokratije, sve to, navodno penzionisani pripadnici pojedinih službi, žele omalovažiti i vratiti one reakcionarne snage koje se lažno nekad izdavahu za revolucionarne.
PS Poštovani Nadziraču, ja za razliku od drugih, ne mislim kako je ovaj forum samo mamac za navodne lajavce i sumnjive tipove, koje treba svabiti na jedno mesto, kao što su nekad neki radili sa nekim... Nije važno, Ti znaš. Zato, izražavam svoju lojalnost višim vrednostima. Potrudio sam da iskažem svu svoju elokveniciju, pravilan i lagan tok misli u gornjem tekstu, raskrinkavajući znate Vi koga. To, nadam se, ima svoju vrednost i moja ocena će sigurno biti pozitivna.
Vaš Odani JA
Inside PRISM: Why the Government Hates Encryption (http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/001040.html)
Quote
Addendum (1:12 PM): Google's Larry Page and David Drummond are categorically denying (http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/what.html) that Google gives the government open-ended, back-door access to user data. This appears to confirm my speculation (for Google at least) that these firms are still tightly controlling data access by reviewing and addressing each data demand on an individual and responsible basis. And keep something in mind -- the government can use legal means to try force you to be silent about a matter, but they can't force you to lie, unless they're resorting to waterboarding and shock collars for Internet executives.
Addendum (10:05 PM): Hangout On Air video discussion of this and related topics recorded this evening (55 minutes) is now available for viewing at this link (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqEZ_bAejPs) and via the embed below.
Yesterday in The Soviet Surveillance States of America (http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/001039.html) we began connecting some of the dots associated with the new disclosures of the U.S. federal government's collection of telephone and Internet data.
Since the initial reports, we've now been informed by officials that they only actually look at the telephone connection "metadata" in the course of specific, targeted investigations, and that the Internet data slurping associated with PRISM is directed at foreign nationals in foreign countries (though Americans can be accidentally sucked into the system as well).
We're told by administration spokesmen and top members in Congress that this is all for our own good, presumably as are ubiquitous CCTV cameras, license plate readers, DNA swabbing of innocent persons, and all the other varied inputs (some of which we possibly don't know about) feeding to our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Our fearless leaders seem startled that there's such a negative reaction to these new revelations. "Calm down children, we know what's best for you!" appears to be the common refrain.
What they forget -- or more likely are conveniently ignoring -- is that we Americans are a historically rather strange breed when it comes to an innate distrust of government. Frequently these concerns go completely overboard, but when government actually does play into the hands of the conspiracy theorists it does nobody any good at all. (On the other hand, we continue to have evidence that our government is so leaky that keeping a really big secret for long is an intense challenge.)
If you really want to incur the ire of most honest Americans, treat them all like they're criminal or terrorist suspects.
Now, what's really going on with PRISM? The government admits that the program exists, but says it is being "mischaracterized" in significant ways (always a risk with secret projects sucking up information about your citizens' personal lives). The Internet firms named in the leaked documents are denying that they have provided "back doors" to the government for data access.
Who is telling the truth?
Likely both. Based on previous information and the new leaks, we can make some pretty logical guesses about the actual shape of all this.
Here's my take.
First, I believe it's reasonable to assume that significant targeted use of DPI -- Deep Packet Inspection -- is in place, most or all of it outside the control (or even perhaps knowledge) of major Internet sites (but quite possibly associated specifically with major ISPs and backbone providers).
Just as I doubt that "all phone calls are being recorded," I doubt that a mass collection of non-targeted Internet data is going on. Not only would this be technically enormously difficult when you consider traffic patterns and volumes, but would not likely be useful from an analysis standpoint compared with more careful targeting of specific communications, even with the improvements in analysis tools we are aware of (and/or can speculate exist in the shadows).
We do know for certain that the government has become very insistent on two fronts -- wanting virtually instantaneous access to specific stored and real-time user data on demand, and getting it in the clear (that is, unencrypted).
So long as most people don't bother to encrypt their email and other data the latter point is largely moot. The government is mostly concerned that someday down the line ubiquitous encryption will take hold -- that is, strong encryption by default -- that would be time consuming for the spooks to crack on an independent basis.
An intriguing outline becomes clear. The government likely doesn't have "back doors" into major Internet sites that would allow government access to those sites' user data on a "willy-nilly" basis. But it does seem reasonable to assume (especially based on the historical record associated with telephony, e.g. CALEA) that the government has pressured major Internet sites to deploy the means for rapid access to specific data requests that would be mediated by gatekeepers at those firms.
That is, NSA (or whomever) would have an expedited means to present a firm with (for example) a court order or National Security Letter. If legal counsel at the firm determines that this is a valid and sufficiently narrow demand, the mechanism would be in place to immediately provide access (perhaps one-shot, perhaps ongoing for some period) to that specific data (likely related to specific user accounts).
In other words, what we're likely talking about with PRISM isn't a "back door" for rummaging around through data in an uncontrolled manner, but rather a technical and legal protocol for the government to quickly gain access to specific data under order when the firm involved agrees that the order is valid and chooses not to challenge it.
Overall, this regime would replace much slower, largely ad hoc systems for responding to data demands, with a pipeline that can provide that data to government directly -- but the firms still control the valve on that pipe and which data is permitted to flow into it, allowing the firms to fight orders that they do not consider reasonable, focused, or otherwise valid.
This kind of scenario may help to explain the seeming contradictions of what we're now hearing about PRISM, and seems to sync well with the battles over government access to user data that we already know about, and with government demands that when they do get such access, they have some way to get the data in unencrypted form.
But even if my speculation about the relatively constrained nature of PRISM is correct, the potential for government abuse of such deployed systems is still enormous.
Such surveillance environments drastically undermine our own ability to criticize similar and worse abuses by other countries. And here at home, the "you have nothing to fear from surveillance if you have nothing to hide" argument does not play well with most honest Americans. Faith in cloud computing and storage models -- which I feel are enormously important to us all in so many ways and bring with them vast benefits to consumers -- are predicated on users trusting that their cloud data will be at least as safe from government abuses as their data would be on their own local hard drives.
The rise of ubiquitous encryption will over time likely be unstoppable, and will change the face of these issues in major ways that we cannot predict with confidence.
We can, however, predict with considerable assurance that any government and any officials -- regardless of political parties -- who insist on treating the American people as suspects, as ignorant children whose personal data should be available to government prying merely at its beck and call, are ultimately helping to destroy critical underpinnings of what has made this country great.
If we continue to permit this, the ultimate fault and blame will not be with our government or our leaders, but rather with ourselves.
--Lauren--
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqEZ_bAejPs&feature=player_embedded (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqEZ_bAejPs&feature=player_embedded)
Koliko da javnem, sad sam na CNN-u gledao u paralamentu Britanije obrazlaganje zakona kojim se uvodi nadzor nad e poštom, datotekama, fotografijama itd. pri čemu će to služiti u razne svrhe i u saradnji sa amerima pomoći između ostalog i zaštiti intelektualne svojine.Što ste piraterisali piraterisali ste.
Quote from: ALEKSIJE D. on 10-06-2013, 19:06:52
Što ste piraterisali piraterisali ste.
ma ionako se više ne prave filmovi niti muzika ko u moje vreme - ovo danas sve sranje! što je valjalo, skino sam, a ovo novo govno i ne moram baš, bolje je bez njega za živce, zdravlje i uopšte za dragoceno vreme.
nek zavrću slavine, majke im ga, pocrcali dabogda!
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fimgs.xkcd.com%2Fcomics%2Fdwarf_fortress.png&hash=1a244e358410b5fa9549741b5b7d60c2676f7527) (http://xkcd.com/1223/)
Po kom zakonu :lol: se ovo radi? Mislim, sad imas pasos pa ti ga "ukinu"?
"Snowden's U.S. passport revoked yesterday & Hong Kong authorities notified -- but may have come too late to stop Snowden leaving HK"
http://m.guardian.co.uk/global/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-leaves-hong-kong-moscow-live (http://m.guardian.co.uk/global/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-leaves-hong-kong-moscow-live)
Inace, HK pismo Americi me razgalilo jutros, moram da priznam. Posebno od 'btw' dela. :lol:
Quote from: lilit_hardy on 23-06-2013, 18:51:19
Po kom zakonu :lol: se ovo radi? Mislim, sad imas pasos pa ti ga "ukinu"?
Eh, sad se pravimo naivni. Svaka drzava ima diskreciono pravo da radi ovakve stvari, posebno ako se radi o bezbednosnim pitanjima. Mislim da sa patriotskim aktom ako nakaleme spijunazu mogu i da ga oderu ako hoce.
I njega i mene, da. Al zar su se Adams & Linkoln borili za ovakav jad? :lol:
Урнебес, мислио сам да извучем неки цитат, али нисам знао који:
http://m.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-us-politicians-react (http://m.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-us-politicians-react)
xrofl xrofl
Hm, ako Edvard bude trazio azil od Ekvadora, ovo je sve USA gejm da se rese Asanza. Mel Gipson progovara iz mene!!!
Quote from: lilit_hardy on 23-06-2013, 19:13:42
I njega i mene, da. Al zar su se Adams & Linkoln borili za ovakav jad? :lol:
Cini mi se da takvo pitanje nema previse smisla jer trenutne politicke strukture bas briga za sta su se borili prethodnici. Oni se bore za sebe i svoje gazde, do smrti ako treba :)
sad tu dizu neku paniku, a za primjerice echelon zna se vec vise od deset godina. ah.
samo neka se rusi vrate u sredozemno more. zarad malo ravnoteze.
Сноуден је већ тражио азил од Еквадора, али је и познато да се пре тога обратио Асанжовом правном тиму за помоћ. Можда они имају неке везе с Еквадором, уверавања или шта већ. Мени није чудно да исти тим сличне људе упути на исту адресу, иако бих (уколико све ово није нека зајебанција) да сам на Сноуденовом месту, пре остао у Азији (источна Русија и Кина), с увек важећом картом за Северну Кореју, него ишао у било коју државу Централне или Јужне Америке. Тај део света је увек био трусан и Империја Зла је тамо вршљала с променљивим успехом; за разлику од тога, у највећем делу Азије (изузев више арапских земаља) или постоје као окупатори (ерго, омражени су) или су попили преко пичке. Све у свему, до пада Запада, Азија је сигурније прибежиште.
А што се "Ешалона" тиче, па он је увек био у сивој зони онога што слуге Новог фашистичког поретка догматски називају "теоријом завере". Знате већ, неки од "угледних" медија нешто назове магичним речима "теорија завере" и онда "информисана интелигенција" широм света презриво одмахује рукама. Сноуден је понудио нешто конкретније од тога, али потребно је ипак знати и један детаљ како НФП заиста функционише - праве лажи су у орвеловском маниру "сакривене" наочиглед свих. То је прилично успешно одрађено у најважнијем догађају 21. века, најн-илевену, па на сличан начин функционише и ова "афера" прислушкивања целог света; то је нешто што сви знају, али се притом и ишчуђавају кад се објави. То јест, није фрка. Као бомбардовање РТС-а током агресије НАТО, најкривљи је Милановић. Јелте.
Neko reče na Tviteru:
Russia: We kill our whistleblowers to make room for yours.
xrofl
kakvi carevi ovi ekvadorci!!! xcheers
viđeni su za bombardovanje! :P
Ecuador Cancels US Trade Pact Over Repeated Threats
Offers 'Aid' to US to Train Them Not to Attack Peoples' Privacy
Faced with several days of overt threats from the Obama Administration and top senators threatening to revoke a key US-Ecuador trade pact if they dare to grant asylum to Edward Snowden, the Ecuadoran government has told the US what they can do with their frozen broccoli and fresh cut flowers, and has cancelled the pact themselves.
President Rafael Correa said that his nation would not tolerate US blackmail and that the trade pact wasn't worth the harm it would do to Ecuadoran sovereignty. With most of its neighbors getting free trade with the US, the loss of the pact may put Ecuador at an economic disadvantage.
But only really on the broccoli and the flowers. Though those are big exports to the US, they are dwarfed by Ecuador's largest export, oil. And if Ecuador's oil is no longer welcome in the US, that's one commodity they can easily sell elsewhere.
And just in case there were any doubts of what Ecuador was telling the Obama Administration, the nation's Communications Secretary, Fernando Alvarado, announced $23 million in Ecuadoran aid to the United States to provide "human rights training" to combat torture, illegal executions and "attacks on peoples' privacy."
http://news.antiwar.com/2013/06/27/ecuador-cancels-us-trade-pact-over-repeated-threats/ (http://news.antiwar.com/2013/06/27/ecuador-cancels-us-trade-pact-over-repeated-threats/)
Stara vest. Danas pricali s Bajdenom. Nista ne pratis.
Quote from: lilit_hardy on 29-06-2013, 23:53:13
Stara vest. Danas pricali s Bajdenom. Nista ne pratis.
zaostao sam otkako te nema na sagiti: nikako da čujem WHAT'S
HOT, WHAT'S
IN, WHERE IT'S
AT! :cry:
prosvetli me!!! pliiiiz!!!!
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/29/politics/nsa-leak/ (http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/29/politics/nsa-leak/)
Quote from: Ghoul on 30-06-2013, 00:14:53
Quote from: lilit_hardy on 29-06-2013, 23:53:13
Stara vest. Danas pricali s Bajdenom. Nista ne pratis.
zaostao sam otkako te nema na sagiti: nikako da čujem WHAT'S HOT, WHAT'S IN, WHERE IT'S AT! :cry:
prosvetli me!!! pliiiiz!!!!
ma nista specijalno guli, ovo sa ekvadorom je klasična sagitaška priča: kurčenje bez pokrića.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/02/ecuador-rafael-correa-snowden-mistake (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/02/ecuador-rafael-correa-snowden-mistake)
Quote from: lilit_hardy on 02-07-2013, 13:07:45
... klasična sagitaška priča: kurčenje bez pokrića.
hm.
Корисни идиот NSA или које већ агенције, прочитао шта сам му написао на Сагити и тражи азил у Русији. Каже, завршио је посао и неће више да "шкоди" Империји Зла.
Snowden wants asylum in Russia, ready to meet condition not to damage US (http://rt.com/news/snowden-meets-rights-activists-013/)
Пиштање америчких званичика увек је забавно читати, али реално гледано све што има везе са "Викиликсом" више је Вики (Миљковић) него (озбиљан) leak. Мислим да су, (можда) за разлику од јужноамеричких држава које воле да шљашти и пршти на све стране, Рује ову ујдурму испратиле са здравим "боле нас кита" ставом. Лично имам утисак да су Сноуденови мотиви искрени и не бих волео да најебе код зликоваца, али реално његова "откривања"... Прислушкујемо цео свет? Nigga (да, ти, Обмано) please. Дајте бре ликери озбиљне ствари, најн-илевн, златне резерве и Форт Нокс, такве ствари, не ово што знају и врапци на грани.
Quote"No actions I take or plan are meant to harm the US... I want the US to succeed,"
Дај бре, каква је ово изјава за азил у РУСИЈИ???? :x :x :x
Много више ми се свиђао онај прошли хладни рат, сад се сви нешто праве фини. Прц.
Па није да је тај несрећни Сноуден открио нешто што нисмо знали и пре њега.
Ако желиш озбиљне олдскул хладноратовске приче тајни и мистерија, ево једне - прогуглај о томе како Русија, тренутно с најпоузданијим ракетама, никако не успева да подигне последње сателите потребне за активирање њене мреже која би била алтернатива GPS-у.
Сноуден, Асанж и ти неки мутни ликови око њих су чисти пајаци. Можда чистог срца, али пајаци.
Quote from: Джон Рейнольдс on 15-07-2013, 14:04:37
Па није да је тај несрећни Сноуден открио нешто што нисмо знали и пре њега.
Ако желиш озбиљне олдскул хладноратовске приче тајни и мистерија, ево једне - прогуглај о томе како Русија, тренутно с најпоузданијим ракетама, никако не успева да подигне последње сателите потребне за активирање њене мреже која би била алтернатива GPS-у.
Сноуден, Асанж и ти неки мутни ликови око њих су чисти пајаци. Можда чистог срца, али пајаци.
zar nije GLONASS već aktivan?
Видиш, да... Промакло ми је да је у априлу ове године подигнут један сателит па је постигнута светска покривеност с минималних 24 комада и без ових сателита који су пали с ракетом.
Note to self: Кад хоћеш да изазиваш ауру параноје око ствари које не пратиш баш детаљно, ипак прво - провери. :lol:
http://youtu.be/GDFIVVmXE-g (http://youtu.be/GDFIVVmXE-g)
:-D
NSA Director Defends Surveillance Activities During Tense Black Hat Keynote (https://threatpost.com/nsa-director-defends-surveillance-activities-during-tense-black-hat-keynote/101541)
Quote
LAS VEGAS –NSA director Gen. Keith Alexander's keynote today at Black Hat USA 2013 was a tense confessional, an hour-long emotional and sometimes angry ride that shed some new insight into the spy agency's two notorious data collection programs, inspired moments of loud applause in support of the NSA, and likewise, profane heckling that called into question the legality and morality of the agency's practices.
Loud voices from the overflowing crowd called out Alexander on his claims that the NSA stands for freedom while at the same time collecting, storing and analyzing telephone business records, metadata and Internet records on Americans. He also denied lying to Congress about the NSA's capabilities and activities in the name of protecting Americans from terrorism in response to such a claim from a member of the audience.
For the first 40 minutes of his talk, Alexander made the case for the agency's authority under Section 215 of the Patriot Act (https://threatpost.com/congress-warns-section-215-may-not-be-renewed/101385) and 702 of the FISA Act (https://threatpost.com/google-microsoft-seek-help-in-lifting-fisa-gag-order/101247), backing that up with specific examples of terrorist plots such as the New York City subway bombings that were disrupted because of intelligence gathered in the two programs. He also talked about the training agents must pass before having access to the databases housing the collected data, as well as the auditing and compliance associated with those requests.
"The tools and things we use are very much the same tools you use in securing networks. The difference is the oversight and compliance that we have in these programs. That part is missing in much of the discussion," Alexander said. "I believe it's important for you to hear that, for you to understand what these people have to do to do their job to defend the nation and the oversight regime we have with the courts, Congress and the administration. You need to understand that to get a full understanding of what we do and do not do."
All of this happened under the backdrop of new revelations from whistleblower Edward Snowden. The Guardian UK disclosed today (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data), some three hours before Alexander took the stage, new details about another of the spy agency's top secret data collection programs, this one called XKeyscore. The details, provided to the newspaper by Snowden, indicate that analysts have access to databases housing the online activities of millions, including browsing history, email messages and online chats.
U.S. intelligence leaders today also testified before a Senate Judiciary Committee and released previously classified documents on data collection activities.
The Snowden documents, the Guardian report says, back up a claim made by the former Booz Allen contractor that he as an analyst could "wiretap" any individual. Snowden, who reportedly remains in the Moscow airport awaiting asylum somewhere, shared training materials for XKeyscore with the Guardian. The documents instruct analysts how to mine intelligence databases for information on anyone in the U.S. The Guardian report says analysts need only to fill out a short on-screen form requesting the search; the form is not looked at nor approved by a court or NSA officials.
Alexander, meanwhile, said the two programs were birthed in 2007 largely because of the failures of intelligence agencies to connect the dots on information prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks. He reiterated that Internet companies share data only when compelled to do so by a court order. Alexander then shared a screenshot of the business records the NSA has access to through Section 215; the interface showed the date and time a record was collected, the from and to address of the call, length of the call, source and origin of metadata record. He said the NSA does not collect content such as voice or text message, nor does it gather subscriber names, addresses or locational information. If there is a suspicion of a terrorist connection, Alexander said the business record is passed on to the FBI, which then will investigate deeper.
As for PRISM (https://threatpost.com/faq-the-nsa-metadata-and-prism-programs/101144), or Section 702 of the FISA Court, Alexander said this is the United States' lawful intercept program, under which service providers can be compelled via a court order to hand over data to the intelligence agency. Alexander said agents are not authorized to listen to communications and that a Senate Select Committee review of the program found no "willful or knowledgeable violations of the law under this program," he said, adding that the agency's auditing tools would detect unauthorized access to records and the agent would be held accountable.
"There are allegations [the NSA] listen to all our emails; that's wrong. We don't," Alexander said, adding that of 54 different terrorist-related activities identified through PRISM, 42 of which were disrupted, including 13 in the U.S., and 25 in Europe. "And if we did, we would be held accountable. There is 100 percent auditability on what we do."
Alexander then answered questions from Black Hat general manager Trey Ford, which the conference solicited from its advisory board and select people in the security community. The questions, Ford said, were evaluated and ranked, though Alexander had no knowledge of them, according to Ford. During the Q&A, Alexander said the Snowden leaks had done significant and irreversible damage to the U.S.
"We're talking about future terror attacks and the success we've had the last 10 years. What will we have in the next 10? What if the 42 of 54 were executed, what would that have meant to our civil liberties and privacy?" Alexander said; a response that was met with loud applause.
Gledala sam snimak pre dva dana. Taj Alexander je FULL MORON. Al najveci šok mi je što i hakeri nisu rebels ko nekad! Svet je puko! :lol:
Ne bih previse verovao Kuriru, al vidi da su samo preneli vest.
QuoteAgenti su prema njenim rečima pretražili kuću a onda i upitali njenog muža da li poseduje neku bombu, da li ima ekspres-lonac,
i dali je na Internetu nekad tražio da vidi kako se pravi bomba od eskpres lonca.
Dodala je da su agenti rekli njnom suprugu da imaju oko 100 ovakvih intervencija u sedmici
i da se za njih 99 ispostavi da se ništa ne događa.
Kurir - VELIKI BRAT: Zbog ekspres lonca FBI joj upao u kuću! (http://www.kurir-info.rs/veliki-brat-zbog-ekspres-lonca-fbi-joj-upao-u-kucu-clanak-921379)
Quote from: lilit_hardy on 02-08-2013, 17:54:25
Gledala sam snimak pre dva dana. Taj Alexander je FULL MORON. Al najveci šok mi je što i hakeri nisu rebels ko nekad! Svet je puko! :lol:
a ti to znas procijeniti? mozes gledati snimak ili mu gledati u supak i ostat ces isto tulava. sef nsa ti je ful moron? bas si uhvatila boga za jaja dokopavsi se beca.
a i rebel si u 3 pm da sudis drugima. pih.
slobodno mi proturijeci. bit cu milosrdan. imam srca za srbsku megalomaniju, fobije, sta god.
I, naravno:
PRISM revelations result in lost business for US cloud companies (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/prism-revelations-result-in-lost-business-for-us-cloud-companies/)
Quote from: leUsam on 03-08-2013, 06:31:52
slobodno mi proturijeci. bit cu milosrdan. imam srca za srbsku megalomaniju, fobije, sta god.
Sta li ti kenjas, poltronu proamerski, pa samo idiot moze da misli da nesto zavisi od kolorisanog Obame, i da demokratija funkcionise u sluzbi tog demosa, koji j enavodno izabrao sve svoje lidere.
Pa svi direktori svih tih tamo amerskih direkcija samo izvrsavaju necije naredbe, i to onih koji ih postavljaju i smenjuju u zavisnosti je li popularno imati ovako ili onako kolorisane i profilisane "lidere".
Zabole ih da ti znas za njih ili cik da ih ne poslusas!
A ako ces konkretno, ta koju prozivas je u Bec otisla sa svojim znanjem i sa njim tamo radi u nauci, a ne sa partijskim slizavanjima kao sto je svaki koji je u politici.
P.S.
Putin je utero cajper celoj Ameriki, ha ha, mora da ti je zao mnogo, pokazi saosecanje pa se idi nabodi na jedan klip kukuruza onako cisto da ne buljis vise u americke supke...
Svi isti. Odmaglite iz svoje "zemlje" u moju i krenete mi sve objasnjavati. Toliko ste pametni da to svijet vidio nije. Trebalo bi vas nekako zastititi. Ti si milo zbrisalo rebelirati na gotovo u?
Pa ti si doso ovdje iz svoje lijepe tvoje, niko te nije zvao da kenjas.
Ali ti si u EU i sad si pametniji, jelte? Sad ste zavrsili poso, nista vise ne morate , eto najpametniji ste i sad imate raj na zemlji, nista vam vise ne fali? Samo ti falim ja da ti objasnjavam?
Eto, samo da znas ja molim Boga da Srbija nikad ne udje u EU samo zato sto ste vi tamo!
Tema su bahati Srbi koji nisu u stanju urediti zemlju velicine postanske marke, kukavni, povrsni, nekulturni.
Quote from: Ugly MF on 10-08-2013, 13:51:19
... ja molim Boga da Srbija nikad ne udje u EU samo zato sto ste vi tamo!
odlicno, nadam se da te presveti alah cuje. za nekoliko godina srbi bi unistili sve za sto smo se genaracijama borili, u dva svjetska rata, nekoliko regionalnih, revolucijama, strajkovima, pa gradili i izgradjivali kroz krv i suze! ovako bar stizete na kapaljku pa je jos donekle podnosljivo.
Pa naravno, Ratovali za papu, Islamske terroriste da ih gajite po Kosovu, i sve ste to izgradili prolivajuci krv, ali Srpsku, jer jedino je Srbija ovde ona koja i dalje pokaze srednji prst kad pokusate da joj uvalite dil vid d devil.
Gej parada? xfuck5
ratovali za slobodu! borili se za najosnovnija ljudska prava! za radnika! za sve sto mrzite i sto vam smeta!
povraca mi se od tebe!!!
Koju bre slobodu, manijace?
Povracaj po svome Josipu Brozu, jebo te on sto vas sastavi s nama!
Sto tad niste kuknuli , 45te kad je sve zavrseno, nego ste ko poslednje picke cutali pred zapadnim masonima kao i sada!
I sto taj vas Hrvat nije zivio u Zagrebu, nego doso u Srpske dvore u Beograd?
Seljacino jedna neotesana, posto je ovo topik za sakupljanje podataka, cudi me da ove opste poznate ignororas!
ah tito je znao kako sa srbima, tito, tudjman, kralj aleksandar, hitler...
Quote from: leUsam on 10-08-2013, 17:34:12
ah tito je znao kako sa srbima, tito, tudjman, kralj aleksandar, hitler...
..i ti si svestan sta si sad napiso?
ne manipuliraj cinjenicama! ovo su veliki ljudi!
Quote from: leUsam on 10-08-2013, 17:42:32
ne manipuliraj cinjenicama! ovo su veliki ljudi!
Moram ovo da quotiram da slucajno nekad ne izbrises... xfuck5
istina se ne moze izbrisati ma koliko se ti trudio!
Quote from: Ugly MF on 10-08-2013, 16:58:59
Gej parada? xfuck5
zivjeli slobodni pederi!!!
evo ti, sad pati! ne mozes nista! nemas argumente protiv gejeva!
'VOLIMO SE I ŽELIMO DA SE NAŠA LJUBAV OKONČA BRAKOM' Josip i Luka, gay par o životnom partnerstvu (http://www.jutarnji.hr/-volimo-se-i-zelimo-da-se-nasa-ljubav-okonca-brakom-/1117952/)
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fs7.directupload.net%2Fimages%2F130810%2Fxrbqarmk.jpg&hash=f32655ac3c4f53f29baf3c1685b73c65ce7ad621)
Quote from: leUsam on 10-08-2013, 18:08:15
Quote from: Ugly MF on 10-08-2013, 16:58:59
Gej parada? xfuck5
zivjeli slobodni pederi!!!
evo ti, sad pati! ne mozes nista! nemas argumente protiv gejeva!
U Hrvatskoj, sto se mene tice, eto nek svaki muskarac bude Gej!
Ja uopste nisam homofob ili kako vec nazivate normalne ljude,
ja samo kazem da toga ovde nece nikad biti!
Jesam li ti vec rekao da mi se povraca od tebe?!
Quote from: leUsam on 10-08-2013, 18:32:10
Jesam li ti vec rekao da mi se povraca od tebe?!
.. si pozelenio ?...treba ti exorcist, da istera zlo iz tebe, da ti utera dobro...
hm, ne razumijem zasto uporno zelis diskusiju sa mnom. mislis da sam neko ludo, blesavo svorenje? jesi li kad sreo bice izuzetne inteligencije, genijalnog razmisljanja, duha neogranicenih sposobnosti i neoborive logike?
sposobno da ucini sve jednim dodirom tvojih misli, ako udjes u dijalog, pa i natjerati te da se zaljubis u ruznog mehu!
nista nisi naucio u toj poganoj crkvi...
Diskusiju? Ma joook, ja to onako, usput...
Ja kad udjem u diskusiju, ocekujem da izadjem iz nje za mrvu pametniji, da nesto naucim..
u tvom slucaju, bas.... :(
da, ja bih ti sprzio mozak. kojem zlatnom teletu se klanjas ako nije tajna?
Sta li seres, dal' cujes sebe... :roll:
skratimo, dosadan si, naporan. tek kad mi odgovoris na sva pitanja dobit ces mehu. prije mi se ne obracaj.
Žena na Novom Zelandu se spori sa svojim poslodavcem oko toga je li legitimno dobila bolovanje ili ne. Poslodavac je otpustio tvrdeći da je uzela nelegitimno bolovanje. Ona putem suda tražila da je vrate na posao. Poslodavac tražio da vidi njene privatne fejsbuk informacije da bi odlučio. Ona odbila. Sud, pak, insistirao da ona poslodavcu pokaže ne samo fejsbuk podatke već i informacije o prometu na njenom bankovnom računu. How much is too much što bi rekao Kevin Martin?
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9027510/Facebook-used-in-worker-dismissal (http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9027510/Facebook-used-in-worker-dismissal)
QuoteA flight attendant was forced to let her bosses examine her Facebook pages and bank accounts in a stoush over what she was up to on sick leave.
The employment court move signals a future where bosses will increasingly demand access to what most workers regard as private details, says employment lawyer Andrew Scott-Howman. He said the development could be seen as creepy and intrusive.
Gina Kensington was sacked by Air New Zealand earlier this year following a dispute over sick leave she took to care for her sister.
She said she did not misuse sick leave, and went to the Employment Relations Authority (ERA) seeking reinstatement.
Air New Zealand responded by demanding to see her Facebook and bank details.
Kensington refused, saying it did not have that information when it dismissed her and that "it is well accepted in New Zealand there are general and legal privacy expectations about people's personal and financial information". But the ERA ordered she must hand over details for March 8 and 9 this year - saying they would provide "substantially helpful" evidence.
"The explanation for taking sick leave must be tested for veracity," said ERA member Tania Tetitaha.
Facebook information had been used previously to sack people, but adding bank account data went a step further, Scott-Howman said.
He warned there would be a backlash from workers.
"I don't really know that society has seen this sort of thing previously. But at a time when we think we are behaving privately, or at least within a restricted circle of friends, we are actually effectively on trial."
He said courts always wanted to get "the best evidence".
"And the courts see Facebook as a wonderful asset because all of a sudden not only do we have the potential for pictures and so forth but . . . we can see what time statements were made and pictures were taken."
He said globally, and in New Zealand in relation to the GCSB law changes, people were fighting back against such intrusion.
"Because while this is best evidence . . . doesn't it creep you out a bit? It feels intrusive and just, frankly, wrong."
He said it was a form of spying on staff.
"Sometimes it is actually OK to spy, if you are on my time and you are doing something bad - but the question is where you draw the line."
Scott-Howman said Parliament would be forced to pass laws to stop bosses and the ERA going too far. He said the ERA could simply demand evidence be produced.
The most high-profile Facebook sacking case involves Gisborne man Bruce Taiapa, who applied for a week's unpaid leave in March 2011 to attend a waka ama championship.
He was granted three days, but then took the rest of the week as sick leave, claiming he had an injured leg. He lost his job after his boss saw photos of him on Facebook, taken at the waka ama championships.
The ERA upheld his sacking.
Air New Zealand and Kensington's lawyers declined to comment on her case while it was still before the courts.
A hearing was held last Monday, but the findings are yet to be released.
- © Fairfax NZ News
што би се рекло: shut up slave!
Naš narod bi na ovo rekao: kadija te tuži, kadija ti sudi:
Obama's "reform" panel to be led by Clapper, who denied spying to Congress (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/obamas-reform-panel-to-be-led-by-clapper-who-denied-spying-to-congress/)
Quote
President Obama held a news conference (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/at-press-conference-obama-denounces-snowden-and-promises-reforms/) on Friday at which he promised reform—but groups who wanted to see real reform in the surveillance area were understandably skeptical (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/obama-promises-reform-nsa-spying-devil-will-be-details).
Obama made promises that he would "work with Congress" to produce better oversight, but he treated the recent leaks about NSA spying as more of a PR problem than anything else. The leaks had been revealed "in the most sensationalized manner," he stressed. But Obama maintained that the programs were not being abused. Notably, the president didn't suggest he would reduce the amount of surveillance taking place in any way.
But the "high level group of outside experts" that Obama promised to convene is unlikely to change any hearts and minds, unless its composition changes. Today it was announced the "outside" committee would report to James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence—one of the officials most scorned by reformers.
It was Clapper who dissembled in front of a Congressional committee when he was questioned directly by NSA critic Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) back in 2011. Wyden asked if "any kind of data at all" was being collected on millions of Americans. "No sir," said (http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130610/09473723393/clapper-my-answer-to-wydens-beating-your-wife-question-data-surveillance-was-least-untruthful-answer.shtml) Clapper at the time.
Now, with at least some of the facts about widespread surveillance making headlines, Clapper maintains (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/misinformation-on-classified-nsa-programs-includes-statements-by-senior-us-officials/2013/06/30/7b5103a2-e028-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_print.html) he thought Wyden was just talking about e-mail and that "mistakes will happen." Wyden's question, of course, was about "any data at all"—which is not only the phrase Wyden used, but the question that was sent to Clapper the day before.
Clapper is even one of four officials named (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/aclu-sues-four-top-obama-administration-officials-over-verizon-metadata-sharing/) in a new ACLU lawsuit claiming the spying program is unconstitutional.
The review group's job, according to a White House letter published (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/12/presidential-memorandum-reviewing-our-global-signals-intelligence-collec) today, is to assess whether the US "employs its technical collection capabilities in a manner that optimally protects our national security and advances our foreign policy while appropriately accounting for other policy considerations, such as the risk of unauthorized disclosure and our need to maintain the public trust."
As Techdirt points out (http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130812/13512624147/president-asks-confessed-liar-to-congerss-james-clapper-to-set-up-independent-review-committee-over-nsa-surveillance.shtml), the group is actually set up to report to Clapper and not directly to the president or Congress. If the president's goal is to make any critics believe he's serious about this reform effort, Clapper is not the right person to put in a command position.
Čisto da ne bude nejasnoća, Clapper je lagao kongres u vezi špijuniranja američkih građana, pod zakletvom, kasnije priznao da je lagao i izvinio (http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/07/02/james-clapper-apologizes-for-lying-to-congress-about-nsa-surveillance-clearly-erroneous/) se i nikada nije čak ni optužen za ikakav prekršaj.
Vec su demantovali da ce Clapper biti ukljucen.
Pa, da, kad ja postujem tri dana stare vesti koje sam pokupio iz slešdotovog njuzletera...
Jbg, ja se RT feedujem: #snowden #manningtrial, etc. Citaj: gubim vreme naveliko!
Lep: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/12/george-orwell-s-letter-on-why-he-wrote-1984.html (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/12/george-orwell-s-letter-on-why-he-wrote-1984.html)
E, do mojega. U opštem zatvaranju servisa koji vele da ne mogu da rade ako će NSA da im dahće za vratom, zatvara se i esencijalni vebsajt Groklaw...
Za neupućene, ovo je sajt koji je mnogo učinio da i mi koji pojma nemamo o pravnim naukama donekle razumemo intrigantne detalje vezane za brojne sudske afere vezane za intelektualno vlasništvo, patente, kopirajt itd. Užasan bedak.
http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20130818120421175 (http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20130818120421175)
Quote
| Forced Exposure ~pj |
| (https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.groklaw.net%2Fimages%2Fspeck.gif&hash=d6bd73e30296128b63b5525e60931f27487a6540) |
| Tuesday, August 20 2013 @ 02:40 AM EDT |
The owner of Lavabit tells us that he's stopped using email and if we knew what he knew, we'd stop too. There is no way to do Groklaw without email. Therein lies the conundrum.
What to do?
What to do? I've spent the last couple of weeks trying to figure it out. And the conclusion I've reached is that there is no way to continue doing Groklaw, not long term, which is incredibly sad. But it's good to be realistic. And the simple truth is, no matter how good the motives might be for collecting and screening everything we say to one another, and no matter how "clean" we all are ourselves from the standpoint of the screeners, I don't know how to function in such an atmosphere. I don't know how to do Groklaw like this.
Years ago, when I was first on my own, I arrived in New York City, and being naive about the ways of evil doers in big cities, I rented a cheap apartment on the top floor of a six-floor walkup, in the back of the building. That of course, as all seasoned New Yorkers could have told me, meant that a burglar could climb the fire escape or get to the roof by going to the top floor via the stairs inside and then through the door to the roof and climb down to the open window of my apartment.
That is exactly what happened. I wasn't there when it happened, so I wasn't hurt in any way physically. And I didn't then own much of any worth, so only a few things were taken. But everything had been pawed through and thrown about. I can't tell how deeply disturbing it is to know that someone, some stranger, has gone through and touched all your underwear, looked at all your photographs of your family, and taken some small piece of jewelry that's been in your family for generations.
If it's ever happened to you, you know I couldn't live there any more, not one night more. It turned out, by the way, according to my neighbors, that it was almost certainly the janitor's son, which stunned me at the time but didn't seem to surprise any of my more-seasoned neighbors. The police just told me not to expect to get anything back. I felt assaulted. The underwear was perfectly normal underwear. Nothing kinky or shameful, but it was the idea of them being touched by someone I didn't know or want touching them. I threw them away, unused ever again.
I feel like that now, knowing that persons I don't know can paw through all my thoughts and hopes and plans in my emails with you.
They tell us that if you send or receive an email from outside the US, it will be read. If it's encrypted, they keep it for five years, presumably in the hopes of tech advancing to be able to decrypt it against your will and without your knowledge. Groklaw has readers all over the world.
I'm not a political person, by choice, and I must say, researching the latest developments convinced me of one thing -- I am right to avoid it. There is a scripture that says, It doesn't belong to man even to direct his step. And it's true. I see now clearly that it's true. Humans are just human, and we don't know what to do in our own lives half the time, let alone how to govern other humans successfully. And it shows. What form of government hasn't been tried? None of them satisfy everyone. So I think we did that experiment. I don't expect great improvement.
I remember 9/11 vividly. I had a family member who was supposed to be in the World Trade Center that morning, and when I watched on live television the buildings go down with living beings inside, I didn't know that she had been late that day and so was safe. Does it matter, though, if you knew anyone specifically, as we watched fellow human beings hold hands and jump out of windows of skyscrapers to a certain death below or watched the buildings crumble into dust, knowing there were so many people just like us being turned into dust as well?
I cried for weeks, in a way I've never cried before, or since, and I'll go to my grave remembering it and feeling it. And part of my anguish was that there were people in the world willing to do that to other people, fellow human beings, people they didn't even know, civilians uninvolved in any war.
I sound quaint, I suppose. But I always tell you the truth, and that is what I was feeling. So imagine how I feel now, imagining as I must what kind of world we are living in if the governments of the world think total surveillance is an appropriate thing?
I know. It may not even be about that. But what if it is? Do we even know? I don't know. What I do know is it's not possible to be fully human if you are being surveilled 24/7.
Harvard's Berkman Center had an online class (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/privacy/index.html) on cybersecurity and internet privacy some years ago, and the resources of the class are still online (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/privacy/module4.html). It was about how to enhance privacy in an online world, speaking of quaint, with titles of articles like, "Is Big Brother Listening?"
And how.
You'll find all the laws in the US related to privacy and surveillance there. Not that anyone seems to follow any laws that get in their way these days. Or if they find they need a law to make conduct lawful, they just write a new law or reinterpret an old one and keep on going. That's not the rule of law as I understood the term.
Anyway, one resource was excerpts from a book (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/privacy99/lesson1/malamud/mal_index.html) by Janna Malamud Smith,"Private Matters: In Defense of the Personal Life", and I encourage you to read it. I encourage the President and the NSA to read it too. I know. They aren't listening to me. Not that way, anyhow. But it's important, because the point of the book is that privacy is vital to being human, which is why one of the worst punishments there is is total surveillance: One way of beginning to understand privacy is by looking at what happens to people in extreme situations where it is absent. Recalling his time in Auschwitz, Primo Levi observed that "solitude in a Camp is more precious and rare than bread." Solitude is one state of privacy, and even amidst the overwhelming death, starvation, and horror of the camps, Levi knew he missed it.... Levi spent much of his life finding words for his camp experience. How, he wonders aloud in Survival in Auschwitz, do you describe "the demolition of a man," an offense for which "our language lacks words."... One function of privacy is to provide a safe space away from terror or other assaultive experiences. When you remove a person's ability to sequester herself, or intimate information about herself, you make her extremely vulnerable....
The totalitarian state watches everyone, but keeps its own plans secret. Privacy is seen as dangerous because it enhances resistance. Constantly spying and then confronting people with what are often petty transgressions is a way of maintaining social control and unnerving and disempowering opposition....
And even when one shakes real pursuers, it is often hard to rid oneself of the feeling of being watched -- which is why surveillance is an extremely powerful way to control people. The mind's tendency to still feel observed when alone... can be inhibiting. ... Feeling watched, but not knowing for sure, nor knowing if, when, or how the hostile surveyor may strike, people often become fearful, constricted, and distracted. I've quoted (http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20070507094824404) from that book before, back when the CNET reporters' emails were read by HP. We thought that was awful. And it was. HP ended up giving them money to try to make it up to them. Little did we know. Ms. Smith continues:Safe privacy is an important component of autonomy, freedom, and thus psychological well-being, in any society that values individuals. ... Summed up briefly, a statement of "how not to dehumanize people" might read: Don't terrorize or humiliate. Don't starve, freeze, exhaust. Don't demean or impose degrading submission. Don't force separation from loved ones. Don't make demands in an incomprehensible language. Don't refuse to listen closely. Don't destroy privacy. Terrorists of all sorts destroy privacy both by corrupting it into secrecy and by using hostile surveillance to undo its useful sanctuary. But if we describe a standard for treating people humanely, why does stripping privacy violate it? And what is privacy? In his landmark book, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin names four states of privacy: solitude, anonymity, reserve, and intimacy. The reasons for valuing privacy become more apparent as we explore these states....
The essence of solitude, and all privacy, is a sense of choice and control. You control who watches or learns about you. You choose to leave and return. ...
Intimacy is a private state because in it people relax their public front either physically or emotionally or, occasionally, both. They tell personal stories, exchange looks, or touch privately. They may ignore each other without offending. They may have sex. They may speak frankly using words they would not use in front of others, expressing ideas and feelings -- positive or negative -- that are unacceptable in public. (I don't think I ever got over his death. She seems unable to stop lying to her mother. He looks flabby in those running shorts. I feel horny. In spite of everything, I still long to see them. I am so angry at you I could scream. That joke is disgusting, but it's really funny.) Shielded from forced exposure, a person often feels more able to expose himself. I hope that makes it clear why I can't continue. There is now no shield from forced exposure. Nothing in that parenthetical thought list is terrorism-related, but no one can feel protected enough from forced exposure any more to say anything the least bit like that to anyone in an email, particularly from the US out or to the US in, but really anywhere. You don't expect a stranger to read your private communications to a friend. And once you know they can, what is there to say? Constricted and distracted. That's it exactly. That's how I feel. So. There we are. The foundation of Groklaw is over. I can't do Groklaw without your input. I was never exaggerating about that when we won awards. It really was a collaborative effort, and there is now no private way, evidently, to collaborate.
I'm really sorry that it's so. I loved doing Groklaw, and I believe we really made a significant contribution. But even that turns out to be less than we thought, or less than I hoped for, anyway. My hope was always to show you that there is beauty and safety in the rule of law, that civilization actually depends on it. How quaint.
If you have to stay on the Internet, my research indicates that the short term safety from surveillance, to the degree that is even possible, is to use a service like Kolab for email, which is located in Switzerland, and hence is under different laws than the US, laws which attempt to afford more privacy to citizens. I have now gotten for myself an email there, p.jones at mykolab.com in case anyone wishes to contact me over something really important and feels squeamish about writing to an email address on a server in the US. But both emails still work. It's your choice.
My personal decision is to get off of the Internet to the degree it's possible. I'm just an ordinary person. But I really know, after all my research and some serious thinking things through, that I can't stay online personally without losing my humanness, now that I know that ensuring privacy online is impossible. I find myself unable to write. I've always been a private person. That's why I never wanted to be a celebrity and why I fought hard to maintain both my privacy and yours.
Oddly, if everyone did that, leap off the Internet, the world's economy would collapse, I suppose. I can't really hope for that. But for me, the Internet is over.
So this is the last Groklaw article. I won't turn on comments. Thank you for all you've done. I will never forget you and our work together. I hope you'll remember me too. I'm sorry I can't overcome these feelings, but I yam what I yam, and I tried, but I can't. |
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I čisto da se ne zaboravi, evo kolumne urednika Guardiana a povodom toga kako su agenti britanske specijalne, jelte službe, teatralno došli i komisijski im uništili svu opremu na kojoj su čuvani podaci vezani za Snowdenova otkrića.
Zanimljivo je da Amerikanci i Britanci tako često dele drugima lekcije o neprikosnovenoj slobodi medija - bez obzira da li je u pitanju državni stok u srpskim medijskim kućama ili Čavezov nalog da se TV stanici koja je javno pozivala na atentat na njega ne obnovi licenca - a onda posegnu za macolom... Sramota do neba.
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/19/david-miranda-schedule7-danger-reporters (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/19/david-miranda-schedule7-danger-reporters)
QuoteIn a private viewing cinema in Soho last week I caught myself letting fly with a four-letter expletive at Bill Keller, the former executive editor of the New York Times. It was a confusing moment. The man who was pretending to be me – thanking Keller for "not giving a shit" – used to be Malcolm Tucker, a foul-mouthed Scottish spin doctor who will soon be a 1,000-year-old time lord (http://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2013/aug/04/peter-capaldi-doctor-who). And Keller will correct me, but I don't remember ever swearing at him. I do remember saying something to the effect of "we have the thumb drive, you have the first amendment".
The fictional moment occurs at the beginning of the DreamWorks film about WikiLeaks, The Fifth Estate (http://www.theguardian.com/film/movie/151168/fifth-estate), due for release next month. Peter Capaldi is, I can report, a very plausible Guardian editor.
This real-life exchange with Keller happened just after we took possession of the first tranche of WikiLeaks documents in 2010 (http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/dec/07/wikileaks-under-attack-definitive-timeline). I strongly suspected that our ability to research and publish anything to do with this trove of secret material would be severely constrained in the UK. America, for all its own problems with media laws and whistleblowers, at least has press freedom enshrined in a written constitution. It is also, I hope, unthinkable that any US government would attempt prior restraint against a news organisation planning to publish material that informed an important public debate, however troublesome or embarrassing.
On Sunday morning David Miranda, the partner of Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald, was detained as he was passing through Heathrow airport on his way back to Rio de Janeiro (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/18/david-miranda-detained-uk-nsa), where the couple live. Greenwald is the reporter who has broken most of the stories about state surveillance based on the leaks from the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/29/speech-nsa-snowden-journalism). Greenwald's work has undoubtedly been troublesome and embarrassing for western governments. But, as the debate in America and Europe has shown, there is considerable public interest in what his stories have revealed about the right balance between security, civil liberties, freedom of speech and privacy. He has raised acutely disturbing questions about the oversight of intelligence; about the use of closed courts; about the cosy and secret relationship between government and vast corporations; and about the extent to which millions of citizens now routinely have their communications intercepted, collected, analysed and stored.
In this work he is regularly helped by David Miranda. Miranda is not a journalist, but he still plays a valuable role in helping his partner do his journalistic work. Greenwald has his plate full reading and analysing the Snowden material, writing, and handling media and social media requests from around the world. He can certainly use this back-up. That work is immensely complicated by the certainty that it would be highly unadvisable for Greenwald (or any other journalist) to regard any electronic means of communication as safe. The Guardian's work on the Snowden story has involved many individuals taking a huge number of flights in order to have face-to-face meetings. Not good for the environment, but increasingly the only way to operate. Soon we will be back to pen and paper.
Miranda was held for nine hours under schedule 7 of the UK's terror laws (http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/aug/19/david-miranda-detention-schedule-7-terrorism-act), which give enormous discretion to stop, search and question people who have no connection with "terror", as ordinarily understood. Suspects have no right to legal representation and may have their property confiscated for up to seven days. Under this measure – uniquely crafted for ports and airport transit areas – there are none of the checks and balances that apply once someone is in Britain proper. There is no need to arrest or charge anyone and there is no protection for journalists or their material. A transit lounge in Heathrow is a dangerous place to be.
Miranda's professional status – much hand-wringing about whether or not he's a proper "journalist" – is largely irrelevant in these circumstances. Increasingly, the question about who deserves protection should be less "is this a journalist?" than "is the publication of this material in the public interest?"
The detention of Miranda has rightly caused international dismay because it feeds into a perception that the US and UK governments – while claiming to welcome the debate around state surveillance started by Snowden – are also intent on stemming the tide of leaks and on pursuing the whistleblower with a vengeance. That perception is right. Here follows a little background on the considerable obstacles being placed in the way of informing the public about what the intelligence agencies, governments and corporations are up to.
A little over two months ago I was contacted by a very senior government official claiming to represent the views of the prime minister. There followed two meetings in which he demanded the return or destruction of all the material we were working on. The tone was steely, if cordial, but there was an implicit threat that others within government and Whitehall favoured a far more draconian approach.
The mood toughened just over a month ago, when I received a phone call from the centre of government telling me: "You've had your fun. Now we want the stuff back." There followed further meetings with shadowy Whitehall figures. The demand was the same: hand the Snowden material back or destroy it. I explained that we could not research and report on this subject if we complied with this request. The man from Whitehall looked mystified. "You've had your debate. There's no need to write any more."
During one of these meetings I asked directly whether the government would move to close down the Guardian's reporting through a legal route – by going to court to force the surrender of the material on which we were working. The official confirmed that, in the absence of handover or destruction, this was indeed the government's intention. Prior restraint, near impossible in the US, was now explicitly and imminently on the table in the UK. But my experience over WikiLeaks – the thumb drive and the first amendment – had already prepared me for this moment. I explained to the man from Whitehall about the nature of international collaborations and the way in which, these days, media organisations could take advantage of the most permissive legal environments. Bluntly, we did not have to do our reporting from London. Already most of the NSA stories were being reported and edited out of New York. And had it occurred to him that Greenwald lived in Brazil?
The man was unmoved. And so one of the more bizarre moments in the Guardian's long history occurred – with two GCHQ security experts overseeing the destruction of hard drives in the Guardian's basement just to make sure there was nothing in the mangled bits of metal which could possibly be of any interest to passing Chinese agents. "We can call off the black helicopters," joked one as we swept up the remains of a MacBook Pro.
Whitehall was satisfied, but it felt like a peculiarly pointless piece of symbolism that understood nothing about the digital age. We will continue to do patient, painstaking reporting on the Snowden documents, we just won't do it in London. The seizure of Miranda's laptop, phones, hard drives and camera will similarly have no effect on Greenwald's work.
The state that is building such a formidable apparatus of surveillance will do its best to prevent journalists from reporting on it. Most journalists can see that. But I wonder how many have truly understood the absolute threat to journalism implicit in the idea of total surveillance, when or if it comes – and, increasingly, it looks like "when".
We are not there yet, but it may not be long before it will be impossible for journalists to have confidential sources. Most reporting – indeed, most human life in 2013 – leaves too much of a digital fingerprint. Those colleagues who denigrate Snowden or say reporters should trust the state to know best (many of them in the UK, oddly, on the right) may one day have a cruel awakening. One day it will be their reporting, their cause, under attack. But at least reporters now know to stay away from Heathrow transit lounges.
Sreća pa ima i ljudi koji su u stanju da mi ulepšaju jutro: http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/3792770 (http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/3792770)
Borat-lajk al ima nekog sarma: http://boingboing.net/2013/09/01/hello-nsa-i-have-lost-an-e.html (http://boingboing.net/2013/09/01/hello-nsa-i-have-lost-an-e.html)
Rojters javlja:
U.S. spied on presidents of Brazil, Mexico: report (http://news.yahoo.com/u-spied-presidents-brazil-mexico-report-115847432.html)
Quote
SAO PAULO (Reuters) - The U.S. National Security Agency spied on the communications of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico, a Brazilian news program reported, a revelation that could strain U.S. relations with the two biggest countries in Latin America.
The report late Sunday by Globo's news program "Fantastico" was based on documents that journalist Glenn Greenwald obtained from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Greenwald, who lives in Rio de Janeiro, was listed as a co-contributor to the report.
"Fantastico" showed what it said was an NSA document dated June 2012 displaying passages of written messages sent by Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who was still a candidate at that time. In the messages, Pena Nieto discussed who he was considering naming as his ministers once elected.
A separate document displayed communication patterns between Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and her top advisers, "Fantastico" said, although no specific written passages were included in the report.
Both documents were part of an NSA case study showing how data could be "intelligently" filtered, Fantastico said.
Justice Minister Jose Eduardo Cardozo told O Globo newspaper that the contents of the documents, if confirmed, "should be considered very serious and constitute a clear violation of Brazilian sovereignty."
"This (spying) hits not only Brazil, but the sovereignty of several countries that could have been violated in a way totally contrary to what international law establishes," Cardozo said.
Cardozo traveled last week to Washington and met with U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and other officials, seeking more details on a previous, seemingly less serious set of disclosures by Snowden regarding U.S. spying in Brazil.
Rousseff is scheduled to make a formal state visit in October to meet U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington, a trip intended to illustrate the warming in Brazil-U.S. relations since she took office in 2011.
A spokesman for Rousseff would not comment on the new spying allegations. Officials at Mexico's presidential palace did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Snowden, an American who worked as a contractor for the NSA before leaking the documents, currently lives in asylum in Russia. "Fantastico" said it contacted Snowden via Internet chat, and that Snowden said he could not comment on the content of the report because of his asylum agreement with Russian authorities.
(Reporting by Brian Winter; editing by Jackie Frank)
Vašington post otkriva da je u 2011. godini Amerika izvršila 231 ofanzivnu sajber akciju... Četri strane teksta, da ne kopiram sve, ima šta da se pročita.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html)
Old news!!!!
Evo nešto još older, DEA ima sa AT&T-om prijateljsku saradnju koja podrazumeva pristup bazi telefonskih poziva koja seže unatrag do 1987. godine :lol:
Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.'s (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0)
Quote
For at least six years, law enforcement officials working on a counternarcotics program have had routine access, using subpoenas, to an enormous AT&T database that contains the records of decades of Americans' phone calls — parallel to but covering a far longer time than the National Security Agency (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/national_security_agency/index.html?inline=nyt-org)'s hotly disputed collection of phone call logs.
The Hemisphere Project, a partnership between federal and local drug officials and AT&T that has not previously been reported, involves an extremely close association between the government and the telecommunications giant.
The government pays AT&T to place its employees in drug-fighting units around the country. Those employees sit alongside Drug Enforcement Administration (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/d/drug_enforcement_administration/index.html?inline=nyt-org) agents and local detectives and supply them with the phone data from as far back as 1987.
The project comes to light at a time of vigorous public debate over the proper limits on government surveillance and on the relationship between government agencies and communications companies. It offers the most significant look to date at the use of such large-scale data for law enforcement, rather than for national security.
The scale and longevity of the data storage appears to be unmatched by other government programs, including the N.S.A.'s gathering of phone call logs under the Patriot Act (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/usa_patriot_act/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier). The N.S.A. stores the data for nearly all calls in the United States, including phone numbers and time and duration of calls, for five years.
Hemisphere covers every call that passes through an AT&T switch — not just those made by AT&T customers — and includes calls dating back 26 years, according to Hemisphere training slides bearing the logo of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. Some four billion call records are added to the database every day, the slides say; technical specialists say a single call may generate more than one record. Unlike the N.S.A. data, the Hemisphere data includes information on the locations of callers.
The slides (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/02/us/hemisphere-project.html) were given to The New York Times by Drew Hendricks, a peace activist in Port Hadlock, Wash. He said he had received the PowerPoint presentation, which is unclassified but marked "Law enforcement sensitive," in response to a series of public information requests to West Coast police agencies.
The program was started in 2007, according to the slides, and has been carried out in great secrecy.
"All requestors are instructed to never refer to Hemisphere in any official document," one slide says (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/02/us/hemisphere-project.html#p12). A search of the Nexis database found no reference to the program in news reports or Congressional hearings.
The Obama administration acknowledged the extraordinary scale of the Hemisphere database and the unusual embedding of AT&T employees in government drug units in three states.
But they said the project, which has proved especially useful in finding criminals who discard cellphones frequently to thwart government tracking, employed routine investigative procedures used in criminal cases for decades and posed no novel privacy issues.
Crucially, they said, the phone data is stored by AT&T, and not by the government as in the N.S.A. program. It is queried for phone numbers of interest mainly using what are called "administrative subpoenas," those issued not by a grand jury or a judge but by a federal agency, in this case the D.E.A.
Brian Fallon, a Justice Department spokesman, said in a statement that "subpoenaing drug dealers' phone records is a bread-and-butter tactic in the course of criminal investigations."
Mr. Fallon said that "the records are maintained at all times by the phone company, not the government," and that Hemisphere "simply streamlines the process of serving the subpoena to the phone company so law enforcement can quickly keep up with drug dealers when they switch phone numbers to try to avoid detection."
He said that the program was paid for by the D.E.A. and the White House drug policy office but that the cost was not immediately available.
Officials said four AT&T employees are now working in what is called the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, which brings together D.E.A. and local investigators — two in the program's Atlanta office and one each in Houston and Los Angeles.
Daniel C. Richman, a law professor at Columbia, said he sympathized with the government's argument that it needs such voluminous data to catch criminals in the era of disposable cellphones.
"Is this a massive change in the way the government operates? No," said Mr. Richman, who worked as a federal drug prosecutor in Manhattan in the early 1990s. "Actually you could say that it's a desperate effort by the government to catch up."
But Mr. Richman said the program at least touched on an unresolved Fourth Amendment question: whether mere government possession of huge amounts of private data, rather than its actual use, may trespass on the amendment's requirement that searches be "reasonable." Even though the data resides with AT&T, the deep interest and involvement of the government in its storage may raise constitutional issues, he said.
Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, said the 27-slide PowerPoint presentation, evidently updated this year to train AT&T employees for the program, "certainly raises profound privacy concerns."
"I'd speculate that one reason for the secrecy of the program is that it would be very hard to justify it to the public or the courts," he said.
Mr. Jaffer said that while the database remained in AT&T's possession, "the integration of government agents into the process means there are serious Fourth Amendment concerns."
Mr. Hendricks filed the public records requests while assisting other activists who have filed a federal lawsuit saying that a civilian intelligence analyst at an Army base near Tacoma infiltrated and spied on antiwar groups. (Federal officials confirmed that the slides are authentic.)
Mark A. Siegel, a spokesman for AT&T, declined to answer more than a dozen detailed questions, including ones about what percentage of phone calls made in the United States were covered by Hemisphere, the size of the Hemisphere database, whether the AT&T employees working on Hemisphere had security clearances and whether the company has conducted any legal review of the program
"While we cannot comment on any particular matter, we, like all other companies, must respond to valid subpoenas issued by law enforcement," Mr. Siegel wrote in an e-mail.
Representatives from Verizon, Sprint and T-Mobile all declined to comment on Sunday in response to questions about whether their companies were aware of Hemisphere or participated in that program or similar ones. A federal law enforcement official said that the Hemisphere Project was "singular" and that he knew of no comparable program involving other phone companies.
The PowerPoint slides outline several "success stories (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/02/us/hemisphere-project.html#p19)" highlighting the program's achievements and showing that it is used in investigating a range of crimes, not just drug violations. The slides emphasize the program's value in tracing suspects who use replacement phones, sometimes called "burner" phones, who switch phone numbers or who are otherwise difficult to locate or identify.
In March 2013, for instance, Hemisphere found the new phone number and location of a man who impersonated a general at a San Diego Navy base and then ran over a Navy intelligence agent. A month earlier the program helped catch a South Carolina woman who had made a series of bomb threats.
And in Seattle in 2011, the document says, Hemisphere tracked drug dealers who were rotating prepaid phones, leading to the seizure of 136 kilos of cocaine and $2.2 million.
Bruce Scheiner ima izvrstan blog koji se bavi bezbednošću (digitalnom i drugom), a ovaj tekst koji govori o tome kako je svet (zapadni, pre svega) počeo da se plaši rizika više nego ičega je veoma dobar:
Our Newfound Fear of Risk (http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/our_newfound_fe.html)
Quote
We're afraid of risk. It's a normal part of life, but we're increasingly unwilling to accept it at any level. So we turn to technology to protect us. The problem is that technological security measures aren't free. They cost money, of course, but they cost other things as well. They often don't provide the security they advertise, and -- paradoxically -- they often increase risk somewhere else. This problem is particularly stark when the risk involves another person: crime, terrorism, and so on. While technology has made us much safer against natural risks like accidents and disease, it works less well against man-made risks.
Three examples:
- We have allowed the police to turn themselves into a paramilitary organization. They deploy SWAT teams multiple times a day, almost always in nondangerous situations. They tase people at minimal provocation, often when it's not warranted. Unprovoked shootings are on the rise. One result of these measures is that honest mistakes -- a wrong address on a warrant, a misunderstanding -- result in the terrorizing of innocent people, and more death (http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/escambia_county_sheriff_david_morgan_his_bizarre_defense_of_the_shooting.single.html)in what were once nonviolent confrontations with police.
- We accept zero-tolerance policies in schools. This results in ridiculous situations, where young children are suspended for pointing gun-shaped fingers at other students or drawing pictures of guns with crayons, and high-school students are disciplined for giving each other over-the-counter pain relievers. The cost of these policies is (http://www.texaspolicy.com/sites/default/files/documents/2012-08-PP18-ExpellingZeroTolerance-CEJ-JeanetteMoll.pdf) enormous (http://www.publicinterestprojects.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/08/VOYCE-report-2011.pdf), both in dollars to implement and its long-lasting effects on students.
- We have spent over one trillion dollars and thousands of lives fighting terrorism in the past decade -- including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- money that could have been better used in all sorts of ways. We now know that the NSA has turned into a massive domestic surveillance organization, and that its data is also used by other government organizations, which then lie about it. Our foreign policy has changed for the worse: we spy on everyone, we trample human rights abroad, our drones kill (http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/08/drone-targeted-killings/) indiscriminately, and our diplomatic outposts have either closed down or become fortresses (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=209909009). In the months after 9/11, so many people chose to drive instead of fly that the resulting deaths dwarfed the deaths from the terrorist attack itself, because cars are much more dangerous than airplanes.
There are lots more examples, but the general point is that we tend to fixate on a particular risk and then do everything we can to mitigate it, including giving up our freedoms and liberties.
There's a subtle psychological explanation. Risk tolerance is both cultural and dependent on the environment around us. As we have advanced technologically as a society, we have reduced many of the risks that have been with us for millennia. Fatal childhood diseases are things of the past, many adult diseases are curable, accidents are rarer and more survivable, buildings collapse less often, death by violence has declined considerably, and so on. All over the world -- among the wealthier of us who live in peaceful Western countries -- our lives have become safer.
Our notions of risk are not absolute; they're based more on how far they are from whatever we think of as "normal." So as our perception of what is normal gets safer, the remaining risks stand out more. When your population is dying of the plague, protecting yourself from the occasional thief or murderer is a luxury. When everyone is healthy, it becomes a necessity.
Some of this fear results from imperfect risk perception. We're bad (http://xkcd.com/1252/)at accurately assessing risk; we tend to exaggerate spectacular, strange, and rare events, and downplay ordinary, familiar, and common ones. This leads us to believe that violence against police, school shootings, and terrorist attacks are more common and more deadly than they actually are -- and that the costs, dangers, and risks of a militarized police, a school system without flexibility, and a surveillance state without privacy are less than they really are.
Some of this fear stems from the fact that we put people in charge of just one aspect of the risk equation. No one wants to be the senior officer who didn't approve the SWAT team for the one subpoena delivery that resulted in an officer being shot. No one wants to be the school principal who didn't discipline -- no matter how benign the infraction -- the one student who became a shooter. No one wants to be the president who rolled back counterterrorism measures, just in time to have a plot succeed. Those in charge will be naturally risk averse, since they personally shoulder so much of the burden.
We also expect that science and technology should be able to mitigate these risks, as they mitigate so many others. There's a fundamental problem at the intersection of these security measures with science and technology; it has to do with the types of risk they're arrayed against. Most of the risks we face in life are against nature: disease, accident, weather, random chance. As our science has improved -- medicine is the big one, but other sciences as well -- we become better at mitigating and recovering from those sorts of risks.
Security measures combat a very different sort of risk: a risk stemming from another person. People are intelligent, and they can adapt to new security measures in ways nature cannot. An earthquake isn't able to figure out how to topple structures constructed under some new and safer building code, and an automobile won't invent a new form of accident that undermines medical advances that have made existing accidents more survivable. But a terrorist will change his tactics and targets in response to new security measures. An otherwise innocent person will change his behavior in response to a police force that compels compliance at the threat of a Taser. We will all change, living in a surveillance state.
When you implement measures to mitigate the effects of the random risks of the world, you're safer as a result. When you implement measures to reduce the risks from your fellow human beings, the human beings adapt and you get less risk reduction than you'd expect -- and you also get more side effects, because we all adapt.
We need to relearn how to recognize the trade-offs that come from risk management, especially risk from our fellow human beings. We need to relearn how to accept risk, and even embrace it, as essential to human progress and our free society. The more we expect technology to protect us from people in the same way it protects us from nature, the more we will sacrifice the very values of our society in futile attempts to achieve this security.
This essay previously appeared (https://www.schneier.com/essay-442.html) on Forbes.com.
<div>опет гардијан (е јебеш овај привју, више не можеш да средиш страницу како треба)</div><div>NSA and GCHQ unlock privacy and security on the internet (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security)</div><div>
</div><div>- NSA and GCHQ unlock encryption used to protect emails, banking and medical records</div><div>- $250m-a-year US program works covertly with tech companies to insert weaknesses into products - Security experts say programs 'undermine the fabric of the internet'</div><div>
</div><div>у суштини, представили су енкрипцију као аномалију и објавили јој рат :) </div><div>
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QuoteUS and British intelligence agencies have successfully cracked much of the online encryption relied upon by hundreds of millions of people to protect the privacy of their personal data, online transactions and emails, according to top-secret documents revealed by former contractor Edward Snowden.</div><div>Through these covert partnerships, the agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities – known as backdoors or trapdoors – into commercial encryption software...идт
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опет гардијан (е јебеш овај привју, више не можеш да средиш страницу како треба)
NSA and GCHQ unlock privacy and security on the internet (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security)
- NSA and GCHQ unlock encryption used to protect emails, banking and medical records
- $250m-a-year US program works covertly with tech companies to insert weaknesses into products - Security experts say programs 'undermine the fabric of the internet'
у суштини, представили су енкрипцију као аномалију и објавили јој рат :)
QuoteUS and British intelligence agencies have successfully cracked much of the online encryption relied upon by hundreds of millions of people to protect the privacy of their personal data, online transactions and emails, according to top-secret documents revealed by former contractor Edward Snowden.
Through these covert partnerships, the agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities – known as backdoors or trapdoors – into commercial encryption software...идт
е средите ово са прегледом, постало је бесмислено
Novi teški udarci na američki ponos i privatnost: NSA neke podatke deli sa Izraelom. Mislim, ima to logike ako uzmemo u obzir logiku da su teroristi = Arapi, ali, naravno, Amere će ovo samo još više da zaboli kad shvate da nekakvi Izraelci sad prebiraju po njihovoj intimi. Gardijan, a kroz prste Glena Grinvalda veli:
NSA shares raw intelligence including Americans' data with Israel (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents)
Quote
• Secret deal places no legal limits on use of data by Israelis
• Only official US government communications protected
• Agency insists it complies with rules governing privacy
• Read the NSA and Israel's 'memorandum of understanding' (http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document)
The National Security Agency routinely shares raw intelligence data with Israel (http://www.theguardian.com/world/israel) without first sifting it to remove information about US citizens, a top-secret document provided to the Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document) by whistleblower Edward Snowden reveals.
Details of the intelligence-sharing agreement are laid out in a memorandum of understanding between the NSA (http://www.theguardian.com/world/nsa) and its Israeli counterpart that shows the US government handed over intercepted communications likely to contain phone calls and emails of American citizens. The agreement places no legally binding limits on the use of the data by the Israelis.
The disclosure that the NSA agreed to provide raw intelligence data to a foreign country contrasts with assurances from the Obama administration (http://www.theguardian.com/world/obama-administration) that there are rigorous safeguards to protect the privacy (http://www.theguardian.com/world/privacy) of US citizens caught in the dragnet. The intelligence community calls this process "minimization", but the memorandum makes clear that the information shared with the Israelis would be in its pre-minimized state.
The deal was reached in principle in March 2009, according to the undated memorandum (http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document), which lays out the ground rules for the intelligence sharing.
The five-page memorandum, termed an agreement between the US and Israeli intelligence agencies "pertaining to the protection of US persons", repeatedly stresses the constitutional rights of Americans to privacy and the need for Israeli intelligence staff to respect these rights.
But this is undermined by the disclosure that Israel is allowed to receive "raw Sigint" – signal intelligence. The memorandum says: "Raw Sigint includes, but is not limited to, unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content."
According to the agreement, the intelligence being shared would not be filtered in advance by NSA analysts to remove US communications. "NSA routinely sends ISNU [the Israeli Sigint National Unit] minimized and unminimized raw collection", it says.
Although the memorandum is explicit in saying the material had to be handled in accordance with US law, and that the Israelis agreed not to deliberately target Americans identified in the data, these rules are not backed up by legal obligations.
"This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights and shall not be construed to be either an international agreement or a legally binding instrument according to international law," the document says.
In a statement to the Guardian, an NSA spokesperson did not deny that personal data about Americans was included in raw intelligence data shared with the Israelis. But the agency insisted that the shared intelligence complied with all rules governing privacy.
"Any US person information that is acquired as a result of NSA's surveillance (http://www.theguardian.com/world/surveillance) activities is handled under procedures that are designed to protect privacy rights," the spokesperson said.
The NSA declined to answer specific questions about the agreement, including whether permission had been sought from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (Fisa) court for handing over such material.
The memorandum of understanding, which the Guardian is publishing in full, allows Israel to retain "any files containing the identities of US persons" for up to a year. The agreement requests only that the Israelis should consult the NSA's special liaison adviser when such data is found.
Notably, a much stricter rule was set for US government communications found in the raw intelligence. The Israelis were required to "destroy upon recognition" any communication "that is either to or from an official of the US government". Such communications included those of "officials of the executive branch (including the White House, cabinet departments, and independent agencies), the US House of Representatives and Senate (member and staff) and the US federal court system (including, but not limited to, the supreme court)".
It is not clear whether any communications involving members of US Congress or the federal courts have been included in the raw data provided by the NSA, nor is it clear how or why the NSA would be in possession of such communications. In 2009, however, the New York Times reported on "the agency's attempt to wiretap a member of Congress, without court approval, on an overseas trip".
The NSA is required by law to target only non-US persons without an individual warrant, but it can collect the content and metadata of Americans' emails and calls without a warrant when such communication is with a foreign target. US persons are defined in surveillance legislation as US citizens, permanent residents and anyone located on US soil at the time of the interception, unless it has been positively established that they are not a citizen or permanent resident.
Moreover, with much of the world's internet traffic passing through US networks, large numbers of purely domestic communications also get scooped up incidentally by the agency's surveillance programs.
The document mentions only one check carried out by the NSA on the raw intelligence, saying the agency will "regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of US persons' identities". It also requests that the Israelis limit access only to personnel with a "strict need to know".
Israeli intelligence is allowed "to disseminate foreign intelligence information concerning US persons derived from raw Sigint by NSA" on condition that it does so "in a manner that does not identify the US person". The agreement also allows Israel to release US person identities to "outside parties, including all INSU customers" with the NSA's written permission.
Although Israel is one of America's closest allies, it is not one of the inner core of countries involved in surveillance sharing with the US - Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This group is collectively known as Five Eyes.
The relationship between the US and Israel has been strained at times, both diplomatically and in terms of intelligence. In the top-secret 2013 intelligence community budget request, details of which were disclosed by the Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html), Israel is identified alongside Iran and China as a target for US cyberattacks.
While NSA documents tout the mutually beneficial relationship of Sigint sharing, another report, marked top secret and dated September 2007, states that the relationship, while central to US strategy, has become overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel.
"Balancing the Sigint exchange equally between US and Israeli needs has been a constant challenge," states the report, titled 'History of the US – Israel Sigint Relationship, Post-1992'. "In the last decade, it arguably tilted heavily in favor of Israeli security concerns. 9/11 came, and went, with NSA's only true Third Party [counter-terrorism] relationship being driven almost totally by the needs of the partner."
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fstatic.guim.co.uk%2Fsys-images%2FGuardian%2FPix%2Faudio%2Fvideo%2F2013%2F9%2F11%2F1378909869874%2Fnewtear3-001.jpg&hash=943002055a46062d0a5954cce0816d660eaa686a)
In another top-secret document seen by the Guardian, dated 2008, a senior NSA official points out that Israel aggressively spies on the US. "On the one hand, the Israelis are extraordinarily good Sigint partners for us, but on the other, they target us to learn our positions on Middle East problems," the official says. "A NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] ranked them as the third most aggressive intelligence service against the US."
Later in the document, the official is quoted as saying: "One of NSA's biggest threats is actually from friendly intelligence services, like Israel. There are parameters on what NSA shares with them, but the exchange is so robust, we sometimes share more than we intended."
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fstatic.guim.co.uk%2Fsys-images%2FGuardian%2FPix%2Faudio%2Fvideo%2F2013%2F9%2F11%2F1378909828609%2Fnewtear1-001.jpg&hash=cd5c0c056a59bea26c2dfd78aa3b05038dd3c5bd)
The memorandum of understanding also contains hints that there had been tensions in the intelligence-sharing relationship with Israel. At a meeting in March 2009 between the two agencies, according to the document, it was agreed that the sharing of raw data required a new framework and further training for Israeli personnel to protect US person information.
It is not clear whether or not this was because there had been problems up to that point in the handling of intelligence that was found to contain Americans' data.
However, an earlier US document obtained by Snowden, which discusses co-operating on a military intelligence program, bluntly lists under the cons: "Trust issues which revolve around previous ISR [Israel] operations."
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fstatic.guim.co.uk%2Fsys-images%2FGuardian%2FPix%2Faudio%2Fvideo%2F2013%2F9%2F11%2F1378909850994%2Fnewtear2-001.jpg&hash=ecb9437ca8ace3035b5d10d75a546bd6c887325d)
The Guardian asked the Obama administration how many times US data had been found in the raw intelligence, either by the Israelis or when the NSA reviewed a sample of the files, but officials declined to provide this information. Nor would they disclose how many other countries the NSA shared raw data with, or whether the Fisa court, which is meant to oversee NSA surveillance programs and the procedures to handle US information, had signed off the agreement with Israel.
In its statement, the NSA said: "We are not going to comment on any specific information sharing arrangements, or the authority under which any such information is collected. The fact that intelligence services work together under specific and regulated conditions mutually strengthens the security of both nations.
"NSA cannot, however, use these relationships to circumvent US legal restrictions. Whenever we share intelligence information, we comply with all applicable rules, including the rules to protect US person information."
pocela sam da verujem u teorije zavere, mislim, sadasnja obamina administracija il je bahata il maliciozna ili prosto glupa. a henlon je odavno objasnio.
Da, možda je zaista Henlon odgovor na sve ovo. Na primer, Marisa Majer veli da se Jahu sudio povodom - po njihovom mišljenju nezakonitih - zahteva za isporučivanjem privatnih podataka i da je presuđeno kako je odbijanje da se podaci daju - izdaja. Zanimljivo je kako se najveća, jelte, svecka demokratija oslanja na tajna suđenja...:
Marissa Mayer: 'It's Treason' For Yahoo To Disobey The NSA (http://www.businessinsider.com/marissa-mayer-its-treason-to-ignore-the-nsa-2013-9)
QuoteMarissa Mayer was on stage on Wednesday at the TechCrunch Disrupt conference when Michael Arrington asked her about NSA snooping.
He wanted to know what would happen if Yahoo just didn't cooperate. He wanted to know what would happen if she were to simply talk about what was happening, even though the government had forbidden it.
"Releasing classified information is treason. It generally lands you incarcerated," she said, clearly uncomfortable with the turn of the conversation.
She also explained that when the government comes calling wanting information on Yahoo users, the company scrutinizes each request and "we push back a lot on requests." But "we can't talk about those things because they're classified," she said.
This has been going on long before her reign, too, she said:
"I'm proud to be part of an organization that from the very beginning in 2007, with the NSA and FISA and PRISM, has been skeptical and has scrutinized those requests. In 2007 Yahoo filed a lawsuit against the new Patriot Act, parts of PRISM and FISA, we were the key plaintiff. A lot of people have wondered about that case and who it was. It was us ... we lost. The thing is, we lost and if you don't comply it's treason."
Hihihi, keith Alexander ispade gik :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: našao je holivudskog scenografa da mu dizajnira NSA "Information Dominance Center" po uzoru na Star Trek.
Inside the mind of NSA chief Gen Keith Alexander (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/15/nsa-mind-keith-alexander-star-trek)
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It has been previously reported (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/15/crux-nsa-collect-it-all) that the mentality of NSA (http://www.theguardian.com/world/nsa) chief Gen. Keith Alexander is captured by his motto "Collect it All". It's a get-everything approach he pioneered first when aimed at an enemy population in the middle of a war zone in Iraq, one he has now imported onto US soil, aimed at the domestic population and everyone else.
But a perhaps even more disturbing and revealing vignette into the spy chief's mind comes from a new Foreign Policy article (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?page=full) describing what the journal calls his "all-out, barely-legal drive to build the ultimate spy machine". The article describes how even his NSA peers see him as a "cowboy" willing to play fast and loose with legal limits in order to construct a system of ubiquitous surveillance. But the personality driving all of this - not just Alexander's but much of Washington's - is perhaps best captured by this one passage, highlighted by PBS' News Hour in a post entitled (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/09/nsa-director-modelled-war-room-after-star-treks-enterprise.html): "NSA director modeled war room after Star Trek's Enterprise". The room was christened as part of the "Information Dominance Center":"When he was running the Army's Intelligence and Security Command, Alexander brought many of his future allies down to Fort Belvoir for a tour of his base of operations, a facility known as the Information Dominance Center. It had been designed by a Hollywood set designer to mimic the bridge of the starship Enterprise from Star Trek, complete with chrome panels, computer stations, a huge TV monitor on the forward wall, and doors that made a 'whoosh' sound when they slid open and closed. Lawmakers and other important officials took turns sitting in a leather 'captain's chair' in the center of the room and watched as Alexander, a lover of science-fiction movies, showed off his data tools on the big screen.
"'Everybody wanted to sit in the chair at least once to pretend he was Jean-Luc Picard,' says a retired officer in charge of VIP visits."
Numerous commentators remarked yesterday on the meaning of all that (note, too, how "Total Information Awareness" was a major scandal in the Bush years, but "Information Dominance Center" - along with things like "Boundless Informant" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining) - are treated as benign or even noble programs in the age of Obama).
But now, on the website of DBI Architects, Inc. (http://www.dbia.com/) of Washington and Reston, Virginia, there are what purports to be photographs of the actual Star-Trek-like headquarters (http://www.dbia.com/projectpage/LIWA.pdf) commissioned by Gen. Alexander that so impressed his Congressional overseers. It's a 10,740 square foot labyrinth in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The brochure touts how "the prominently positioned chair provides the commanding officer an uninterrupted field of vision to a 22'-0" wide projection screen":
The glossy display further describes how "this project involved the renovation of standard office space into a highly classified, ultramodern operations center." Its "primary function is to enable 24-hour worldwide
visualization, planning, and execution of coordinated information operations for the US Army and other federal agencies." It gushes: "The
futuristic, yet distinctly military, setting is further reinforced by the Commander's console, which gives the illusion that one has boarded
a star ship":
Other photographs of Gen. Alexander's personal Star Trek Captain fantasy come-to-life (courtesy of public funds) are here (http://www.dbia.com/projectpage/LIWA.pdf). Any casual review of human history proves how deeply irrational it is to believe that powerful factions can be trusted to exercise vast surveillance power with little accountability or transparency. But the more they proudly flaunt their warped imperial hubris, the more irrational it becomes.
Glen Grinvold nastavlja. U ovom nastavku: kako NSA identifikuje ljude koji koriste TOR:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption)
Ričard Stalman u Vajrdu:
Stallman: How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand? (http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance/)
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Editor's Note: Given Richard Stallman's longtime role in promoting software that respects user freedom (including GNU, which just turned 30 (http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/why-free-software-is-more-important-now-than-ever-before/)), his suggested "remedies" for all the ways technology can be re-designed to provide benefits while avoiding surveillance — like the smart meters example he shares below — seem particularly relevant.
The current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. To recover our freedom and restore democracy, we must reduce surveillance to the point where it is possible for whistleblowers of all kinds to talk with journalists without being spotted. To do this reliably, we must reduce the surveillance capacity of the systems we use.
Using free/libre software, as I've advocated (http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/why-free-software-is-more-important-now-than-ever-before/) for 30 years, is the first step in taking control of our digital lives. We can't trust non-free software; the NSA uses and even creates (http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm) security weaknesses in non-free software so as to invade (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security) our own computers and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers, but that won't protect our privacy once we set foot (http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/) on the internet.
Bipartisan legislation to "curtail the domestic surveillance powers" in the U.S. is being drawn up (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill), but it relies on limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers. That won't suffice to protect whistleblowers if "catching the whistleblower" is grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go further.
Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, sources, and journalists provides confirmation. We need to reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is the maximum tolerable level of surveillance, beyond which it becomes oppressive? That happens when surveillance interferes with the functioning of democracy: when whistleblowers (such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.
Don't Agree We Need to Reduce Surveillance? Then Read This Section First If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the last shred of effective control over our government and institutions. That's why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has talked with a reporter is too much surveillance — too much for democracy to endure.
An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told (http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river) journalists in 2011 that the U.S. would not subpoena reporters because "We know who you're talking to." Sometimes journalists' phone call records are subpoena'd to find (http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press) this out, but Snowden has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records (https://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/05/14) of everyone in the U.S., all the time.
Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated (http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf) the U.S. government's systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups on the pretext that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.
Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was unable (http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/) to effectively hold the NSA accountable.) Suspicion of a crime will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of "espionage", finding the "spy" will provide an excuse to access the accumulated material.
The state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for personal reasons too. Some NSA agents used (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems) U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers — past, present, or wished-for — in a practice called "LoveINT." The NSA says it has caught and punished this a few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught. But these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have long used their access to driver's license records to track (http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm) down someone attractive, a practice known as "running a plate for a date."
Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the possibility of access to it, it may misuse that data in dreadful ways.
Total surveillance plus vague law provides an opening for a massive fishing expedition against any desired target. To make journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily accessible to the state.
Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose a set of legal principles designed to prevent (https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text) the abuses of massive surveillance. These principles include, crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic freedoms — if adopted completely and enforced without exception forever.
However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or ignored (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html).
Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a handful of people, will give them an opportunity.
If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become available for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by companies, for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won't exist, and there will be no way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only collect data starting at that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.
We Must Design Every System for Privacy If we don't want a total surveillance society, we must consider surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental impact of physical construction.
For example: "Smart" meters for electricity are touted for sending the power company moment-by-moment data about each customer's electric usage, including how usage compares with users in general. This is implemented based on general surveillance, but does not require any surveillance. It would be easy for the power company to calculate the average usage in a residential neighborhood by dividing the total usage by the number of subscribers, and send that to the meters. Each customer's meter could compare her usage, over any desired period of time, with the average usage pattern for that period. The same benefit, with no surveillance!
We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems.
Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to privacy. The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where someone reported a crime. It would not be feasible to physically collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them.
Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are connected to the internet so recordings can be collected in a data center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going to get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see who they talk with.
Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security themselves, so anyone could (http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/cia-wants-spy-you-through-your-appliances) watch what the camera sees. To restore privacy, we should ban the use of internet-connected cameras aimed where and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people. Everyone must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the systematic accumulation of such data on the internet must be limited.
Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance Most data collection comes from people's own digital activities. Usually the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes to the threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a business, because the data that the companies collect is systematically available to the state.
The NSA, through PRISM, has gotten into (https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2) the databases of many large internet corporations. AT&T has saved all its phone call records since 1987 and makes them available (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0) to the DEA to search on request. Strictly speaking, the U.S. government does not possess that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it.
The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires that we reduce the data collected about people by any organization, not just by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they do not accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data about our transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more than a short time beyond what is inherently necessary for their dealings with us.
One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the internet is that sites are financed through advertising based on tracking users' activities and propensities. This converts a mere annoyance — advertising that we can learn to ignore — into a surveillance system that harms us whether we know it or not. Purchases over the internet also track their users. And we are all aware that "privacy policies" are more excuses to violate privacy than commitments to uphold it.
We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous payments — anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don't want the payee to dodge taxes.) Bitcoin is not (http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/) anonymous, but technology for digital cash (http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html) was first developed 25 years ago; we need only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct them.
A further threat from sites' collection of personal data is that security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes customers' credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end this danger: a security hole in the site can't hurt you if the site knows nothing about you.
Remedy for Travel Surveillance We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems recognize all license plates, and the data can be kept (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm) indefinitely; they should be required by law to notice and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.
The U.S. "no-fly" list must be abolished because it is punishment (https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes) without trial.
It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage will be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to be enough for all legitimate purposes.
Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel associated with each card. Together they amount to massive surveillance. This data collection must be reduced.
Navigation services do surveillance: the user's computer tells the map service the user's location and where the user wants to go; then the server determines the route and sends it back to the user's computer, which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records the user's locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This surveillance is not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it: free/libre software in the user's computer could download map data for the pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the route, and display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is or wants to go.
Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the borrower's identity is known only inside the station where the item was borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is "out", so when the user returns it at any station (in general, a different one), that station will know where and when that item was borrowed. It will enform the other station that the item is no longer "out". It will also calculate the user's bill, and send it (after waiting some random number of minutes) to headquarters along a ring of stations, so that headquarters would not find out which station the bill came from. Once this is done, the return station would forget all about the transaction. If an item remains "out" for too long, the station where it was borrowed can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the borrower's identity immediately.
Remedy for Communications Dossiers Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc). With mobile phones, they also record (http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz) the user's physical location. They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&T. Soon they will even record (http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/) the user's body activities. It appears that the NSA collects (https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location) cell phone location data in bulk.
Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and phone companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very long, in the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.
This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't physically stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as it is generated — which is what the U.S. does (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order) with some or all phone companies. We would have to rely on prohibiting that by law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the relevant law (the PATRIOT Act) does not clearly prohibit the practice. In addition, if the government did resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about everyone's phone calls made prior to that time.
But Some Surveillance Is Necessary For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court order. With the internet, the power to tap phone conversations would naturally extend to the power to tap internet connections. This power is easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary. Fortunately, this won't make it possible to find whistleblowers after the fact.
Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have their own jargon term (https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&oldid=552608302) for perjury, "testilying," since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and photographers (http://photographyisnotacrime.com/).) One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all the time found (http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition) their use of force fell by 60%. The ACLU is in favor of this.
Corporations are not people, and not (http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266) entitled to human rights. It is legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational (e.g., DRM (http://defectivebydesign.org)) or political (e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of terrorism.
However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when it is carried out as part of a business.
***
Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the level of surveillance of our' movements, actions, and communications. It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s, and far more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced (http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/06/your_iphone_works_for_the_secret_police.html) in the 1980s, and would still be far more even with additional legal limits on state use of the accumulated data.
Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.
Glen Grinvold napušta Guardian da krene sa sopstvenim sajtom za vesti...
Glenn Greenwald announces departure from the Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/15/glenn-greenwald-announces-departure-guardian)
Quote
Journalist who broke stories about widespread NSA surveillance leaving to pursue 'once-in-a-career journalistic opportunity'
Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who broke a string of stories about widespread electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency based on files leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden (http://www.theguardian.com/world/edward-snowden), has announced that he is leaving the Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/media/theguardian).
In a statement posted on his blog (http://ggsidedocs.blogspot.com.br/), Greenwald said: "My partnership with the Guardian has been extremely fruitful and fulfilling. I have high regard for the editors and journalists with whom I worked and am incredibly proud of what we achieved.
"The decision to leave was not an easy one, but I was presented with a once-in-a-career opportunity that no journalist could possibly decline.
"Because this news leaked before we were prepared to announce it, I'm not yet able to provide any details of this momentous new venture, but it will be unveiled very shortly."
A Guardian spokesperson said: "Glenn Greenwald is a remarkable journalist and it has been fantastic working with him. Our work together over the past year has demonstrated the crucial role that responsible investigative journalism can play in holding those in power to account.
"We are, of course, disappointed by Glenn's decision to move on, but can appreciate the attraction of the new role he has been offered. We wish him all the best."
Greenwald joined the Guardian in 2012 from Salon. He is a former constitutional lawyer, a best-selling author, and the recipient of the first annual IF Stone award for independent journalism.
jel' to on najzad pokrenuo onaj ultraskupi projekat sa onim kako-se-zvase eBay bajom?
Ne kaže, ali znaćemo uskoro. Evo svežijeg napisa iz Vošington posta:
Why Glenn Greenwald's new media venture is a big deal (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/10/17/why-glenn-greenwalds-new-media-venture-is-a-big-deal/)
Quote
Glenn Greenwald, who has published many of the most important scoops from the Edward Snowden leaks, is leaving The Guardian and setting up a new media venture with long-time journalist Laura Poitras and Jeremy Scahill from The Nation. The venture is being funded by eBay founder Pierre Omidyar, who has suggested (http://pressthink.org/2013/10/why-pierre-omidyar-decided-to-join-forces-with-glenn-greenwald-for-a-new-venture-in-news/) that he's prepared to invest more than $250 million in the new venture.
This is big news for journalism. It's also big news for people interested in the relationship between information technology and politics. Martha Finnemore (http://elliott.gwu.edu/faculty/finnemore.cfm) and I drafted a paper (http://henryfarrell.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Wikileaks_draft.pdf) a couple of years ago about how Wikileaks-type organizations were changing the relationship between knowledge, politics and hypocrisy. Our ideas about hypocrisy led to an article on the true consequences of the Snowden leaks, which is coming out in the next issue of Foreign Affairs. Our ideas about knowledge and politics maybe tell us something about the consequences of the new venture (but bear with me — our argument is a little complicated).
Fundamentally, we think that much of the commentary about Wikileaks and Snowden's revelations are wrong. Most people think that Wikileaks, Snowden etc. are politically important because they reveal secret information that was hitherto unknown. Many of Wikileaks' defenders, including, initially, Julian Assange himself, thought that the organization would change politics and bring down corrupt regimes by revealing information that the government wanted to hide. The critics of Snowden and Wikileaks actually agree — they argue that they have hurt America (and perhaps the world) by revealing information that should have stayed secret.
Neither are right. Neither Wikileaks or Snowden has revealed any truly surprising and damaging (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/us/qaeda-plot-leak-has-undermined-us-intelligence.html?hp) information (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/11/the_obama_administration_has_w.html). European and South American governments already knew that the U.S. was spying on them. China was certainly aware that U.S. agencies were trying to hack into its systems. On the other hand, Assange's initial hope that he could change the world through publishing damaging information turned out to be completely unfounded. Wikileaks had a very frustrating time trying to get anyone except bloggers to pay attention to their early revelations. No one seemed to care.
The reason why is important. There's too much information out there for most people to pay attention to, let alone figure out whether they believe it or not. Hence, most people rely on other institutions such as media organizations to tell them which information is worth caring about. Not only do people not pay much attention to information until it gets the stamp of approval from some authoritative institution, but this information is transformed, because everybody knows that everybody else is paying attention to it. It stops being mere information, and becomes knowledge — generally accepted facts that people use to build their understanding of what everybody knows about politics.
Established newspapers like the New York Times, The Washington Post and the Financial Times play a crucial sociological role in deciding which information is important and trustworthy, and which is not. When one of these newspapers publishes information, it is legitimated as knowledge — which people are not only more likely to take seriously themselves, but may have to take seriously, because they know that other people are taking it seriously. European Union governments knew perfectly well that the U.S. had been tapping communications in their building (and if you read specialist sources, you knew about this, too). However, these governments found it more politically convenient to ignore U.S. spying than to make a big fuss. When this information became knowledge — when it was published and treated as authoritative by major newspapers — it became impossible to ignore any longer.
Assange and Wikileaks figured out some version of this early on. This is why they started working together with major newspapers such as the Guardian and New York Times — because this was the only way that they could get people to systematically pay attention to the information they had uncovered, and to turn that information into knowledge that everyone accepted. Unsurprisingly, however, this relationship turned out to be very difficult. Newspapers — even the most pioneering ones — have political relationships with governments, which make them nervous about publishing (and hence validating) certain kinds of information. This also helps explain the awkwardness that many journalists express toward Greenwald. While they recognize that he has uncovered many valuable scoops, they don't see him as bounded by the same rules as they are.
On the one hand, people like Assange, Greenwald and Snowden need newspapers or similar media outlets. Without some such outlet, they are voices in the wilderness. On the other hand, exactly because newspapers play a crucial political role in validating knowledge, they have complicated relationships with governments and politicians. This leads them to actions which people like Assange and Greenwald are likely to see as compromises with power.
And this is why the new venture is so interesting. It will likely shape up as a serious journalistic enterprise. Capital of USD $250 million can hire some very good people. The venture has the potential to become the kind of news source that can turn information into knowledge. Yet it doesn't sound as if it'll be bound by the kinds of political relationships that most newspapers are embedded in. The Columbia Journalism Review gets this best (http://www.cjr.org/the_audit/the_extraordinary_promise_of_t.php) when it describes the venture as I.F. Stone's Weekly (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I._F._Stone), if it had been lavishly funded by a friendly billionaire.
If this works, it is likely to change the relationship between information, knowledge and politics in some very interesting ways. Most obviously, it will make it even harder for the U.S. government to control the politics of leaks by pressuring newspapers not to publish stories that it thinks hurt the national interest. Former New York Times editor Bill Keller describes how:
The tension between our obligation to inform and the government's obligation to protect plays out in a set of rituals. As one of my predecessors, Max Frankel, wrote...: "For the vast majority of 'secrets,' there has developed between the government and the press (and Congress) a rather simple rule of thumb: The government hides what it can, pleading necessity as long as it can, and the press pries out what it can, pleading a need and a right to know. Each side in this 'game' regularly 'wins' and 'loses' a round or two. Each fights with the weapons at its command. When the government loses a secret or two, it simply adjusts to a new reality.
It's difficult to imagine Greenwald (or Poitras) having any interest in engaging in these rituals. If governments start to lose control over public knowledge in the information age, it won't be because information "wants to be free." It'll be because of the creation of new ventures like this, that create public knowledge without adhering to the old rules about how government has a voice in deciding what gets published and what doesn't.
NSA asked Japan to tap regionwide fiber-optic cables in 2011 (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/27/world/nsa-asked-japan-to-tap-regionwide-fiber-optic-cables-in-2011/#.Um9sz1OmZi8)
Quote
The U.S. National Security Agency sought the Japanese government's cooperation in 2011 over wiretapping fiber-optic cables carrying phone and Internet data across the Asia-Pacific region, but the request was rejected, sources said Saturday.
The agency's overture was apparently aimed at gathering information on China given that Japan is at the heart of optical cables that connect various parts of the region. But Tokyo turned down the proposal, citing legal restrictions and a shortage of personnel, the sources said.
The NSA asked Tokyo if it could intercept personal information from communication data passing through Japan via cables connecting it, China and other regional areas, including Internet activity and phone calls, they said.
Faced with China's growing presence in the cyberworld and the need to bolster information about international terrorists, the United States may have been looking into whether Japan, its top regional ally, could offer help similar to that provided by Britain, according to the sources.
Based on documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, British newspaper The Guardian reported that the agency had been sharing data intercepted by Britain's spy agency, GCHQ, through transatlantic cables since 2011.
But Tokyo decided it could not do so because under current legislation, it cannot intercept such communications even if the aim is to prevent a terrorist act. Japan also has a substantially smaller number of intelligence personnel, compared with the NSA's estimated 30,000 employees, the sources said.
A separate source familiar with intelligence activities of major nations said the volume of data that would need to be intercepted from fiber-optic cables would require a massive number of workers and the assistance of the private sector.
Spies worry over "doomsday" cache stashed by ex-NSA contractor Snowden (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/25/us-usa-security-doomsday-idUSBRE9AO0Y120131125)
Quote
(Reuters) - British and U.S. intelligence officials say they are worried about a "doomsday" cache of highly classified, heavily encrypted material they believe former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden has stored on a data cloud.
The cache contains documents generated by the NSA and other agencies and includes names of U.S. and allied intelligence personnel, seven current and former U.S. officials and other sources briefed on the matter said.
The data is protected with sophisticated encryption, and multiple passwords are needed to open it, said two of the sources, who like the others spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters.
The passwords are in the possession of at least three different people and are valid for only a brief time window each day, they said. The identities of persons who might have the passwords are unknown.
Spokespeople for both NSA and the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.
One source described the cache of still unpublished material as Snowden's "insurance policy" against arrest or physical harm.
U.S. officials and other sources said only a small proportion of the classified material Snowden downloaded during stints as a contract systems administrator for NSA has been made public. Some Obama Administration officials have said privately that Snowden downloaded enough material to fuel two more years of news stories.
"The worst is yet to come," said one former U.S. official who follows the investigation closely.
Snowden, who is believed to have downloaded between 50,000 and 200,000 classified NSA and British government documents, is living in Russia under temporary asylum, where he fled after traveling to Hong Kong. He has been charged in the United States under the Espionage Act.
Cryptome, a website which started publishing leaked secret documents years before the group WikiLeaks or Snowden surfaced, estimated that the total number of Snowden documents made public so far is over 500.
Given Snowden's presence in Moscow, and the low likelihood that he will return to the United States anytime soon, U.S. and British authorities say they are focused more on dealing with the consequences of the material he has released than trying to apprehend him.
It is unclear whether U.S. or allied intelligence agencies - or those of adversary services such as Russia's and China's -
know where the material is stored and, if so, have tried to unlock it.
One former senior U.S. official said that the Chinese and Russians have cryptographers skilled enough to open the cache if they find it.
Snowden's revelations of government secrets have brought to light extensive and previously unknown surveillance of phone, email and social media communications by the NSA and allied agencies. That has sparked several diplomatic rows between Washington and its allies, along with civil liberties debates in Europe, the United States and elsewhere.
Among the material which Snowden acquired from classified government computer servers, but which has not been published by media outlets known to have had access to it, are documents containing names and resumes of employees working for NSA's British counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), sources familiar with the matter said.
The sources said Snowden started downloading some of it from a classified GCHQ website, known as GC-Wiki, when he was employed by Dell and assigned to NSA in 2012.
Snowden made a calculated decision to move from Dell Inc to another NSA contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, because he would have wide-ranging access to NSA data at the latter firm, one source with knowledge of the matter said.
"EXTREME PRECAUTIONS"
Glenn Greenwald, who met with Snowden in Hong Kong and was among the first to report on the leaked documents for the Guardian newspaper, said the former NSA contractor had "taken extreme precautions to make sure many different people around the world have these archives to insure the stories will inevitably be published."
"If anything happens at all to Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them to get access to the full archives," Greenwald said in a June interview with the Daily Beast website. He added: "I don't know for sure whether has more documents than the ones he has given me... I believe he does."
In an email exchange with Reuters, Greenwald, who has said he remains in contact with Snowden, affirmed his statements about Snowden's "precautions" but said he had nothing to add.
Officials believe that the "doomsday" cache is stored and encrypted separately from any material that Snowden has provided to media outlets.
Conservative British politicians, including Louise Mensch, a former member of parliament, have accused the Guardian, one of two media outlets to first publish stories based on Snowden's leaks, of "trafficking of GCHQ agents' names abroad."
No names of British intelligence personnel have been published by any media outlet. After U.K. officials informed the Guardian it could face legal action, the newspaper disclosed it had destroyed computers containing Snowden material on GCHQ, but had provided copies of the data to the New York Times and the U.S. nonprofit group ProPublica.
Sources familiar with unpublished material Snowden downloaded said it also contains information about the CIA - possibly including personnel names - as well as other U.S. spy agencies such as the National Reconnaissance Office and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which operate U.S. image-producing satellites and analyze their data.
U.S. security officials have indicated in briefings they do not know what, if any, of the material is still in Snowden's personal possession. Snowden himself has been quoted as saying he took no such materials with him to Russia.
(Editing by Warren Strobel and Tim Dobbyn)
Ameri dočekali da malo oni potkače Francuze glede prisluškivanja:
France Broadens Its Surveillance Power (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/world/europe/france-broadens-its-surveillance-power.html?_r=0)
Quote
PARIS — For all their indignation (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/world/europe/new-report-of-nsa-spying-angers-france.html) last summer, when the scope of the United States' mass data collection began to be made public, the French are hardly innocents in the realm of electronic surveillance. Within days of the reports about the National Security Agency's activities, it was revealed that French intelligence services operated a similar system (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/world/europe/france-too-is-collecting-data-newspaper-reveals.html), with similarly minimal oversight.
And last week, with little public debate, the legislature approved a law that critics feared would markedly expand electronic surveillance of French residents and businesses.
The provision, quietly passed as part of a routine military spending bill, defines the conditions under which intelligence agencies may gain access to or record telephone conversations, emails, Internet activity, personal location data and other electronic communications.
The law provides for no judicial oversight and allows electronic surveillance for a broad range of purposes, including "national security," the protection of France (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/france/index.html?inline=nyt-geo)'s "scientific and economic potential" and prevention of "terrorism" or "criminality."
In an unusual alliance, Internet and corporate groups, human rights organizations and a small number of lawmakers have opposed the law as a threat to business or an encroachment on individual rights.
The government argues that the law, which does not take effect until 2015, does little to expand intelligence powers. Rather, officials say, those powers have been in place for years, and the law creates rules where there had been none, notably with regard to real-time location tracking.
While conceding that the new law "does effectively expand the existing regime to adapt it to the missions and reality of our intelligence services," Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told the Senate that "it especially reinforces oversight as compared with the current situation."
In effect, analysts say, the government has either staked out rights to a vast new range of surveillance practices, or acknowledged that it has already been collecting far more data, under far less regulated circumstances, than people realized.
Neither prospect is terribly comforting to the law's opponents.
"We feel that anything can be placed under the heading 'national security,' " said Clémence Bectarte, a lawyer for the International Federation for Human Rights (http://www.fidh.org/en/what-is-fidh/). The law, she said, expanded the list of state administrations authorized to request electronic surveillance, for example to include the budget ministry.
"There should have been a parliamentary commission and a real public debate," she said.
French intelligence agencies have little experience publicly justifying their practices. Parliamentary oversight did not begin until 2007.
The Association des Services Internet Communautaires (http://www.lasic.fr/), or @sic, an advocacy group whose members include AOL, eBay, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and several top French Internet companies, discovered the new legislation essentially by chance.
"There was no consultation at all," said Giuseppe de Martino, @sic's director and an executive at Dailymotion (http://www.dailymotion.com/fr), a French online video service. "No one said anything about it to us."
The National Commission for Information Technology and Freedoms (http://www.cnil.fr/english/), a state administration meant to protect the rights and privacy of citizens, said it was not consulted on the contentious elements of the bill, though it was asked to review other provisions.
The government denied any effort to shield the law from public scrutiny. The bill went through four votes in Parliament, noted one government official. "Not exactly discreet, as maneuvers go," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly.
@sic said the law could give the authorities blanket rights to seize "all documents stocked in a 'cloud' service subscribed by a given Internet user," for instance. Currently, such a seizure would require a warrant, the group argued.
"We don't know what this is going to mean in practice," Mr. de Martino said. "But now the doors are open."
French intelligence services are already reputed to be rapacious collectors of foreign industrial secrets, and there is some concern the law could discourage international investment. Internet service companies worry that users may begin to turn away from the Internet or share their personal information less freely.
But Jean-Pierre Sueur, a senator from President François Hollande's Socialist Party, said identical provisions have been in place since the passage of an electronic intercepts law in 1991.
"If they're angry about this, they ought to have been angry for 23 years," Mr. Sueur said. The new law created "only additional guarantees," he said, and stricter rules for the 200,000 or so intercept operations conducted by French intelligence services each year.
He rejected calls for judicial oversight, saying, "In the context of the antiterror fight, day to day, it's impossible."
Alain Juillet, president of the Academy of Economic Intelligence and a former intelligence director for France's foreign intelligence service, said the law's value was "that it puts a framework where there wasn't one before. Before, there was nothing; it was total freedom," he said.
Laurent Borredon, a reporter for Le Monde, qualified that endorsement.
"If one can reproach the parliamentarians for something," he wrote last week (http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.lemonde.fr/journaliste/laurent-borredon/&prev=/search?q%3Dlaurent%2Bborredon%2Ble%2Bmonde%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs%3Dbnc%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26biw%3D1035%26bih%3D682), "it's to have regulated the tip of an iceberg whose depth we're only barely beginning to measure today."
NSA umiruje naciju (i posredno svet) i objašnjava da svo ovo prisluškivanje o kome se priča zapravo nije tako obimno. Evo sižea sa slešdota:
QuoteThis week CBS New's 60 Minutes program had a broadcast segment devoted to the NSA (http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-speaks-out-on-snowden-spying/), and additional online features. It revealed that the first secret Snowden stole was the test and answers (http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/snowden-cheated-his-way-into-the-nsa) for a technical examination to get a job at NSA. When working at home, Snowden covered his head and screen with a hood so that his girlfriend couldn't see what he was doing. NSA considered the possibility that Snowden left malicious software behind and removed every computer and cable that Snowden had access to from its classified network, costing tens of millions of dollars. Snowden took approximately 1.7 million classified documents. Snowden never approached any of multiple Inspectors General, supervisors, or Congressional oversight committee members about his concerns. Snowden's activity caught the notice of other System Administrators. There were also other interesting details, such as the NSA has a highly competitive intern program for High School students that are given a Top Secret clearance and a chance to break codes that have resisted the efforts of NSA's analysts — some succeed. The NSA is only targeting the communications, as opposed to metadata, of less than 60 Americans. Targeting the actual communications of Americans, rather than metadata, requires a probable cause finding and a specific court order. NSA analysts working with metadata don't have access to the name, and can't listen to the call. The NSA's work is driven by requests for information by other parts of the government, and there are about 31,000 requests. Snowden apparently managed to steal a copy of that document, the 'crown jewels' of the intelligence world. With that information, foreign nations would know what the US does and doesn't know, and how to exploit it.
A evo i reportaže:
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-speaks-out-on-snowden-spying/ (http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-speaks-out-on-snowden-spying/)
мислим да је једина истинска вредност емисије прво појављивање цифре узетих докумената
QuoteSnowden took approximately 1.7 million classified documents.
осталим причама могу поверовати само обамаботи и њихови републикански пандани
http://www.collegehumor.com/video/6942530/google-is-going-to-blackmail-you (http://www.collegehumor.com/video/6942530/google-is-going-to-blackmail-you)
Sjajan tekst o jednom od najpoznatijih spemera svih vremena na arstehnici
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/the-decade-long-quest-to-stop-spamford-wallace/ (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/the-decade-long-quest-to-stop-spamford-wallace/)
Ako se neko uzdao u američki savezni sud da stane u kraj razularenom NSA špijuniranju, sad je neizmerno razočaran:
Federal judge: NSA phone surveillance legal (http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/27/new-york-nsa-phone-surveillance/4219055/)
Quote
A federal judge ruled on Friday that the National Security Agency's bulk collection of millions of Americans' telephone and Internet records is legal and a critical component of the country's effort to combat the threat of terrorism.
The decision by U.S. District Judge William Pauley contrasts with a ruling earlier this month by U.S. District Court Judge Richard Leon and increases the likelihood that the issue will go before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Leon had granted a preliminary injunction against the collecting of phone records, saying the program likely violates the U.S. Constitution's ban on unreasonable search.
The NSA-run programs pick up millions of telephone and Internet records that are routed through American networks each day.
In the 54-page opinion issued in New York, Pauley said the sweeping program "represents the government's counter-punch" to eliminate al-Qaeda's terror network by connecting fragmented and fleeting communications.
"There is no evidence that the Government has used any of the bulk telephony metadata it collected for any purpose other than investigating and disrupting terrorist attacks," he wrote.
The judge further maintained that the program, which sucks up vast amounts of data, is subject to executive and congressional oversight as well as monitoring by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
"We are pleased with the decision," Justice Department spokesman Peter Carr said.
In issuing the ruling, Pauley dismissed a lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties Union, which had sued after former NSA analyst Edward Snowden leaked details of the secret programs that critics say violate privacy rights.
"We are extremely disappointed with this decision, which misinterprets the relevant statutes, understates the privacy implications of the government's surveillance and misapplies a narrow and outdated precedent to read away core constitutional protections," Jameel Jaffer, ACLU deputy legal director said in a statement.
In hearings last month in New York, an ACLU lawyer had argued that the government's interpretation of its authority under the Patriot Act was so broad that it could justify the mass collection of financial, health and even library records of innocent Americans without their knowledge. A government lawyer had countered that counterterrorism investigators wouldn't find most personal information useful.
The judge acknowledged that the data collection system is far-reaching, and "vacuums up information about virtually every telephone call, to, from or within the United States.
"This blunt tool only works because it collects everything," the judge wrote. "Such a program if unchecked, imperils the civil liberties of the every citizen."
While acknowledging this "natural tension" between protecting the nation and preserving civil liberty, Pauley said the system sweeps up huge quantities of data "by design" and could have helped investigators connect the dots before the Sept. 11 terrorists attacks
"The government learned from its mistake and adapted to confront a new enemy: a terror network capable of orchestrating attacks across the world. It launched a number of counter-measures, including a bulk telephony metadata collection program — a wide net that could find and isolate gossamer contacts among suspected terrorists in an ocean of seemingly disconnected data," he said.
He also found that the right to be free from search and seizures "is fundamental, but not absolute."
"Every day, people voluntarily surrender personal and seemingly-private information to transnational corporations, which exploit that data for profit," Pauley wrote in . Few think twice about it, even though it is far more intrusive than bulk telephony metadata collection.
Contributing: Associated Press
NSA reportedly intercepting laptops purchased online to install spy malware (http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/29/5253226/nsa-cia-fbi-laptop-usb-plant-spy) Quote
According to a new report from Der Spiegel based on internal NSA documents (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969-3.html), the signals intelligence agency's elite hacking unit (TAO) is able to conduct sophisticated wiretaps in ways that make Hollywood fantasy look more like reality. The report indicates that the NSA, in collaboration with the CIA and FBI, routinely and secretly intercepts shipping deliveries for laptops or other computer accessories in order to implant bugs before they reach their destinations. According to Der Spiegel, the NSA's TAO group is able to divert shipping deliveries to its own "secret workshops" in a method called interdiction, where agents load malware onto the electronics or install malicious hardware that can give US intelligence agencies remote access.
While the report does not indicate the scope of the program, or who the NSA is targeting with such wiretaps, it's a unique look at the agency's collaborative efforts with the broader intelligence community to gain hard access to communications equipment. One of the products the NSA appears to use to compromise target electronics is codenamed COTTONMOUTH, and has been available since 2009; it's a USB "hardware implant" that secretly provides the NSA with remote access to the compromised machine.
This tool, among others, is available to NSA agents through what Der Spiegel describes as a mail-order spy catalog (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html). The report indicates that the catalog offers backdoors into the hardware and software of the most prominent technology makers, including Cisco, Juniper Networks, Dell, Seagate, Western Digital, Maxtor, Samsung, and Huawei. Many of the targets are American companies. The report indicates that the NSA can even exploit error reports from Microsoft's Windows operating system; by intercepting the error reports and determining what's wrong with a target's computer, the NSA can then attack it with Trojans or other malware.
In response to Der Spiegel's report, Cisco senior vice president John Stewart wrote that "we are deeply concerned with anything that may impact the integrity of our products or our customers' networks," and that the company does "not work with any government to weaken our products for exploitation." Other US companies have fired back against reports of NSA tampering in recent months, including Microsoft, which labeled the agency an "advanced persistent threat" (http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/5/5177554/microsoft-plans-server-encryption-against-nsa-snooping) over its efforts to secretly collect private user data within the internal networks of Google and Yahoo (http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/30/5046958/nsa-secretly-taps-into-google-yahoo-networks-to-collect-information).
The Der Spiegel report, which gives a broad look at TAO operations, also highlights the NSA's cooperation with other intelligence agencies to conduct Hollywood-style raids. Unlike most of the NSA's operations which allow for remote access to targets, Der Spiegel notes that the TAO's programs often require physical access to targets. To gain physical access, the NSA reportedly works with the CIA and FBI on sensitive missions that sometimes include flying NSA agents on FBI jets to plant wiretaps. "This gets them to their destination at the right time and can help them to disappear again undetected after even as little as a half hour's work," the report notes.
The NSA currently faces pressure from the public, Congress, federal courts, and privacy advocates over its expansive spying programs. Those programs, which include bulk telephone surveillance of American citizens, are said by critics to violate constitutional protections against unreasonable searches, and were uncovered earlier this year by whistleblower Edward Snowden. Beyond the programs that scoop up data on American citizens, Snowden's documents have also given a much closer look at how the spy agency conducts other surveillance operations, including tapping the phones of high-level foreign leaders (http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/26/5031990/us-has-been-monitoring-german-chancellor-angela-merkels-phone-since-2002).
'ел овако намерно или се отело контроли?
ahahah,
sanjam ja noćas, meho me ubeđuje da pristupim njegovom planetarno poznatom bendu i sviram harfu, a ja kažem: - ne pada mi na pamet da sviram s onima koji ne znaju da primene pitagorinu teoremu!
sreća pa me dete probudilo, kako sam bila besna, bilo bi mrtvih. :lol: :lol:
Quote from: дејан on 31-12-2013, 17:45:32
'ел овако намерно или се отело контроли?
Otelo se al bilo mi simpatično pa ostavio.
Quote from: lilit on 31-12-2013, 18:24:34
ahahah,
sanjam ja noćas, meho me ubeđuje da pristupim njegovom planetarno poznatom bendu i sviram harfu, a ja kažem: - ne pada mi na pamet da sviram s onima koji ne znaju da primene pitagorinu teoremu!
sreća pa me dete probudilo, kako sam bila besna, bilo bi mrtvih. :lol: :lol:
U mom bendu ipak ima jedan inženjer mašinstva, slutim da bi on umeo da se snađe sa PT.
Quote from: lilit on 31-12-2013, 18:24:34
ahahah,
sanjam ja noćas, meho me ubeđuje da pristupim njegovom planetarno poznatom bendu i sviram harfu, a ja kažem: - ne pada mi na pamet da sviram s onima koji ne znaju da primene pitagorinu teoremu!
sreća pa me dete probudilo, kako sam bila besna, bilo bi mrtvih. :lol: :lol:
Joj lilito kakva nocna mora xrofl
Pa, srećna nova godina, onda.
Srecna Nova i ....svi snovi da se ostvare... ;) !!!!
Carmakers keep data on drivers' locations (http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140107/AUTO01/301070017)
Quote
Washington — A government report finds that major automakers are keeping information about where drivers have been — collected from onboard navigation systems — for varying lengths of time. Owners of those cars can't demand that the information be destroyed. And, says the U.S. senator requesting the investigation, that raises questions about driver privacy.
The Government Accountability Office in a report released Monday found major automakers have differing policies about how much data they collect and how long they keep it.
Automakers collect location data in order to provide drivers with real-time traffic information, to help find the nearest gas station or restaurant, and to provide emergency roadside assistance and stolen vehicle tracking. But, the report found, "If companies retained data, they did not allow consumers to request that their data be deleted, which is a recommended practice."
The report reviewed practices of Detroit's Big Three automakers, Toyota Motor Corp., Honda Motor Co. and Nissan Motor Co. It also looked at navigation system makers Garmin and TomTom and app developers Google Maps and Telenav. The report, which didn't identify the specific policies of individual companies, found automakers had taken steps to protect privacy and were not selling personal data of owners, but said drivers are not aware of all risks.
The agency said privacy advocates worry location data could be used to market to individuals and to "track where consumers are, which can in turn be used to steal their identity, stalk them or monitor them without their knowledge. In addition, location data can be used to infer other sensitive information about individuals such as their religious affiliation or political activities."
Sen. Al Franken, D-Minn., who chairs a judiciary committee on privacy and requested the report, said Monday that more work needs to be done to ensure privacy protections for in-car navigation systems and mapping apps. He plans to reintroduce his location privacy legislation sometime this year.
"Modern technology now allows drivers to get turn-by-turn directions in a matter of seconds, but our privacy laws haven't kept pace with these enormous advances," Franken said in a statement. "Companies providing in-car location services are taking their customers' privacy seriously — but this report shows that Minnesotans and people across the country need much more information about how the data are being collected, what they're being used for, and how they're being shared with third parties."
The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the trade group representing Detroit's Big Three automakers, Toyota, Volkswagen AG and other major automakers, said automakers are committed to driver privacy. "Details of the industry's strict privacy policies are traditionally included in our sales and service agreements," spokeswoman Gloria Bergquist said. "That way, we ensure our customers have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with these strict privacy policies."
In addition to navigation systems, there are other ways vehicles can collect information: Event data recorders, known as "black boxes," store data in the event of crashes. Transponders like EZ-PASS transmit location and are used in some instances by law enforcement and for research. Some owners also agree to monitoring of driving habits to qualify for lower insurance rates or to keep tabs on teen drivers.
The report said "companies should safeguard location data, in part, by de-identifying them; that companies should not keep location data longer than needed; and that such data should be deleted after a specific amount of time." It found companies use different de-identification methods that may lead to varying levels of protection. It also found wide variation in how long they keep information.
GM said in a statement, "OnStar takes seriously matters that affect our customers' privacy and operates its services with strong privacy protections and practices." GM spokeswoman Heather Rosenker said the automaker keeps no records of requests for turn-by-turn navigation.
None of the companies told the GAO how long they keep data.
A contractor that works with three of the companies told the GAO that when a consumer requests services, information such as location, vehicle information number and other information may be kept for up to seven years.
Another company said it "retains personally identifiable location data for no more than 24 hours." A representative from another company said that it does not retain such data at all. However, the report said representatives from both those companies said they kept de-identified location data indefinitely.
The GAO also found one developer of mobile apps did not encrypt transmitted information, and the agency was able to view locations and other information such as passwords. "This developer acknowledged that such data were not encrypted and told us that it had made a decision independent from our review to encrypt the data...," the report said.
The NSA Uses Radio Waves to Monitor 100,000 Computers Without Internet (http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-uses-radio-waves-to-monitor-100-000-computers-w-1501722277?utm_campaign=socialflow_gizmodo_facebook&utm_source=gizmodo_facebook&utm_medium=socialflow)QuoteAccording to the article (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0), the NSA has been using the technology, called Quantum, since 2008. It uses "covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers," which are "sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target...
Depresivno.... Dizni Vrld prati svaki vaš korak i skuplja podatke o tome šta radite a autor članka ovome pokušava da da određeni pozitivni spin...
You don't want your privacy: Disney and the meat space data race (http://gigaom.com/2014/01/18/you-dont-want-your-privacy-disney-and-the-meat-space-data-race/)
Quote
Summary: MailChimp Chief Data Scientist is at Disney World this weekend wearing his RFID-equipped MagicBand. Here's how he thinks the practice of digitally tracking consumers in the physical world will reach everywhere from theme parks to our homes.
When my wife and I went backpacking around Europe 10 years ago, we made a vow to each other. After seeing the stunningly blue waters off Greece, the paragliders sailing through the Austrian Alps, the idyllic countryside of Slovenia, we said, "Never will we take our children to Disney World. Why would you need something so manufactured when you have the real world?"
It's 10 years later. And I left for Disney World on Thursday. The thing I didn't understand, which, now that I have three boys, I know in my bones is this: You can't see Buzz Lightyear while backpacking.
Oh well, Walt! You win.
But as a data scientist at a tech company, I have to admit, I'm geeking out over the technology. Disney World is like a petri dish for advanced analytic techniques because the hotels and parks are all tied together in one large, heavily controlled environment. If you ever wanted to star in The Truman Show, a trip to Disney is the next best thing — it feels like a centrally planned North Korea only with more fun, less torture and the same amount of artifice.
From the mundane to the magical, the fact is there's probably an engineer behind the scenes at Disney who has thought through it. Disney has industrial engineers that work on everything from optimal food-and-beverage pricing and laundry facility optimization, to attraction performance and wait-time minimization (the vaunted FASTPASS system).
MagicBands: like magic beans, except they grow data But those tried-and-true efforts at optimization were just the appetizer. Earlier this week, there was a knock on my door and there on my doorstep sat a little bit of hand-delivered magic. I opened the package with the sweaty palms of anticipation because, to me, this package represented a billion-dollar investment by Disney in big data analytics.
That investment is called MagicBands. They're a new technology for the park, and the program officially opened up about a month ago. Disney has thought of everything.
The box in which the bands arrived (http://mousechat.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/disney-magic-bands-pixie-vacations-1.jpg) rivaled Apple in its Incredibles-themed design. Each magic band was tucked in a slot, standing up straight, ready to be put on by the vacationer like some fabled amulet. Each rubber wristband was smartly colored with a soft-touch matte.
But under all that visual appeal, beneath the surface of the band, was the reason for Disney's huge investment: a sophisticated RFID tag. These bands, which are individually coded to each visitor, allow Disney to track individuals wherever they go in the parks and resorts with long-range RFID readers. You check into FASTPASS rides with your band, you purchase food by swiping your band and you use it as a key to your hotel room.
The bands are even uniquely colored and monogrammed with your family members' names so that they won't get switched up. Why? Because they don't want their database to get confused and think that you, a 45-year-old man, rode the teacups instead of your little son Timmy. This is one of the first examples I've seen of physical design (e.g., monogramming and coloring) for the sake of digital data purity.
If ever there was a testimony to the importance big data has achieved in business it's this: We will now shape our physical world to create better streams of digital information.
Mickey thinks you need some Buzz Lightyear time Stop a moment and dream of the MagicBand possibilities.
The pitch that Disney is making is personalization. For each band, for example, Disney asks for the name and birthday of the person who'll be wearing it. So if your kid is having a birthday in the park and there's a character wandering nearby, that character can be notified to sneak up on your kid and creepily wish them a happy birthday individually.
Now, let's dig a little deeper.
What does Disney get out of the deal? In short, it tracks everything you do, everything you buy, everything you eat, everything you ride, everywhere you go in the park. If the goal is to keep you in the park longer so you'll spend more money, it can build AI models on itineraries, show schedules, line length, weather, etc., to figure out what influences stay length and cash expenditure. Perhaps there are a few levers they can pull to get money out of you.
Or perhaps its models know that your family is staying in a high-dollar luxury Disney resort and that this morning you forked over lots of money at the Cinderella character breakfast. But right now your high-dollar family is stuck in a long line at an attraction. If your family gets too tuckered out or frustrated, you might be inclined to call it a day.
So, a model marks you as a candidate for "encouragement." Within the park, a character is notified to make its way over to your children and entertain them until they can get on the ride. This increases enjoyment, decreases perceived exhaustion, and hopefully keeps you around for more meals, more trinkets and more arcade games.
The research questions that might be answered with this type of tracking data are endless:
- What menu items served at breakfast at the resort hotel restaurants will result in the longest stay at the park?
- Do we detect an influx of park-goers into the bathrooms for long stays on the toilet? Perhaps they all ate at the same place, and we can cut off a foodborne illness problem before it gets worse.
- Is there a roller coaster that's correlated with early park departure or a high incidence of bathroom visits? That means less money in the park's pockets. How might that coaster be altered?
- Is there a particular ride and food fingerprint for the type of park visitor that's likely to buy in-park high-dollar merchandise? If so, can we actively get vendors in front of this attendee's eye by moving hawkers to them at just the right time?
The allusion of freedom and agency still exist within the park, but with these bands, you are giving up much of your privacy and freedom to experience something "untailored" in exchange for a better time. Even if that better time is achieved by spending more money.
The future of big data is in meat space "Meat space" (coined by William Gibson in Neuromancer) is a term for the physical world where our bodies (meat) move around and do meat-like things (for example, eat, jog or go clubbin'). The interesting thing about the term is it's a play on "cyber space" — meat space is an internet-first way of viewing the world.
And that internet-first way of seeing the world is what's driving these changes at Disney, casinos (http://www.revenueanalytics.com/pdf/2008%20Interfaces.pdf), insurance companies (http://business.time.com/2013/08/06/big-data-is-my-copilot-auto-insurers-push-devices-that-track-driving-habits/), etc. We've been "cookie-ing" people online and tracking their browsing habits for years, and in that contained environment, businesses have seen the value of acting on personal transactional data. But now businesses are taking this approach and applying it to meat space.
Why? Because cyber space is small, it starts and stops at internet-connected devices. Think of the transactions and interactions that are carried out each day in meat space. Think of the money spent in meat space (on your caramel macchiato, for instance).
While not everyone is online all day long, we're all implicitly offline. Wouldn't it be great it we could gather meat space data and use that to tailor the offline experience much like companies now tailor your online experience? "Personalizing your meat space experience" is a gross way of saying "pretty much control your life."
Which is frightening. But that's exactly what companies want to do.
It's not new. It's one of the fundamental goals of marketing. For example, a discount pricing model implemented on airline seats wants to control your booking decisions by adjusting prices. The control is targeted and specific, so you feel pretty good about it.
We now know this is Google's end game. Self-driving cars, Google Glass and the purchase of Nest — Google is dying to get out of your computer and all up in your life. With Nest, Google won't just know how you like your air to feel. It'll know when you're at work and when you're at home (http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/01/13/google_buys_nest_for_3_2_billion_why_google_wants_a_smart_thermostat.html). It gets pieces in a data puzzle that is your entire observable life.
Loyalty cards (those things you swipe at the grocery store) were the first salvos into this real-world data gathering. Now, department stores are doing a lo-fi version of MagicBands by tracking the hardware ID on your cell phone's Wi-Fi card (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/19/how-stores-use-your-phones-wifi-to-track-your-shopping-habits/) as you wander the store.
Hey, look! That's the same Wi-Fi ID as the person who bought a necklace from us last week. Maybe a sales associate should propose a pair of earrings to them?
This is where data science is headed, and it's part of the reason why there aren't enough qualified data analysts to meet demand. The reach of the discipline is moving out of the browser and into every business that can gather data on your life.
But I'd like to keep my meat private, thanks. At this point, I'm sure a lot of you are freaked out by the privacy implications of where all this is headed. Indeed, one journalist just compared what Disney is doing to the recent disclosures (http://entertainment.time.com/2014/01/02/disney-nsa-style-magic-bands-theme-park/) about the NSA's own tracking programs. But at the end of that article there's a big glaring difference between the NSA and Disney: "Disney fanatics, for their part, can't wait to get their hands on the [MagicBands]."
We want MagicBands!
We don't want the NSA tracking us, because we get nothing in return. It tries to sell us on "terrorism prevention," but most people don't experience that benefit in a visceral way. But this is not to say Americans won't give up privacy for anything.
On the contrary, Americans are very, very cheap dates. For just a modicum of convenience, entertainment and comfort, I'm happy to give you a list of everyone I call and everywhere I go. That's more than I'm sure the NSA has on me. And despite your privacy concerns, most of you are exactly the same way.
Don't believe me? I recently installed a flashlight app on my phone. In exchange for this app that does no more than turn on my phone's camera flash, I give it my geolocation all day long (http://www.fastcompany.com/3023042/fast-feed/this-popular-flashlight-app-has-been-secretly-your-sharing-location-and-device-id). Who owns this app? No idea. Probably some Ukranians. What I do know is that this app is worth like $5 to me, and yet that was enough to give these strangers all my info.
Same with Angry Birds (tracks location). Same with LinkedIn (can read AND WRITE my phone call data, can read my "calendar events plus confidential information", etc.). Same with the freaking Shazam app that let's me identify that song playing in the mall. Have you heard of Stylitics? You get your wardrobe mirrored back at you in a virtual closet –whatever that is — and Stylitics gets to sell your clothing data to retailers to better understand where else you shop beside their stores.
We're all wringing our hands over the NSA, and meanwhile we're handing our data as fast as we can to other entities for next to nothing. If the NSA were smart, it would buy Candy Crush Saga, change the permissions, and be done with it.
If we're honest, we give privacy lip service, but we vote with our keypresses and our dollars, and the bands we strap to our wrists.
Expect your future meat space world to feel very much like your cyber space one. The next time your RFID tag lets Mickey know you've got diarrhea, maybe the stall door can make suggestions to you: "Customers who got funnel cake diarrhea also bought Maalox."
Ovo je juče bilo i u našim medijima: NSA koristi telefonske apove da, jelte, špijunira svet. Dakle, Enrgi brdz end šit:
Angry Birds and 'leaky' phone apps targeted by NSA and GCHQ for user data (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data)
Quote
• US and UK spy agencies piggyback on commercial data
• Details can include age, location and sexual orientation
• Documents also reveal targeted tools against individual phones
The National Security Agency (http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files) and its UK counterpart GCHQ (http://www.theguardian.com/uk/gchq) have been developing capabilities to take advantage of "leaky" smartphone apps, such as the wildly popular Angry Birds game, that transmit users' private information across the internet, according to top secret documents.
The data pouring onto communication networks from the new generation of iPhone and Android apps ranges from phone model and screen size to personal details such as age, gender and location. Some apps, the documents state, can share users' most sensitive information such as sexual orientation – and one app recorded in the material even sends specific sexual preferences such as whether or not the user may be a swinger.
Many smartphone owners will be unaware of the full extent this information is being shared across the internet, and even the most sophisticated would be unlikely to realise that all of it is available for the spy agencies to collect.
Dozens of classified documents, provided to the Guardian by whistleblower Edward Snowden and reported in partnership with the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html) and ProPublica (http://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data), detail the NSA and GCHQ efforts to piggyback on this commercial data collection for their own purposes.
Scooping up information the apps are sending about their users allows the agencies to collect large quantities of mobile phone data from their existing mass surveillance tools – such as cable taps, or from international mobile networks – rather than solely from hacking into individual mobile handsets.
Exploiting phone information and location is a high-priority effort for the intelligence agencies, as terrorists and other intelligence targets make substantial use of phones in planning and carrying out their activities, for example by using phones as triggering devices in conflict zones. The NSA has cumulatively spent more than $1bn in its phone targeting efforts.
The disclosures also reveal how much the shift towards smartphone browsing could benefit spy agencies' collection efforts.
One slide from a May 2010 NSA presentation on getting data from smartphones – breathlessly titled "Golden Nugget!" – sets out the agency's "perfect scenario": "Target uploading photo to a social media site taken with a mobile device. What can we get?"
The question is answered in the notes to the slide: from that event alone, the agency said it could obtain a "possible image", email selector, phone, buddy lists, and "a host of other social working data as well as location".
In practice, most major social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, strip photos of identifying location metadata (known as EXIF data) before publication. However, depending on when this is done during upload, such data may still, briefly, be available for collection by the agencies as it travels across the networks.
Depending on what profile information a user had supplied, the documents suggested, the agency would be able to collect almost every key detail of a user's life: including home country, current location (through geolocation), age, gender, zip code, marital status – options included "single", "married", "divorced", "swinger" and more – income, ethnicity, sexual orientation, education level, and number of children.
The agencies also made use of their mobile interception capabilities to collect location information in bulk, from Google and other mapping apps. One basic effort by GCHQ and the NSA was to build a database geolocating every mobile phone mast in the world – meaning that just by taking tower ID from a handset, location information could be gleaned.
A more sophisticated effort, though, relied on intercepting Google Maps queries made on smartphones, and using them to collect large volumes of location information.
So successful was this effort that one 2008 document noted that "t effectively means that anyone using Google Maps on a smartphone is working in support of a GCHQ system."
The information generated by each app is chosen by its developers, or by the company that delivers an app's adverts. The documents do not detail whether the agencies actually collect the potentially sensitive details some apps are capable of storing or transmitting, but any such information would likely qualify as content, rather than metadata.
Data collected from smartphone apps is subject to the same laws and minimisation procedures as all other NSA activity – procedures that the US president, Barack Obama, suggested may be subject to reform in a speech 10 days ago (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/obama-nsa-reforms-end-storage-americans-call-data). But the president focused largely on the NSA's collection of the metadata from US phone calls and made no mention in his address of the large amounts of data the agency collects from smartphone apps.
The latest disclosures could also add to mounting public concern about how the technology sector collects and uses information, especially for those outside the US, who enjoy fewer privacy protections than Americans. A January poll for the Washington Post showed 69% of US adults were already concerned about how tech companies such as Google used and stored their information.
The documents do not make it clear how much of the information that can be taken from apps is routinely collected, stored or searched, nor how many users may be affected. The NSA says it does not target Americans and its capabilities are deployed only against "valid foreign intelligence targets".
The documents do set out in great detail exactly how much information can be collected from widely popular apps. One document held on GCHQ's internal Wikipedia-style guide for staff details what can be collected from different apps. Though it uses Android apps for most of its examples, it suggests much of the same data could be taken from equivalent apps on iPhone or other platforms.
The GCHQ documents set out examples of what information can be extracted from different ad platforms, using perhaps the most popular mobile phone game of all time, Angry Birds – which has reportedly been downloaded more than 1.7bn times – as a case study.
From some app platforms, relatively limited, but identifying, information such as exact handset model, the unique ID of the handset, software version, and similar details are all that are transmitted.
Other apps choose to transmit much more data, meaning the agency could potentially net far more. One mobile ad platform, Millennial Media, appeared to offer particularly rich information. Millennial Media's website states it has partnered with Rovio on a special edition of Angry Birds; with Farmville maker Zynga; with Call of Duty developer Activision, and many other major franchises.
Rovio, the maker of Angry Birds, said it had no knowledge of any NSA or GCHQ programs looking to extract data from its apps users.
"Rovio doesn't have any previous knowledge of this matter, and have not been aware of such activity in 3rd party advertising networks," said Saara Bergström, Rovio's VP of marketing and communications. "Nor do we have any involvement with the organizations you mentioned [NSA and GCHQ]."
Millennial Media did not respond to a request for comment.
In December, the Washington Post reported (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/) on how the NSA could make use of advertising tracking files generated through normal internet browsing – known as cookies – from Google and others to get information on potential targets.
However, the richer personal data available to many apps, coupled with real-time geolocation, and the uniquely identifying handset information many apps transmit give the agencies a far richer data source than conventional web-tracking cookies.
Almost every major website uses cookies to serve targeted advertising and content, as well as streamline the experience for the user, for example by managing logins. One GCHQ document from 2010 notes that cookie data – which generally qualifies as metadata – has become just as important to the spies. In fact, the agencies were sweeping it up in such high volumes that their were struggling to store it.
"They are gathered in bulk, and are currently our single largest type of events," the document stated.
The ability to obtain targeted intelligence by hacking individual handsets has been well documented, both through several years of hacker conferences and previous NSA disclosures in Der Spiegel (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/how-the-nsa-spies-on-smartphones-including-the-blackberry-a-921161.html), and both the NSA and GCHQ have extensive tools ready to deploy against iPhone, Android and other phone platforms.
GCHQ's targeted tools against individual smartphones are named after characters in the TV series The Smurfs. An ability to make the phone's microphone 'hot', to listen in to conversations, is named "Nosey Smurf". High-precision geolocation is called "Tracker Smurf", power management – an ability to stealthily activate an a phone that is apparently turned off – is "Dreamy Smurf", while the spyware's self-hiding capabilities are codenamed "Paranoid Smurf".
Those capability names are set out in a much broader 2010 presentation that sheds light on spy agencies' aspirations for mobile phone interception, and that less-documented mass-collection abilities.
The cover sheet of the document sets out the team's aspirations:
These are particularly useful to the agency as data is often only weakly encrypted on such networks, and includes extra information such as handset ID or mobile number – much stronger target identifiers than usual IP addresses or similar information left behind when PCs and laptops browse the internet.
The NSA said its phone interception techniques are only used against valid targets, and are subject to stringent legal safeguards.
"The communications of people who are not valid foreign intelligence targets are not of interest to the National Security Agency," said a spokeswoman in a statement.
"Any implication that NSA's foreign intelligence collection is focused on the smartphone or social media communications of everyday Americans is not true. Moreover, NSA does not profile everyday Americans as it carries out its foreign intelligence mission. We collect only those communications that we are authorized by law to collect for valid foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes – regardless of the technical means used by the targets.
"Because some data of US persons may at times be incidentally collected in NSA's lawful foreign intelligence mission, privacy protections for US persons exist across the entire process concerning the use, handling, retention, and dissemination of data. In addition, NSA actively works to remove extraneous data, to include that of innocent foreign citizens, as early as possible in the process.
"Continuous and selective publication of specific techniques and tools lawfully used by NSA to pursue legitimate foreign intelligence targets is detrimental to the security of the United States and our allies – and places at risk those we are sworn to protect."
The NSA declined to respond to a series of queries on how routinely capabilities against apps were deployed, or on the specific minimisation procedures used to prevent US citizens' information being stored through such measures.
GCHQ declined to comment on any of its specific programs, but stressed all of its activities were proportional and complied with UK law.
"It is a longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters," said a spokesman.
"Furthermore, all of GCHQ's work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework that ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight, including from the Secretary of State, the Interception and Intelligence Services Commissioners and the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. All our operational processes rigorously support this position."
• A separate disclosure on Wednesday, published by Glenn Greenwald and NBC News (http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite), gave examples of how GCHQ was making use of its cable-tapping capabilities to monitor YouTube and social media traffic in real-time.
GCHQ's cable-tapping and internet buffering capabilities , codenamed Tempora, were disclosed by the Guardian in June, (http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa) but the new documents published by NBC from a GCHQ presentation titled "Psychology: A New Kind of SIGDEV" set out a program codenamed Squeaky Dolphin which gave the British spies "broad real-time monitoring" of "YouTube Video Views", "URLs 'Liked' on Facebook" and "Blogspot/Blogger Visits".
A further slide noted that "passive" – a term for large-scale surveillance through cable intercepts – give the agency "scalability".
The means of interception mean GCHQ and NSA could obtain data without any knowledge or co-operation from the technology companies. Spokespeople for the NSA and GCHQ told NBC all programs were carried out in accordance with US and UK law.
• This article was amended on 28 January 2014. It referred to martial status, instead of marital status. This has been corrected.
Plus, naravno, kad špijunirate u ime nacionalne bezbednosti, definicija nacionalne bezbednosti može da se proširi i na... industrijsku špijunažu:
Edward Snowden says NSA engages in industrial espionage (http://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/Edward%20Snowden%20says%20NSA%20engages%20in%20industrial%20espionage)
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The U.S. National Security Agency is involved in industrial espionage and will grab any intelligence it can get its hands on regardless of its value to national security, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden told a German TV network.
In text released ahead of a lengthy interview to be broadcast on Sunday, ARD TV quoted Snowden as saying the NSA does not limit its espionage to issues of national security and he cited German engineering firm, Siemens as one target.
"If there's information at Siemens that's beneficial to U.S. national interests — even if it doesn't have anything to do with national security — then they'll take that information nevertheless," Snowden said, according to ARD, which recorded the interview in Russia where he has claimed asylum.
Snowden also told the German public broadcasting network he no longer has possession of any documents or information on NSA activities and has turned everything he had over to select journalists.
He said he did not have any control over the publication of the information, ARD said.
Questions about U.S. government spying on civilians and foreign officials burst into the open last June when Snowden, leaked documents outlining the widespread collection of telephone records and email.
The revelations shocked Germany, a country especially sensitive after the abuses by the Gestapo during the Nazi reign and the Stasi in Communist East Germany during the Cold War.
Reports the NSA monitored Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone have added to the anger in Germany, which has been pushing for a 'no-spy' agreement with the United States, a country it considers to be among its closest allies.
NSA software could help hackers Snowden's claim the NSA is engaged in industrial espionage follows a New York Times report earlier this month that the NSA put software in almost 100,000 computers around the world, allowing it to carry out surveillance on those devices and could provide a digital highway for cyberattacks.
The NSA planted most of the software after gaining access to computer networks, but has also used a secret technology that allows it entry even to computers not connected to the internet, the newspaper said, citing U.S. officials, computer experts and documents leaked by Snowden.
The newspaper said the technology had been in use since at least 2008 and relied on a covert channel of radio waves transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards secretly inserted in the computers.
Frequent targets of the program, code-named Quantum, included units of the Chinese military and industrial targets.
Snowden faces criminal charges after fleeing to Hong Kong and then Russia, where he was granted at least a year's asylum.
He was charged with theft of government property, unauthorized communication of national security information and giving classified intelligence data to an unauthorized person.
© Thomson Reuters, 2014
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cbc.ca%2Fgfx%2Ficon_reuters.gif&hash=b083b9c7ac2317e953f109c744aea29486ab3bea) (http://thomsonreuters.com/)
QuotePlus, naravno, kad špijunirate u ime nacionalne bezbednosti, definicija nacionalne bezbednosti može da se proširi i na... industrijsku špijunažu:
Edward Snowden says NSA engages in industrial espionage
па, мајку му, та индустријска шпиунажа је један од најбитнијих делова њиховог посла!
Moguće, ja sam sve što znam o NSA naučio igrajući Splinter Cell. :oops:
Urnebes. Dejvid Kameron, britanski premijer insistira da se u britansko zakonodavstvo uvedu široka ovlašćenja za praćenje, prisluškivanje i beleženje komunikacija građana, uz obrazloženje da u svim policijskim serijama koje gleda na televiziji, dobri momci na kraju spasu stvar zato što su imali pristup snimcima telefonskih razgovora itd. Fak!
David Cameron Says Snooper's Charter Is Necessary Because Fictional Crime Dramas He Watches Prove It (http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140131/09523326059/david-cameron-says-snoopers-charter-is-necessary-because-fictional-crime-dramas-he-watches-prove-it.shtml)
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You may recall the stories from the past couple years about the so-called "snooper's charter" in the UK (http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120614/14141919329/uk-snoopers-charter-seeks-to-eliminate-pesky-private-communications.shtml) -- a system to further legalize the government's ability to spy on pretty much all communications. It was setting up basically a total surveillance system, even beyond what we've since learned is already being done today. Thankfully, that plan was killed off (http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130425/02375422830/uk-snoopers-charter-torn-up-now-what.shtml) by Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg.
However, Prime Minister David Cameron is back to pushing for the snooper's charter (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25969918) -- and his reasoning is as stupid as it is unbelievable. Apparently, he thinks it's necessary because the fictional crime dramas he watches on TV show why it's necessary. I am not joking, even though I wish I was: > In the most serious crimes [such as] child abduction communications data... is absolutely vital. I love watching, as I probably should stop telling people, crime dramas on the television. There's hardly a crime drama where a crime is solved without using the data of a mobile communications device.
What we have to explain to people is that... if we don't modernise the practice and the law, over time we will have the communications data to solve these horrible crimes on a shrinking proportion of the total use of devices and that is a real problem for keeping people safe. Yes, he just said that. Because fictional characters on crime drama TV shows make use of data, that's somehow proof that it's necessary. Perhaps someone can send Cameron a copy of Enemy of the State (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120660/) or any other fictional work showing how the government can abuse such information. Or, better yet, let's have our side stick with reality, and we can just point to real historical events (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Edgar_Hoover) of governments abusing such information.
Bonus: video na kome se vidi kako GCHQ agenti uništavaju Guardijanovu opremu na kojoj se nalaze podaci dobijeni od Edwarda Snowdena
http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/jan/31/snowden-files-computer-destroyed-guardian-gchq-basement-video (http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/jan/31/snowden-files-computer-destroyed-guardian-gchq-basement-video)
Distopija mikromenadžmenta zaposlenih:
How your boss can keep you on a leash (http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/02/opinion/greene-corporate-surveillance/index.html?hpt=hp_bn7)
Quote
Editor's note: CNN Contributor Bob Greene is a bestselling author whose 25 books include "Late Edition: A Love Story"; "When We Get to Surf City: A Journey Through America in Pursuit of Rock and Roll, Friendship, and Dreams"; and "Once Upon a Town: The Miracle of the North Platte Canteen," which has been named the One Book, One Nebraska (http://onebook.nebraska.gov/2014/index.aspx) statewide reading selection (http://onebook.nebraska.gov/2014/index.aspx) for 2014.
(CNN) -- If you're a person who hates it when your supervisor looks over your shoulder at work, you may want to stop reading this column right now.
Because what follows is only going to depress you.
Hitachi, the big electronics company based in Japan, is manufacturing and selling to corporations a device intended to increase efficiency in the workplace. It has a rather bland and generic-sounding name: the Hitachi Business Microscope (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303796404579099203059125112).
But what it is capable of doing ... well, just imagine being followed around the office or the factory all day by the snoopiest boss in the world. Even into the restroom.
And, the thing is, once you hear about it, you just know that, from a management point of view, it is an innovation of absolute genius.
Here's how it works:
The device looks like an employee ID badge that most companies issue. Workers are instructed to wear it in the office.
Embedded inside each badge, according to Hitachi, are "infrared sensors, an accelerometer, a microphone sensor and a wireless communication device."
Hitachi says that the badges (http://www.hitachi.com/design/field/solution/microscope/) record and transmit to management "who talks to whom, how often, where and how energetically."
It tracks everything.
If you get up to walk around the office a lot, the badge sends information to management about how often you do it, and where you go.
If you stop to talk with people throughout the day, the badge transmits who you're talking to (by reading your co-workers' badges), and for how long.
Do you contribute at meetings, or just sit there? Either way, the badge tells your bosses.
The stated intention of this is to increase productivity and get the most out of employees.
But a case can be made that, however much we worry that the National Security Agency may be peeking into our lives, we should be just as concerned -- or more -- about the potential for corporations to become their own, private NSAs.
And there's not much, in the future, that employees will be able to do about it. With government surveillance, the public can complain that the state has no right to be scrutinizing the lives of its citizens so intrusively. But corporations can make the argument that supervisors have always been encouraged to keep an eye on how workers are spending their time when they're on the clock -- and that electronic tools such as the Business Microscope are simply a 21st-century way to do that.
The employers are paying for their workers' time, the argument will go -- and if the employees don't like being accountable for how they spend that time, they can always choose to work elsewhere.
Hitachi says that by analyzing the "enormous amount of data collected with the Business Microscope, it will be possible to propose methods to improve organizational communication and quantitatively evaluate efficacy." Among the activities the badges record and transmit, according to Hitachi, are "the distance between people talking face-to face" and "an individual's activity level (active or nonactive), which is determined on the basis of subtle movements detected (such as talking, nodding and silence)."
And the sensor badges never sleep. They never take breaks. They don't go to lunch. As H. James Wilson, a senior researcher at Babson Executive Education, wrote in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303796404579099203059125112), the badges not only transmit who employees are talking to and how long the conversations go on, but can "also measure how well they're talking to them." If you're in a conference room with colleagues and they are animated participants in a discussion about, say, sales strategy, while you just remain quiet in your seat, the badge knows it.
Businesses have long dreamed of maximum efficiency, and Hitachi says that, since the Business Microscope was first developed in its labs in 2007, "over one million days of human behavior and big data" have been collected.
(You can imagine the surveillance experts at NSA, and at spy agencies for governments around the world, hearing about what Hitachi has come up with, shaking their heads in admiration, and saying: "Boy, those guys are good!")
The long-term question will be whether companies, in the name of workplace output, will want to risk the morale problems that will inevitably arise among employees who are instructed to wear such devices, manufactured either by Hitachi or by other firms that will engineer their own digital tracking machinery. Technology always wins, but victory can come with a price.
And if employees bristle and become resentful about being kept on such a short electronic leash, that could bring about productivity problems of a different sort. Unhappy workers are not motivated to put in extra effort.
Of course, the employees could get up from their desks, congregate in an out-of-the-way corner of the office, and bitterly complain about it all.
But the badges would know.
And tell.
French journalist "hacks" govt by inputting correct URL, later fined $4,000+ (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/french-journalist-fined-4000-plus-for-publishing-public-documents/)
A Google search turned up public files that Olivier Laurelli is accused of publishing.
In 2012, French blogger, activist, and businessman Olivier Laurelli sat down at his computer. It automatically connected to his VPN on boot (he owns a small security services company, called Toonux (http://toonux.com/), which was providing a connection via a Panamanian IP address) and began surfing the Web.
Laurelli, who goes by the alias "Bluetouff" in most circles (including on Ars Technica (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/06/french-isp-provided-anti-p2p-tool-has-gaping-security-hole/)), is something of a presence (https://twitter.com/bluetouff) among the French tech-savvy community. Besides managing Toonux, he also co-founded the French-language activist news site Reflets.info (http://reflets.info/), which describes itself as a "community project to connect journalists and computer networking specialists." As such, Laurelli initiated a Google search on other subjects, but what he stumbled on was perhaps more interesting: a link that led to 7.7 Gb of internal documents from the French National Agency for Food Safety, Environment, and Labor (the acronym is ANSES in French).
Although the documents were openly indexed by Google, Laurelli would soon be in the French government's crosshairs for publishing them. He eventually faced criminal charges, though he was later acquitted of those (http://www.numerama.com/magazine/25789-accuse-de-vol-de-donnees-librement-accessibles-bluetouff-est-relaxe.html). However, a separate government agency pursued a civil appeal. And last Tuesday, a French appeals court fined Laurelli 3,000 Euros (or a little over $4,000), meaning he likely made one of the more expensive Google searches to date.
On that fateful night, Laurelli merely used the Linux Wget tool to download all of the contents of the Web directory that he found. He left the files on his drive for a few days and then transferred them to his desktop for more convenient reading (which the French government would later spin as "the accused made backup copies of the documents he had stolen"). A few days later, Laurelli searched through the documents he downloaded and sent some to a fellow Reflets writer, Yovan Menkevick. About two weeks later, a few interesting scientific slides pertaining to nano-substances from the cache were published on Laurelli's site.
He later wrote (http://bluetouff.com/2013/04/25/la-non-affaire-bluetouff-vs-anses/) about how he reacted when discovering the documents—that is, how he faced what at the time was a non-dilemma:
Through a Google search which strictly did not have anything to do with ANSES or with public health, I found myself in the ANSES extranet. Simply by clicking on a search result.
- First observation: there are a lot of documents freely available here.
- Second observation: they speak about public health.
- Third observation: L'ANSES is a public establishment.
- Question: Is it that this ought to be public?
- Response: (too) obvious at the time: yes.
...I did it wrong. According to French language site PC Inpact (http://www.pcinpact.com/news/79274-la-dcri-desavouee-par-justice-face-a-bluetouff.htm), when ANSES discovered the slides in question on Reflets.info, the agency filed a report with the police, "citing potential 'intrusion into a computer system and data theft from a computer.'" At that point, France's Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence (or DCRI in French) joined the case to investigate how the files had been "hacked."
The DCRI discovered that the files had been downloaded via a Panamanian IP address, and when they discovered that the address was used by a VPN service operated by a Reflets editor, they went after Laurelli. The activist claims that the involvement of the VPN was the tipping point in convincing the investigators that he was guilty or that he at least did something nefarious: "This VPN (in fact above all this Panamanian IP address) is probably one of the strongest elements which had driven the prosecution to pursue a criminal case," he wrote. Laurelli was held in custody for 30 hours before officials indicted him.
Shortly after this, an excerpt from court documents (provided on Laurelli's personal website) shows that ANSES' internal investigation led to an embarrassing discovery: "We [ANSES] have proceeded with internal technical investigations to attempt to identify the method used by the hackers to access and retrieve the documents. Following these analyses, we then found that it was sufficient to have the full URL to access to the resource on the extranet in order to bypass the authentication rules on this server." In other words, the method of hacking was inputting the URL correctly.Incredibly, although a lower criminal court ruled that Laurelli could not be penalized for accessing data that was not secure, the DCRI decided to appeal the decision. That's after ANSES, the organization from which the documents were "stolen" in the first place, decided not to pursue any civil action. Although the court documents are not yet available, French technology news site Numerama (http://www.numerama.com/magazine/28295-bluetouff-condamne-en-appel-pour-avoir-su-utiliser-google.html) and the French-language version of Slate (http://www.slate.fr/france/81431/juge-connait-pas-google-login-proces-bluetouff) both quote a baffling scene from the first appeals-court hearing in December 2013, which Mediapart (paywalled link (http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/201213/piratage-google-drole-de-proces-en-appel-pour-un-journaliste)) attended. During those opening arguments, a presiding judge appeared unable to pronounce Google (saying "gogleu" instead) and demonstrated an ignorance of how logins occur. The prosecutor did not help this perception, saying at the hearing, "half the words I heard today, I did not even understand."
The appeals court acquitted Laurelli of fraudulently accessing an information system but saw fit to convict Bluetouff of theft of documents and fraudulent retention of information. The court wrote: "It is well demonstrated that he was conscious of his irregular retention in automated data processing, accessed where he downloaded protected evidence; and that investigations have shown that these data had been downloaded before being... disseminated to others; that it is, in any event, established that Olivier Laurelli made copies of computer files inaccessible to the public for personal use without the knowledge and against the will of its owner"
Although $4,000 may not be a huge amount, Le Point (http://www.lepoint.fr/chroniqueurs-du-point/guerric-poncet/3-000-euros-d-amende-pour-avoir-trop-bien-cherche-sur-google-06-02-2014-1789010_506.php) explains that the lack of technical knowledge by the courts is hugely troubling for the French public—especially journalists. "This decision should unsettle all citizens, in particular journalists, who could themselves be convicted much more heavily when they publish documents with the same motive: that of informing."
Laurelli, for his part, seems to be taking everything in stride. "It's huge :) I am officially a cybercriminal" he tweeted (https://twitter.com/bluetouff/statuses/431085890299895809) Wednesday morning.
UPDATE: Laurelli ended up admitting (http://www.maitre-eolas.fr/post/2014/02/07/NON%2C-on-ne-peut-pas-%C3%AAtre-condamn%C3%A9-pour-utiliser-Gougleu) in testimony that when he found the documents, he traveled back to the homepage that they stemmed from and found an authentication page. This indicated that the documents were likely supposed to be protected. That admission played a part in his later conviction in the appeals court.
Glen Grinvold objašnjava kako NSA i GCHQ između ostalog koriste ubačene, jelte, elemente, da kontrolišu i truju onlajn diskusije, podmećući ljudima stvari koje nikad nisu uradili, predstavljajući se kao žrtve tih ljudi itd. Ništa, dakle, što i inače nismo naslućivali. Tekst ima gomilu slajdova (Snouden je stvarno bio temeljan) pa ga neću kopirati:
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
Snowden: I raised NSA concerns internally over 10 times before going rogue (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/03/07/snowden-i-raised-nsa-concerns-internally-over-10-times-before-going-rogue/?tid=hpModule_1728cf4a-8a79-11e2-98d9-3012c1cd8d1e)
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Former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden said he repeatedly tried to go through official channels to raise concerns about government snooping programs but that his warnings fell on the deaf ears. In testimony (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201403/20140307ATT80674/20140307ATT80674EN.pdf) to the European Parliament released Friday morning, Snowden wrote that he reported policy or legal issues related to spying programs to more than 10 officials, but as a contractor he had no legal avenue to pursue further whistleblowing.
Asked specifically if he felt like he had exhausted all other avenues before deciding to leak classified information to the public, Snowden responded:
Yes. I had reported these clearly problematic programs to more than ten distinct officials, none of whom took any action to address them. As an employee of a private company rather than a direct employee of the US government, I was not protected by US whistleblower laws, and I would not have been protected from retaliation and legal sanction for revealing classified information about lawbreaking in accordance with the recommended process.
Snowden worked for the CIA before becoming an NSA contractor for various companies. He was working for Booz Allen Hamilton at an NSA facility in Hawaii at the time he leaked information about government programs to the press.
In an August news conference, President Obama said there were "other avenues (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press-conference)" available to someone like Snowden "whose conscience was stirred and thought that they needed to question government actions." Obama pointed to Presidential Policy Directive 19 (http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-19.pdf) -- which set up a system for questioning classified government actions under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. However, as a contractor rather than an government employee or officer, Snowden was outside the protection of this system. "The result," Snowden said, "was that individuals like me were left with no proper channels."
Elsewhere in his testimony, Snowden described the reaction he received when relating his concerns to co-workers and superiors. The responses, he said, fell into two camps. "The first were well-meaning but hushed warnings not to 'rock the boat,' for fear of the sort of retaliation that befell former NSA whistleblowers like Wiebe, Binney, and Drake." All three (http://www.washingtonian.com/blogs/capitalcomment/scene/indictment-continues-obama-administrations-war-on-leaks.php) of those men, he notes, were subject to intense scrutiny and the threat of criminal prosecution.
"Everyone in the Intelligence Community is aware of what happens to people who report concerns about unlawful but authorized operations," he said.
The other responses, Snowden said, were similar: suggestions that he "let the issue be someone else's problem." Even the highest-ranking officials he told about his concerns could not recall when an official complaint resulted in the shutdown of an unlawful program, he testified, "but there was a unanimous desire to avoid being associated with such a complaint in any form."
Snowden has claimed that he brought up issues with what he considers unlawful government programs before. The NSA disputes his account, previously telling (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html) The Washington Post that, "after extensive investigation, including interviews with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden's contention that he brought these matters to anyone's attention."
Both Obama and his national security adviser, Susan E. Rice, have said (http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/susan-rice-edward-snowden-nsa-101468.html) that Snowden should return to the United States and face criminal sanctions for his actions. Snowden was charged with three felonies over the summer and has been living in Russia since fleeing the United States in the wake of the leaks.
Zašto i kako je Lavabit (firma koja je davala korisnicima uslugu zaštite poruka elektronske pošte, koju je koristio i Snowden) zatvoren - vlasnik firme piše za Guardian:
Secrets, lies and Snowden's email: why I was forced to shut down Lavabit (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/20/why-did-lavabit-shut-down-snowden-email)
QuoteFor the first time, the founder of an encrypted email startup that was supposed to insure privacy for all reveals how the FBI and the US legal system made sure we don't have the right to much privacy in the first place
My legal saga started last summer with a knock at the door, behind which stood two federal agents ready to to serve me with a court order requiring the installation of surveillance equipment on my company's network.
My company, Lavabit, provided email services to 410,000 people – including Edward Snowden (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/09/lavabit-shutdown-snowden-silicon-valley), according to news reports – and thrived by offering features specifically designed to protect the privacy and security of its customers. I had no choice but to consent to the installation of their device, which would hand the US government access to all of the messages – to and from all of my customers – as they travelled between their email accounts other providers on the Internet.
But that wasn't enough. The federal agents then claimed that their court order required me to surrender my company's private encryption keys, and I balked. What they said they needed were customer passwords – which were sent securely – so that they could access the plain-text versions of messages from customers using my company's encrypted storage feature. (The government would later claim they only made this demand because of my "noncompliance".)
Bothered by what the agents were saying, I informed them that I would first need to read the order they had just delivered – and then consult with an attorney. The feds seemed surprised by my hesitation.
What ensued was a flurry of legal proceedings that would last 38 days, ending not only my startup but also destroying, bit by bit, the very principle upon which I founded it – that we all have a right to personal privacy.
In the first two weeks, I was served legal papers a total of seven times and was in contact with the FBI every other day. (This was the period a prosecutor would later characterize as my "period of silence".) It took a week for me to identify an attorney who could adequately represent me, given the complex technological and legal issues involved – and we were in contact for less than a day when agents served me with a summons ordering me to appear in a Virginia courtroom, over 1,000 miles from my home. Two days later, I was served the first subpoena for the encryption keys.
With such short notice, my first attorney was unable to appear alongside me in court. Because the whole case was under seal, I couldn't even admit to anyone who wasn't an attorney that I needed a lawyer, let alone why. In the days before my appearance, I would spend hours repeating the facts of the case to a dozen attorneys, as I sought someone else that was qualified to represent me. I also discovered that as a third party in a federal criminal indictment, I had no right to counsel. After all, only my property was in jeopardy – not my liberty. Finally, I was forced to choose between appearing alone or facing a bench warrant for my arrest.
In Virginia, the government replaced its encryption key subpoena with a search warrant and a new court date. I retained a small, local law firm before I went back to my home state, which was then forced to assemble a legal strategy and file briefs in just a few short days. The court barred them from consulting outside experts about either the statutes or the technology involved in the case. The court didn't even deliver transcripts of my first appearance to my own lawyers for two months, and forced them to proceed without access to the information they needed.
Then, a federal judge entered an order of contempt against me – without even so much as a hearing.
But the judge created a loophole: without a hearing, I was never given the opportunity to object, let alone make any any substantive defense, to the contempt change. Without any objection (because I wasn't allowed a hearing), the appellate court waived consideration of the substantive questions my case raised – and upheld the contempt charge, on the grounds that I hadn't disputed it in court. Since the US supreme court traditionally declines to review decided on wholly procedural grounds, I will be permanently denied justice.
In the meantime, I had a hard decision to make. I had not devoted 10 years of my life to building Lavabit, only to become complicit in a plan which I felt would have involved the wholesale violation of my customers' right to privacy. Thus with no alternative, the decision was obvious: I had to shut down my company (http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/08/lavabit-email-shut-down-edward-snowden).
The largest technological question we raised in our appeal (which the courts refused to consider) was what constitutes a "search", i.e., whether law enforcement can demand the encryption keys of a business and use those keys to inspect the private communications of every customer, even when the court has only authorized them to access information belonging to specific targets.
The problem here is technological: until any communication has been decrypted and the contents parsed, it is currently impossible for a surveillance device to determine which network connections belong to any given suspect. The government argued that, since the "inspection" of the data was to be carried out by a machine, they were exempt from the normal search-and-seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment.
More importantly for my case, the prosecution also argued that my users had no expectation of privacy, even though the service I provided – encryption – is designed for users' privacy.
If my experience serves any purpose, it is to illustrate what most already know: courts must not be allowed to consider matters of great importance under the shroud of secrecy, lest we find ourselves summarily deprived of meaningful due process. If we allow our government to continue operating in secret, it is only a matter of time before you or a loved one find yourself in a position like I did – standing in a secret courtroom, alone, and without any of the meaningful protections that were always supposed to be the people's defense against an abuse of the state's power.
Smart Lights: New LEDS Allow NSA To Spy On Your Every Movement
Smart Lights: New LEDS Allow NSA To Spy On Your Every Movement (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kSEnSVFD5o#ws)
двоумио сам се дал да ставим на топик са дроњама или на топик за надзирање, па сам се на крају одлучио да му је овде више место...
у најновијим вестима можемо, поред осталог, сазнати и да ако дроње (у САД данас, а у вашој демократској џамахирији сутра) не слете на ваш посед могу да вас снимају до миле воље.
ево како је главна уредница ио9 проанализирала ово питање (http://io9.com/this-rule-about-drone-surveillance-is-just-plain-absurd-1599350343) а гратис распевавање је званични одговор ФБИ-а сенатору рон полу (http://www.paul.senate.gov/files/documents/072913FBIResponse.pdf) на питање како агенција оправдава такво коришћење дроња.
иако је крекд изгубио сваки кредибилитет (и то не само имбецилним текстовима о украјини и осталим тренутним свеЦким дешавањима) још увек, понекад, може да се прочита занимљив чланак
5 Terrifying Smartphone Hacks You Won't Believe Are Possible (http://www.cracked.com/article_20345_5-terrifying-smartphone-hacks-you-wont-believe-are-possible.html?wa_user1=4&wa_user2=Tech&wa_user3=article&wa_user4=companion)
Quote from: поднаслови
#5. Your Phone's Tilt Sensor Can Sense What You're Typing on Your Computer
#4. Smartphones Can Steal Your Credit Card Information Just by Being Near Them
#3. Fake "Free Charging" Stations May Be Waiting to Ambush You
#2. Fake Cell Towers Can Turn Your Phone into a Remote Listening Device
#1. Big Brother Can Use Your Phone to Spy on You in 3D
Da, ova priča o zapisivanju teksta samo na osnovu vibracija kucanja, o kojoj se govori već mesecima je zastrašujuća.
Inače, ispostavlja se ono što smo svi ionako znali, proces da vas američka vlada proglasi za teroristu i stavi na razne iste za promatranje itd. ne oslanja se ni na nedvosmislene dokaze ni na uopšte, ikakve konkretne činjenice:
The Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/)
Ranije smo pominjali kako na osnovu zvuka kucanja po tastaturi može da se rekonstruiše tekst koji ste kucali, a i znamo da špijuniranje već bar pola veka podrazumeva i osetljivu opremu koja vibracije prozorskih stakala koristi da dekodira govor iz prostorije na kojoj je prozor. Stvari samo postaju sofisticiranije, evo videa kako se rekonstruiše govor na osnovu vizuelnog zapisa vibracija raznih predemta - na primer kesice čipsa:
The Visual Microphone: Passive Recovery of Sound from Video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKXOucXB4a8#ws)
Zabrinjavajuće. A s druge strane moguće je čak čitati i električne signale u mozgu. Za stotinak godina ćemo za važne stvari prestati da komunicirmo audio i video putem, nego samo elektronski. To makar može da se šifruje. Ugrađivaćemo oplatu oko lobanje i radio transivere, tako da ono što mislimo može da rekonstruiše samo onaj kome je namenjeno.
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi60.tinypic.com%2F2moured.jpg&hash=8e0133148e740cd761eca504b7b70ea037d13dac)
Ogroman tekst na Wiredu koji je delom priča sa Snowdenom, delom špekulacija o futurističkom NSA cyberwarfare softveru:
http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/ (http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/)
eво још прилога сигурности рачунара...за комплетно праћење тока података потребно вам је мало жице и мало...зноја?!
Stealing encryption keys through the power of touch (http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/08/stealing-encryption-keys-through-the-power-of-touch/)
QuoteResearchers from Tel Aviv University have demonstrated an attack against the GnuPG encryption software that enables them to retrieve decryption keys by touching exposed metal parts of laptop computers.
There are several ways of attacking encryption systems. At one end of the spectrum, there are flaws and weaknesses in the algorithms themselves that make it easier than it should be to figure out the key to decrypt something. At the other end, there are flaws and weaknesses in human flesh and bones that make it easier than it should be to force someone to offer up the key to decrypt something.
In the middle are a range of attacks that don't depend on flaws on the encryption algorithms but rather in the way they've been implemented. Encryption systems, both software and hardware, can leak information about the keys being used in all sorts of indirect ways, such as the performance of the system's cache, or the time taken to perform encryption and decryption operations. Attacks using these indirect information leaks are known collectively as side channel attacks.
This research is a side-channel attack. The metal parts of a laptop, such as the shielding around USB ports, and heatsink fins, are notionally all at a common ground level. However, this level undergoes tiny fluctuations due to the electric fields within the laptop. These variations can be measured, and this can be used to leak information about encryption keys.
The measurements can be done by directly attaching a digitizer to a metal part of the laptop, but they don't have to be this obvious. The researchers showed that they could retrieve information with connections at the far end of shielded USB, VGA, and Ethernet connections. They also used human touch: a person in contact with metal parts of the laptop can in turn be connected to a digitizer, and the voltage fluctuations can be measured.
The researchers note that this works better in hot weather, due to the lower resistance of sweaty fingers.
While the information retrieval was better when used with high-end lab equipment, the researchers also experimented with using a smartphone connected to Ethernet shielding via its headphone port, and found that this was sufficient to perform some attacks.
The major important source of the voltage variations is the processor. The simplest thing to detect is probably whether the processor is active or sleeping, with the researchers saying that on almost all machines, the difference between an active processor and a processor suspended with the "HLT" instruction could be detected. On many machines, finer grained information was visible. The research recorded the fluctuations with a sample rate of between a few tens of kilohertz, and a few megahertz. These sample rates are far lower than the several gigahertz that processors operate, and so these measurements can't give insight into individual instructions—but this wasn't actually necessary.
During encryption and decryption operations, the processor has to perform certain long-running operations (for example, exponentiation of various large numbers), and these operations caused a consistent, characteristic set of voltage fluctuations. When sampling the voltages at a rate of a few MHz, keys for the RSA and ElGamal encryption algorithms could be extracted in a few seconds.
This attack required a single piece of encrypted data to be decrypted a few times.
Lower sampling rates of a few tens of kilohertz needed an adaptive attack, where multiple, specially chosen pieces of encrypted data are decrypted. The voltage fluctuations reveal a characteristic pattern that varies depending on whether a particular bit of the decryption key is a 1 or a 0. With enough chosen pieces of encrypted data, each bit of the decryption key can be determined.
The researchers have reported their findings to the GnuPG developers, and the software has been altered to reduce some of the information leaked this way. Even with this alteration, the software is not immune to this side channel attack, and different encryption keys can be distinguished from one another. Robust protection is hard to do, because the side-channel is largely a feature of the hardware. Faraday cages can protect against electromagnetic side channels, insulation can protect against this kind of "touching metal parts" attack, and optical fibres can protect against measuring fluctuations in Ethernet connections, but all these drive up costs and are of limited practicality.
Zanimljiva interaktivna mapa koja prikazuje stepen "slobodnosti" interneta u raznim državama sveta. Naravno da je za debatu šta je i kako stvarno slobodno, ali ljudi koji su ovo napravili daju jasne kriterijume pa se može porediti. Nažalost, mnogo zemalja nije uključeno u mapu (još uvek):
https://www.ivpn.net/internet-censorship/ (https://www.ivpn.net/internet-censorship/)
oво је напокон сишло из теорија завера у народ - пресретачи телефонских позива
Mysterious Phony Cell Towers Could Be Intercepting Your Calls
(http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/mysterious-phony-cell-towers-could-be-intercepting-your-calls)
Quote
Like many of the ultra-secure phones that have come to market in the wake of Edward Snowden's leaks, the CryptoPhone 500, which is marketed in the U.S. by ESD America and built on top of an unassuming Samsung Galaxy SIII body, features high-powered encryption. Les Goldsmith, the CEO of ESD America, says the phone also runs a customized or "hardened" version of Android that removes 468 vulnerabilities that his engineering team team found in the stock installation of the OS.
His mobile security team also found that the version of the Android OS that comes standard on the Samsung Galaxy SIII leaks data to parts unknown 80-90 times every hour. That doesn't necessarily mean that the phone has been hacked, Goldmsith says, but the user can't know whether the data is beaming out from a particular app, the OS, or an illicit piece of spyware. His clients want real security and control over their device, and have the money to pay for it.
To show what the CryptoPhone can do that less expensive competitors cannot, he points me to a map that he and his customers have created, indicating 17 different phony cell towers known as "interceptors," detected by the CryptoPhone 500 around the United States during the month of July alone. (The map below is from August.) Interceptors look to a typical phone like an ordinary tower. Once the phone connects with the interceptor, a variety of "over-the-air" attacks become possible, from eavesdropping on calls and texts to pushing spyware to the device.
"Interceptor use in the U.S. is much higher than people had anticipated," Goldsmith says. "One of our customers took a road trip from Florida to North Carolina and he found 8 different interceptors on that trip. We even found one at South Point Casino in Las Vegas."
Who is running these interceptors and what are they doing with the calls? Goldsmith says we can't be sure, but he has his suspicions.
"What we find suspicious is that a lot of these interceptors are right on top of U.S. military bases. So we begin to wonder – are some of them U.S. government interceptors? Or are some of them Chinese interceptors?" says Goldsmith. "Whose interceptor is it? Who are they, that's listening to calls around military bases? Is it just the U.S. military, or are they foreign governments doing it? The point is: we don't really know whose they are."
Interceptors vary widely in expense and sophistication – but in a nutshell, they are radio-equipped computers with software that can use arcane cellular network protocols and defeat the onboard encryption. Whether your phone uses Android or iOS, it also has a second operating system that runs on a part of the phone called a baseband processor. The baseband processor functions as a communications middleman between the phone's main O.S. and the cell towers. And because chip manufacturers jealously guard details about the baseband O.S., it has been too challenging a target for garden-variety hackers.
"The baseband processor is one of the more difficult things to get into or even communicate with," says Mathew Rowley, a senior security consultant at Matasano Security. "[That's] because my computer doesn't speak 4G or GSM, and also all those protocols are encrypted. You have to buy special hardware to get in the air and pull down the waves and try to figure out what they mean. It's just pretty unrealistic for the general community."
But for governments or other entities able to afford a price tag of "less than $100,000," says Goldsmith, high-quality interceptors are quite realistic. Some interceptors are limited, only able to passively listen to either outgoing or incoming calls. But full-featured devices like the VME Dominator (http://www.meganet.com/meganet-products-cellphoneinterceptors.html), available only to government agencies, can not only capture calls and texts, but even actively control the phone, sending out spoof texts, for example. Edward Snowden revealed that the N.S.A. is capable of an over-the-air attack (http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/06/technology/security/nsa-turn-on-phone/) that tells the phone to fake a shut-down while leaving the microphone running, turning the seemingly deactivated phone into a bug. And various (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6aKuDSg_CQ) ethical hackers have demonstrated DIY interceptor projects (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTb1_v8M6iA), using a software programmable radio and the open-source base station software package OpenBTS – this creates a basic interceptor for less than $3,000. On August 11, the F.C.C. announced an investigation (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/11/feds-to-study-illegal-use-of-spy-gear/) into the use of interceptors against Americans by foreign intelligence services and criminal gangs.
An "Over-the-Air" Attack Feels Like Nothing
Whenever he wants to test out his company's ultra-secure smart phone against an interceptor, Goldsmith drives past a certain government facility in the Nevada desert. (To avoid the attention of the gun-toting counter-intelligence agents in black SUVs who patrol the surrounding roads, he won't identify the facility to Popular Science). He knows that someone at the facility is running an interceptor, which gives him a good way to test out the exotic "baseband firewall" on his phone. Though the baseband OS is a "black box" on other phones, inaccessible to manufacturers and app developers, patent-pending software allows the GSMK CryptoPhone 500 to monitor the baseband processor for suspicious activity.
So when Goldsmith and his team drove by the government facility in July, he also took a standard Samsung Galaxy S4 and an iPhone to serve as a control group for his own device.
"As we drove by, the iPhone showed no difference whatsoever. The Samsung Galaxy S4, the call went from 4G to 3G and back to 4G. The CryptoPhone lit up like a Christmas tree."
Though the standard Apple and Android phones showed nothing wrong, the baseband firewall on the Cryptophone set off alerts showing that the phone's encryption had been turned off, and that the cell tower had no name – a telltale sign of a rogue base station. Standard towers, run by say, Verizon or T-Mobile, will have a name, whereas interceptors often do not.
Some devices can not only capture calls and texts, but even actively control the phone and send spoof texts.
And the interceptor also forced the CryptoPhone from 4G down to 2G, a much older protocol that is easier to de-crypt in real-time. But the standard smart phones didn't even show they'd experienced the same attack.
"If you've been intercepted, in some cases it might show at the top that you've been forced from 4G down to 2G. But a decent interceptor won't show that," says Goldsmith. "It'll be set up to show you [falsely] that you're still on 4G. You'll think that you're on 4G, but you're actually being forced back to 2G."
So Do I Need One?
Though Goldsmith won't disclose sales figures or even a retail price for the GSMK CryptoPhone 500, he doesn't dispute an MIT Technology Review (http://www.technologyreview.com/news/525556/for-3500-a-spy-resistant-smartphone/) article from this past spring reporting that he produces about 400 phones per week for $3,500 each. So should ordinary Americans skip some car payments to be able to afford to follow suit?
It depends on what level of security you expect, and who you might reasonably expect to be trying to listen in, says Oliver Day, who runs Securing Change, an organization that provides security services to non-profits.
"There's this thing in our industry called "threat modeling," says Day. "One of the things you learn is that you have to have a realistic sense of your adversary. Who is my enemy? What skills does he have? What are my goals in terms of security?"
If you're not realistically of interest to the U.S. government and you never leave the country, then the CryptoPhone is probably more protection than you need. Goldsmith says he sells a lot of phones to executives who do business in Asia. The aggressive, sophisticated hacking teams working for the People's Liberation Army have targeted (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/world/asia/us-case-offers-glimpse-into-chinas-hacker-army.html) American trade secrets, as well as political dissidents.
Day, who has written a paper about undermining censorship software used by the Chinese government, recommends people in hostile communications environments watch what they say over the phone and buy disposable "burner" phones that can be used briefly and then discarded.
"I'm not bringing anything into China that I'm not willing to throw away on my return trip," says Day.
Goldsmith warns that a "burner phone" strategy can be dangerous. If Day were to call another person on the Chinese government's watch list, his burner phone's number would be added to the watch list, and then the government would watch to see who else he called. The CryptoPhone 500, in addition to alerting the user whenever it's under attack, can "hide in plain sight" when making phone calls. Though it does not use standard voice-over-IP or virtual private network security tools, the CryptoPhone can make calls using just a WI-FI connection -- it does not need an identifiable SIM card. When calling over the Internet, the phone appears to eavesdroppers as if it is just browsing the Internet.
препоручио бих да испратите и линкове унутар текста
још један везан чланак - плус историја НСА праћења (до сада позната јавности)
QuoteThe US government, with assistance from major telecommunications carriers including AT&T, has engaged in a massive illegal dragnet surveillance of domestic communications and communications records of millions of ordinary Americans since at least 2001. Since this was first reported on by the press and discovered by the public in late 2005, EFF has been at the forefront of the effort to stop it and bring government surveillance programs back within the law and the Constitution.
History of NSA Spying Information since 2005 (See EFF's full timeline of events here (https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/timeline))
News reports in December 2005 first revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) has been intercepting Americans' phone calls and Internet communications. Those news reports, combined with a USA Today story in May 2006 and the statements of several members of Congress, revealed that the NSA is also receiving wholesale copies of American's telephone and other communications records. All of these surveillance activities are in violation of the privacy safeguards established by Congress and the US Constitution.
In early 2006, EFF obtained whistleblower evidence (.pdf) from former AT&T technician Mark Klein showing that AT&T is cooperating with the illegal surveillance. The undisputed documents show that AT&T installed a fiberoptic splitter at its facility at 611 Folsom Street in San Francisco that makes copies of all emails web browsing and other Internet traffic to and from AT&T customers and provides those copies to the NSA. This copying includes both domestic and international Internet activities of AT&T customers. As one expert observed, "this isn't a wiretap, it's a country-tap."
Secret government documents, published by the media in 2013, confirm the NSA obtains full copies of everything that is carried along major domestic fiber optic cable networks. In June 2013, the media, led by the Guardian and Washington Post started publishing a series of articles, along with full government documents, that have confirmed much of what was reported in 2005 and 2006 and then some. The reports showed-and the government later admitted -that the government is mass collecting phone metadata of all US customers under the guise of the Patriot Act. Moreover, the media reports confirm that the government is collecting and analyzing the content of communications of foreigners talking to persons inside the United States, as well as collecting collecting much more, without a probable cause warrant. Finally, the media reports confirm the "upstream" collection off of the fiberoptic cables that Mr. Klein first revealed in 2006. (See EFF's How It Works page here for more)
EFF Fights Back in the Courts
EFF is fighting these illegal activities in the courts. Currently, EFF is representing victims of the illegal surveillance program in Jewel v. NSA, a lawsuit filed in September 2008 seeking to stop the warrantless wiretapping and hold the government and government officials behind the program accountable. In July 2013, a federal judge ruled that the government could not rely on the controversial 'state secrets' privilege to block our challenge to the constitutionality of the program. This case is being heard in conjunction with Shubert v. Obama, which raises similar claims. Also in July, 2013, EFF filed another lawsuit, First Unitarian v. NSA, based on the recently published FISA court order demanding Verizon turn over all customer phone records including who is talking to whom, when and for how long—to the NSA. This so-called "metadata," especially when collected in bulk and aggregated, allows the government to track the associations of various political and religious organizations. The Director of National Intelligence has since confirmed that the collection of Verizon call records is part of a broader program.
In addition to making the same arguments we made in Jewel, we argue in Unitarian First Unitarian v. NSA that this type of collection violates the First Amendment right to association. Previously, in Hepting v. AT&T, EFF filed the first case against a cooperating telecom for violating its customers' privacy. After Congress expressly intervened and passed the FISA Amendments Act to allow the Executive to require dismissal of the case, Hepting was ultimately dismissed by the US Supreme Court.
Preteko si me sa ovim, taman sam se spremao da okačim isto. :lol: Videćemo koliko Amerikance sve to uopšte potresa jer godinu i kusur dana posle Snowdenovih otkrića i teških trenutaka za NSA u kojima su povremeno direktno lagali kongres, ne primećuje se da postoji nekakav opštenarodni pokret za očuvanje privatnosti. Uglavnom se bune liberalni političari i tehnička inteligencija, ali to mu je to.
ми овде смо савршено анестезирани, како онда они не би били са свим благодетима модерног света?!
но од кад је сноуден у москви, кренуо је озбиљан војно-политички пичвајз, мислим да се тим пребегом десио својеврстан quickening нагомиланих потенцијалних глобалних сукоба интереса.
тако да тај пребег не видим само као локалну (САД) фусноту већ једно од озбиљнијих поглавља будуће историје.
First US appeals court hears argument to shut down NSA database (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/09/first-us-appeals-court-hears-argument-to-shut-down-nsa-database/)
Quote
Six days after the first Snowden leak appeared on the front pages of newspapers worldwide, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit to stop the mass surveillance (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/aclu-sues-four-top-obama-administration-officials-over-verizon-metadata-sharing/) by US intelligence agencies. A New York federal judge ruled against the ACLU (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/judge-denies-governments-bid-to-delay-lawsuit-to-halt-nsa-metadata-collection/) in December. Today, ACLU lawyers made a second effort, making their case to a three-judge panel on the US Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. It's the first time a US Appeals Court has considered whether the "bulk telephony" database is constitutional.
Oral arguments stretched on for nearly two hours this morning, an unusually long argument for the US Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, which often gives just 10 or 15 minutes to each side for oral argument in an appeal case. C-SPAN was allowed to record and broadcast the full proceeding, another unusual step in an appeals court that's nearly always closed to cameras. The proceedings can be viewed on C-SPAN's website (http://www.c-span.org/video/?321163-1/aclu-v-clapper-oral-argument-phone-record-surveillance).
ACLU v. Clapper is one of three cases challenging mass surveillance that are now headed to appeals courts. Another case, Klayman v. Obama, was filed in Washington, DC federal courts just one day after the surveillance revelations. In that case, DC-based US District Judge Richard Leon ruled that the NSA's spying technology was "almost Orwellian" and likely unconstitutional (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/federal-judge-finds-nsa-spying-unconstitutional/).
A third case, Smith v. Obama (https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-aclu-join-idaho-moms-legal-challenge-nsa-surveillance), was filed later, and also resulted in the NSA program being upheld. It's now headed to the 9th Circuit, joined by the ACLU and Electronic Frontier Foundation.
In a blog post (https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/challenge-nsas-mass-surveillance-inches-way-court-system) accompanying today's argument, ACLU lawyer Alex Abdo suggested that even getting the issues debated in the open was a step forward.
"The legal challenges are also significant for the simple fact that they have forced the government to defend its program in public," he wrote. "For over a decade, the government has thwarted all attempts at public judicial review of the legality of the surveillance programs it inaugurated in the aftermath of 9/11."
"The injury is ongoing" Today's extensive questioning, which focused on just a few of the questions raised in both sides' briefs, didn't suggest in any obvious way how the three-judge panel might rule.
Abdo spoke first, making his case that the broad collection program warrants an injunction.
"If Section 215 [of the Patriot Act] permits bulk collection, it would be permitted not just for phone records but for any records," he said. "Not just in the context of terrorism, but in the context of any crime involving more than one person."
"If the government were to get FISA Court approval before entering a query, would that essentially end the controversy here?" asked Senior Judge Robert Sack.
"We would love it if the government ended bulk collection of Americans' phone records," said Abdo. He continued:
If the government did that, and purged the records it currently has, that would resolve everything put at issue by our preliminary injunction motion. But that is not the current state of affairs. It would be unwise to expect this Congress or the next to act... the injury is ongoing on a daily basis. Even if Congress acts in several months, we're entitled to a remedy today.
Senior Judge Robert Sack asked if the prudent thing might not be to wait. "Might we not say—great, we agree with you, but there's other litigation going on," he said. "We want to let the Supreme Court have a kick at the ball. Does it make sense to say, here are our views—and then wait until the DC Circuit speaks, and the Supreme Court has an opportunity to speak? Before actually making an order, an injunction? Suppose we're wrong, and someone blows up a subway train?"
It would be well within the court's authority to act now, said Abdo.
Much of Abdo's argument centered around the issue of whether the warrantless phone database should be legal under the 4th Amendment, which bans "unreasonable" searches without a warrant. The government has argued that "pen registers," which capture which numbers are called by a telephone, are legal under a 1979 case, Smith v. Maryland. That's the precedent that Leon essentially said wasn't appropriate for the digital age, when he ruled against the NSA.
Circuit Judge Gerald Lynch suggested they put aside Smith v. Maryland for a minute. Even without that precedent, "isn't there still quit a bit to the government's argument—that in this context, there's not much expectation of privacy in this record?" He continued:
In the opening of your brief you have this nice parade of horribles, all the things that the government could find out. Whether it's likely someone was HIV positive, or had an abortion. But couldn't Verizon find out those things if it chose? And go into the records it has, and determine the same kind of search, of the same kind of private information?
"I don't think our contract provides for unlimited access to our call records," said Abdo. "No one has ever suggested that Verizon's ability to listen to the content of our communications means we have no expectation of privacy."
"How, without any fact-finding at all, can we begin to know whether this is reasonable or not?" asked Sacks.
Fact-finding isn't necessary, said Abdo, in part because President Barack Obama has already acknowledged—by his openness to intelligence reforms—that the government doesn't need a vast telephony database to fight terror. "The government has conceded there are alternative, less intrusive means," he said.
"If the president thought that, then why did he send his lawyers here to say that you should lose?" asked Lynch.
Questions of intent "This case concerns an intelligence program that has been considered and approved by all three branches of government," said Assistant Attorney General Stuart Delery, arguing for the government.
The collection of "call detail records" was "twice reauthorized without change, after Congress was briefed on this very program."
"It also allows [the intelligence agencies] to build a historical repository for some period of time," and to see connections between users of different telephone companies, said Delery. "Going in, the government doesn't know which of the metadata might reveal an important connection to a known terrorist."
"So you're saying they're not relevant, really, to an investigation right now," said Lynch. "You're saying that you want to have them in case they become relevant."
Both Sacks and Lynch questioned the idea that Congress had OK'd the program in any kind of straightforward way.
"I wonder how valid the ratification argument is when you're dealing with secret law," said Sacks. "I'm not sure that ratification carries as much baggage as you want it to, until June of 2013, when people knew what was going on."
Delery pushed forward with his argument that Congress had understood and approved the programs. He even noted the oblique 2011 warnings about spying (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/us/27patriot.html) made by Sens. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Mark Udall (D-CO), as proof that Congress had known what they were doing.
"The intelligence committees were briefed over time, and in advance of reauthorization in both 2010 and 2011, the executive branch provided a briefing paper to be made available to all members [of the House of Representatives] in 2010, before the ratification, and of all Senators in 2011."
"I would find this a lot more reassuring if it were subject to an adversary process," said Sacks.
"As Your Honor may be aware, changes to the program [under consideration] would include provisions that allow for the kind of approach you're talking about," said Delery. "These [databases] can only be queried for counter-terrorism purposes, and then only when the selection term is connected, associated with a specified foreign terrorist organization."
Abdo was allowed to get in the last word with a short rebuttal.
"Ratification... is not a game of 'gotcha' with Congressional intent," he said. "Many members of Congress weren't aware of the program. Those that were, weren't provided legal analysis of the program. And those that were, weren't allowed to discuss it with their colleagues or constituents."
Update 9/3: Story changed to reflect that Smith v. Obama is also on appeal.
NSA i GCHQ planiraju da mapiraju ceo internet.
Treasure Map: The NSA Breach of Telekom and Other German Firms (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html)
QuoteWhen it comes to choosing code names for their secret operations, American and British agents demonstrate a flare for creativity. Sometimes they borrow from Mother Nature, with monikers such as "Evil Olive" and "Egoistic Giraffe." Other times, they would seem to take their guidance from Hollywood. A program called Treasure Map even has its own logo, a skull superimposed onto a compass, the eye holes glowing in demonic red, reminiscent of a movie poster for the popular "Pirates of the Caribbean" series, starring Johnny Depp.
Treasure Map is anything but harmless entertainment. Rather, it is the mandate for a massive raid on the digital world. It aims to map the Internet, and not just the large traffic channels, such as telecommunications cables. It also seeks to identify the devices across which our data flows, so-called routers.
Furthermore, every single end device that is connected to the Internet somewhere in the world -- every smartphone, tablet and computer -- is to be made visible. Such a map doesn't just reveal one treasure. There are millions of them.
The breathtaking mission is described in a Treasure Map presentation from the documents of the former intelligence service employee Edward Snowden which SPIEGEL has seen. It instructs analysts to "map the entire Internet -- Any device, anywhere, all the time."
Treasure Map allows for the creation of an "interactive map of the global Internet" in "near real-time," the document notes. Employees of the so-called "FiveEyes" intelligence agencies from Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which cooperate closely with the American agency NSA, can install and use the program on their own computers. One can imagine it as a kind of Google Earth for global data traffic, a bird's eye view of the planet's digital arteries.
Battlefield Map
In addition to monitoring one's own networks as well as those belonging to "adversaries," Treasure Map can also help with "Computer Attack/Exploit Planning." As such, the program offers a kind of battlefield map for cyber warfare.
The New York Times reported on the existence of Treasure Map last November. What it means for Germany (http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html) can be seen in additional material in the Snowden archive that SPIEGEL has examined.
Treasure Map graphics don't just provide detailed views of German cable and satellite networks. Red markings also reveal to agents which carriers and internal company networks FiveEyes agencies claim to have already accessed. Of particular interest from the German perspective are two "Autonomous Systems" (AS) -- networks -- marked in red. They are labeled Deutsche Telekom AG and Netcologne, a Cologne-based provider.
The legend for the graphics in question explains the meaning behind the red markings: "Red Core Nodes: SIGINT Collection access points within AS." SIGINT refers to signals intelligence. In other words, networks marked with a red dot are under observation.
Regional provider Netcologne operates its own fiber-optic network and provides telephone and Internet services to over 400,000 customers. The formerly state-owned company Telekom, of which the German government still owns a 31.7 percent stake, is one of the dozen or so international telecommunications companies that operate global networks, so-called Tier 1 providers. In Germany alone, Telekom provides mobile phone services, Internet and land lines to 60 million customers.
According to the logic of the undated Treasure Map documents, that would mean that the NSA and its partner agencies are perhaps not only able to monitor the networks of these companies and the data that travels through them, but also the end devices of their customers. Where exactly the NSA gained access to the companies' networks is not made clear in the graphics. The red-marked AS of Deutsche Telekom by itself includes several thousand routers worldwide.
'Completely Unacceptable'
The German company is also active in the US and Great Britain. Furthermore, it is part of the TAT14 telecommunications cable consortium; the cable runs via Great Britain to the east coast of the US. "The accessing of our network by foreign intelligence agencies," says a Telekom spokesperson, "would be completely unacceptable."
Because Netcologne is a regional provider, it would seem highly likely that the NSA or one of its Treasure Map partners accessed the network from within Germany. That would be a clear violation of German law and potentially another NSA-related case for German public prosecutors. Thus far, the only NSA-related casecurrently being investigated (http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-expected-to-open-investigation-into-nsa-spying-on-merkel-a-973326.html) is the monitoring of Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone.
Several weeks ago, SPIEGEL shared a GCHQ document with both companies in order to give them an opportunity to look into the alleged security breaches themselves. The security departments of both firms say they launched intensive investigations but failed to find suspicious mechanisms or data streams leaving the network.
Telekom and Netcologne are not the first German companies to have been successfully hacked by Anglo-American intelligence agencies, according to their own documents. In March, SPIEGEL reported on the large-scale attack (http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html) by the British agency GCHQ on German satellite teleport operators Stellar, Cetel and IABG. Such providers offer satellite Internet connections to remote regions of the world. All three companies are marked red on the Treasuremap graphic, meaning that the NSA and its partner agencies have, according to their documents, internal "Collection Access Points."
SPIEGEL also contacted 11 non-German providers marked in the documents to request comment. Four answered, all saying they examined their systems and were unable to find any irregularities. "We would be extremely concerned if a foreign government were to seek unauthorized access to our global networks and infrastructure," said a spokesperson for the Australian telecommunications company Telstra.
'Key Staff'
Just how far GCHG and NSA go to improve their secret map of the Internet and its users can be seen in the example of Stellar.
The document describing the attack on the business, part of the so-called Mittelstand of small- to medium-sized companies that form the backbone of the German economy, originates from the Network Analysis Center of Britain's GCHQ, which is based in Bude along the Atlantic coast in Cornwall. The document lists "key staff" at the company. The document states they should be identified and "tasked." "Tasking" somebody in signals intelligence jargon means that they are to be targeted for surveillance. In addition to CEO Christian Steffen, nine other employees are named in the document.
The attack on Stellar has notable similarities with the GCHQ surveillance operation targeting the half-state-owned Belgian provider Belgacom, which SPIEGEL reported on in the summer of 2013. There too, the GCHQ Network Analysis department penetrated deeply into the Belgacom network and that of its subsidiary BICS by way of hacked employee computers. They then prepared routers for cyber-attacks.
SPIEGEL reporters visited Stellar at its offices in Hürth, near Cologne, and presented passages of the documents in question to the CEO as well as three other employees cited by the British. A video of the visit can be seen here.
Among other things, Steffen and his colleagues were able to recognize in the GCHQ document a listing for their central server including the company's mail server, which the attackers appear to have hacked.
The document also includes details about the concrete findings of the spying efforts, including an internal table that shows which Stellar customers are being served by which specific satellite transponders. "Those are company secrets and sensitive information," said Stellar's visibly shocked IT chief, Ali Fares, who is himself cited as an employee to be "tasked."
'Fuck!'
Any remaining sanguinity is lost at the point the Stellar officials see the password for the central server of an important customer in the intelligence agency documents. The significance of the theft is immense, Fares says. The information, he continues, could allow the agencies to cut off Internet access to customers in, for example, Africa. It could also allow them to manipulate links and emails.
CEO Steffen commented on the document with a terse "Fuck!" He considers it to be final proof that his company's systems were illegally breached. "The hacked server stood behind our company's own firewall," he said. "The only way of accessing it is if you first successfully break into our network." The company in question is no longer a customer with Stellar.
When asked if there are any possible reasons that would prompt Britain, an EU partner country, to take such an aggressive approach to his company, Steffen just shrugged his shoulders, perplexed. "Our customer traffic doesn't run across conventional fiber optic lines," he said. "In the eyes of intelligence services, we are apparently seen as difficult to access." Still, he argues, "that doesn't give anyone the right to break in."
The founder and CEO of Stellar says he has no intention of letting this pass. "A cyber-attack of this nature is a clear criminal offense under German law," he said. "I want to know why we were a target and exactly how the attack against us was conducted -- if for no other reason than to be able to protect myself and my customers from this happening again." Six weeks ago, Steffen wrote a letter to the British government asking for an explanation, but he has not received an answer. Both GCHQ and NSA have likewise declined comment on the matter.
Meanwhile, Deutsche Telekom's security division has conducted a forensic review of important routers in Germany, but has yet to detect anything. Volker Tschersich, who heads the security division, says it's possible the red markings in Treasure Map can be explained as access to the Tat14 cable, in which Telekom occupies a frequency band in Britain and the US. At the end of last week, the company informed Germany's Federal Office for Information Security of SPIEGEL's findings. The classified documents also indicate that other data from Germany contributes to keeping the global treasure map current. Of the 13 servers the NSA operates around the world in order to track current data flows on the open Internet, one is located somewhere in Germany.
Like the other servers, this one, which feeds data into the secret NSA network is "covered" in a data center.
NSA and GCHQ Treasure Map Documents The following selection of NSA and GCHQ documents pertain to Treasure Map and the access to internal networks of German and non-German companies achieved via the program. SPIEGEL has redacted them to obscure the most sensitive information.
- Satellite Teleport Knowledge -- Stellar
- Bad Guys Are Everywhere -- Treasure Map Presentation
- Treasure Map Announces a New Release
http://nsasimulator.com/ (http://nsasimulator.com/)
QuoteNSA Simulator.com is a website which embeds the video feeds of various security cams streamed open on the web. We do not host any illegal content and only stream the content which is already public. We are just making the browsing easy. We have scripts which find and insert live webcams and then we have automated checking systems which removed the feed from index if it is down. Please note, this website is not created to break into other privacy. The aim is to show everyone that security measures are needed to be taken to avoid hackers from gaining access to their systems.
Eh, Australija....
Metadata, uključujući istoriji brauzovanja interneta može da bude dostupna na zahtev suda - ali u građanskim parnicama :cry: :cry: :cry:
Oz gov lets slip: telco metadata might be available to civil courts (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/11/02/oz_gov_lets_slip_telco_metadata_might_be_available_to_civil_courts/)
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A series of slips by the nation's top cop followed by communications minister Malcolm Turnbull has made Australia's data retention bill even more of a potential horror than it seemed when it was introduced last week.It started with the Australian Federal Police commissioner Andrew Colvin saying that stored telecommunications metadata could be used to go after people who infringe copyright online. That statement, made on October 30, was unequivocal – he used the word "absolutely (http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/malcolm-turnbull-introduces-legislation-for-metadata-retention-scheme-20141030-11e101.html)".
It's always a bad idea for police to rashly tell the world what they really think.
The first response came from Senator George Brandis, who said that the data retention bill is all about criminal, not civil matters. Turnbull similarly explained that outfits like the AFP and ASIO aren't interested (http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/10/31/asio-not-interested-game-thrones) in copyright infringement (not that Colvin's use-case can't happen, only that two specific agencies aren't going to try to use the data that way).
That became the chorus-sheet, with Colvin toeing (http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2014/s4118577.htm) the "not interested" line on ABC Radio.
Perhaps feeling the heat, Turnbull then clarified the position further, telling ZDNet's Josh Taylor that if film studios want to use metadata to sue Torrenters, they won't be able to do their dirty work through the police, but would have to ask the courts to give them access (http://www.zdnet.com/au/film-studios-could-use-retained-data-to-sue-torrenters-7000035263/) to it.
At which point, it looks like each successive explanation has made things just that little bit worse.
It's not only that Turnbull's timing is shocking, since ISPs are right now resisting legal action trying to force them to reveal subscriber information through the courts to a copyright troll.
It's that there's nothing in any of the statements – Turnbull's, Colvin's, or Brandis' – that confines any such court process to copyright. The data is there, and accessible through the courts.
By whom, exactly? How much data could a court open up to a smart and well-funded litigant?
How would the average individual, without access to Philip Street lawyers, resist having their data swept up by someone demanding access to their metadata? Today, the IP address assigned to you or I isn't available to be pettifogged by a lawyer because it doesn't exist. Will it be the same tomorrow?
With injudicious statements, ill-conceived legislation, and its desire to metasplain its way out of trouble, the federal government has told the world: your metadata will be available to the civil courts.
And lawyers are already gathering, telling (http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2014/s4119217.htm) the ABC's PM program that metadata could be demanded in family law cases and insurance cases. Instead of creating the government-control beloved of conservative states, the government has created a honeypot for the scummiest practitioners of the legal profession. Personally, I fear them more than I fear most hackers.
Two senior cabinet ministers, Brandis and Turnbull, aggregate such outrageous incompetence that they couldn't predict this, and they're both lawyers.
There's also the assertion that copyright infringements aren't of interest to the AFP, which is only half true. As the government's IP Australia Website explains here (http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/ip-infringement/counterfeiting-and-piracy/): The Copyright Act 1968 similarly provides for criminal sanctions. Under this Act it is an offence to:
- knowingly import, possess, sell, distribute or commercially deal with an infringing copy
- offer for sale infringing copies of computer programs
- transmit a computer program to enable it to be copied when received.
If there were a criminal copyright infringement investigation in hand, rather than a merely civil complaint, a target's metadata would be in the mix. "Absolutely", as AFP commissioner Colvin honestly put it, before the backpeddaling began.
What's depressing is that Australians probably won't take to the streets about this issue. It's unlikely they'll read even a handful of the stories about the data retention regime. And thus does a country sleepwalk into a Stasi-like regime.
British Spies Are Free to Target Lawyers and Journalists (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/06/uk-surveillance-of-lawyers-journalists-gchq/)
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British spies have been granted the authority to secretly eavesdrop on legally privileged attorney-client communications, according to newly released documents.
On Thursday, a series of previously classified policies (https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1354812-2014-11-05-pub-belhaj-gov-amended-response-to.html) confirmed for the first time that the U.K.'s top surveillance agency Government Communications Headquarters (pictured above) has advised its employees: "You may in principle target the communications of lawyers."
The U.K.'s other major security and intelligence agencies—MI5 and MI6—have adopted similar policies, the documents show. The guidelines also appear to permit surveillance of journalists and others deemed to work in "sensitive professions" handling confidential information.
The documents were made public as a result of a legal case (http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2012_06_28_Libya_renditions_issued/) brought against the British government by Libyan families who allege that they were subjected to extraordinary rendition and torture in a joint British-American operation that took place in 2004. After revelations about mass surveillance from National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden last year, the families launched another case (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/17/libya-rendition-disclosure-uk-surveillance-policy) alleging that their communications with lawyers at human rights group Reprieve (http://www.reprieve.org.uk/) may have been spied on by the government, hindering their ability to receive a fair trial.
In a statement (http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2014_11_06_uk_govt_force_release_spying_lawyers/) on Thursday, Reprieve's legal director Cori Crider said that the new disclosures raised "troubling implications for the whole British justice system" and questioned how frequently the government had used its spy powers for unfair advantage in court.
"It's now clear the intelligence agencies have been eavesdropping on lawyer-client conversations for years," Crider said. "Today's question is not whether, but how much, they have rigged the game in their favor in the ongoing court case over torture."
Rachel Logan, a legal adviser at rights group Amnesty International, said that spying on lawyers affords the U.K. government an "unfair advantage akin to playing poker in a hall of mirrors."
"It could mean, amazingly, that the government uses information they have got from snooping on you, against you, in a case you have brought," Logan said. "This clearly violates an age-old principle of English law set down in the 16th century—that the correspondence between a person and their lawyer is confidential."
In the U.S., the NSA has also been caught (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/) spying (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html?_r=0) on lawyers. Earlier this year, the agency was forced to reassure attorneys (http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/NSA_tells_ABA_firmly_committed_to_rule_of_law_attorney_client_privilege/) that it "will continue to afford appropriate protection to privileged attorney-client communications acquired during its lawful foreign intelligence mission in accordance with privacy procedures required by Congress, approved by the Attorney General, and, as appropriate, reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court."
In the U.K., the oversight of intelligence agencies is undoubtedly far more lax.
According to the documents released Thursday (https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1354812-2014-11-05-pub-belhaj-gov-amended-response-to.html), in at least one case legally privileged material that was covertly intercepted by a British agency may have been used to the government's advantage in legal cases. One passage notes that security service MI5 identified an instance in which there was potential for "tainting" a legal case after secretly intercepted privileged material apparently ended up in the hands of its lawyers.
The policies state that the targeting of lawyers "must give careful consideration to necessity and proportionality," but the GCHQ policy document adds that each individual analyst working at the agency is "responsible for the legality" of their targeting, suggesting that a large degree of personal judgement is involved in the process. Notably, there is no judicial oversight of eavesdropping conducted by GCHQ or other British security agencies; their surveillance operations are signed off by a senior politician in government, usually the Foreign or Home Secretary.
The categories that allow the agencies to spy on lawyers or others working with "confidential" material, such as journalists, are extremely broad. One policy document from GCHQ notes:
If you wish the target the communications of a lawyer or other legal professional or other communications that are likely to result in the interception of confidential information you must:
Have reasonable grounds to believe that they are participating in or planning activity that is against the interests of national security, the economic well-being of the UK or which in itself constitutes a serious crime.
In practice, this could mean that any lawyer or an investigative journalist working on a case or story involving state secrets could be targeted on the basis that they are perceived to be working against the vaguely defined national security interests of the government. Any journalists or lawyers working on the Snowden leaks, for instance, are a prime example of potential targets under this rationale. The U.K. government has already accused (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/02/david-miranda-terrorism-glenn-greenwald-british_n_4199838.html) anyone working to publish stories based on the Snowden documents of being engaged in terrorism—and could feasibly use this as justification to spy on their correspondence.
GCHQ declined to comment for this post, referring a request from The Intercept to the government's Home Office (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office). A Home Office spokesperson said: "We do not comment on ongoing legal proceedings."
Da li sakupljanjem metapodataka možemo biti identifikovati kao "jedinstven" korisnik interneta? Zapravo, da, ovaj sajt pomaže da vidite "otisak prsta" vašeg browsera i odgovara na jednostavno pitanje: da li me neko može pratiti:
https://amiunique.org/
jupiii, unikatan sam!
UPS! :(
New Snowden documents show that the NSA and its allies are laughing at the rest of the world (http://www.theverge.com/2015/1/17/7629721/nsa-is-pwning-everyone-and-having-a-chuckle-about-it)
Posle Kameronove izjave da vlasti treba da imaju uvid u enrkiptovanu komunikaciju građana i da bi provajderi i imejl kompanije trebalo da im to omoguće (http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/16/david-cameron-encryption-lavabit-ladar-levison), Obama se pridružio sentimentu:
Obama Sides with Cameron in Encryption Fight (http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/16/obama-sides-with-cameron-in-encryption-fight/)
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President Barack Obama said Friday that police and spies should not be locked out of encrypted smartphones and messaging apps, taking his first public stance in a simmering battle over private communications in the digital age.
Apple, Google (http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=GOOGL) GOOGL +1.28% and Facebook (http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=FB) FB +1.53% have introduced encrypted products in the past half year that the companies say they could not unscramble, even if faced with a search warrant. That's prompted vocal complaints from spy chiefs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, this week, British Prime Minister David Cameron (http://topics.wsj.com/person/C/david,-cameron/5940).
Obama's comments came after two days of meetings with Cameron, and with the prime minister at his side.
"If we find evidence of a terrorist plot... and despite having a phone number, despite having a social media address or email address, we can't penetrate that, that's a problem," Obama said. He said he believes Silicon Valley companies also want to solve the problem. "They're patriots."
In the U.S., governments have long been able to access the contents of electronic communication, including phone calls, consumer email and social media, typically with warrants, through wiretaps and from technology companies themselves.
But the law that governs these practices is dated and doesn't mandate tech firms incorporate such features into modern apps. In the post-Edward Snowden era, many technology firms have turned encryption and "zero-knowledge" into marketing buzzwords.
The president on Friday argued there must be a technical way to keep information private, but ensure that police and spies can listen in when a court approves. The Clinton administration fought and lost a similar battle during the 1990s when it pushed for a "clipper chip" that would allow only the government to decrypt scrambled messages.
That's a notable shift for the president. "He sounded more like Jim Comey than anything else the White House has said in the past couple of months," said Stewart Baker, former general counsel at the National Security Agency, referring to the FBI director, who has criticized the tech companies' new encryption policies.
Security experts have long argued such systems would hobble many anti-hacking tools, leaving computers exposed. For instance, if an encryption algorithm has a master key, it is inherently weaker because it's possible for an outsider to steal that master key and crack the code.
Obama must now choose between competing priorities: the security of private information, or the ability of law enforcement to gather intelligence, said Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist at the American Civil Liberties Union.
Earlier in his remarks Friday, the president talked about new efforts by Britain and the U.S. to fight hackers attacking private sector companies.
"How in the same speech can you talk about taking steps to improve cybersecurity and complain about encryption," Soghoian said.
Baker, the former NSA lawyer, called that argument a "red herring."
"We expect companies to be able to help with this," he said. "That doesn't mean that you always have to write bad cryptography."
A sudija u Španjolskoj navodi korišćenje enkripcije kao moguć indikator da ste umešani u terorizam (http://www.networkworld.com/article/2867329/microsoft-subnet/judge-cites-use-of-secure-email-riseup-as-a-potential-terrorist-indicator.html).
Range-R radar allows police to 'see' through walls and inside homes (http://www.techworm.net/2015/01/range-r-radar-allows-police-see-walls-inside-homes.html)
Law enforcement agencies have been secretly equipping their officers with special Range-R radar devices that allow them to peer through the walls to detect movement on the other side, expanding the extent of government surveillance.
Quote"The idea that the government can send signals through the wall of your house to figure out what's inside is problematic, Technologies that allow the police to look inside of a home are among the intrusive tools that police have."
"The Marshals Service routinely pursues and arrests violent offenders based on pre-established probable cause in arrest warrants for serious crimes."
на једном месту окупљене неке од најбољих апликација за 'интернет сигурност' за ваш андроид (иос?)
TextSecure (Android) (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
RedPhone / Signal (Android (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.redphone) / iOS (https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/signal-private-messenger/id874139669?mt=8))
Orbot (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) + Orweb (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=info.guardianproject.browser) (Android)
ChatSecure (Android (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=info.guardianproject.otr.app.im)/ iOS (https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/chatsecure-encrypted-secure/id464200063?mt=8))
Prey (all platforms (https://preyproject.com/download))
виа фацтолабс (http://www.fastcolabs.com/3040201/the-apps-you-need-now-to-keep-your-privacy-intact)
Pa vi sad vidite:
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi59.tinypic.com%2F2dhgok5.jpg&hash=d8a03bd4e4ef64427ef14605e7d75a5ea91b5eee)
The Great SIM Heist
How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/ (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/)
Quote
AMERICAN AND BRITISH spies hacked into the internal computer network of the largest manufacturer of SIM cards in the world, stealing encryption keys used to protect the privacy of cellphone communications across the globe, according to top-secret documents provided to The Intercept by National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden.
The hack was perpetrated by a joint unit consisting of operatives from the NSA and its British counterpart Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ. The breach, detailed in a secret 2010 GCHQ document (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2015/02/19/cne-access-core-mobile-networks-2/), gave the surveillance agencies the potential to secretly monitor a large portion of the world's cellular communications, including both voice and data.
The company targeted by the intelligence agencies, Gemalto (http://www.gemalto.com/), is a multinational firm incorporated in the Netherlands that makes the chips used in mobile phones and next-generation credit cards. Among its clients are AT&T, T-Mobile, Verizon, Sprint and some 450 wireless network providers around the world. The company operates in 85 countries and has more than 40 manufacturing facilities. One of its three global headquarters is in Austin, Texas and it has a large factory in Pennsylvania.
In all, Gemalto produces some 2 billion SIM cards a year. Its motto is "Security to be Free."
With these stolen encryption keys, intelligence agencies can monitor mobile communications without seeking or receiving approval from telecom companies and foreign governments. Possessing the keys also sidesteps the need to get a warrant or a wiretap, while leaving no trace on the wireless provider's network that the communications were intercepted. Bulk key theft additionally enables the intelligence agencies to unlock any previously encrypted communications they had already intercepted, but did not yet have the ability to decrypt.
As part of the covert operations against Gemalto, spies from GCHQ — with support from the NSA — mined the private communications of unwitting engineers and other company employees in multiple countries.
Gemalto was totally oblivious to the penetration of its systems — and the spying on its employees. "I'm disturbed, quite concerned that this has happened," Paul Beverly, a Gemalto executive vice president, told The Intercept. "The most important thing for me is to understand exactly how this was done, so we can take every measure to ensure that it doesn't happen again, and also to make sure that there's no impact on the telecom operators that we have served in a very trusted manner for many years. What I want to understand is what sort of ramifications it has, or could have, on any of our customers." He added that "the most important thing for us now is to understand the degree" of the breach.
Leading privacy advocates and security experts say that the theft of encryption keys from major wireless network providers is tantamount to a thief obtaining the master ring of a building superintendent who holds the keys to every apartment. "Once you have the keys, decrypting traffic is trivial," says Christopher Soghoian, the principal technologist for the American Civil Liberties Union. "The news of this key theft will send a shock wave through the security community."
Beverly said that after being contacted by The Intercept, Gemalto's internal security team began on Wednesday to investigate how their system was penetrated and could find no trace of the hacks. When asked if the NSA or GCHQ had ever requested access to Gemalto-manufactured encryption keys, Beverly said, "I am totally unaware. To the best of my knowledge, no."
According to one secret GCHQ slide (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2015/02/19/cne-access-core-mobile-networks-2/), the British intelligence agency penetrated Gemalto's internal networks, planting malware on several computers, giving GCHQ secret access. We "believe we have their entire network," the slide's author boasted about the operation against Gemalto.
Additionally, the spy agency targeted unnamed cellular companies' core networks, giving it access to "sales staff machines for customer information and network engineers machines for network maps." GCHQ also claimed the ability to manipulate the billing servers of cell companies to "suppress" charges in an effort to conceal the spy agency's secret actions against an individual's phone. Most significantly, GCHQ also penetrated "authentication servers," allowing it to decrypt data and voice communications between a targeted individual's phone and his or her telecom provider's network. A note accompanying the slide asserted that the spy agency was "very happy with the data so far and [was] working through the vast quantity of product."
The Mobile Handset Exploitation Team (MHET), whose existence has never before been disclosed, was formed in April 2010 to target vulnerabilities in cellphones. One of its main missions was to covertly penetrate computer networks of corporations that manufacture SIM cards, as well as those of wireless network providers. The team included operatives from both GCHQ and the NSA.
While the FBI and other U.S. agencies can obtain court orders compelling U.S.-based telecom companies to allow them to wiretap or intercept the communications of their customers, on the international front this type of data collection is much more challenging. Unless a foreign telecom or foreign government grants access to their citizens' data to a U.S. intelligence agency, the NSA or CIA would have to hack into the network or specifically target the user's device for a more risky "active" form of surveillance that could be detected by sophisticated targets. Moreover, foreign intelligence agencies would not allow U.S. or U.K. spy agencies access to the mobile communications of their heads of state or other government officials.
"It's unbelievable. Unbelievable," said Gerard Schouw, a member of the Dutch Parliament, when told of the spy agencies' actions. Schouw, the intelligence spokesperson for D66, the largest opposition party in the Netherlands, told The Intercept, "We don't want to have the secret services from other countries doing things like this." Schouw added that he and other lawmakers will ask the Dutch government to provide an official explanation and to clarify whether the country's intelligence services were aware of the targeting of Gemalto, whose official headquarters is in Amsterdam.
Last November, the Dutch government proposed (http://www.government.nl/ministries/bzk/news/2014/07/16/constitution-to-extend-protection-to-e-mails.html) an amendment to its constitution to include explicit protection for the privacy of digital communications, including those made on mobile devices. "We have, in the Netherlands, a law on the [activities] of secret services. And hacking is not allowed," Schouw said. Under Dutch law, the interior minister would have to sign off on such operations by foreign governments' intelligence agencies. "I don't believe that he has given his permission for these kind of actions."
The U.S. and British intelligence agencies pulled off the encryption key heist in great stealth, giving them the ability to intercept and decrypt communications without alerting the wireless network provider, the foreign government or the individual user that they have been targeted. "Gaining access to a database of keys is pretty much game over for cellular encryption," says Matthew Green, a cryptography specialist at the Johns Hopkins Information Security Institute. The massive key theft is "bad news for phone security. Really bad news."
AS CONSUMERS BEGAN to adopt cellular phones en masse in the mid-1990s, there were no effective privacy protections in place. Anyone could buy a cheap device from RadioShack capable of intercepting calls placed on mobile phones. The shift from analog to digital networks introduced basic encryption technology, though it was still crackable by tech savvy computer science graduate students, as well as the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, using readily available equipment.
Today, second-generation (2G) phone technology, which relies on a deeply flawed encryption system, remains the dominant platform globally, though U.S. and European cellphone companies now use 3G, 4G and LTE technology in urban areas. These include more secure, though not invincible, methods of encryption, and wireless carriers throughout the world are upgrading their networks to use these newer technologies.
It is in the context of such growing technical challenges to data collection that intelligence agencies, such as the NSA, have become interested in acquiring cellular encryption keys. "With old-fashioned [2G], there are other ways to work around cellphone security without those keys," says Green, the Johns Hopkins cryptographer. "With newer 3G, 4G and LTE protocols, however, the algorithms aren't as vulnerable, so getting those keys would be essential."
The privacy of all mobile communications — voice calls, text messages and Internet access — depends on an encrypted connection between the cellphone and the wireless carrier's network, using keys stored on the SIM, a tiny chip smaller than a postage stamp, which is inserted into the phone. All mobile communications on the phone depend on the SIM, which stores and guards the encryption keys created by companies like Gemalto. SIM cards can be used to store contacts, text messages, and other important data, like one's phone number. In some countries, SIM cards are used to transfer money. As The Intercept reported (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/) last year, having the wrong SIM card can make you the target of a drone strike.
SIM cards were not invented to protect individual communications — they were designed to do something much simpler: ensure proper billing and prevent fraud, which was pervasive in the early days of cellphones. Soghoian compares the use of encryption keys on SIM cards to the way Social Security numbers are used today. "Social security numbers were designed in the 1930s to track your contributions to your government pension," he says. "Today they are used as a quasi national identity number, which was never their intended purpose."
Because the SIM card wasn't created with call confidentiality in mind, the manufacturers and wireless carriers don't make a great effort to secure their supply chain. As a result, the SIM card is an extremely vulnerable component of a mobile phone. "I doubt anyone is treating those things very carefully," says Green. "Cell companies probably don't treat them as essential security tokens. They probably just care that nobody is defrauding their networks." The ACLU's Soghoian adds, "These keys are so valuable that it makes sense for intel agencies to go after them."
As a general rule, phone companies do not manufacture SIM cards, nor program them with secret encryption keys. It is cheaper and more efficient for them to outsource this sensitive step in the SIM card production process. They purchase them in bulk with the keys pre-loaded by other corporations. Gemalto is the largest of these SIM "personalization" companies.
After a SIM card is manufactured, the encryption key, known as a "Ki," is burned directly onto the chip. A copy of the key is also given to the cellular provider, allowing its network to recognize an individual's phone. In order for the phone to be able to connect to the wireless carrier's network, the phone — with the help of the SIM — authenticates itself using the Ki that has been programmed onto the SIM. The phone conducts a secret "handshake" that validates that the Ki on the SIM matches the Ki held by the mobile company. Once that happens, the communications between the phone and the network are encrypted. Even if GCHQ or the NSA were to intercept the phone signals as they are transmitted through the air, the intercepted data would be a garbled mess. Decrypting it can be challenging and time-consuming. Stealing the keys, on the other hand, is beautifully simple, from the intelligence agencies' point of view, as the pipeline for producing and distributing SIM cards was never designed to thwart mass surveillance efforts.
One of the creators of the encryption protocol that is widely used today for securing emails, Adi Shamir, famously asserted: "Cryptography is typically bypassed, not penetrated." In other words, it is much easier (and sneakier) to open a locked door when you have the key than it is to break down the door using brute force. While the NSA and GCHQ have substantial resources dedicated to breaking encryption, it is not the only way — and certainly not always the most efficient — to get at the data they want. "NSA has more mathematicians on its payroll than any other entity in the U.S.," says the ACLU's Soghoian. "But the NSA's hackers are way busier than its mathematicians."
GCHQ and the NSA could have taken any number of routes to steal SIM encryption keys and other data. They could have physically broken into a manufacturing plant. They could have broken into a wireless carrier's office. They could have bribed, blackmailed or coerced an employee of the manufacturer or cellphone provider. But all of that comes with substantial risk of exposure. In the case of Gemalto, hackers working for GCHQ remotely penetrated the company's computer network in order to steal the keys in bulk as they were en route to the wireless network providers.
SIM card "personalization" companies like Gemalto ship hundreds of thousands of SIM cards at a time to mobile phone operators across the world. International shipping records obtained by The Intercept show that in 2011, Gemalto shipped 450,000 smart cards from its plant in Mexico to Germany's Deutsche Telekom in just one shipment.
In order for the cards to work and for the phones' communications to be secure, Gemalto also needs to provide the mobile company with a file containing the encryption keys for each of the new SIM cards. These master key files could be shipped via FedEx, DHL, UPS or another snail mail provider. More commonly, they could be sent via email or through File Transfer Protocol, FTP, a method of sending files over the Internet.
The moment the master key set is generated by Gemalto or another personalization company, but before it is sent to the wireless carrier, is the most vulnerable moment for interception. "The value of getting them at the point of manufacture is you can presumably get a lot of keys in one go, since SIM chips get made in big batches," says Green, the cryptographer. "SIM cards get made for lots of different carriers in one facility." In Gemalto's case, GCHQ hit the jackpot, as the company manufactures SIMs for hundreds of wireless network providers, including all of the leading U.S.— and many of the largest European — companies.
But obtaining the encryption keys while Gemalto still held them required finding a way into the company's internal systems.
TOP-SECRET GCHQ documents reveal that the intelligence agencies accessed the email and Facebook accounts of engineers and other employees of major telecom corporations and SIM card manufacturers in an effort to secretly obtain information that could give them access to millions of encryption keys. They did this by utilizing the NSA's X-KEYSCORE program, which allowed them access to private emails hosted by the SIM card and mobile companies' servers, as well as those of major tech corporations, including Yahoo and Google.
In effect, GCHQ clandestinely cyberstalked (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2015/02/19/dapino-gamma-gemalto-yuaawaa-wiki/) Gemalto employees, scouring their emails in an effort to find people who may have had access to the company's core networks and Ki-generating systems. The intelligence agency's goal was to find information that would aid in breaching Gemalto's systems, making it possible to steal large quantities of encryption keys. The agency hoped to intercept the files containing the keys as they were transmitted between Gemalto and its wireless network provider customers.
GCHQ operatives identified key individuals and their positions within Gemalto and then dug into their emails. In one instance, GCHQ zeroed in on a Gemalto employee in Thailand who they observed sending PGP-encrypted files, noting that if GCHQ wanted to expand its Gemalto operations, "he would certainly be a good place to start." They did not claim to have decrypted the employee's communications, but noted that the use of PGP could mean the contents were potentially valuable.
The cyberstalking was not limited to Gemalto. GCHQ operatives wrote a script that allowed the agency to mine the private communications of employees of major telecommunications and SIM "personalization" companies for technical terms used in the assigning of secret keys to mobile phone customers. Employees for the SIM card manufacturers and wireless network providers were labeled as "known individuals and operators targeted" in a top-secret GCHQ document.
According to that April 2010 document (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2015/02/19/pcs-harvesting-scale/), "PCS Harvesting at Scale," hackers working for GCHQ focused on "harvesting" massive amounts of individual encryption keys "in transit between mobile network operators and SIM card personalisation centres" like Gemalto. The spies "developed a methodology for intercepting these keys as they are transferred between various network operators and SIM card providers." By that time, GCHQ had developed "an automated technique with the aim of increasing the volume of keys that can be harvested."
The PCS Harvesting document acknowledged that, in searching for information on encryption keys, GCHQ operatives would undoubtedly vacuum up "a large number of unrelated items" from the private communications of targeted employees. "[H]owever an analyst with good knowledge of the operators involved can perform this trawl regularly and spot the transfer of large batches of [keys]."
The document noted that many SIM card manufacturers transferred the encryption keys to wireless network providers "by email or FTP with simple encryption methods that can be broken ... or occasionally with no encryption at all." To get bulk access to encryption keys, all the NSA or GCHQ needed to do was intercept emails or file transfers as they were sent over the Internet — something both agencies already do millions of times per day. A footnote in the 2010 document observed that the use of "strong encryption products ... is becoming increasingly common" in transferring the keys.
In its key harvesting "trial" operations in the first quarter of 2010, GCHQ successfully intercepted (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2015/02/19/imsis-identified-ki-data-network-providers-jan10-mar10-trial/) keys used by wireless network providers in Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, India, Serbia, Iceland and Tajikistan. But, the agency noted, its automated key harvesting system failed to produce results against Pakistani networks, denoted as "priority targets" in the document, despite the fact that GCHQ had a store of Kis from two providers in the country, Mobilink and Telenor. "t is possible that these networks now use more secure methods to transfer Kis," the document concluded.
From December 2009 through March 2010, a month before the Mobile Handset Exploitation Team was formed, GCHQ conducted a number of trials aimed at extracting encryption keys and other personalized data for individual phones. In one two-week period, they accessed the emails of 130 people associated with wireless network providers or SIM card manufacturing and personalization. This operation produced nearly 8,000 keys matched to specific phones in 10 countries. In another two-week period, by mining just six email addresses, they produced 85,000 keys. At one point in March 2010, GCHQ intercepted nearly 100,000 keys for mobile phone users in Somalia. By June, they'd compiled (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2015/02/19/ccne-successes-jan10-mar10-trial/) 300,000. "Somali providers are not on GCHQ's list of interest," the document noted. "[H]owever, this was usefully shared with NSA."
The GCHQ documents only contain statistics for three months of encryption key theft in 2010. During this period, millions of keys were harvested. The documents stated explicitly that GCHQ had already created a constantly evolving automated process for bulk harvesting of keys. They describe active operations targeting Gemalto's personalization centers across the globe, as well as other major SIM card manufacturers and the private communications of their employees.
A top-secret NSA document asserted that, as of 2009, the U.S. spy agency already had the capacity to process between 12 and 22 million keys per second for later use against surveillance targets. In the future, the agency predicted, it would be capable of processing more than 50 million per second. The document did not state how many keys were actually processed, just that the NSA had the technology to perform such swift, bulk operations. It is impossible to know how many keys have been stolen by the NSA and GCHQ to date, but, even using conservative math, the numbers are likely staggering.
GCHQ assigned "scores" to more than 150 individual email addresses based on how often the users mentioned certain technical terms, and then intensified the mining of those individuals' accounts based on priority. The highest-scoring email address was that of an employee of Chinese tech giant Huawei, which the U.S. has repeatedly accused of collaborating with Chinese intelligence. In all, GCHQ harvested the emails of employees of hardware companies that manufacture phones, such as Ericsson and Nokia; operators of mobile networks, such as MTN Irancell and Belgacom; SIM card providers, such as Bluefish and Gemalto; and employees of targeted companies who used email providers, such as Yahoo and Google. During the three-month trial, the largest number of email addresses harvested were those belonging to Huawei employees, followed by MTN Irancell. The third largest class of emails harvested in the trial were private Gmail accounts, presumably belonging to employees at targeted companies.
The GCHQ program targeting Gemalto was called DAPINO GAMMA. In 2011, GCHQ launched operation HIGHLAND FLING to mine the email accounts of Gemalto employees in France and Poland. A top-secret document on the operation stated that one of the aims was "getting into French HQ" of Gemalto "to get in to core data repositories." France, home to one of Gemalto's global headquarters, is the nerve center of the company's worldwide operations. Another goal was to intercept private communications of employees in Poland that "could lead to penetration into one or more personalisation centers" — the factories where the encryption keys are burned onto SIM cards.
As part of these operations, GCHQ operatives acquired the usernames and passwords for Facebook accounts of Gemalto targets. An internal top-secret GCHQ wiki on the program from May 2011 indicated that GCHQ was in the process of "targeting" more than a dozen Gemalto facilities across the globe, including in Germany, Mexico, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Spain, Japan and Singapore.
The document also stated that GCHQ was preparing similar key theft operations against one of Gemalto's competitors, Germany-based SIM card giant Giesecke and Devrient.
On January 17, 2014, President Barack Obama gave a major address on the NSA spying scandal. "The bottom line is that people around the world, regardless of their nationality, should know that the United States is not spying on ordinary people who don't threaten our national security and that we take their privacy concerns into account in our policies and procedures," he said.
The monitoring of the lawful communications of employees of major international corporations shows that such statements by Obama, other U.S. officials and British leaders — that they only intercept and monitor the communications of known or suspected criminals or terrorists — were untrue. "The NSA and GCHQ view the private communications of people who work for these companies as fair game," says the ACLU's Soghoian. "These people were specifically hunted and targeted by intelligence agencies, not because they did anything wrong, but because they could be used as a means to an end."
THERE ARE TWO basic types of electronic or digital surveillance: passive and active. All intelligence agencies engage in extensive passive surveillance, which means they collect bulk data by intercepting communications sent over fiber-optic cables, radio waves or wireless devices.
Intelligence agencies place high-power antennas, known as "spy nests," on the top of their countries' embassies and consulates, which are capable of vacuuming up data sent to or from mobile phones in the surrounding area. The joint NSA/CIA Special Collection Service is the lead entity that installs and mans these nests for the United States. An embassy situated near a parliament or government agency could easily intercept the phone calls and data transfers of the mobile phones used by foreign government officials. The U.S. embassy in Berlin, for instance, is located a stone's throw from the Bundestag. But if the wireless carriers are using stronger encryption, which is built into modern 3G, 4G and LTE networks, then intercepted calls and other data would be more difficult to crack, particularly in bulk. If the intelligence agency wants to actually listen to or read what is being transmitted, they would need to decrypt the encrypted data.
Active surveillance is another option. This would require government agencies to "jam" a 3G or 4G network, forcing nearby phones onto 2G. Once forced down to the less secure 2G technology, the phone can be tricked into connecting to a fake cell tower operated by an intelligence agency. This method of surveillance, though effective, is risky, as it leaves a digital trace that counter-surveillance experts from foreign governments could detect.
Stealing the Kis solves all of these problems. This way, intelligence agencies can safely engage in passive, bulk surveillance without having to decrypt data and without leaving any trace whatsoever.
"Key theft enables the bulk, low-risk surveillance of encrypted communications," the ACLU's Soghoian says. "Agencies can collect all the communications and then look through them later. With the keys, they can decrypt whatever they want, whenever they want. It's like a time machine, enabling the surveillance of communications that occurred before someone was even a target."
Neither the NSA nor GCHQ would comment specifically on the key theft operations. In the past, they have argued more broadly that breaking encryption is a necessary part of tracking terrorists and other criminals. "It is longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters," a GCHQ official stated in an email, adding that the agency's work is conducted within a "strict legal and policy framework" that ensures its activities are "authorized, necessary and proportionate," with proper oversight, which is the standard response the agency has provided for previous stories published by The Intercept. The agency also said, "[T]he UK's interception regime is entirely compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights." The NSA declined to offer any comment.
It is unlikely that GCHQ's pronouncement about the legality of its operations will be universally embraced in Europe. "It is governments massively engaging in illegal activities," says Sophie in't Veld, a Dutch member of the European Parliament. "If you are not a government and you are a student doing this, you will end up in jail for 30 years." Veld, who chaired the European Parliament's recent inquiry into mass surveillance exposed by Snowden, told The Intercept: "The secret services are just behaving like cowboys. Governments are behaving like cowboys and nobody is holding them to account."
The Intercept's Laura Poitras has previously reported (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html) that in 2013 Australia's signals intelligence agency, a close partner of the NSA, stole some 1.8 million encryption keys from an Indonesian wireless carrier.
A few years ago, the FBI reportedly (http://www.amazon.com/Deep-State-Government-Secrecy-Industry/dp/1118146689) dismantled several transmitters set up by foreign intelligence agencies around the Washington, D.C. area, which could be used to intercept cellphone communications. Russia, China, Israel and other nations use similar technology as the NSA across the world. If those governments had the encryption keys for major U.S. cellphone companies' customers, such as those manufactured by Gemalto, mass snooping would be simple. "It would mean that with a few antennas placed around Washington, D.C., the Chinese or Russian governments could sweep up and decrypt the communications of members of Congress, U.S. agency heads, reporters, lobbyists and everyone else involved in the policymaking process and decrypt their telephone conversations," says Soghoian.
"Put a device in front of the U.N., record every bit you see going over the air. Steal some keys, you have all those conversations," says Green, the Johns Hopkins cryptographer. And it's not just spy agencies that would benefit from stealing encryption keys. "I can only imagine how much money you could make if you had access to the calls made around Wall Street," he adds.
THE BREACH OF Gemalto's computer network by GCHQ has far-reaching global implications. The company, which brought in $2.7 billion in revenue in 2013, is a global leader in digital security, producing banking cards, mobile payment systems, two-factor authentication devices used for online security, hardware tokens used for securing buildings and offices, electronic passports and identification cards. It provides chips to Vodafone in Europe and France's Orange, as well as EE, a joint venture in the U.K. between France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom. Royal KPN, the largest Dutch wireless network provider, also uses Gemalto technology.
In Asia, Gemalto's chips are used by China Unicom, Japan's NTT and Taiwan's Chungwa Telecom, as well as scores of wireless network providers throughout Africa and the Middle East. The company's security technology is used by more than 3,000 financial institutions and 80 government organizations. Among its clients are Visa, Mastercard, American Express, JP Morgan Chase and Barclays. It also provides chips for use in luxury cars, including those made by Audi and BMW.
In 2012, Gemalto won a sizable contract, worth $175 million, from the U.S. government to produce the covers for electronic U.S. passports, which contain chips and antennas that can be used to better authenticate travelers. As part of its contract, Gemalto provides the personalization and software for the microchips implanted in the passports. The U.S. represents Gemalto's single largest market, accounting for some 15 percent of its total business. This raises the question of whether GCHQ, which was able to bypass encryption on mobile networks, has the ability to access private data protected by other Gemalto products created for banks and governments.
As smart phones become smarter, they are increasingly replacing credit cards and cash as a means of paying for goods and services. When Verizon, AT&T and T-Mobile formed an alliance in 2010 to jointly build an electronic pay system to challenge Google Wallet and Apple Pay, they purchased Gemalto's technology for their program, known as Softcard. (Until July 2014, it previously went by the unfortunate name of "ISIS Mobile Wallet.") Whether data relating to that, and other Gemalto security products, has been compromised by GCHQ and the NSA is unclear. Both intelligence agencies declined to answer any specific questions for this story.
PRIVACY ADVOCATES and security experts say it would take billions of dollars, significant political pressure, and several years to fix the fundamental security flaws in the current mobile phone system that NSA, GCHQ and other intelligence agencies regularly exploit.
A current gaping hole in the protection of mobile communications is that cellphones and wireless network providers do not support the use of Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), a form of encryption designed to limit the damage caused by theft or disclosure of encryption keys. PFS, which is now built into modern web browsers and used by sites like Google and Twitter, works by generating unique encryption keys for each communication or message, which are then discarded. Rather than using the same encryption key to protect years' worth of data, as the permanent Kis on SIM cards can, a new key might be generated each minute, hour or day, and then promptly destroyed. Because cellphone communications do not utilize PFS, if an intelligence agency has been "passively" intercepting someone's communications for a year and later acquires the permanent encryption key, it can go back and decrypt all of those communications. If mobile phone networks were using PFS, that would not be possible — even if the permanent keys were later stolen.
The only effective way for individuals to protect themselves from Ki theft-enabled surveillance is to use secure communications software, rather than relying on SIM card-based security. Secure software includes email and other apps that use Transport Layer Security (TLS), the mechanism underlying the secure HTTPS web protocol. The email clients included with Android phones and iPhones support TLS, as do large email providers like Yahoo and Google.
Apps like TextSecure and Silent Text are secure alternatives to SMS messages, while Signal, RedPhone and Silent Phone encrypt voice calls. Governments still may be able to intercept communications, but reading or listening to them would require hacking a specific handset, obtaining internal data from an email provider, or installing a bug in a room to record the conversations.
"We need to stop assuming that the phone companies will provide us with a secure method of making calls or exchanging text messages," says Soghoian.
Nama koji otiske prstiju dajemo državnoj oružanoj sili čim zađemo u punoletstvo je sve ovo normalno, ali nekim delovima sveta je priličan šok ovo kako u Pakistanu odlučuju da - sprečavanja terorizma radi - prikupe otiske prstiju velikog broja populacije. Naime - bez davanja otisaka prstiju nema više korišćenja moblinog telefona:
Pakistanis face a deadline: Surrender fingerprints or give up cellphone (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistanis-face-a-deadline-surrender-fingerprints-or-give-up-cellphone/2015/02/23/de995a88-b932-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html)
Quote
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Cellphones didn't just arrive in Pakistan. But someone could be fooled into thinking otherwise, considering the tens of millions of Pakistanis pouring into mobile phone stores these days.
In one of the world's largest — and fastest — efforts to collect biometric information, Pakistan has ordered cellphone users to verify their identities through fingerprints for a national database being compiled to curb terrorism. If they don't, their service will be shut off, an unthinkable option for many after a dozen years of explosive growth in cellphone usage here.
Prompted by concerns about a proliferation of illegal and untraceable SIM cards, the directive is the most visible step so far in Pakistan's efforts to restore law and order (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/after-years-of-delays-pakistan-cracks-down-on-violent-islamists/2014/12/28/cbce12fa-8d58-11e4-ace9-47de1af4c3eb_story.html)after Taliban militants killed 150 students and teachers at a school in December. Officials said the six terrorists who stormed the school in Peshawar were using cellphones registered to one woman (http://www.ibtimes.com/peshawar-school-attack-4-suspects-arrested-bahawalpur-pakistani-taliban-used-womans-1763334)who had no obvious connection to the attackers.
[Related: After years of delays, Pakistan cracks down on violent Islamists] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/after-years-of-delays-pakistan-cracks-down-on-violent-islamists/2014/12/28/cbce12fa-8d58-11e4-ace9-47de1af4c3eb_story.html)
But the effort to match one person to each cellphone number involves a jaw-dropping amount of work. At the start of this year, there were 103 million SIM cards in Pakistan — roughly the number of the adult population — that officials were not sure were valid or properly registered. And mobile companies have until April 15 to verify the owners of all of the cards, which are tiny chips in cellphones that carry a subscriber's personal security and identity information.
In the past six weeks, 53 million SIMs belonging to 38 million residents have been verified through biometric screening, officials said.
"Once the verification of each and every SIM is done, coupled with blocking unverified SIMs, the terrorists will no longer have this tool," said a senior Interior Ministry official, who was not authorized to speak publicly about the government's security policy. "The government knows that it's an arduous job, both for the cellular companies and their customers, but this has to be done as a national duty."
[Related: Pakistan announces a national plan to fight terrorism] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/24/pakistan-announces-a-national-plan-to-fight-terrorism-says-terrorists-days-are-numbered/)
As Pakistan's decade-long struggle against Islamist extremism has stretched on, residents have grown accustomed to hassles such as long security lines and police checkpoints. Now they must add the inconvenience of rushing into a retail store to keep their phones on.
"I spend all day working and sometimes have to work till late in the night. . . . I cannot afford to stand in line for hours to have my SIM verified," said Abid Ali Shah, 50, a taxi driver who was waiting to be fingerprinted at a cellphone store. "But if I don't do it, my phone is my only source of communication that I have to remain in touch with my family."
Though Pakistan's first cellphone company (http://telecompk.net/2009/12/28/history-pakistan-telecom-impact-culture/)launched in 1991, there was only sparse usage until the turn of the 21st century. Since then, the number of cellphone subscribers has grown from about 5 million in 2003 to about 136 million today, according to the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority.
The mobile phone subscription rate now stands at about 73 percent, roughly equal to the rate in neighboring India, according to the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2). It's even common for Pakistanis in remote or mountainous areas, where electricity can be sporadic and few have access to vehicles, to own a cellphone.
With 50 million more SIM cards left to be verified, phone companies are dispatching outreach teams deep into the countryside and mountains to notify customers of the policy.
"It's a massive, nationwide exercise with a tight deadline, but hopefully we will be able to verify our customers by the April deadline," said Omar Manzur, an executive at Mobilink, which has 38 million customers in Pakistan. "We have sent out 700 mobile vans all across Pakistan to reach out to these far-flung areas, the villages and small towns."
One region that appears largely unaffected by the plan is the immediate area around the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where many Islamist militants have historically sought refuge. Pakistani cellphone networks generally do not provide service to those areas, and residents try to get coverage from Afghan networks, officials said.
Cellphone owners' fingerprints are being matched with those on file in a national database the government began creating in 2005. Those whose prints are not in the database must first submit them to the National Database & Registration Authority. (https://www.nadra.gov.pk/)Some residents, including several million (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-cracks-down-on-afghan-immigrants-fearing-an-influx-as-us-leaves-afghanistan/2014/05/12/74057f62-cfa9-11e3-b812-0c92213941f4_story.html) Afghan refugees not eligible (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-cracks-down-on-afghan-immigrants-fearing-an-influx-as-us-leaves-afghanistan/2014/05/12/74057f62-cfa9-11e3-b812-0c92213941f4_story.html)for citizenship, also have to obtain a court affidavit attesting they will properly use their cellphones.
Over the years, several countries, including South Africa and India (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-18156858), have implemented broad systems for obtaining and storing residents' biometric information. But analysts and communications experts say they can't recall a country trying to gather biometrics as rapidly as Pakistan is doing.
"In a country like this, where the infrastructure is not available in many areas, this looks unprecedented," said Wahaj us Siraj, the chief executive officer of Nayatel, a major Pakistani Internet supplier.
Once the nationwide verification process is complete, police and intelligence officials will have a much easier time tracing the origins of crimes or terrorist attacks, said Ammar Jaffri, the former deputy director of Pakistan's Federal Investigation Agency.
Jaffri noted that cellphones have often been used to detonate explosive devices in Pakistan. Authorities are also struggling to curb extortion carried out by criminals, often affiliated with banned militant groups, who make threatening phone calls demanding money.
Jaffri said Pakistanis should just accept that a SIM card "becomes part of you" and that any privacy concerns do not override government regulation of airwaves.
"We have new technology now, and we shouldn't be afraid of these things, we should face it," said Jaffri, president of the Pakistan Information Security Association. "Watching people when they move, it's natural: Every country does it. "
As they show up at cellphone stores, some Pakistanis are learning firsthand just how lax Pakistan had been in tracking SIM cards.
At a Mobilink office in Islamabad, Muhammad Safdar, 30, was told that six different SIM cards were attached to his name.
"I think some of my friends had my ID card number," Safdar said. "Earlier it was very easy to simply redeem that number and get a SIM issued in that name."
Ghulam Rasool, a 24-year-old Afghan citizen living here, waited in line only to learn that the SIM card he had bought at a fruit market four years ago was now illegal.
"Before, no one asked, but now they are, and it has to be in my name," said Rasool, who emerged from the Mobilink office with a new phone number. "Everyone has my old number, and now I have to contact hundreds of people" in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Still, many Pakistanis are taking the process in stride, saying they are willing to do whatever it takes to reduce terrorism. They are skeptical, however, that this will be the answer to ending a war that has killed (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/amid-fighting-in-tribal-areas-pakistan-braces-for-a-long-and-deadly-war/2015/02/19/d200b070-b13d-11e4-bf39-5560f3918d4b_story.html) more than 50,000 Pakistani residents and soldiers over the past 13 years.
"If this can bring peace, it's okay," said Khan Gul, his thumb still stained with blue ink. "But I am wondering how a mobile phone verification can bring peace."
Slavoj Žižek (2015) "I Don't Care About Surveillance" (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L0SN29Ee8mo#ws)
Snowden kopa da se vrati u Ameriku, ako će da mu garantuju pošteno suđenje (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/snowden-in-talks-on-returning-to-us-russian-lawyer-says/article23261304/).
Evo, da se ne kaže posle da nam nisu rekli:
UK Government Admits Intelligence Services Allowed To Break Into Any System, Anywhere, For Any Reason (https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150320/04052830372/uk-government-admits-intelligence-services-allowed-to-break-into-any-system-anywhere-any-reason.shtml)
QuoteRecently, Techdirt noted that the FBI may soon have permission to break (https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150317/07440430342/judicial-committee-gives-fbi-first-ok-it-needs-to-hack-any-computer-anywhere-planet.shtml) into computers anywhere on the planet. It will come as no surprise to learn that the US's partner in crime, the UK, granted similar powers to its own intelligence services some time back. What's more unexpected is that it has now publicly said as much (https://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/545), as Privacy International explains: The British Government has admitted its intelligence services have the broad power to hack into personal phones, computers, and communications networks, and claims they are legally justifed to hack anyone, anywhere in the world, even if the target is not a threat to national security nor suspected of any crime.
That important admission was made in what the UK government calls its "Open Response (http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/news_and_features/Pages/IPT-Governments-Open-Response.aspx)" to court cases (https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140909/08452028462/privacy-international-lodges-legal-challenge-to-official-secrecy-surrounding-gchq-spying.shtml) started last year against GCHQ. Here's what it reveals, according to Privacy International: Buried deep within the document, Government lawyers claim that while the intelligence services require authorisation to hack into the computer and mobile phones of "intelligence targets", GCHQ is equally permitted to break into computers anywhere in the world even if they are not connected to a crime or a threat to national security.
Moreover: The intelligence services assert the right to exploit communications networks in covert manoeuvres that severely undermine the security of the entire internet. The deployment of such powers is confirmed by recent news stories detailing how GCHQ hacked into Belgacom using the malware Regin, and targeted Gemalto, the world's largest maker of SIM cards used in countries around the world.
What's important about this revelation is not just the information itself -- many people had assumed this was the case -- but the fact that once more, bringing court cases against the UK's GCHQ has ferreted out (https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150219/07273430070/humiliating-admission-uk-government-that-yet-more-its-surveillance-was-unlawful.shtml) numerous details that were previously secret. This shows the value of the strategy, and suggests it should be used again where possible.
Evo, tko još nije pogledao istorijski :lol: intervju Džona Olivera sa Edvardom Snoudenom, nek to učini:
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Government Surveillance (HBO) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEVlyP4_11M#ws)
Dilema je ovo: Oliver Snoudenu pokušava da objasni da je bitno da stvari pojednostavi do banalnosti za Joe Sixpack građane koji uopšte ne kapiraju zašto bi bilo strašno to što ih Veliki Brat nadgleda pa insistira na tome da NSA vidi svačiju pišu. Ovo ima logike. Ali ima i logike u tome da Snouden ne želi da priča o ovom elementu cele slike jer je on zaista banalan i može da zakloni važnije delove.
Maestralno! Objašnjenje na praktičnom primeru. Ne vidim ni jednog Amerikanca koji bi mogao ovo da izvede, makar mu i petlja bila obmotana prugama i zvezdama.
изузетан интервју, оливер је знатно порастао у мојим очима
Most Americans Dislike Snowden, But He's Popular Abroad: Poll (https://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/edward-snowden-nsa-surveillance-aclu/2015/04/22/id/639957/)
Quote
An international poll conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union (https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/snowden_poll_results.pdf) focusing on the attitudes of millennials toward Edward Snowden found that majorities held positive opinions of him, but more so in Europe than in the U.S., according to U.S. News & World Reports (http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/21/edward-snowden-unpopular-at-home-a-hero-abroad-poll-finds).
The ACLU represents Snowden against U.S. government efforts to prosecute him for violations of the Espionage Act. He continues to dump thousands of pages of classified information about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance activities into the public domain.
Millennials, ages 18 to 34, tend to view Snowden as a champion of privacy. They see his actions as basically benign, and lean toward thinking that what he did is unlikely to undermine efforts to stop terrorist groups from striking in the West.
Pluralities in some countries, including the U.S., say they are not sure about his impact on terrorism.
Besides the U.S., the poll was conducted in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Britain, Italy, Canada, New Zealand, France and Australia.
Snowden was most popular among Italian young people, with 86 percent "very" or "somewhat" positive. American millennials were comparatively the least enthused with Snowden's actions, though 56 percent were "very" or "somewhat" positive, according to the ACLU.
U.S. News reported exclusively that 64 percent of Americans of all ages surveyed hold a negative opinion of Snowden and 36 percent a positive one — of these, 8 percent are very positive.
The older the group of Americans are, the less favorable their views on Snowden. Among those aged 35-44, some 34 percent have positive attitudes toward him. For the 45-54 age cohort, the figure is 28 percent, and it drops to 26 percent among Americans over age 55, U.S. News reported.
Snowden, who worked as a private contractor at the NSA, fled the U.S. on May 20, 2013. Through collaborators Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras, he began releasing purloined classified information about phone and Internet intercepts in June. He arrived in Moscow on June 23 and was soon granted asylum by President Vladimir Putin.
From Moscow, Snowden continues to disseminate information about the U.S. and its allies. In February, he made public that the Israeli, American and British intelligence services were coordinating efforts to track the activities of leaders in the Islamic Republic of Iran because of suspicions about that country's nuclear weapons program, Haaretz (http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.643602) reported.
The younger generation opposes government agencies tracking them online or collecting data about their phone calls, said ACLU executive director Anthony Romero, according to U.S. News.
"It is unlikely this generation of digital natives will shed a fundamental commitment to the free exchange of information" even when they grow older, Romero wrote in a
Evo kome se čita, detalji o programu Stellarwind koji je imao sve odlike moderne prisluškivačke priče: kršenje ustava, široko zabačena mreža u koju se hvataju krivi i nevini, al pretežno nevini itd.
Government Releases Once-Secret Report on Post-9/11 Surveillance (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/25/us/25stellarwind-ig-report.html?_r=0)
Spojlr alrt: izveštaj tvrdi da je ova vrsta špijuniranja sopstvenih građana neefikasna.
Holy Trinity of whistleblowers: Statues of Assange, Snowden and Manning go up in Berlin (VIDEO) (http://rt.com/news/255137-manning-assange-snowden-statue/)
Quote
One of the German capital's central squares has become the stage for a provocative art piece, which not only celebrates whistleblowers, but encourages other ordinary citizens to speak out.
"They have lost their freedom for the truth, so they remind us how important it is to know the truth," Italian sculptor Davide Dormino told the media in Berlin's Alexanderplatz.
The life-sized statues of the three whistleblowers stand upon three chairs, as if speaking in an impromptu public meeting. Next to them is a fourth, empty chair.
For Dormino, who titled his piece, Anything to Say? this is the centerpiece of the composition.
"The fourth chair is open to anyone here in Berlin who wants to get up and say anything they want," he told Deutsche Welle.
Dozens of people, including children, have already overcome their fears, and stood up on the platform, some with a loudspeaker.
"People are saying many different things. From politics to babbling to silence, from people who desperately are wanting to help Julian, Bradley and Edward to people who have no idea who they are. This chair is, I guess, a place of free speech," said Dormino.
Bradley Manning, who leaked US diplomatic cables in 2011, is serving a 35-year sentence in a military prison. Manning has since changed her gender to female, and is now known as Chelsea. However, she is presented in her former guise as a male US soldier in the composition. Julian Assange, who hosted Manning's files on his Wikileaks website, remains in the Ecuadorian embassy in London, aware that leaving it may leave him exposed to extradition to the US. Former intelligence agent Edward Snowden, who revealed the intricacies and reach of NSA surveillance technologies, has been marooned in an undisclosed location in Russia for nearly two years.
Dormino, who came up with the idea together with the US journalist Charles Glass, specifically chose a classical bronze statue for his depiction – and not an installation or abstract piece – since statues are usually made of establishment figures. For the Rome-based artist, this is an injustice – while men who order others to their deaths get immortalized, those who resist are often forgotten, so "the statue pays homage to three who said no to war, to the lies that lead to war and to the intrusion into private life that helps to perpetuate war."
Dormino says he will now tour the world's most prominent public places with his exhibit, recording the opinions or ordinary citizens across the globe. One place he may not be welcome is the US: an unapproved bust of Snowden, placed in a New York park last month, was removed within hours.
http://youtu.be/kWn5XxijJJI (http://youtu.be/kWn5XxijJJI)
Kolko je do njega bilo, on je uradio...
Obama signs bill reforming surveillance program (http://news.yahoo.com/obama-signs-bill-reforming-surveillance-program-013459585--finance.html)
Quote
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Barack Obama signed into law on Tuesday legislation passed by Congress earlier in the day reforming a government surveillance program that swept up millions of Americans' telephone records.
Reversing security policy in place since shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the bill ends a system exposed by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. The spy agency collected and searched records of phone calls looking for terrorism leads but was not allowed to listen to their content.
Passage of the USA Freedom Act, the result of an alliance between Senate Democrats and some of the chamber's most conservative Republicans, was a victory for Obama, a Democrat, and a setback for Senate Republican Majority Leader Mitch McConnell.
After the Senate voted 67-32 on Tuesday to give final congressional approval to the bill, Obama used his Twitter account, @POTUS, to say he was glad it had passed. "I'll sign it as soon as I get it," the tweet said.
Before voting, senators defeated three amendments proposed by Republican leaders after they reversed themselves and ended efforts to block it. The House of Representatives passed the measure overwhelmingly last month.
In the end, 23 Senate Republicans voted for the Freedom Act, joining 196 who backed it in the House. In a rift between Republicans, who control both chambers, House leaders had warned that amendments proposed by McConnell would be a "challenge" for the House that could delay the bill.
A federal appeals court on May 7 ruled the collection of "metadata" illegal.
The new law would require companies such as Verizon Communications Inc and AT&T Inc, to collect and store telephone records the same way that they do now for billing purposes.
But instead of routinely feeding U.S. intelligence agencies such data, the companies would be required to turn it over only in response to a government request approved by the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
The Freedom Act is the first major legislative reform of U.S. surveillance since Snowden's revelations two years ago this month led to debate over how to balance Americans' distrust of intrusive government with fears of terrorist attacks.
Along with the phone records program, two other domestic surveillance programs authorized under the 2001 USA Patriot Act have been shut down since Sunday.
MISSED DEADLINE
After Republican Senator Rand Paul, a 2016 presidential candidate, blocked McConnell's efforts to keep them going temporarily, the Senate missed a deadline to extend legal authorities for certain data collection by the NSA and the FBI.
McConnell made an unusually strong last-ditch argument against the Freedom Act after his amendments failed. "It surely undermines American security by taking one more tool from our war fighters, in my view, at exactly the wrong time," he said in a Senate speech.
Telephone companies had been less than thrilled about potentially overhauling their record-keeping systems to become the repositories of surveillance records.
Together with civil liberties groups, they opposed specific requirements for how long they must retain any data, which were proposed in some amendments that were later defeated. A Verizon official, for instance, spoke in support of the Freedom Act, without such a mandate, in a Senate hearing last year.
After the vote, Microsoft Corp General Counsel Brad Smith praised Congress. "Today's vote by the Senate on the USA Freedom Act will help to restore the balance between protecting public safety and preserving civil liberties," Smith said in a statement.
Democratic Senator Ron Wyden, a leading Senate privacy advocate, voted for the Freedom Act. He pledged that he and his allies would continue pushing for more limits on surveillance.
"This has always been about reforming intelligence policies that do not make America safer and threaten our liberties," Wyden told reporters.
The American Civil Liberties Union said the Freedom Act was a milestone, but did not go far enough. "The passage of the bill is an indication that comprehensive reform is possible, but it is not comprehensive reform in itself," ACLU deputy legal director Jameel Jaffer said in a statement.
A senior U.S. intelligence official said the bulk telephone data collection system had been shut down since shortly before 8 p.m. EDT on Sunday.
It was not immediately clear how soon the NSA program would be restarted. The Freedom Act allows it to continue for six months while the new system is established.
The White House said the administration would move quickly to get it up and running again.
With Obama's signing of the bill, the executive branch will have to apply to the surveillance court for reauthorization.
Taj luckasti EfBiAj:
Congress Didn't Notice the FBI Creating a 'Small Air Force' for Surveillance (http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/congress-didnt-notice-the-fbi-creating-a-small-air-force-for-surveillance/395147/)
Last week, Americans learned that even as the NSA collected information on their telephone and Internet behavior, the FBI was using fictitious companies to secretly operate what the AP called "a small air force with scores of low-flying planes across the country carrying video and, at times, cell phone surveillance technology."
The news organization reported (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-behind-mysterious-surveillance-aircraft-over-us-cities/2015/06/02/030ce2e2-0959-11e5-951e-8e15090d64ae_story.html) that surveillance flights may be more than a decade old, and identified "more than 100 flights since late April orbiting both major cities and rural areas."
The merits of this program will now be debated.
What's already clear, however, is the anti-democratic nature of keeping it hidden all these years. The U.S. is supposed to be governed by the people. Whether Americans want a federal law-enforcement agency using planes to conduct surveillance on vast swaths of the country is a question properly aired and debated.
It is for Americans to choose.
ADVERTISING
Instead, an executive branch that has grown alarmingly powerful since the September 11 terrorist attacks, or perhaps even before, imposed its preferred policy in secret. The vast majority of Americans were completely unaware of its choice.
This made voter accountability on the issue impossible.
And many of the FBI's ostensible overseers in Congress don't know much more than the public, either. This is evident from letters that legislators have written in recent days. Senator Charles Grassley, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, demanded to be briefed (http://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/judiciary/upload/2015-06-01%20CEG%20to%20FBI%20%28Aerial%20Surveillance%29.pdf) no later than this week on "the scope, nature, and purpose of these operations... and what legal authorities, if any, are being relied upon in carrying out these operations."
Sixteen House members wrote to the FBI, pointing out that the president had just signed a reform ending the bulk collection of phone records. "It is highly disturbing," they wrote, "to learn that your agency may be doing just that and more with a secret fleet of aircraft engaged in surveillance missions." They asked for the FBI to identify the legal theory used to justify the flights, the circumstances surrounding them, the technologies on the aircraft, the privacy policy used for data collected, and the civil liberties safeguards that had been put in place.
Senator Al Franken has posed ten questions of his own to the FBI (http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/150603FBIPlaneLetter.pdf):
- What technologies are used by the FBI during the course of aerial surveillance? To what extent does the FBI use IMSI-catchers, "DRTBoxes," "dirtboxes," or "Stingrays"? To what extent does the FBI use infrared cameras? To what extent does the FBI use video cameras?
- How frequently does the FBI engage in aerial surveillance that utilizes IMSI-catchers, infrared cameras, or video technology? In what types of operations does the FBI deploy aerial surveillance utilizing these technologies? More generally, under what circumstances is aerial surveillance using these technologies deployed?
- Under what legal authority is the FBI acting when conducting aerial surveillance, including aerial surveillance that utilizes IMSI-catchers, infrared cameras, or video technology? To the extent that the Department of Justice is seeking court approval before deploying any of these technologies during aerial surveillance, is this done on a case-by-case basis or does the Department seek broader authorization? What are judges told about how the technologies deployed work, and the potential impact on innocent Americans? Please provide a representative sample of the applications for these court orders.
- To the extent that the Department of Justice has developed policies governing the use of IMSI-catchers, infrared cameras, or video technology during aerial surveillance, please identify the policies and legal processes used. Are different technologies subject to different policies or forms of legal process? If so, please describe the application of these policies.
- Has the Department of Justice developed policies on the retention of data collected in the course of aerial surveillance that utilizes IMSI-catchers, infrared cameras, or video technology? Has the Department developed policies on the destruction of that data? If so, please describe these policies.
- How many individuals can be detected, tracked, and/or monitored during each surveillance flight? If IMSI-catchers are being used, how many phones can be detected, tracked, and/or monitored during each flight?
- Reports indicate that some of the surveillance systems have the capability of blocking phone calls, including 911 and other emergency calls. What steps have been taken to ensure that hone calls of non-targeted civilians are not interrupted by the FBI's aerial surveillance?
- To the extent that aerial surveillance has been deployed above large public gatherings, what steps is the government taking to ensure that such surveillance does not chill constitutionally protected conduct, such as political and religious activity?
- Has the Department of Justice's Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties conducted a privacy impact assessment or otherwise reviewed the use of technologies utilized during aerial surveillance? Has a review or privacy impact assessment been conducted on the FBI's use of aerial surveillance more broadly? If so, please provide copies of such assessments or reviews.
- What safeguards are in place to ensure innocent Americans' privacy is protected during aerial surveillance utilizing technology that collects data and personal information?
Shame on the FBI for not informing the public and the full Congress about this program. And shame on legislators for being so clueless about surveillance flights run for years by a law-enforcement agency which they are responsible for overseeing. The fact that questions about legal authorities and privacy are just now being raised is yet another indication that legislators have been derelict in their duties.
Ova najnovija pizdarija oko toga da su Kinezi i Rusi "dobili" od Snoudena tajne podatke je naravno zanimljiva. Glen Grinvold:
The Sunday Times' Snowden Story is Journalism at its Worst — and Filled with Falsehoods (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/14/sunday-times-report-snowden-files-journalism-worst-also-filled-falsehoods/)
Heh, kad prisluškujete Francuze, očekujte posledice :lol: :lol: :lol:
French Justice Minister Says Snowden and Assange Could Be Offered Asylum (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/25/french-justice-minister-says-snowden-assange-offered-assylum/)
Quote
French Justice Minister Christiane Taubira thinks National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange might be allowed to settle in France.
If France decides to offer them asylum, she would "absolutely not be surprised," she told (http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/25/europe/france-assange-snowden-asylum/) French news channel BFMTV on Thursday (translated from the French). She said it would be a "symbolic gesture."
Taubira was asked about the NSA's sweeping surveillance of three French presidents, disclosed by WikiLeaks this week, and called it an "unspeakable practice."
Her comments echoed those in an editorial (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/25/french-newspaper-cites-u-s-contempt-reason-offer-snowden-asylum/) in France's leftist newspaper Libération Thursday morning, which said giving Snowden asylum would be a "single gesture" that would send "a clear and useful message to Washington," in response to the "contempt" the U.S. showed by spying on France's president.
Snowden, who faces criminal espionage charges in the U.S., has found himself stranded in Moscow with temporary asylum as he awaits responses from two dozen countries where he'd like to live; and Assange is trapped inside the Ecuadorian Embassy in London to avoid extradition to Sweden. (See correction below.)
Taubira, the chief of France's Ministry of Justice, holds the equivalent position of the attorney general in the United States. She has been described (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/14/christiane-taubira-french-politics) in the press as a "maverick," targeting issues such as poverty and same-sex marriage, often inspiring anger among French right-wingers.
Taubira doesn't actually have the power to offer asylum herself, however. She said in the interview that such a decision would be up to the French president, prime minister and foreign minister. And Taubira just last week threatened (http://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/L-ultimatum-de-Christiane-Taubira-a-Manuel-Valls-sur-la-justice-des-mineurs-738474) to quit her job unless French President François Hollande implemented her juvenile justice reforms.
Correction: Due to an editing error, an earlier version of this article improperly described the state of Assange's case in Sweden and his reason for avoiding extradition. He has refused to go to Sweden, where he faces accusations of sexual assault, because he fears he could then be extradited to the United States.
(This post is from our blog: Unofficial Sources (https://firstlook.org/theintercept/unofficial-sources/).)
Plot se zgušnjava:
Surveillance Court Rules That N.S.A. Can Resume Bulk Data Collection (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-court-rules-nsa-can-resume-bulk-data-collection.html?_r=1)
Quote
WASHINGTON — The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled late Monday that the National Security Agency may temporarily resume its once-secret program that systematically collects records of Americans' domestic phone calls in bulk.
But the American Civil Liberties Union said Tuesday that it would ask the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which had ruled that the surveillance program was illegal, to issue an injunction to halt the program, setting up a potential conflict between the two courts.
The program lapsed on June 1, when a law on which it was based, Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, expired. Congress revived that provision on June 2 with a bill called the USA Freedom Act, which said the provision could not be used for bulk collection after six months (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics/senate-surveillance-bill-passes-hurdle-but-showdown-looms.html).
The six-month period was intended to give intelligence agencies time to move to a new system in which the phone records — which include information like phone numbers and the duration of calls but not the contents of conversations — would stay in the hands of phone companies. Under those rules, the agency would still be able to gain access to the records to analyze links between callers and suspected terrorists.
But, complicating matters, in May the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, ruled in a lawsuit brought by the A.C.L.U. that Section 215 (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/08/us/nsa-phone-records-collection-ruled-illegal-by-appeals-court.html?_r=0) of the Patriot Act could not legitimately be interpreted as permitting bulk collection at all.
Congress did not include language in the Freedom Act contradicting the Second Circuit ruling or authorizing bulk collection even for the six-month transition. As a result, it was unclear whether the program had a lawful basis to resume in the interim.
After President Obama signed the Freedom Act on June 2, his administration applied (http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2015-01%20Memorandum%20of%20Law.pdf) to restart the program for six months. But a conservative and libertarian advocacy group, FreedomWorks (http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2015-01%20Motion-1.pdf), filed a motion in the surveillance court saying it had no legal authority to permit the program to resume, even for the interim period.
In a 26-page opinion (https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2124483-br-15-75-misc-15-01-opinion-and-order.html) made public on Tuesday, Judge Michael W. Mosman of the surveillance court rejected the challenge by FreedomWorks, which was represented by a former Virginia attorney general, Ken Cuccinelli, a Republican. And Judge Mosman said the Second Circuit was wrong, too.
"Second Circuit rulings are not binding" on the surveillance court, he wrote, "and this court respectfully disagrees with that court's analysis, especially in view of the intervening enactment of the USA Freedom Act."
When the Second Circuit issued its ruling that the program was illegal, it did not issue any injunction ordering the program halted, saying it would be prudent to see what Congress did as Section 215 neared its June 1 expiration. Jameel Jaffer, an A.C.L.U. lawyer, said on Tuesday that the group would now ask for one.
"Neither the statute nor the Constitution permits the government to subject millions of innocent people to this kind of intrusive surveillance," Mr. Jaffer said. "We intend to ask the court to prohibit the surveillance and to order the N.S.A. to purge the records it's already collected." Advertisement
Continue reading the main story (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-court-rules-nsa-can-resume-bulk-data-collection.html?_r=1#story-continues-4) Advertisement
Continue reading the main story (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-court-rules-nsa-can-resume-bulk-data-collection.html?_r=1#story-continues-4) Advertisement
Continue reading the main story (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-court-rules-nsa-can-resume-bulk-data-collection.html?_r=1#story-continues-4) The bulk phone records program traces back to October 2001, when the Bush administration secretly authorized the N.S.A. to collect records of Americans' domestic phone calls in bulk as part of a broader set of post-Sept. 11 counterterrorism efforts.
The program began on the basis of presidential power alone. In 2006, the Bush administration persuaded the surveillance court to begin blessing it under of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which says the government may collect records that are "relevant" to a national security investigation.
The program was declassified in June 2013 after its existence was disclosed by the former intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden.
It remains unclear whether the Second Circuit still considers the surveillance program to be illegal during this six-month transition period. The basis for its ruling in May was that Congress had never intended for Section 215 to authorize bulk collection.
In his ruling, Judge Mosman said that because Congress knew how the surveillance court was interpreting Section 215 when it passed the Freedom Act, lawmakers implicitly authorized bulk collection to resume for the transition period.
"Congress could have prohibited bulk data collection" effective immediately, he wrote. "Instead, after lengthy public debate, and with crystal-clear knowledge of the fact of ongoing bulk collection of call detail records," it chose to allow a 180-day transitional period during which such collection could continue, he wrote.
The surveillance court is subject to review by its own appeals panel, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Both the Second Circuit and the surveillance review court are in turn subject to the Supreme Court, which resolves conflicts between appeals courts.
Wyn Hornbuckle, a Justice Department spokesman, said in a written statement that the Obama administration agreed with Judge Mosman.
Since the program was made public, plaintiffs have filed several lawsuits before regular courts, which hear arguments from each side before issuing rulings, unlike the surveillance court's usual practice, which is to hear only from the government. Judge Mosman's disagreement with the Second Circuit is the second time that the surveillance court has rejected a contrary ruling about the program by a judge in the regular court system.
In a lawsuit challenging the program that was brought by the conservative legal advocate Larry Klayman, Judge Richard J. Leon of Federal District Court in the District of Columbia ruled in December 2013 that the program most likely violated the Fourth Amendment (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/us/politics/federal-judge-rules-against-nsa-phone-data-program.html), which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
But in March 2014, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer, a Federal District Court judge who also sits on the secret surveillance court, rejected Judge Leon's reasoning (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/us/phone-company-bid-to-keep-data-from-nsa-is-rejected.html) and permitted the program to keep going. The Obama administration has appealed Judge Leon's decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The Freedom Act also contains a provision saying that whenever the surveillance court addresses a novel and significant legal issue, it must either appoint an outside "friend of the court" who can offer arguments contrary to what the government is saying, or explain why appointing one is not appropriate.
The first test of that reform came last month when another judge on the court, F. Dennis Saylor IV, addressed a separate issue raised by the passage of the Freedom Act. Judge Saylor acknowledged (http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%2015-77%2015-78%20Memorandum%20Opinion.pdf) that it was novel and significant, but declined to appoint an outside advocate, saying the answer to the legal question was "sufficiently clear" to him without hearing from one.
Has This Man Unlocked The Secret To Internet Anonymity? (http://www.fastcompany.com/3049569/has-this-man-unlocked-the-secret-to-internet-anonymity)
Whoa.
Swedish prosecutors drop Assange sexual assault probe (http://news.yahoo.com/swedish-prosecutors-drop-assange-sexual-assault-probe-103219116.html)
QuoteStockholm (AFP) - Swedish prosecutors dropped a sexual assault probe against Julian Assange on Thursday, but the move failed to placate the Wikileaks founder who still faces a rape claim.
Two of the four allegations against the Australian -- who has been holed up at Ecuador's London embassy since 2012 to avoid extradition -- have reached their statute of limitations after five years.
"Now that the statute of limitations has expired on certain offences, I am obliged to drop part of the investigation," prosecutor Marianne Ny said.
But she said she still wanted to question the 44-year-old over the more serious claim of rape.
The accusations dropped involve one count of sexual assault and another of unlawful coercion. A separate allegation of sexual molestation will run out on August 18.
The Australian can still however be prosecuted for rape, which carries a 10-year statute of limitations that expires in 2020.
Assange has always denied the allegations brought by two Swedish women, and insists the sexual encounters were consensual.
"I am extremely disappointed. There was no need for any of this. I am an innocent man," Assange said in a statement after the prosecutor's decision.
- Unable to access embassy -
He accused her of being "beyond incompetence" for failing to going to the Ecuador embassy to take his statement or to pledge he would not be sent to the United States.
A member of his legal team, Baroness Helena Kennedy of Britain, also took aim at the Swedish prosecution.
"The evidence would never have stood in any court of law worthy of its name," she said in a statment, adding: "The remaining allegation is just as unlikely to lead to conviction."
Under Swedish law, if a suspect is not questioned before the deadline on the case expires, they can no longer be tried for the alleged crimes.
Despite repeated attempts, prosecutors say they have been unable to gain access to Ecuador's embassy.
They initially insisted Assange return to Sweden for interrogation -- a condition he rejected for fear Stockholm could deliver him to US authorities, who may try him for leaking nearly 750,000 classified military and diplomatic documents in 2010.
In a U-turn in March, prosecutors agreed to Assange's compromise offer to question him inside the London mission but say they have yet to see their request approved by Ecuador because of procedural issues -- leading critics to suspect Quito of playing the clock.
Attorneys for Assange however say suspicions Ecuador is using delaying tactics are unfounded.
"The (Swedish) request came in late and is being processed by Ecuador, which will certainly approve it after following its own procedures," Assange's Swedish lawyer Per Samuelsson told AFP earlier this month.
Claes Borgstrom, a lawyer for one of the two women accusing Assange of assault in 2010, said his client was trying to come to terms with the likelihood that the case will never be tried.
- 'Weight lifted' -
"She has always been ready to stand by her accusations and wanted to bring the case to court. But at the same time a weight has been lifted. This has been dragging on for five years and she wants to go back to her normal life," he told the daily Dagens Nyheter earlier this week.
Assange has compared living inside the embassy -- which has no garden but is in the plush Knightsbridge district, near Harrods department store -- to life on a space station.
His room, which measures 15 feet by 13 feet (4.5 by 4 metre), is divided into an office and a living area. He has a treadmill, a shower, a microwave and a sun lamp and spends most of his day at his computer.
Assange is subject to a European arrest warrant. Britain has vowed to detain him if he sets foot outside the embassy, which is under constant police surveillance.
U.S. Appeals Court Overturns Decision That NSA Metadata Collection Was Illegal (http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/08/28/435506021/u-s-appeals-court-overturns-decision-that-nsa-metadata-collection-was-illegal)
Quote
A three-judge panel for a U.S. appeals court has thrown out a lower-court decision that sought to stop the NSA from continuing to collect metadata on phone calls made by Americans.
The lower court ruling had found (http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/12/16/251645205/federal-judge-rules-nsa-bulk-phone-record-collection-unconstitutional) that the practice was unconstitutional.
In some ways, this decision is much less important now that Congress has passed a law that changes the way metadata is collected (http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/02/411534447/senateis-poised-to-vote-on-house-approved-usa-freedom-act) by the government. If you remember, after a fierce battle, both houses of Congress voted in favor of a law that lets phone companies keep that database (http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/31/410569671/all-eyes-on-senate-as-patriot-act-provisions-set-to-expire) but still allows the government to query it for specific data.
The three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia still decided to take on the case, because that new program doesn't begin until 180 days after the date that law was enacted (June 2, 2015).
Until then, and as a result of this decision (http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/ED64DC482F286F1785257EAF004F71E8/$file/14-5004-1570210.pdf), the NSA is allowed to continue with its metadata collection program.
The court reversed a decision by Judge Richard Leon (http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/12/16/251645205/federal-judge-rules-nsa-bulk-phone-record-collection-unconstitutional) and sent it back to him for further proceedings.
This court did not make its decision on Constitutional terms; instead, it ruled that the plaintiffs did not have standing to receive a preliminary injunction. The court sent the case back to Judge Leon to see if the plaintiffs could cobble up more evidence showing they are being directly targeted by the bulk collection program.
The complication there is the U.S. government has in the past refused to turn over that evidence, claiming it is secret.
Snowden joins Twitter, follows NSA (http://news.yahoo.com/snowden-joins-twitter-171454920.html)
Teen hacker says he cracked CIA head's personal email: media (https://www.yahoo.com/tech/s/teen-hacker-says-cracked-cia-heads-personal-email-225434339.html)
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Washington (AFP) - A teenaged hacker broke into CIA Director John Brennan's personal email account and swiped sensitive files including a top-secret application for a security clearance, the New York Post reported.
If true, the story will be a major embarrassment for Brennan and the Central Intelligence Agency, coming after months of intense national scrutiny of Hillary Clinton for her use of a private email server when she was secretary of state.
The Post said a hacker, describing himself as an American high school student, had called the newspaper to describe his exploits.
Stored on Brennan's private email account were a range of sensitive files including his 47-page application for the security clearance, the hacker told The Post in a story Sunday.
In a series of tweets from his purported Twitter account -- @phphax -- the hacker taunted authorities and showed redacted images of what appeared to be sensitive government information.
The account references "CWA." The hacker told the Post this stood for "Crackas With Attitude," which he said referred to him and a classmate.
The man said he was not Muslim but carried out the hack because he opposed US foreign policy and supported Palestine.
As well as cracking Brennan's personal AOL account, he claimed to have targeted Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, accessing his Internet provider account and listening to his voicemails.
The CIA did not immediately respond to a request for comment Monday but told the Post it had "referred the matter to the appropriate authorities."
A Homeland Security spokesman told AFP: "We are aware of the media report, however as a matter of policy, we do not comment on the Secretary's personal security."
According to CNN, the FBI and Secret Service are investigating the report.
The Post said the alleged hacker told them he accessed the account by using a process called "social engineering" in which he tricked Verizon workers into divulging Brennan's personal information then convinced AOL to reset his password.
The hacker told the newspaper he had even prank-called America's top spy and taunted him by reciting Brennan's Social Security number.
"He waited a tiny bit and hung up," the hacker told the Post.
The government is still reeling after hackers this summer breached US government databases and stole personal information from background checks of 21.5 million people.
Bura u čaši vode koji je izazvala pomisao da nas po internetu prate & špijuniraju kojekakve nacionalne službe bi verovatno bila veća da nismo svesni da veliki deo svojih intimnih informacija već svojevoljno (ili makar blago škrgućući zubima) poveravamo privatnom sektoru. Danas je "big data" big biznis, ali evo teksta koji procenjuje koliko zapravo vredi tržište trgovanja velikim količinama privatnih podataka koje o ljudima skupljaju mobilni provajderi u SAD. Spojlr alrt: 24 milijarde dolara godišnje (http://adage.com/article/datadriven-marketing/24-billion-data-business-telcos-discuss/301058/).
UK policija kaska za srpskom koja ove opcije već ima: UK police to get powers to check public's web browsing history (https://uk.news.yahoo.com/uk-police-powers-check-publics-050757278.html#NxJk7MC)
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The government's new surveillance bill plans to give police the power to access the web browsing history of anyone in the UK. Under the proposal, telecoms and internet service providers will be legally required to retain their customers' web browsing history for a period of 12 months that enforcement agencies can then use in their investigations.
The communication firms will be paid to log their customers' emails, internet use and other correspondence so that they can be easily searched by security officials, namely the police, the National Crime Agency, the intelligence agencies and even the HM Revenue and Customs.
The proposal will allow the police to seize details of the website and access specific web addresses visited by anyone. However, they will need to get judicial approval to access the content of the websites. The bill is set to be introduced by Home Secretary Theresa May (https://uk.news.yahoo.com/theresa-may/) in the House of Commons on Wednesday (4 November).
"I've said many times before that it is not possible to debate the balance between privacy and security, including the rights and wrongs of intrusive powers and the oversight arrangements that govern them without also considering the threats that we face as a country," May was quoted as saying by The Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11964655/Police-to-be-granted-powers-to-view-your-internet-history.html).
"Those threats remain considerable and they are evolving. They include not just terrorism from overseas and home-grown in the UK, but also industrial, military and state espionage. They include not just organised criminality, but also the proliferation of once physical crimes online, such as child sexual exploitation. And the technological challenges that that brings. In the face of such threats we have a duty to ensure that the agencies whose job it is to keep us safe have the powers they need to do the job," she said.
David Davis MP, who said the police are trying to revive a power that parliament has already rejected, told The Times (http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/technology/internet/article4600136.ece): "It's extraordinary they're asking for this again, they are overreaching and there is no proven need to retain such data for a year."
"Prove their case — not just assert that they need it," he added. Britain would be "setting a worrying international precedent" if the proposal under the new bill gets the go ahead, former deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg warned. Also, three-quarters of people who took a survey, which was conducted by YouGov for Big Brother Watch, did not trust that the data would be kept secret. Back in 2012, the Liberal Democrats (https://uk.news.yahoo.com/liberal-democrats/), which was part of the government coalition, had blocked a similar proposal (http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/coalition-government-split-nick-clegg-david-cameron-row-over-snoopers-charter-1483168)in the so-called snooper's charter.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister David Cameron (http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/fears-over-uk-saudi-relations-prompt-cameron-launch-diplomatic-offensive-1526367) is looking at ways to strengthen the pact with the US to ensure that US-based internet companies hand over data of suspects when requested. News of the proposal comes barely a week after data security breaches were reported in several UK companies, including TalkTalk.
Mass surveillance: EU citizens' rights still in danger, says Parliament (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20151022IPR98818/html/Mass-surveillance-EU-citizens'-rights-still-in-danger-says-Parliament)
Quote
Too little has been done to safeguard citizens' fundamental rights following revelations of electronic mass surveillance, say MEPs in a resolution voted on Thursday. They urge the EU Commission to ensure that all data transfers to the US are subject to an "effective level of protection" and ask EU member states to grant protection to Edward Snowden, as a "human rights defender". Parliament also raises concerns about surveillance laws in several EU countries.
This resolution, approved by 342 votes to 274, with 29 abstentions, takes stock of the (lack of) action taken by the European Commission, other EU institutions and member states on the recommendations set out by Parliament in its resolution of 12 March 2014 on the electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0230+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN), drawn up in the wake of Edward Snowden's revelations.
By 285 votes to 281, MEPs decided to call on EU member states to "drop any criminal charges against Edward Snowden, grant him protection and consequently prevent extradition or rendition by third parties, in recognition of his status as whistle-blower and international human rights defender".
Data transfers to the US
MEPs welcome the 6 October ruling by the EU Court of Justice (http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf) (ECJ) in the Schrems case, which invalidated the Commission's decision on the Safe Harbour scheme for data transfers to the US. "This ruling has confirmed the long-standing position of Parliament regarding the lack of an adequate level of protection under this instrument", they say.
Parliament calls on the Commission to "immediately take the necessary measures to ensure that all personal data transferred to the US are subject to an effective level of protection that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU". It invites the Commission to reflect immediately on alternatives to Safe Harbour and on the "impact of the judgment on any other instruments for the transfer of personal data to the US, and to report on the matter by the end of 2015". The resolution also reiterates a call to suspend the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) agreement with the US.
In general, MEPs consider the Commission's response so far to Parliament's 2014 resolution "highly inadequate" given the extent of the revelations of mass surveillance. "EU citizens' fundamental rights remain in danger" and "too little has been done to ensure their full protection," they say.
Concerns over surveillance laws in several EU countries
Parliament is concerned about "recent laws in some member states that extend surveillance capabilities of intelligence bodies", including in France, the UK and the Netherlands. It is also worried by revelations of mass surveillance of telecommunications and internet traffic inside the EU by the German foreign intelligence agency BND in cooperation with the US National Security Agency (NSA).
The resolution also calls for an EU strategy for greater IT independence and online privacy, stresses the need to ensure meaningful democratic oversight of intelligence activities and to rebuild trust with the US.
Procedure: non-legislative resolution
REF. : 20151022IPR98818 Updated: ( 30-10-2015 - 12:09
Internet firms to be banned from offering unbreakable encryption under new laws (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11970391/Internet-firms-to-be-banned-from-offering-out-of-reach-communications-under-new-laws.html)
Quote
Internet and social media companies will be banned from putting customer communications beyond their own reach under new laws to be unveiled on Wednesday. Companies such as Apple, Google and others will no longer be able to offer encryption so advanced that even they cannot decipher it when asked to, the Daily Telegraph can disclose. Measures in the Investigatory Powers Bill will place in law a requirement on tech firms and service providers to be able to provide unencrypted communications to the police or spy agencies if requested through a warrant. The move follows concerns that a growing number of encryption services are now completely inaccessible apart from to the users themselves. It came as David Cameron, the Prime Minister, pleaded with the public and MPs to back his raft of new surveillance measures.
He said terrorists, paedophiles and criminals must not be allowed a "safe space" online.
Ministers have no plans to ban encryption services because they have an important role in the protection of legitimate online activity such as banking and personal data.
But there is concern over some aspects of so-called end-to-end encryption where only the sender and recipient of messages can decipher them.
Terrorists and criminals are increasingly using such technology to communicate beyond the reach of MI5 or the police.
On its website, Apple promotes the fact that it has, for example, "no way to decrypt iMessage and FaceTime data when it's in transit between devices".
It adds: "So unlike other companies' messaging services, Apple doesn't scan your communications, and we wouldn't be able to comply with a wiretap order even if we wanted to."
Last month, Metropolitan assistant commissioner Mark Rowley, the country's most senior counter-terrorism officer, warned that for some firms (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11912779/Police-losing-track-of-terror-plots-because-of-irresponsible-social-media-firms.html) it was "a part of their strategy - they design their products in full recognition that they will be unable to help us because of the way they have designed them".
However, proposals to be published on Wednesday will, for the first time, place a duty on companies to be able to access their customer data in law.
A Home Office spokesman said: "The Government is clear we need to find a way to work with industry as technology develops to ensure that, with clear oversight and a robust legal framework, the police and intelligence agencies can access the content of communications of terrorists and criminals in order to resolve police investigations and prevent criminal acts.
"That means ensuring that companies themselves can access the content of communications on their networks when presented with a warrant, as many of them already do for their own business purposes, for example to target advertising. These companies' reputations rest on their ability to protect their users' data."
The Investigatory Powers Bill (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11964655/Police-to-be-granted-powers-to-view-your-internet-history.html) is also expected to maintain the current responsibility for signing off requests to snoop with the Home Secretary but with extra judicial oversight – a move that is likely to anger civil liberty campaigners and some Tory backbenchers.
It will also require internet companies to retain the web browsing history of their customers for up to a year.
The bill is expected to face a tough route through parliament but Mr Cameron urged critics to back the measures.
He told ITV's This Morning: "As Prime Minister I would just say to people 'please, let's not have a situation where we give terrorists, criminals, child abductors, safe spaces to communicate'.
"It's not a safe space for them to communicate on a fixed line telephone or a mobile phone, we shouldn't allow the internet to be a safe space for them to communicate and do bad things."
Lord Carlile, the former terrorism laws watchdog, said there had been a "lot of demonization" of the police and security services over their intentions for such information.
"I think it is absurd to suggest the police and the security services have a kind of casual desire to intrude on the privacy of the innocent," he said.
"They have enough difficulty finding the guilty. No-one has produced any evidence of casual curiosity on part of the security services."
Ex-CIA director: Snowden should be 'hanged' for Paris (http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/260817-ex-cia-director-snowden-should-be-hanged-for-paris)
Quote
A former CIA director says leaker Edward Snowden should be convicted of treason and given the death penalty in the wake of the terrorist attack on Paris.
"It's still a capital crime, and I would give him the death sentence, and I would prefer to see him hanged by the neck until he's dead, rather than merely electrocuted," James Woolsey told (http://www.mediaite.com/tv/ex-cia-director-blood-on-snowdens-hands-for-paris-should-be-hanged-by-the-neck/) CNN's Brooke Baldwin on Thursday.
Woolsey said Snowden, who divulged classified in 2013, is partly responsible for the terrorist attack in France last week that left at least 120 dead and hundreds injured."I think the blood of a lot of these French young people is on his hands," he said.
Woolsey, who served as the head of the CIA from 1993 to 1995, said the Snowden leak was "substantial."
"They turned loose not only material about some procedural aspects of something, they turned loose, for example, some substantial material about the Mexican intelligence service and law enforcement working together against human trafficking," he said.
Woolsey wondered if Snowden were "pro-pimp."
Current CIA Director John Brennan has recently echoed (http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/260573-cia-director-attacks-snowden-following-paris-attacks) his predecessor's sentiments, arguing that Snowden's disclosures make it harder for intelligence officials to track terror plots.
"I think any unauthorized disclosures made by individuals that have dishonored the oath of office, that they have raised their hand and attested to, undermines this nation's security," Brennan said about Snowden at the Overseas Security Advisory Council's annual meeting on Wednesday.
Snowden fled the country after stealing classified information and disclosing the extent of U.S. surveillance programs. He currently resides in Russia, where he has been granted temporary asylum.
http://youtu.be/rlG3Cnp6CX4 (http://youtu.be/rlG3Cnp6CX4)
Glenn Greenwald: Why the CIA is smearing Edward Snowden after the Paris attacks (http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1126-greenwald-snowden-paris-encryption-20151126-story.html)
Kako reče i aktuelni gradonačelnik Čikaga: "You never let a serious crisis go to waste. And what I mean by that it's an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before."
Quote
Decent people see tragedy and barbarism when viewing a terrorism attack. American politicians and intelligence officials see something else: opportunity.
Bodies were still lying in the streets of Paris when CIA (http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics-government/central-intelligence-agency-ORGOV000009-topic.html) operatives began exploiting the resulting fear and anger to advance long-standing political agendas. They and their congressional allies instantly attempted to heap blame for the atrocity not on Islamic State (http://www.latimes.com/topic/unrest-conflicts-war/islamic-state-ORCIG000120-topic.html) but on several preexisting adversaries: Internet encryption, Silicon Valley's privacy policies and Edward Snowden (http://www.latimes.com/topic/crime-law-justice/crime/edward-snowden-PEOCVC000306-topic.html).
The CIA's former acting director, Michael Morell, blamed the Paris attack on Internet companies "building encryption without keys," which, he said, was caused by the debate over surveillance prompted by Snowden's disclosures. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) blamed Silicon Valley's privacy safeguards, claiming: "I have asked for help. And I haven't gotten any help."
Former CIA chief James Woolsey said Snowden "has blood on his hands" because, he asserted, the Paris attackers learned from his disclosures how to hide their communications behind encryption. Woolsey thus decreed on CNN that the NSA whistleblower should be "hanged by the neck until he's dead, rather than merely electrocuted."
In one sense, this blame-shifting tactic is understandable. After all, the CIA, the NSA and similar agencies receive billions of dollars annually from Congress and have been vested by their Senate overseers with virtually unlimited spying power. They have one paramount mission: find and stop people who are plotting terrorist attacks. When they fail, of course they are desperate to blame others.
The CIA's blame-shifting game, aside from being self-serving, was deceitful in the extreme. To begin with, there still is no evidence that the perpetrators in Paris used the Internet to plot their attacks, let alone used encryption technology.
CIA officials simply made that up. It is at least equally likely that the attackers formulated their plans in face-to-face meetings. The central premise of the CIA's campaign — encryption enabled the attackers to evade our detection — is baseless.
Even if they had used encryption, what would that prove? Are we ready to endorse the precept that no human communication can ever take place without the U.S. government being able to monitor it? To prevent the CIA and FBI from "going dark" on terrorism plots that are planned in person, should we put Orwellian surveillance monitors in every room of every home that can be activated whenever someone is suspected of plotting?
The claim that the Paris attackers learned to use encryption from Snowden is even more misleading. For many years before anyone heard of Snowden, the U.S. government repeatedly warned that terrorists were using highly advanced means of evading American surveillance.
Then-FBI Director Louis Freeh told a Senate panel in March 2000 that "uncrackable encryption is allowing terrorists — Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda (http://www.latimes.com/topic/unrest-conflicts-war/terrorism/al-qaeda-ORCIG000003751-topic.html) and others — to communicate about their criminal intentions without fear of outside intrusion."
Or consider a USA Today article dated Feb. 5, 2001, eight months before the 9/11 attack. The headline warned "Terror groups hide behind Web encryption." That 14-year-old article cited "officials" who claimed that "encryption has become the everyday tool of Muslim extremists."
Even the official version of how the CIA found Osama bin Laden features the claim that the Al Qaeda leader only used personal couriers to communicate, never the Internet or telephone.
Within the Snowden archive itself, one finds a 2003 document that a British spy agency called "the Jihadist Handbook." That 12-year-old document, widely published on the Internet, contains instructions for how terrorist operatives should evade U.S. electronic surveillance.
In sum, Snowden did not tell the terrorists anything they did not already know. The terrorists have known for years that the U.S. government is trying to monitor their communications.
What the Snowden disclosures actually revealed to the world was that the U.S. government is monitoring the Internet communications and activities of everyone else: hundreds of millions of innocent people under the largest program of suspicionless mass surveillance ever created, a program that multiple federal judges have ruled is illegal and unconstitutional.
That is why intelligence officials are so eager to demonize Snowden: rage that he exposed their secret, unconstitutional schemes.
But their ultimate goal is not to smear Snowden. That's just a side benefit. The real objective is to depict Silicon Valley as terrorist-helpers for the crime of offering privacy protections to Internet users, in order to force those companies to give the U.S. government "backdoor" access into everyone's communications. American intelligence agencies have been demanding "backdoor" access to encryption since the mid-1990s. They view exploitation of the outrage and fear resulting from the Paris attacks as their best opportunity yet to achieve this access.
The key lesson of the post-9/11 abuses — from Guantanamo to torture to the invasion of Iraq — is that we must not allow military and intelligence officials to exploit the fear of terrorism to manipulate public opinion. Rather than blindly believe their assertions, we must test those claims for accuracy. In the wake of the Paris attacks, that lesson is more urgent than ever.
Glenn Greenwald is a founding editor of the Intercept. He led the reporting for the Guardian's 2013 series on global surveillance programs, based on classified documents disclosed by Edward Snowden, which was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service.
ко не зна ко је џејкоб апелбаум (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_Appelbaum) нек баци поглед на линк да сазна.
у овом десетоминутном говору је изнео низ проверљивих информација везаних за нападе у француској, глобално надгледање, изговоре тајних служби, (мени веома занимљивом и одвратном) англо-атлантском културном расизму, демократији и 'демократији' итд...погледајте говор до краја, има и пар хинтова о томе како се компјутер или телефон лако може заштитити на мрежи (није да је нама овде то потребно ал треба знати такве ствари)
! No longer available (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZHOgWeg8T0#)
у духу претходног поста ево и 'каталога' (https://theintercept.com/surveillance-catalogue/) опреме за надгледање и ослушкивање телефона
и чланак (https://theintercept.com/2015/12/17/a-secret-catalogue-of-government-gear-for-spying-on-your-cellphone/)
Quote
THE INTERCEPT HAS OBTAINED a secret, internal U.S. government catalogue of dozens of cellphone surveillance devices used by the military and by intelligence agencies. The document, thick with previously undisclosed information, also offers rare insight into the spying capabilities of federal law enforcement and local police inside the United States.
The catalogue includes details on the Stingray, a well-known brand of surveillance gear, as well as Boeing "dirt boxes" and dozens of more obscure devices that can be mounted on vehicles, drones, and piloted aircraft. Some are designed to be used at static locations, while others can be discreetly carried by an individual. They have names like Cyberhawk, Yellowstone, Blackfin, Maximus, Cyclone, and Spartacus. Within the catalogue, the NSA is listed as the vendor of one device, while another was developed for use by the CIA, and another was developed for a special forces requirement. Nearly a third of the entries focus on equipment that seems to have never been described in public before.
The Intercept obtained the catalogue from a source within the intelligence community concerned about the militarization of domestic law enforcement.
A few of the devices can house a "target list" of as many as 10,000 unique phone identifiers. Most can be used to geolocate people, but the documents indicate that some have more advanced capabilities, like eavesdropping on calls and spying on SMS messages. Two systems, apparently designed for use on captured phones, are touted as having the ability to extract media files, address books, and notes, and one can retrieve deleted text messages.
Above all, the catalogue represents a trove of details on surveillance devices developed for military and intelligence purposes but increasingly used by law enforcement agencies to spy on people and convict them of crimes. The mass shooting earlier this month in San Bernardino, California, which President Barack Obama has called "an act of terrorism," prompted calls for state and local police forces to beef up their counterterrorism capabilities, a process that has historically involved adapting military technologies to civilian use. Meanwhile, civil liberties advocates and others are increasingly alarmed about how cellphone surveillance devices are used domestically and have called for a more open and informed debate about the trade-off between security and privacy — despite a virtual blackout by the federal government on any information about the specific capabilities of the gear.
"We've seen a trend in the years since 9/11 to bring sophisticated surveillance technologies that were originally designed for military use — like Stingrays or drones or biometrics — back home to the United States," said Jennifer Lynch, a senior staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which has waged a legal battle challenging the use of cellphone surveillance devices domestically. "But using these technologies for domestic law enforcement purposes raises a host of issues that are different from a military context."
MANY OF THE DEVICES in the catalogue, including the Stingrays and dirt boxes, are cell-site simulators, which operate by mimicking the towers of major telecom companies like Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile. When someone's phone connects to the spoofed network, it transmits a unique identification code and, through the characteristics of its radio signals when they reach the receiver, information about the phone's location. There are also indications that cell-site simulators may be able to monitor calls and text messages.
In the catalogue, each device is listed with guidelines about how its use must be approved; the answer is usually via the "Ground Force Commander" or under one of two titles in the U.S. code governing military and intelligence operations, including covert action.
But domestically the devices have been used in a way that violates the constitutional rights of citizens, including the Fourth Amendment prohibition on illegal search and seizure, critics like Lynch say. They have regularly been used without warrants, or with warrants that critics call overly broad. Judges and civil liberties groups alike have complained that the devices are used without full disclosure of how they work, even within court proceedings.
"Every time police drive the streets with a Stingray, these dragnet devices can identify and locate dozens or hundreds of innocent bystanders' phones," said Nathan Wessler, a staff attorney with the Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project of the American Civil Liberties Union.
The controversy around cellphone surveillance illustrates the friction that comes with redeploying military combat gear into civilian life. The U.S. government has been using cell-site simulators for at least 20 years, but their use by local law enforcement is a more recent development.
The archetypical cell-site simulator, the Stingray, was trademarked by Harris Corp. in 2003 and initially used by the military, intelligence agencies, and federal law enforcement. Another company, Digital Receiver Technology, now owned by Boeing, developed dirt boxes — more powerful cell-site simulators — which gained favor among the NSA, CIA, and U.S. military as good tools for hunting down suspected terrorists. The devices can reportedly track more than 200 phones over a wider range than the Stingray.
Amid the war on terror, companies selling cell-site simulators to the federal government thrived. In addition to large corporations like Boeing and Harris, which clocked more than $2.6 billion in federal contracts last year, the catalogue obtained by The Intercept includes products from little-known outfits like Nevada-based Ventis, which appears to have been dissolved, and SR Technologies of Davie, Florida, which has a website that warns: "Due to the sensitive nature of this business, we require that all visitors be registered before accessing further information." (The catalogue obtained by The Intercept is not dated, but includes information about an event that occurred in 2012.)
The U.S. government eventually used cell-site simulators to target people for assassination in drone strikes, The Intercept has reported. But the CIA helped use the technology at home, too. For more than a decade, the agency worked with the U.S. Marshals Service to deploy planes with dirt boxes attached to track mobile phones across the U.S., the Wall Street Journal revealed.
After being used by federal agencies for years, cellular surveillance devices began to make their way into the arsenals of a small number of local police agencies. By 2007, Harris sought a license from the Federal Communications Commission to widely sell its devices to local law enforcement, and police flooded the FCC with letters of support. "The text of every letter was the same. The only difference was the law enforcement logo at the top," said Chris Soghoian, the principal technologist at the ACLU, who obtained copies of the letters from the FCC through a Freedom of Information Act request.
The lobbying campaign was a success. Today nearly 60 law enforcement agencies in 23 states are known to possess a Stingray or some form of cell-site simulator, though experts believe that number likely underrepresents the real total. In some jurisdictions, police use cell-site simulators regularly. The Baltimore Police Department, for example, has used Stingrays more than 4,300 times since 2007.
Police often cite the war on terror in acquiring such systems. Michigan State Police claimed their Stingrays would "allow the State to track the physical location of a suspected terrorist," although the ACLU later found that in 128 uses of the devices last year, none were related to terrorism. In Tacoma, Washington, police claimed Stingrays could prevent attacks using improvised explosive devices — the roadside bombs that plagued soldiers in Iraq. "I am not aware of any case in which a police agency has used a cell-site simulator to find a terrorist," said Lynch. Instead, "law enforcement agencies have been using cell-site simulators to solve even the most minor domestic crimes."
The Intercept is not publishing information on devices in the catalogue where the disclosure is not relevant to the debate over the extent of domestic surveillance.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment for this article. The FBI, NSA, and U.S. military did not offer any comment after acknowledging The Intercept's written requests. The Department of Justice "uses technology in a manner that is consistent with the requirements and protections of the Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment, and applicable statutory authorities," said Marc Raimondi, a Justice Department spokesperson who, for six years prior to working for the DOJ, worked for Harris Corp., the manufacturer of the Stingray.
WHILE INTEREST FROM local cops helped fuel the spread of cell-site simulators, funding from the federal government also played a role, incentivizing municipalities to buy more of the technology. In the years since 9/11, the U.S. has expanded its funding to provide military hardware to state and local law enforcement agencies via grants awarded by the Department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department. There's been a similar pattern with Stingray-like devices.
"The same grant programs that paid for local law enforcement agencies across the country to buy armored personnel carriers and drones have paid for Stingrays," said Soghoian. "Like drones, license plate readers, and biometric scanners, the Stingrays are yet another surveillance technology created by defense contractors for the military, and after years of use in war zones, it eventually trickles down to local and state agencies, paid for with DOJ and DHS money."
In 2013, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement reported the purchase of two HEATR long-range surveillance devices as well as $3 million worth of Stingray devices since 2008. In California, Alameda County and police departments in Oakland and Fremont are using $180,000 in Homeland Security grant money to buy Harris' Hailstorm cell-site simulator and the hand-held Thoracic surveillance device, made by Maryland security and intelligence company Keyw. As part of Project Archangel, which is described in government contract documents as a "border radio intercept program," the Drug Enforcement Administration has contracted with Digital Receiver Technology for over $1 million in DRT surveillance box equipment. The Department of the Interior contracted with Keyw for more than half a million dollars of "reduced signature cellular precision geolocation."
Information on such purchases, like so much about cell-site simulators, has trickled out through freedom of information requests and public records. The capabilities of the devices are kept under lock and key — a secrecy that hearkens back to their military origins. When state or local police purchase the cell-site simulators, they are routinely required to sign non-disclosure agreements with the FBI that they may not reveal the "existence of and the capabilities provided by" the surveillance devices, or share "any information" about the equipment with the public.
Indeed, while several of the devices in the military catalogue obtained by The Intercept are actively deployed by federal and local law enforcement agencies, according to public records, judges have struggled to obtain details of how they work. Other products in the secret catalogue have never been publicly acknowledged and any use by state, local, and federal agencies inside the U.S. is, therefore, difficult to challenge.
"It can take decades for the public to learn what our police departments are doing, by which point constitutional violations may be widespread," Wessler said. "By showing what new surveillance capabilities are coming down the pike, these documents will help lawmakers, judges, and the public know what to look out for as police departments seek ever-more powerful electronic surveillance tools."
Sometimes it's not even clear how much police are spending on Stingray-like devices because they are bought with proceeds from assets seized under federal civil forfeiture law, in drug busts and other operations. Illinois, Michigan, and Maryland police forces have all used asset forfeiture funds to pay for Stingray-type equipment.
"The full extent of the secrecy surrounding cell-site simulators is completely unjustified and unlawful," said EFF's Lynch. "No police officer or detective should be allowed to withhold information from a court or criminal defendant about how the officer conducted an investigation."
JUDGES HAVE BEEN among the foremost advocates for ending the secrecy around cell-site simulators, including by pushing back on warrant requests. At times, police have attempted to hide their use of Stingrays in criminal cases, prompting at least one judge to throw out evidence obtained by the device. In 2012, a U.S. magistrate judge in Texas rejected an application by the Drug Enforcement Administration to use a cell-site simulator in an operation, saying that the agency had failed to explain "what the government would do with" the data collected from innocent people.
Law enforcement has responded with some limited forms of transparency. In September, the Justice Department issued new guidelines for the use of Stingrays and similar devices, including that federal law enforcement agencies using them must obtain a warrant based on probable cause and must delete any data intercepted from individuals not under investigation.
Contained within the guidelines, however, is a clause stipulating vague "exceptional circumstances" under which agents could be exempt from the requirement to get a probable cause warrant.
"Cell-site simulator technology has been instrumental in aiding law enforcement in a broad array of investigations, including kidnappings, fugitive investigations, and complicated narcotics cases," said Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates.
Meanwhile, parallel guidelines issued by the Department of Homeland Security in October do not require warrants for operations on the U.S. border, nor do the warrant requirements apply to state and local officials who purchased their Stingrays through grants from the federal government, such as those in Wisconsin, Maryland, and Florida.
The ACLU, EFF, and several prominent members of Congress have said the federal government's exceptions are too broad and leave the door open for abuses.
"Because cell-site simulators can collect so much information from innocent people, a simple warrant for their use is not enough," said Lynch, the EFF attorney. "Police officers should be required to limit their use of the device to a short and defined period of time. Officers also need to be clear in the probable cause affidavit supporting the warrant about the device's capabilities."
In November, a federal judge in Illinois published a legal memorandum about the government's application to use a cell-tower spoofing technology in a drug-trafficking investigation. In his memo, Judge Iain Johnston sharply criticized the secrecy surrounding Stingrays and other surveillance devices, suggesting that it made weighing the constitutional implications of their use extremely difficult. "A cell-site simulator is simply too powerful of a device to be used and the information captured by it too vast to allow its use without specific authorization from a fully informed court," he wrote.
He added that Harris Corp. "is extremely protective about information regarding its device. In fact, Harris is so protective that it has been widely reported that prosecutors are negotiating plea deals far below what they could obtain so as to not disclose cell-site simulator information. ... So where is one, including a federal judge, able to learn about cell-site simulators? A judge can ask a requesting Assistant United States Attorney or a federal agent, but they are tight-lipped about the device, too."
The ACLU and EFF believe that the public has a right to review the types of devices being used to encourage an informed debate on the potentially far-reaching implications of the technology. The catalogue obtained by The Intercept, said Wessler, "fills an important gap in our knowledge, but it is incumbent on law enforcement agencies to proactively disclose information about what surveillance equipment they use and what steps they take to protect Fourth Amendment privacy rights."
бтњ, овај интерсепт је веома занимљив сајт
InterApp: The Gadget That Can Spy on Any Smartphone (http://news.softpedia.com/news/interapp-the-gadget-that-can-spy-on-any-smartphone-497864.shtml)
Quote
Tel Aviv-based Rayzone Group is selling a nifty little gadget called InterApp that can leverage outdated mobile devices and intercept and extract information from nearby smartphones.
As Razyone describes its product, "InterApp (http://www.rayzoneg.com/en.interapp.html) is a game-changing tactical intelligence system, developed for intelligence and law enforcement agencies, enabling them to stealthily collect information from the cloud using smartphone application vulnerabilities."
InterApp can allow its operators to break into nearby smartphones that have their WiFi connection open, and then, employing a diverse arsenal of security vulnerabilities, gain root permission on devices and exfiltrate information to a tactical server.
InterApp can steal passwords and data from targeted smartphones According to Rayzone, InterApp can steal a user's email address password and content, passwords for social networking apps, Dropbox passwords and files, the user's phone contact list, and his photo gallery.
Additionally, the gadget can also acquire the phone's previous geographical locations and plot them on a map, IMEI details, MSISDN data, MAC address, device model, OS info, and personal information on the target, such as gender, age, address, education, and more.
InterApp works on a variety of platforms, operates very fast, handles hundreds of devices at the same time, and requires no technical skills to operate, coming equipped with an idiot-proof administration panel.
InterApp leaves no tracks behind Even better, InterApp's hacking operations leave no forensics traces on a target's smartphone, or so Rayzone claims.
The company claims that its device was intentionally created for law enforcement, recommending its usage in tactical police centers, airports, or with intervention teams, being quite small and portable.
Rayzone's other products include TA9 - a big data analysis platform; Piranha - a 2G, 3G, and 4G IMSI catcher; ArrowCell - a device for detecting, locating, and neutralizing other IMSI catchers; and GeoMatrix - an advanced geo-location intelligence system. Basically, the company is the hardware-side counterpart of the infamous Hacking Team, an offensive-security vendor from Italy.
Quote from: дејан on 18-12-2015, 12:11:09
бтњ, овај интерсепт је веома занимљив сајт
Da, pa nije Grinvold blesav.
Evo:
Recently Bought a Windows Computer? Microsoft Probably Has Your Encryption Key (https://theintercept.com/2015/12/28/recently-bought-a-windows-computer-microsoft-probably-has-your-encryption-key/)
Većini Američkih građana nadziranje komunikacije bez sudskog naloga je u principu okej.
AP-NORC Poll: Online surveillance is OK for most (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_AP_POLL_CIVIL_LIBERTIES_THINGS_TO_KNOW?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2015-12-31-03-37-50)
Quote
WASHINGTON (AP) -- A majority of Americans say they support warrantless government surveillance of the Internet communications of U.S. citizens, according to a new poll by The Associated Press and the NORC Center for Public Affairs Research.
It's at least somewhat important for the government to sacrifice freedoms to ensure safety, most say in the survey.
Here are some things to know about public opinion on civil liberties from the AP-NORC poll:
---
MOST SUPPORT WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE
According to the new poll, 56 percent of Americans favor and 28 percent oppose the ability of the government to conduct surveillance on Internet communications without needing to get a warrant. That includes such surveillance on U.S. citizens.
Majorities both of Republicans (67 percent) and Democrats (55 percent) favor government surveillance of Americans' Internet activities to watch for suspicious activity that might be connected to terrorism. Independents are more divided, with 40 percent in favor and 35 percent opposed. Only a third of Americans under 30, but nearly two-thirds 30 and older, support warrantless surveillance.
The poll finds that for most Americans, safety concerns trump civil liberties at least some of the time.
More than half - 54 percent - say it's sometimes necessary for the government to sacrifice freedoms to fight terrorism, while 45 percent think that's not necessary. On a more general level, 42 percent say it's more important for the government to ensure Americans' safety than to protect citizens' rights, while 27 percent think rights are more important and 31 percent rate both equally.
---
TERRORISM CONCERNS RISING
Concerns about terrorism have risen since 2013. In the latest poll, nearly 6 in 10 Americans say they are at least somewhat concerned that they or their family might be victims of a terrorist attack, after just 3 in 10 said so two years ago.
Six in 10 Americans now think that the recent attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California, indicate an increased risk of attacks against Western countries, while 37 percent think the risk is about the same as it was before. Three-quarters of Republicans and majorities of both Democrats and independents think the attacks are an indication of increased risk.
Americans are similarly concerned about both domestic terrorism and possible attacks by Islamic extremist groups, with about 6 in 10 saying they're at least somewhat concerned about each.
Democrats and Republicans are about equally likely to say they're concerned about domestic terrorism, but Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to say they're concerned about attacks by Islamic extremists, 67 percent to 47 percent.
---
MIXED OPINIONS ON PROTECTING RIGHTS
Americans have mixed views of how the government is doing at protecting their rights.
Seven in 10 say the government does at least a somewhat good job protecting the right to vote, and nearly 6 in 10 say it's doing a good job of protecting freedom of speech and of the press. More than half say it's doing a good job of protecting religious liberties.
But just 4 in 10 Americans rate the government's performance as good on protecting the right to equal protection under the law, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, or the right to bear arms.
Democrats are significantly more likely than Republicans to say the government is doing a good job of protecting the right to freedom of religion, 64 percent to 49 percent.
On protecting the right to bear arms, 46 percent of Democrats and just 33 percent of Republicans think the government is doing a good job.
---
DIVIDE ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES
Majorities of Americans think it's important to protect religious freedoms for a variety of religious groups, including Christians, Muslims and Jews.
But they're significantly more likely to say so of some groups than others. While 82 percent of Americans in the poll say that it's extremely or very important that Christians be allowed to freely practice their religion in the United States, just 61 percent say the same for Muslims. Seventy-two percent say religious freedom is important for Jews, and 67 percent say the same of Mormons. And 63 percent say it's important to protect the freedoms of people with no religion.
Among Republicans, 88 percent say it's important that Christians be able to worship freely and 60 percent say so of Muslims. Among Democrats, too, there's a gap, with 83 percent saying religious liberties are important for Christians and 67 percent saying so for Muslims.
Eight in 10 Americans say it's very or extremely important for people like themselves to be allowed to practice their religion freely.
---
The AP-NORC Poll of 1,042 adults was conducted online and by phone Dec. 10-13 using a sample drawn from NORC's probability-based AmeriSpeak panel, which is designed to be representative of the U.S. population. The margin of sampling error for all respondents is plus or minus 3.9 percentage points.
Respondents were first selected randomly using address-based sampling methods, and later interviewed online. People selected for AmeriSpeak who didn't otherwise have access to the Internet were interviewed over the phone.
---
Online:
AP-NORC Center: http://www.apnorc.org/ (http://www.apnorc.org/)
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 05-03-2015, 10:08:10
Snowden kopa da se vrati u Ameriku, ako će da mu garantuju pošteno suđenje (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/snowden-in-talks-on-returning-to-us-russian-lawyer-says/article23261304/).
Skoro punu godinu dana kasnije... Snowden i dalje veli isto...
Snowden would return to US if government guarantees fair trial (http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/nsa/270216-snowden-would-return-to-us-if-government-guarantees-fair-trial)
QuoteEdward Snowden (http://thehill.com/person/edward-snowden) said if the government would guarantee him a fair trial, he would return to the United States.
Snowden spoke via Skype from Russia on Saturday at the New Hampshire Liberty Forum, WTOP reported (http://wtop.com/asia/2016/02/snowden-would-return-to-us-with-guarantee-of-fair-trial/).
"I've told the government I would return if they would guarantee a fair trial where I can make a public interest defense of why this was done and allow a jury to decide," Snowden said.
Snowden, a National Security Agency contractor, copied and leaked classified information from the NSA about global surveillance programs. Snowden then fled the country. He could face up to 30 years in prison, WTOP reported.
Snowden had talked about making a plea deal with the government in the past.
On Saturday, Snowden said some of his former colleagues at the NSA and CIA said "the Constitution doesn't really matter." Though others agreed with him about the importance of an individual's privacy.
China Tries Its Hand at Pre-Crime (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-03/china-tries-its-hand-at-pre-crime)
Quote
China's effort to flush out threats to stability is expanding into an area that used to exist only in dystopian sci-fi: pre-crime. The Communist Party has directed one of the country's largest state-run defense contractors, China Electronics Technology Group, to develop software to collate data on jobs, hobbies, consumption habits, and other behavior of ordinary citizens to predict terrorist acts before they occur. "It's very crucial to examine the cause after an act of terror," Wu Manqing, the chief engineer for the military contractor, told reporters at a conference in December. "But what is more important is to predict the upcoming activities."
The program is unprecedented because there are no safeguards from privacy protection laws and minimal pushback from civil liberty advocates and companies, says Lokman Tsui, an assistant professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who has advised Google on freedom of expression and the Internet. The project also takes advantage of an existing vast network of neighborhood informants assigned by the Communist Party to monitor everything from family planning violations to unorthodox behavior. A draft cybersecurity law unveiled in July grants the government almost unbridled access to user data in the name of national security. "If neither legal restrictions nor unfettered political debate about Big Brother surveillance is a factor for a regime, then there are many different sorts of data that could be collated and cross-referenced to help identify possible terrorists or subversives," says Paul Pillar, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Building a crystal ball to predict and prevent terror attacks, a real-world version of Minority Report, is the ultimate goal of crime fighters the world over. But, so far, more data has just meant more noise, security experts say. "There are not enough examples of terrorist activity to model what it looks like in data, and that's true no matter how much data you have," says Jim Harper, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. "You need yeast to make bread. You can't make up for a lack of yeast by adding more flour.""We don't call it a big data platform but a united information environment." —Wu Manqing, China Electronics TechnologyChina was a surveillance state long before Edward Snowden clued Americans in to the extent of domestic spying. Since the Mao era, the government has kept a secret file, called a dang'an, on almost everyone. Dang'an contain school reports, health records, work permits, personality assessments, and other information that might be considered confidential and private in other countries. The contents of the dang'an can determine whether a citizen is eligible for a promotion or can secure a coveted urban residency permit. The government revealed last year that it was also building a nationwide database that would score citizens on their trustworthiness.
New antiterror laws that went into effect on Jan. 1 allow authorities to gain access to bank accounts, telecommunications, and a national network of surveillance cameras called Skynet. Companies including Baidu, China's leading search engine; Tencent, operator of the popular social messaging app WeChat; and Sina, which controls the Weibo microblogging site, already cooperate with official requests for information, according to a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service. A Baidu spokesman says the company wasn't involved in the new antiterror initiative. Tencent and Sina's Weibo didn't respond to requests for comment.
China Electronics Technology, which got the antiterrorism job in October 2014, had operating revenue of 164 billion yuan ($25 billion) in 2015. Apart from supplying the Chinese military with radar and electronic warfare systems, the company has played a leading role in the country's ambitious space program.
Much of the project is shrouded in secrecy. The Ministry of State Security, which oversees counterintelligence and political security, doesn't even have its own website, let alone answer phone calls. Only Wu, the engineer at China Electronics Technology, would speak on the record. He hinted at the scope of the data collection effort when he said the software would be able to draw portraits of suspects by cross-referencing information from bank accounts, jobs, hobbies, consumption patterns, and footage from surveillance cameras.
The program would flag unusual behavior, such as a resident of a poor village who suddenly has a lot of money in her bank account or someone with no overseas relatives who makes frequent calls to foreigners. According to Wu, these could be indicators that a person is a terrorist. "We don't call it a big data platform," he said, "but a united information environment." In China, once a suspect is targeted, police can freeze bank accounts and compel companies to hand over records of his communications.
Another China Electronics Technology executive, who requested anonymity because he isn't authorized to speak publicly, says the antiterrorism software would first be tested in territories where Chinese authorities are struggling to stamp out sometimes violent opposition to Communist rule by ethnic minorities. He says the pilot had a better chance of success than a nationwide program, because it's focused on the 22 million residents of the sparsely populated Xinjiang territory in China's northwest and the 3 million in mountainous Tibet.
Brookings's Pillar is skeptical. "No system of surveillance and exploitation of intelligence can stop everything," he says. But Tsui, the Hong Kong professor, says if anyone has a chance of coming up with a workable high-tech Big Brother, it's the Chinese. The lack of privacy protections means that China's data sniffers are more practiced than those in the West. "The people who are good at this are good because they have access to a lot of data," he says. "They can experiment with all kinds of stuff."
The bottom line: A top Chinese military contractor is building a data analytics platform to help authorities identify terrorists before they strike.
No, Turning On Your Phone Is Not Consenting to Being Tracked by Police (https://theintercept.com/2016/03/04/no-turning-on-your-phone-is-not-consenting-to-being-tracked-by-police/)
Quote
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals on Wednesday upheld a historic decision by a state trial court that the warrantless use of cell-site simulators, or Stingrays, violates the Fourth Amendment.
The trial court had suppressed evidence obtained by the warrantless use of a Stingray — the first time any court in the nation had done so.
Last April, a Baltimore police detective testified that the department has used Stingrays 4,300 times (http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cell-surveillance/31994181/) since 2007, usually without notifying judges or defendants.
The ruling has the potential to set a strong precedent about warrantless location tracking. "Police should now be on notice," said Nate Wessler, a staff attorney with the ACLU's Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project. "Accurately explain your surveillance activities to a judge and get a warrant, or risk your evidence being thrown out."
Stingrays mimic cellphone towers, tricking nearby phones into connecting and revealing users' locations. Stingrays sweep up data on every phone nearby — collecting information on dozens or potentially hundreds of people.
The case centers around the 2014 arrest of Kerron Andrews, a suspect in a shooting (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/7/police-use-of-cellphone-tracking-faces-test-in-cou/?page=all) that injured three people. In order to locate him, police filed a "pen register" application, which is not a warrant, and does not require them to establish probable cause. A judge granted the application, which said that police would obtain the information from Andrews' wireless service provider.
Instead, police used a high-tech Stingray called the "Hailstorm." They located Andrews and found the murder weapon. However, they repeatedly failed to notify the judge about the change in tactics. Finally, during a hearing (https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/june_4_2015_transcript.pdf) last June, the police department was forced to testify about the Hailstorm, leading the judge to accuse it of intentionally withholding information from the defense.
After the trial court threw out the Stingray evidence, the Maryland attorney general alarmed (https://www.eff.org/cases/state-maryland-v-kerron-andrews) civil liberties groups by arguing (https://motherboard.vice.com/read/maryland-attorney-general-if-you-dont-want-to-be-tracked-turn-off-your-phone) that anyone who keeps their phone turned "on" is consenting to being tracked by police. The full ruling, which has not yet been issued, will presumably reject that argument.
During the oral argument (https://soundcloud.com/nwessler/state-v-andrews-oral-argument-feb-9-2016) before the appeals court in February, one of the judges called the police's pen register application a "completely false document," and "completely disingenuous."
The Department of Justice issued guidelines (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators) in September requiring federal officers to apply for a warrant before using a Stingray. Those guidelines only applied to the seven agencies (https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them#agencies) known to use them, not to state and local police. In 2014, the state of Maryland passed a law (http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2014RS/Chapters_noln/CH_191_sb0698e.pdf) requiring a warrant for police to track an individual's current or real-time location. The law only affects cases going forward, so it did not influence Andrew's case.
Stingrays are also piquing the interest of lawmakers on Capitol Hill. Lawmakers held a hearing (https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/geolocation-technology-and-privacy/) Tuesday on a bill that would require all police departments to get a warrant before using Stingrays. "Just because it's easier in 2016 for law enforcement to track our location and learn intimate details about our lives, it doesn't mean those details are somehow less worthy of Constitutional protection," said House Oversight Committee Chairman Jason Chaffetz. "Get a warrant."
In December, The Intercept published a secret catalogue of U.S. government surveillance equipment (https://theintercept.com/2015/12/17/a-secret-catalogue-of-government-gear-for-spying-on-your-cellphone/), including Stingrays. The advertisements for some items boast that they can spy on 10,000 people.
Government Can't Let Smartphones Be `Black Boxes,' Obama Says (http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-03-11/obama-confronts-a-skeptical-silicon-valley-at-south-by-southwest)
QuotePresident Barack Obama said Friday that smartphones -- like the iPhone the FBI is trying to force Apple Inc. to help it hack -- can't be allowed to be "black boxes," inaccessible to the government. The technology industry, he said, should work with the government instead of leaving the issue to Congress.
"You cannot take an absolutist view on this," Obama said at the South by Southwest festival in Austin, Texas. "If your argument is strong encryption no matter what, and we can and should create black boxes, that I think does not strike the kind of balance we have lived with for 200, 300 years, and it's fetishizing our phones above every other value."
Obama's appearance on Friday at the event known as SXSW, the first by a sitting president, comes as the FBI tries to force Apple Inc. to help investigators access an iPhone used by one of the assailants (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-01/lynch-challenges-apple-refusal-over-access-to-suspects-iphones) in December's deadly San Bernardino, California, terror attack. Apple has appealed a magistrate court order that it assist the government, saying to do so would undermine (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-07/apple-software-chief-warns-one-phone-break-in-can-wreak-havoc)its encryption technology.
Rapid technological advancements "offer us enormous opportunities, but also are very disruptive and unsettling," Obama said at the festival, where he hoped to persuade tech workers to enter public service. "They empower individuals to do things that they could have never dreamed of before, but they also empower folks who are very dangerous to spread dangerous messages."
Siding with Apple are technology companies including Amazon Inc., Microsoft Corp., Facebook Inc. and Google's parent Alphabet Inc. On Thursday, the government filed a memorandum (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/government-strikes-back-at-silicon-valley-s-support-for-apple) in the case arguing that Apple would need to assign as few as six workers for as little as two weeks to hack into Syed Farook's phone.
"This burden, which is not unreasonable, is the direct result of Apple's deliberate marketing decision to engineer its products so that the government cannot search them, even with a warrant," government attorneys said in the filing.'Sloppy and Rushed'Obama was interviewed at the festival by the CEO and editor in chief of the Texas Tribune, Evan Smith, who told him that "it looks to the tech community, or to some in the tech community, that government is the enemy" in its dealings with Apple. South by Southwest, now 30 years old, has grown from an event to highlight local musicians and artists into one of the nation's largest and most popular technology conferences and film-and-music festivals.
The White House has backed the FBI in its fight with Apple, but has said Obama believes it it is vital to balance privacy protections against the needs of law enforcement. Obama has not weighed in on legislation being drafted by Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Burr, a North Carolina Republican, and the senior Democrat on the panel, Dianne Feinstein of California, which would require companies to comply with court orders asking for assistance accessing encrypted data.
He indicated on Friday that he believes leaving the matter to lawmakers may not be ideal. The result would be "sloppy and rushed and it will go through Congress in ways that have not been thought through," he said.
Apple and other tech firms have said that building backdoors into their encrypted products could put them at a disadvantage to foreign competitors. They have also warned that China or other countries could demand similar cooperation with government investigations.
Without commenting on the Apple case, Obama dismissed those arguments, saying that for centuries law enforcement agencies have been able to search private property for evidence of crimes using a warrant.
"The question we now have to ask is, if technologically it is possible to make an impenetrable device or system, where the encryption is so strong there's no key, there's no door at all, then how do we apprehend the child pornographer? How do we solve or disrupt a terrorist plot?" Obama said. "If in fact you can't crack that at all, government can't get in, then everybody's walking around with a Swiss bank account in their pocket."
Compromise is possible, he said, and the technology industry must help design it.
"I suspect the answer is going to come down to, how do we create a system that, encryption is as strong as possible, the key is secure as possible, and it is accessible by the smallest number of people possible for the subset of issues that we agree is important," he said.Recruiting CodersIt isn't the first time his policies have caused the White House a headache at the Austin festival. In 2014, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden gave a virtual keynote speech from Russia on privacy rights. WikiLeaks editor-in-chief Julian Assange also spoke remotely to the conference that year.
Snowden's leaks have complicated the encryption issue, Obama said, by "elevating people's suspicions" of government surveillance.
Still, White House officials believe that engagement with the technology sector is critical, especially if the administration is to recruit talented programmers to help modernize the federal government.
"Cooperation that exists between the government and the tech sector continues beyond the issue of encryption," Jason Goldman, the White House's chief digital officer, said on a conference call with reporters before Obama's appearance.
In recent years, Obama has hired officials from companies including Microsoft, Alphabet, and Twitter Inc. to help repair the broken HealthCare.gov enrollment system and the byzantine Veterans Affairs claims processing system, among other assignments. The administration hopes the president's appearance at SXSW can help replenish the ranks of hundreds of technology specialists who put their Silicon Valley careers on hold for public service.
Obama called HealthCare.gov "an example of the big and the bloated and frustrating" in government. When the website failed in October 2013, he said, it "was a little embarrassing for me because I was the cool early adopter president. My entire campaign had been premised on having really cool technology and social media and all that."
After fixing HealthCare.gov with the assistance of private-sector technology experts, "what we realized was we could potentially build a SWAT team, a world class tech office inside of the government, that was helping across agencies," Obama said. That became the U.S. Digital Service.
Ovo ne znam ni u koji topik da stavim pa hajde onda ovde. Dakle, Amazon radi na tome da čin logovanja učini... glupljim... to je jedina reč koja mi pada na pamet, pošto hoće da korišćenje lozinki za autentikaciju korisnika zamene selfijem ili nekim gestom koji ćete napraviti pred kamerom. Zvuči startrekovski, naravno, trebalo bi da se obradujemo ali teško je ne zamisliti kako jednosekundni čin ukucavanja pasvorda postaje naporan, iznurujući pregovarački proces dok pratite uputstva nekog jebenog Amazonovog securebota koji od vas traži da namigujete ili se smešite u kameru koja nema dovoljno osvetljenja ili već nešto... Naravno, kao i uvek, u pozadini zamenjivanja nečeg što radi nečim što ne radi stoji to da se sada većina ljudi na internet penje telefonom...
Amazon wants to replace passwords with selfies and videos (https://thestack.com/security/2016/03/15/amazon-wants-to-replace-passwords-with-selfies-and-videos/)
QuoteAmazon has filed a patent application for a technology which would allow consumers to authenticate transactions via selfie or video. As part of the verification process, the computer or mobile device will prompt the user to 'perform certain actions, motions or gestures, such as to smile, blink, or tilt his or her head.'
Amazon claims (http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=20160071111.PGNR.) that the introduction of facial recognition technology (FRT) will make transactions more user friendly and secure than conventional identification methods, such as passwords which can be stolen and hacked.
The e-commerce giant added that the new technology would remove the hassle of entering in passwords on tiny mobile device screens.
'The entry of these passwords on portable devices is not user friendly in many cases, as the small touchscreen or keyboard elements can be difficult to accurately select, and can require the user to turn away from friends or co-workers when entering a password, which can be awkward or embarrassing in many situations,' read the patent application.
Amazon is not the first company to show interest in FR software for authentication. At CeBIT last year, Alibaba chairman Jack Ma demonstrated (https://thestack.com/security/2015/03/16/alibaba-demonstrates-facial-recognition-payment-system-at-cebit/) Alipay's recognition technologies – using a selfie as payment ID. He argued that buying things online is 'always a big headache' for consumers – "You forget your password, you worry about your security. Today we show you a new technology."
This month Google also revealed that it was running a trial in San Francisco which allows smartphone users on Android and iOS to pay for products via FR, without even having to remove their mobiles from their pockets. Pali Bhat, senior director of product management at Google, explained (https://thestack.com/cloud/2016/03/03/google-hands-free-facial-recognition-trial-san-francisco/): 'This process uses an in-store camera to automatically confirm your identity based on your Hands Free profile picture.'
Earlier this year, MasterCard (https://thestack.com/iot/2016/02/22/mastercard-rolls-out-selfie-verification-for-mobile-payments/) too announced its plans to invest in FRT in the UK, in an effort to reduce false decline transactions and increase security for mobile payments. In the roll-out users will be able to choose between finger scanning and FR for verification, instead of traditional passwords and PIN codes.
Your Data Footprint Is Affecting Your Life In Ways You Can't Even Imagine (http://www.fastcoexist.com/3057514/your-data-footprint-is-affecting-your-life-in-ways-you-cant-even-imagine)
Quotemagine you're moving apartments and shopping for new furniture at a couple of stores. You see a couch you like, but you're not sure, so you leave thinking maybe you'll return another day. But that couch doesn't take well to rejection. It gets up, leaves the store, and starts following you around as you shop elsewhere and even after you go home having purchased a different couch. Then you start getting offers in the mail for new mattresses.This is basically people's experience on the Internet today—where innocently clicking on a link results in ad targeting that's hard to shake and our purchases quickly reveal more information than we intend, such as the infamous example (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) of Target knowing a woman is pregnant before she's told her family—and before she's purchased any baby products.
From the credit card offers we receive to recommendations we see on Netflix and posts we see on Facebook, ads and marketing are the obvious example of our personal data being aggregated and analyzed to make predictions about us. National security—facilitated by massive and sometimes illegal data collection by the government—is clearly another. And if you work at a large information-based business, you've no doubt heard the terms "big data" and "bottom line" in the same sentence before.Predictions about you are deeply shaping your life in ways of which you are probably blissfully unaware. But these (mostly) benign examples that we encounter every day hide the truth about what large-scale government and corporate data collection means and where it's being used. Predictions about you (and millions of other strangers) are starting to deeply shape your life. Your career, your love life, major decisions about your health and well-being, and even if you end up in jail, are now being governed in no small part by the digital bread crumbs you've left behind—many of which you don't even know you've dropped in the first place.Cities have long seen the potential in big data to improve the government and the lives of citizens, and this is now being put into action in ways where governments touch citizens' lives in very sensitive areas. New York City's Department of Homelessness Services is mining apartment eviction filings (http://www.fastcoexist.com/3024504/facing-a-homelessness-crisis-new-york-city-pinpoints-vulnerable-families-by-mining-eviction-), to see if they can understand who is at risk of becoming homeless and intervene early. And police departments all over the country have adopted predictive policing software that guides where officers should deploy, and at what time, leading to reduced crime in some cities.Predictions based on this biased data could create a feedback loop.In one study (http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/predictive-policing-substantially-reduces-crime-in-los-angeles-during-months-long-test) in Los Angeles, police officers deployed to certain neighborhoods by predictive policing software prevented 4.3 crimes per week, compared to 2 crimes per week when assigned to patrol a specific area by human crime analysts. Surely, a reduction in crime is a good thing. But community activists in places such as Bellingham, Washington (http://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article30797004.html#storylink=cpy), have grave doubts. They worry that outsiders can't examine how the algorithms work, since the software is usually proprietary, and so citizens have no way of knowing what data the government is using to target them. They also worry that predictive policing is just exacerbating existing patterns of racial profiling. If the underlying crime data being used is the result of years of over-policing minority communities for minor offenses, then the predictions based on this biased data could create a feedback loop and lead to yet more over-policing.
At a smaller and more limited scale is the even more sensitive area of child protection services. Though the data isn't really as "big" as in other examples, a few agencies are carefully exploring using statistical models to make decisions in several areas, such as which children in the system are most in danger (http://www.eckerd.org/about-eckerd-kids/what-were-doing/innovations-in-action/) of violence, which children are most in need of a trauma screening, and which are at risk of entering (http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/la_dpp_evaluation_report.pdf) the criminal justice system.
In Hillsborough County, Florida (http://www.eckerd.org/about-eckerd-kids/what-were-doing/innovations-in-action/), where a series of child homicides occurred, a private provider selected to manage the county's child welfare system in 2012 came in and analyzed the data. Cases with the highest probability of serious injury or death had a few factors in common, they found: a child under the age of three, a "paramour" in the home, a substance abuse or domestic violence history, and a parent previously in the foster care system. They identified nine practices to use in these cases and hired a software provider to create a dashboard that allowed real-time feedback and dashboards. Their success has led to the program being implemented statewide.Dating apps get popular when they are actually connecting people, so it's obvious that their systems usually try to show you matches based on some formula that accounts for the person you say you prefer, what your swipes and clicks reveal, and how others behave. Apps surely increase the number of strangers you can meet, but in the quest for love, research shows that (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/11/11/the-one-thing-about-matching-algorithms-that-dating-sites-dont-want-you-to-know/) all the work of their matching algorithms are mostly meaningless. You still need to work hard to find the right person, because a formula can't account for all the uncertainty and individuality about what finding a lasting relationship requires.
But while they don't have the magic formula for creating love, dating sites are still shaping the romantic lives of the growing portion of the population that use them. Consider that Tinder has an internal rating (http://www.fastcompany.com/3054871/whats-your-tinder-score-inside-the-apps-internal-ranking-system) of how desirable you are. If you're getting a lot of swipes, you won't be shown as frequently to give other people a chance. Another app, Coffee Meets Bagel, guides users to people of their own race (http://www.buzzfeed.com/katienotopoulos/coffee-meets-bagel-racial-preferences#.kkEeperaP) or ethnicity, even if they say "no preference" on their profile. Partly, they do this because of what their data reveal: even when users say they have no preference, in private, people gravitate to others like them. That may be true in general, but for any given user, it may nudge them to live more segregated lives than they would otherwise want to, without them knowing at all.The emerging and heavily funded field of precision medicine revolves around the fact that doctors can start to personalize diagnosis and treatment based on how others—whether similar to you in their DNA, demographics, disease pattern, or life habits—respond to care. In the future, the goal is that health care will be highly personalized, and improved outcomes and lower costs will result. This is at an early stage, but already, responding to financial incentives in Obamacare, hospitals are using data mining to predict which patients are more likely to be readmitted (http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/upmcs-big-data-approach-slashes-readmissions) within 90 days. People at a high risk to return are likely to receive more attentive follow-up care. At one hospital, for example, they are assigned (http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022050/futurist-forum/in-the-hospital-of-the-future-big-data-is-one-of-your-doctors) a post discharge coordinator, where someone at a lower risk might not get the same treatment."It's not that much of a stretch, where [a computer] actually says, here's what I suggest with your portfolio."Personal finance is another new area for algorithmic, data-driven predictions, with a number of new "robo-advsior (http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/19/is-the-future-for-robo-advisors-bright-or-a-bust.html)" apps. "We're getting used to computers actually being pretty credible in terms of the recommendations they make," says Vasant Dhar, a professor at NYU's Stern School of Business and its Center for Data Science. "It's not that much of a stretch, where [a computer] actually says, here's what I suggest with your portfolio."
Even major life decisions like college admissions and hiring are being affected. You might think that a college is considering you on your merits, and while that's mostly true, it's not entirely. Pressured to improve their rankings, colleges are very interested in increasing their graduation rates and the percentage of admitted students who enroll. They have now have developed statistical programs (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/new-tool-colleges-using-admissions-decisions-big-data/) to pick students who will do well on these measures. These programs may take into account obvious factors like grades, but also surprising factors like their sex, race, and behavior on social media accounts. If your demographic factors or social media presence happen to doom you, you may find it harder to get into school—and not know why.
And what about getting a job? Consider a startup called Gild (https://www.gild.com/), which has built a database of tens of millions of professionals that contains data purchased from third-party providers plus "anything and everything that's publicly available," according to CEO Sheeroy Desai. Its system identifies candidates who fit a job opening and analyzes factors that might predict their success. The company says it currently has about 10,000 recruiting and hiring managers using the platform, from employers such as Facebook, HBO, and TD Bank.
Desai says Gild's speciality is "unifying information across very different sources." Its big data-based recommendations consider factors including job history, language, and behavior on social media sites, and public work samples such as a programmer's open-source code contributions. By analyzing the job movements of millions of people, it rates candidates not only based on their expertise but also how in-demand they might be based on the current job market. It also tries to answer questions like when a given person is most susceptible to a new job offer, how a person's career track predicts where they'll be in 10 years, and the likelihood a person will be a good fit at a company.The reason the job market is so inefficient is that we have humans making decisions."The reason the job market is so inefficient is that we have humans making decisions," says Desai. Humans, he says, often have more nuanced judgment than a computer, but that judgment is clouded by lots of little biases that people are blind to. "At the end of the day, companies are still going to make decisions based on humans. We want to make more unbiased recommendations on who you should be interviewing."
On the plus side, recruiters have lauded it for helping them find candidates they might not otherwise have considered, like someone who didn't go to college. A downside? Candidates trying to negotiate a higher salary against this kind of smart system might find a harder time of it. In either case, job candidates, Desai says, are sometimes shocked at how much interviewers know about them ahead of time."I think the opportunity is a rich one. At the same time, the ethical considerations need to be guiding us," says Jesse Russell, chief program officer at the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (http://www.nccdglobal.org/), who has followed the use of predictive analytics in child protective services. Officials, he says, are treading carefully before using data to make decisions about individuals, especially when the consequences of being wrong—such as taking a child out of his or her home unnecessarily—are huge. And while caseworker decision-making can be flawed or biased, so can the programs that humans design. When you rely too much on data—if the data is flawed or incomplete, as could be the case in predictive policing—you risk further validating bad decisions or existing biases.There's this danger we lose our identity as people and we become categories.Russell's concerns are applicable to many areas where big data touches our lives. What happens when a computer says you're likely to commit a crime before you do it, and, worse, what if the data underlying that prediction is wrong and you can't do anything about it? What happens when a dating program is slowly pushing us to a more segregated society because it shows us the people it thinks we want to see? Or when personalized medicine can save lives, but because it is based mainly around genomes sequenced from white people of European descent (http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35491835), it's only saving some lives?
And while it's true that analytics can already make smarter guesses than humans in many situations, people are more than their data. A world where people struggle to rise above what is expected of them—say a college won't admit them because they don't seem like someone with a good chance of graduating—is a sad world. "There's this danger we lose our identity as people and we become categories," says Dhar.On the other hand, big data does have the potential to vastly expand our understanding of who we are and why we do what we do. A decade ago, serious scientists would have laughed someone out of the room who proposed a study of "the human condition." It is a topic so broad and lacking in measurability. But perhaps the most important manifestation of big data in people's lives could come from the ability for scientists to study huge, unwieldy questions they couldn't before.
A massive scientific undertaking to study the human condition is set to launch in January of 2017. The Kavli Human Project (http://kavlihumanproject.org/), funded by the Kavli Foundation, plans to recruit 10,000 New Yorkers from all walks of life to be measured for 10 years. And by measured, they mean everything: all financial transactions, tax returns, GPS coordinates, genomes, chemical exposure, IQ, bluetooth sensors around the house, who subjects text and call—and that's just the beginning. In all, the large team of academics expect to collect about a billion data points per person per year at an unprecedented low cost for each data point compared to other large research surveys."There's so many pressing problems that we struggle with in this society, and we are so bad at data-driven policy."The hope is with so much continuous data, researchers can for the first time start to disentangle the complex, seemingly unanswerable questions that have plagued our society, from what is causing the obesity epidemic to how to disrupt the poverty to prison cycle. "There's so many pressing problems that we struggle with in this society, and we are so bad at data-driven policy," says Paul Glimcher, director of the project and a professor of neural science, economics, and psychology at NYU.
For example, how do people decide what to eat? In these decisions, there's complex interactions between biology, behavior, and environment that have always made this question hard to study comprehensively. But if the Kavli Human Project combines geo-located food shopping and consumption data with health biomarkers with financial details and other data, obesity experts say (http://kavlihumanproject.org/research/diet-economics-and-health-in-the-family-and-community-context/) this will be a "first-of-its-kind bio-behavioral, economic, and cultural atlas of diet quality and health for New York City" that can help them make breakthroughs.
Part of its potential is that it could bring the benefits of big data to those who are currently left out. "I think it's really not been the case that [big data] has broadly impacted everyone. I think it's impacted the people who write for The New York Times and Fast Company, and people who read The New York Times and Fast Company," Glimcher says.
Glimcher says he's disappointed at the ways that big data tools have been used so far. "It's just terrible," he says. "Sometimes big data is treated as if it's an organism. And the question is how will this organism interact with us. And we really honestly hate that. We like the idea as scientists, as activists—we are big data. We are designing big data. And the challenge is to design big data that has those positive impacts, not to wait and see."
Brus šajner:
The Internet of Things Will Be the World's Biggest Robot (https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/02/the_internet_of_1.html)
QuoteThe Internet of Things is the name given to the computerization of everything in our lives. Already you can buy Internet-enabled thermostats, light bulbs, refrigerators, and cars. Soon everything will be on the Internet: the things we own, the things we interact with in public, autonomous things that interact with each other.
These "things" will have two separate parts. One part will be sensors that collect data about us and our environment. Already our smartphones know our location and, with their onboard accelerometers, track our movements. Things like our thermostats and light bulbs will know who is in the room. Internet-enabled street and highway sensors will know how many people are out and about -- and eventually who they are. Sensors will collect environmental data from all over the world.
The other part will be actuators. They'll affect our environment. Our smart thermostats aren't collecting information about ambient temperature and who's in the room for nothing; they set the temperature accordingly. Phones already know our location, and send that information back to Google Maps and Waze to determine where traffic congestion is; when they're linked to driverless cars, they'll automatically route us around that congestion. Amazon already wants autonomous drones to deliver packages. The Internet of Things will increasingly perform actions for us and in our name.
Increasingly, human intervention will be unnecessary. The sensors will collect data. The system's smarts will interpret the data and figure out what to do. And the actuators will do things in our world. You can think of the sensors as the eyes and ears of the Internet, the actuators as the hands and feet of the Internet, and the stuff in the middle as the brain. This makes the future clearer. The Internet now senses, thinks, and acts.
We're building a world-sized robot, and we don't even realize it.
I've started calling this robot the World-Sized Web.
The World-Sized Web -- can I call it WSW? -- is more than just the Internet of Things. Much of the WSW's brains will be in the cloud, on servers connected via cellular, Wi-Fi, or short-range data networks. It's mobile, of course, because many of these things will move around with us, like our smartphones. And it's persistent. You might be able to turn off small pieces of it here and there, but in the main the WSW will always be on, and always be there.
None of these technologies are new, but they're all becoming more prevalent. I believe that we're at the brink of a phase change around information and networks. The difference in degree will become a difference in kind. That's the robot that is the WSW.
This robot will increasingly be autonomous, at first simply and increasingly using the capabilities of artificial intelligence. Drones with sensors will fly to places that the WSW needs to collect data. Vehicles with actuators will drive to places that the WSW needs to affect. Other parts of the robots will "decide" where to go, what data to collect, and what to do.
We're already seeing this kind of thing in warfare; drones are surveilling the battlefield and firing weapons at targets. Humans are still in the loop, but how long will that last? And when both the data collection and resultant actions are more benign than a missile strike, autonomy will be an easier sell.
By and large, the WSW will be a benign robot. It will collect data and do things in our interests; that's why we're building it. But it will change our society in ways we can't predict, some of them good and some of them bad. It will maximize profits for the people who control the components. It will enable totalitarian governments. It will empower criminals and hackers in new and different ways (https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2016/01/when_hacking_could_e.html). It will cause power balances to shift and societies to change.
These changes are inherently unpredictable, because they're based on the emergent properties of these new technologies interacting with each other, us, and the world. In general, it's easy to predict technological changes due to scientific advances, but much harder to predict social changes due to those technological changes. For example, it was easy to predict that better engines would mean that cars could go faster. It was much harder to predict that the result would be a demographic shift into suburbs. Driverless cars and smart roads will again transform our cities in new ways, as will autonomous drones, cheap and ubiquitous environmental sensors, and a network that can anticipate our needs.
Maybe the WSW is more like an organism. It won't have a single mind. Parts of it will be controlled by large corporations and governments. Small parts of it will be controlled by us. But writ large its behavior will be unpredictable, the result of millions of tiny goals and billions of interactions between parts of itself.
We need to start thinking seriously about our new world-spanning robot. The market will not sort this out all by itself. By nature, it is short-term and profit-motivated -- and these issues require broader thinking. University of Washington law professor Ryan Calo has proposed a Federal Robotics Commission (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2529151) as a place where robotics expertise and advice can be centralized within the government. Japan (http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201505/15article3.html) and Korea (http://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/article/the_quiet_giant_of_asian_robotics_korea) are already moving in this direction.
Speaking as someone with a healthy skepticism for another government agency, I think we need to go further. We need to create agency, a Department of Technology Policy, that can deal with the WSW in all its complexities. It needs the power to aggregate expertise and advice other agencies, and probably the authority to regulate when appropriate. We can argue the details, but there is no existing government entity that has the either the expertise or authority to tackle something this broad and far reaching. And the question is not about whether government will start regulating these technologies, it's about how smart they'll be when they do it.
The WSW is being built right now, without anyone noticing, and it'll be here before we know it. Whatever changes it means for society, we don't want it to take us by surprise.
This essay originally appeared (http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceschneier/2016/02/02/the-internet-of-things-will-be-the-worlds-biggest-robot/#678f2e763162) on Forbes.com, which annoyingly blocks browsers using ad blockers.
EDITED TO ADD: Kevin Kelly has also thought along these lines (http://longnow.org/seminars/02014/nov/12/technium-unbound/), calling the robot "Holos."
EDITED TO ADD: Commentary (https://resilient.com/bruce-schneiers-notion-of-the-world-sized-web/).
Recimo da ovo zgodno ide na ovaj topik:
Why we should fear a cashless world (http://www.theguardian.com/money/commentisfree/2016/mar/21/fear-cashless-world-contactless)
QuoteThe health food chain Tossed has just opened the UK's first cashless cafe (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/16/salad-london-recpie-capital-avocado-alienation). It's another step towards the death of cash.
This is nothing new. Money is tech. The casting of coins made shells, whales' teeth and other such primitive forms of money redundant. The printing press did the same for precious metals: we started using paper notes instead. Electronic banking put paid to the cheque. Contactless payment is now doing the same to cash, which is becoming less and less convenient. In the marketplace convenience usually wins.
That's fine as long as people are making this choice freely. What concerns me is the unofficial war on cash that is going on, from the suspicion with which you are treated if you ever use large sums of cash to the campaign in Europe to decommission the €500 note (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/12/eu-finance-ministers-call-for-restrictions-on-500-euro-note-crime). I'm not sure the consequences have been properly considered. We already live in a world that is, as far as the distribution of wealth is concerned, about as unequal as it gets. It may even be as unequal as it's ever been. My worry is that a cashless society may exacerbate inequality even further.
It will hand yet more power to the financial sector in that banks and related fintech companies will oversee all transactions. The crash of 2008 showed that, when push comes to shove, banks have already been exempted from the very effective regulation that is bankruptcy – one by which the rest of us must all operate. Do we want this sector to have yet more power and influence?
In a world without cash, every payment you make will be traceable. Do you want governments (which are not always benevolent), banks or payment processors to have potential access to that information? The power this would hand them is enormous and the potential scope for Orwellian levels of surveillance is terrifying.
Cash, on the other hand, empowers its users. It enables them to buy and sell, and store their wealth, without being dependent on anyone else. They can stay outside the financial system, if so desired.
There are many reasons, both moral and practical, to want this. In 2008 many rushed to take their money out of the banks. If the financial system really was as close to breaking point as we are told it was, then such actions are quite justified. When Cyprus's banks teetered on the cliff of financial disaster in 2011, we saw bail-ins. Ordinary people's money in deposit accounts was sequestered to bail out the system. If your life savings were threatened with confiscation to bail out a corporation you considered profligate, I imagine you too would rush to withdraw them.
We have seen similar panics in Greece and, to a lesser extent, across southern Europe. Mervyn King, the former governor of the Bank of England, recently declared that banking was not fixed and that we would see financial panic again. In Japan, the central bank has imposed negative rates and you are charged by banks to store money. This is to try and goad people into spending, rather than saving. So much cash has been withdrawn from banks that there are now reports that the country has sold out of safes. (http://fortune.com/2016/02/23/japans-negative-interest-rate-driving-up-safe-sales/)
These are all quite legitimate reasons to want to exit the system. I'm not saying we should all take our money out of the bank, but that we should all have the option to. Cash gives you that option. Why remove it? It's our money. Not the banks'.
The telephone teaches us a useful lesson. At its peak in 2008, there were 1.3bn landlines for a global population close to 7 billion. Today more than 6 billion people have a mobile phone – more than have access to a toilet, according to a UN study. Many assume that the mobile succeeded where the landline failed, because the superior technology made widespread coverage more possible. There is something to that.
But the main reason, simply, is that, to get a landline, you need a bank account and credit. About half of the world's population is "unbanked", without access to the basic financial services you need. Telecoms companies saw no potential custom, the infrastructure was never built and many were left with fewer possibilities to communicate. But a mobile phone and its airtime you can buy with cash. You don't need to be banked. Almost anyone can get a mobile – and they have. The financial system was actually a barrier to progress for the world's poor, while cash was a facilitator for them.
Six billion people around the world will have a smartphone by 2020. They will have pretty much everything they need to participate in e-commerce – internet access, basically – except the financial inclusion. Which is why there will be a huge role to play in the future for new forms of digital cash – from Kenya's M-Pesa to bitcoin (http://www.theguardian.com/technology/bitcoin) – money you can use even if you are not financially included.
Cash has its uses for small transactions – a chocolate bar, a newspaper, a pint of milk – which, in the UK, are still uneconomic to process by other means. It will always be the fastest and most direct form of payment there is. I like to tip waiters, for example, in cash, knowing they will receive that money, without it being siphoned off by some unscrupulous employer. I also like to shop in markets, where I can buy directly from the producer knowing they will receive the money, without middle men shaving off their percentages.
It also has its uses for private transactions, for which there are many possible reasons, and by no means all of them illegal. Small businesses starting out need the cash economy. Poor people need the cash economy. The war on cash is a war on them.
If you listen to the scaremongering, you'd start to think that all cash users are either criminals, tax evaders or terrorists. Sure, some use cash to evade tax, but it's paltry compared to the tax avoidance schemes Google and Facebook have employed. Google doesn't use cash to avoid tax. It's all done via legislative means.
Cash means total financial inclusion, a luxury the better-off take for granted. Without financial inclusion – and there will always be some who, for whatever reason, won't have it – you are trapped in poverty. So beware the war on cash.
Global majority backs a ban on 'dark net,' poll says (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-privacy-idUSKCN0WV111)
QuoteSeven in 10 people say the "dark net" - an anonymous online home to both criminals and activists fearful of government surveillance - should be shut down, according to a global Ipsos poll released on Tuesday.The findings, from a poll of at least 1,000 people in each of 24 countries, come as policymakers and technology companies argue over whether digital privacy should be curbed to help regulators and law enforcement more easily thwart hackers and other digital threats.The U.S. Justice Department is currently trying to force Apple Inc to write software to allow access to an iPhone used by San Bernardino, California shooter Rizwan Farook.The dark net refers to an area of the Internet only accessible via special web browsers that ensure anonymity, where content is hidden and data typically encrypted.The Ipsos poll was commissioned the Waterloo, Ontario-based Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). The think tank is part of a commission seeking to shape Internet governance. The question asked in the poll pointed out the dark net's anonymity can protect journalists, human rights activists, dissidents and whistleblowers, but also hide child abuse networks and illegal marketplaces selling weapons and narcotics.The portion of respondents who either strongly agreed or somewhat agreed it should be shuttered ranged between 61 percent and 85 percent, with support strongest in Indonesia, India, Egypt and Mexico and weakest in Sweden, South Korea and Kenya. Other countries polled included Pakistan, Australia, the United States, France, Germany, Turkey, and Tunisia."The public clearly wants law enforcement to have the tools to do its job. But if you flip it around and say should they have access to your data they tend to feel differently," said Fen Osler Hampson, director of the global security and politics program at CIGI.Only 38 percent of all respondents said they trust that their online activities are not monitored. Hampson said public concern about online privacy will likely grow as more and more cars, appliances and infrastructure connect to online networks.Ipsos said the poll was accurate in each country to within plus or minus 3.5 percentage points.
Evo i samog ipsosovog izveštaja:
http://ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=7186 (http://ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=7186)
Startap firma koju finansira CIA razvija proizvode za negu kože koji... er... sakupljaju lične informacije???
Beauty Secrets of the Spies (https://theintercept.com/2016/04/08/cia-skincare-startup/)
Quote
SKINCENTIAL SCIENCES, a company with an innovative line of cosmetic products marketed as a way to erase blemishes and soften skin, has caught the attention of beauty (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6nEohRYKHk) bloggers (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9MoqqPWCwU) on YouTube, Oprah's lifestyle magazine (https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0465/2137/files/O_MAG_PIC_large.png?7718916324969055213), and celebrity skin care professionals (http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/eclipse-aesthetics-partners-to-offer-clearista-pro-line-300235012.html). Documents obtained by The Intercept reveal that the firm has also attracted interest and funding from In-Q-Tel, the venture capital arm of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The previously undisclosed relationship with the CIA might come as some surprise to a visitor to the website of Clearista (http://clearista.com/), the main product line of Skincential Sciences, which boasts (http://clearista.com/pages/skin-care) of a "formula so you can feel confident and beautiful in your skin's most natural state."
Though the public-facing side of the company touts a range of skin care products, Skincential Sciences developed a patented technology that removes a thin outer layer of the skin, revealing unique biomarkers that can be used for a variety of diagnostic tests, including DNA collection.
Skincential Science's noninvasive procedure, described on the Clearista website as "painless (http://clearista.com/blogs/clearista-testimonials/19030623-go-for-it)," is said to require only water, a special detergent, and a few brushes against the skin, making it a convenient option for restoring the glow of a youthful complexion — and a novel technique for gathering information about a person's biochemistry.
n-Q-Tel, founded in 1999 by then-CIA Director George Tenet, identifies cutting-edge technology to support the mission of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, and provides venture funding to help grow tech firms to develop those solutions.
"Our company is an outlier for In-Q-Tel," Russ Lebovitz, the chief executive of Skincential Sciences, said during an interview with The Intercept. He conceded that the relationship might make for "an unusual and interesting story," but said, "If there's something beneath the surface, that's not part of our relationship and I'm not directly aware. They're interested here in something that can get easy access to biomarkers."
Still, Lebovitz claimed he has limited knowledge of why In-Q-Tel selected his firm.
"I can't tell you how everyone works with In-Q-Tel, but they are very interested in doing things that are pure science," Lebovitz said. The CIA fund approached his company, telling him the fund shares an interest in looking at DNA extraction using the method pioneered by Skincential Sciences, according to Lebovitz.
Beyond that, Lebovitz said he was unsure of the intent of the CIA's use of the technology, but the fund was "specifically interested in the diagnostics, detecting DNA from normal skin." He added, "There's no better identifier than DNA, and we know we can pull out DNA."
Perhaps law enforcement could use the biomarker extraction technique for crime scene identification or could conduct drug tests, Lebovitz suggested.
Carrie A. Sessine, the vice president for external affairs at In-Q-Tel, declined a media interview because "IQT does not participate in media interviews or opportunities."
(Officials at the venture capital firm have, in fact, given interviews (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/14/AR2005081401108.html) in the past.)
Though In-Q-Tel operates in the open, it has often kept key details of its activities out of public view, beyond required annual reports. After a SecureDrop (https://theintercept.com/securedrop/) source told The Intercept about a gathering in San Jose for In-Q-Tel executives and start-up companies backed by the fund, The Intercept attempted to attend, but was denied access.
Skincential Sciences was among several presenting companies.
The shroud of secrecy around In-Q-Tel belies a 17-year effort to build ties between the CIA and the biggest names in Silicon Valley. Gilman Louie, a video game executive known for publishing best-sellers such as Tetris, Falcon, and Civilization II, was brought on (http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1739&context=njilb) as the first chief executive of In-Q-Tel. The popular mapping tool Google Earth was created around technology developed by Keyhole Corp., an In-Q-Tel-backed company that was later acquired (https://www.iqt.org/google-acquires-keyhole-corporation/) by Google.
Still, little is publicly revealed about the use of In-Q-Tel-backed ventures and their relevance to the goals of intelligence agencies. Many of the fund's investments are not publicly revealed. The fund is reviewed (http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/522/522149962/522149962_201403_990.pdf) by the CIA's inspector general and reports directly to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which frequently conducts business through classified briefings.
David Petraeus, while serving as the director of the CIA in 2012, remarked (https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/in-q-tel-summit-remarks.html), "Our partnership with In-Q-Tel is essential to helping identify and deliver groundbreaking technologies with mission-critical applications to the CIA and to our partner agencies."
Despite the association with computer and satellite technology, In-Q-Tel also maintains (https://web.archive.org/web/20130511114639/http://www.iqt.org/portfolio/pbt.html) a long-running interest in developing advanced genetic analysis, biological technologies for detection and diagnostics, as well as research into what is known as physiological intelligence, which, in a 2010 article, the fund described as "actionable information about human identity and experience that have always been of interest to the Intelligence Community."
The article, which is no longer available on the fund's website but is preserved (https://web.archive.org/web/20130704121843/http://www.iqt.org/portfolio/on-our-radar/Physiological_Intelligence.pdf) by a cache hosted by the Internet Archive, argues that advances in medical research into biomarkers can be leveraged by intelligence agencies for a variety of uses, from airport security to next-generation identification tools.
A diagram in the article calls human skin the body's largest organ and a "unique, underutilized source for sample collection." The author, Dr. Kevin O'Connell, then a "senior solutions architect" with In-Q-Tel, notes, "The DNA contained in microorganisms in a person's gut or on a person's skin may contain sequences that indicate a particular geographical origin."
In-Q-Tel has invested in several companies working in this realm, in addition to Skincential Sciences. In 2013, In-Q-Tel publicly announced (https://www.iqt.org/bio-nems-corporation-announces-strategic-partnership-with-iqt/) a strategic partnership with Bio-NEMS, a firm that developed a semiconductor device used to analyze DNA for a variety of diagnostic and human identification applications. Claremont BioSolutions, a diagnostics firm, and Biomatrica, a firm that specializes in preparing biological samples for DNA testing, are also backed by In-Q-Tel.
Skincential Sciences did not start out as a beauty company. The firm was founded in 2010 as DX Biosciences, which was developed around a patent by a team of scientists including Dr. Samir Mitragotri of the University of California, Santa Barbara. Mitragotri has published (https://mdanderson.influuent.utsystem.edu/en/publications/diagnostic-opportunities-based-on-skin-biomarkers%282d7bf1fc-c90d-4e01-ac28-71ee000d0c3c%29.html) research into the use of biomarkers as a "window to body's health."
The company gained early backing (http://www.dfjfrontier.com/companies.shtml) from Frontier, a venture capital company, among other investors.
While the technology has potential for a variety of medical diagnostics, including early melanoma detection, Lebovitz said the company quickly realized it had immediate value as a cosmetic. The application of the detergent developed by the firm could be used easily to diminish blemishes and dark patches on the skin. And unlike similar treatments at aesthetic spas, the technology developed by Dr. Mitragotri and his colleagues did not require acid or any discomfort.
In 2013, the firm relaunched and recapitalized as Skincential Sciences, with Clearista as its primary brand of beauty products.
Lebovitz says he intends to continue developing the technology so that it may be medically relevant, but he is also focusing on breaking into the multibillion-dollar skin care market. While Skincential has won measured success for its Clearista brand products by landing coverage on television (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOpIaGXEi4U) and through social media, the company has not yet been able to compete with mainstream skin care companies.
Jamie Walsh, a blogger who runs Glam Latte, a beauty website, endorsed a Clearista product on her YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9MoqqPWCwU), noting that with only one application of the cream, her skin improved and was "glowing." Walsh said Skincential Sciences sent her the product for a testimonial, and noted that like many independent brands, she did not know about the company's funding.
Skincential hopes to license its product with a major distributor, or even one day become acquired by a larger beauty company. "We'll take any of those," said Lebovitz.
The chief executive noted that he is proud of the In-Q-Tel support, calling the fund "great partners."
At the gathering in February for In-Q-Tel portfolio companies, Lebovitz joined a crowd that included a number of In-Q-Tel executives, along with senior members of the intelligence community. Presenting speakers included Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, and John Maeda, design partner of Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, a leading Silicon Valley investment firm.
"Not only was I the odd man out," Lebovitz said, "but almost every woman at the conference wanted to come up to me to talk about skin care."
Research: Margot Williams
Evropski parlament:
Data protection reform - Parliament approves new rules fit for the digital era (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160407IPR21776/Data-protection-reform-Parliament-approves-new-rules-fit-for-the-digital-era)
QuoteNew EU data protection rules which aim to give citizens back control of their personal data and create a high, uniform level of data protection across the EU fit for the digital era was given their final approval by MEPs on Thursday. The reform also sets minimum standards on use of data for policing and judicial purposes.
Parliament's vote ends more than four years of work on a complete overhaul of EU data protection rules. The reform will replace the current data protection directive, dating back to 1995 when the internet was still in its infancy, with a general regulation designed to give citizens more control over their own private information in a digitised world of smartphones, social media, internet banking and global transfers.
"The general data protection regulation makes a high, uniform level of data protection throughout the EU a reality. This is a great success for the European Parliament and a fierce European 'yes' to strong consumer rights and competition in the digital age. Citizens will be able to decide for themselves which personal information they want to share", said Jan Philipp Albrecht (Greens, DE), who steered the legislation through Parliament.
"The regulation will also create clarity for businesses by establishing a single law across the EU. The new law creates confidence, legal certainty and fairer competition", he added.
The new rules include provisions on:
- a right to be forgotten,
- "clear and affirmative consent" to the processing of private data by the person concerned,
- a right to transfer your data to another service provider,
- the right to know when your data has been hacked,
- ensuring that privacy policies are explained in clear and understandable language, and
- stronger enforcement and fines up to 4% of firms' total worldwide annual turnover, as a deterrent to breaking the rules.
New rules on data transfers to ensure smoother police cooperation
The data protection package also includes a directive on data transfers for policing and judicial purposes. It will apply to data transfers across borders within the EU as well as, for the first time, setting minimum standards for data processing for policing purposes within each member state.
The new rules aim to protect individuals, whether victims, criminals or witnesses, by setting out clear rights and limitations on data transfers for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including safeguarding against and preventing threats to public security, while at the same time facilitating smoother and more effective cooperation among law enforcement authorities.
"The main problem concerning terrorist attacks and other transnational crimes is that member states' law enforcement authorities are reluctant to exchange valuable information", said Parliament's lead MEP on the directive Marju Lauristin (S&D, ET)."By setting European standards for information exchange between law enforcement authorities, the data protection directive will become a powerful and useful tool which will help authorities transfer personal data easily and efficiently, at the same time respecting the fundamental right to privacy", she concluded.
More details on the general data protection regulation and the directive in our Q&A (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160413BKG22980/QA-new-EU-rules-on-data-protection-put-the-citizen-back-in-the-driving-seat) here.
Next steps
The regulation will enter into force 20 days after its publication in the EU Official Journal. Its provisions will be directly applicable in all member states two years after this date.
Member states will have two years to transpose the provisions of the directive into national law.
Due to UK and Ireland's special status regarding justice and home affairs legislation, the directive's provisions will only apply in these countries to a limited extent.
Denmark will be able to decide within six months after the final adoption of the directive whether it wants to implement it in its national law.
REF. : 20160407IPR21776 Updated: ( 14-04-2016 - 16:23
New system to identify people by their 'brainprints' (http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/new-system-to-identify-people-by-their-brainprints-116041900354_1.html)
QuoteScientists have developed a new system that can identify people using their brain waves or 'brainprint' with 100 per cent accuracy, an advance that may be useful in high-security applications.
Researchers at Binghamton University in US recorded the brain activity of 50 people wearing an electroencephalogram (EEG) headset while they looked at a series of 500 images designed specifically to elicit unique responses from person to person - eg a slice of pizza, a boat, or the word "conundrum."
They found that participants' brains reacted differently to each image, enough that a computer system was able to identify each volunteer's 'brainprint' with 100 per cent accuracy.
"When you take hundreds of these images, where every person is going to feel differently about each individual one, then you can be really accurate in identifying which person it was who looked at them just by their brain activity," said Assistant Professor Sarah Laszlo.
According to Laszlo, brain biometrics are appealing because they are cancellable and cannot be stolen by malicious means the way a finger or retina can.
The results suggest that brainwaves could be used by security systems to verify a person's identity.
"If someone's fingerprint is stolen, that person can't just grow a new finger to replace the compromised fingerprint - the fingerprint for that person is compromised forever," said Laszlo.
"In the unlikely event that attackers were actually able to steal a brainprint from an authorised user, the authorised user could then 'reset' their brainprint," Laszlo said.
Zhanpeng Jin, assistant professor at Binghamton University, does not see this as the kind of system that would be mass-produced for low security applications, but it could have important security applications.
"We tend to see the applications of this system as being more along the lines of high-security physical locations, like the Pentagon or Air Force Labs, where there aren't that many users that are authorised to enter, and those users don't need to constantly be authorising the way that a consumer might need to authorise into their phone or computer," Jin said.
The study was published in The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security journal.
Heh..
Baš ovih dana (ponovo) čitam Andersonove "Hodnike vremena", i tu se opisuje sistem identifikacije koji funkcioniše tako što osoba zamisli određenu, zadatu reč, a skener očita "unique brain response" koji ta reč izaziva.. :lol:
In a First, Judge Throws Out Evidence Obtained from FBI Malware (http://motherboard.vice.com/read/in-a-first-judge-throws-out-evidence-obtained-from-fbi-malware)
Quote
For the first time, a judge has thrown out evidence obtained via a piece of FBI malware. The move comes from a cased affected by the FBI's seizure of a dark web child pornography site in February 2015, and the subsequent deployment of a network investigative technique (https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbis-unprecedented-hacking-campaign-targeted-over-a-thousand-computers) (NIT)—the agency's term for a hacking tool—in order to identify the site's visitors.
"Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that the NIT warrant was issued without jurisdiction and thus was void ab initio," Judge William G. Young of the District of Massachusetts writes in an order. "It follows that the resulting search was conducted as though there were no warrant at all."
"Since warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, and the good-faith exception is inapplicable, the evidence must be excluded," it continues.
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fmotherboard-images.vice.com%2Fcontent-images%2Fcontentimage%2F32776%2F146119447384270.jpeg&hash=854de78d285957bfe9b4457eebeaae87cbb0f093)
Young's order came in response to a motion to suppress from the lawyers of Alex Levin, who was arrested as part of the investigation into the child pornography site Playpen. After seizing the site, the FBI ran Playpen from a government facility from February 20 to March 4, 2015, and used a NIT to obtain over a thousand IP addresses (https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbi-may-be-sitting-on-a-firefox-vulnerability) for US-based users of the site, and at least 3000 for users abroad, according to Motherboard's investigations (https://motherboard.vice.com/read/child-porn-sting-goes-global-fbi-hacked-computers-in-denmark-greece-chile).
Young's move hinges around the one warrant (https://motherboard.vice.com/read/here-is-the-warrant-the-fbi-used-to-hack-over-a-thousand-computers) used to authorise all of these computer intrusions. Lawyers have raised issues with it before—Colin Fieman, a defender in a related case, previously told Motherboard (https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbis-unprecedented-hacking-campaign-targeted-over-a-thousand-computers) that it "effectively authorizes an unlimited number of searches, against unidentified targets, anywhere in the world." The Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a strongly-worded amicus brief in another affected case, and called the warrant (https://motherboard.vice.com/read/fbi-warrant-used-to-hack-child-porn-visitors-was-unconstitutional-eff-argues) "unconstitutional."
"This is the first time a court has ever suppressed anything from a government hacking operation," Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), told Motherboard in an encrypted phone call. (Soghoian has been called as an expert by the defense in another affected case.)
Other judges have blocked parts of hacking operations before. In 2013, a judge denied the FBI (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324743704578443011661957422) a hacking warrant that would have authorised the agency to collect chat logs, web history and other data from the target laptop, as well as turn on the suspect's web camera.
Lawyers from other affected cases around the country are sure to be following this latest order closely.
UPDATE: Peter Carr, a spokesperson for the Department of Justice, sent a statement.
"We are disappointed with the court's decision and are reviewing our options. The decision highlights why the government supports the clarification of the rules of procedure currently pending before the Supreme Court to ensure that criminals using sophisticated anonymizing technologies to conceal their identities while they engage in crime over the Internet are able to be identified and apprehended."
Sve bi bilo lakše kad bi prosto objavili rat dečijoj pornografiji, kao do što su već u ratu s drogama i teroristima.
UK intel agencies spy indiscriminately on millions of innocent folks (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/04/uk-secret-police-surveillance-bulk-personal-datasets/)
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 24-04-2016, 07:42:47
millions of innocent folks
eh, innocent!
niko nije innocent dok to ne dokaže, i to ubedljivo!
pa još MILIONI takvih?
gde?
How Big Data Creates False Confidence (http://nautil.us/blog/how-big-data-creates-false-confidence)
Snouden Eduard u Gardijanu:
Edward Snowden: 'Governments can reduce our dignity to that of tagged animals' (http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/03/edward-snowden-assassination-complex-governments-tagged-animals-drone-warfare-whistleblower)
A samo ste hteli app za telefon koji će da prebroji kolko ste kilometara pretrčali u jutarnjem džogingu...
Runkeeper is secretly tracking you around the clock and sending your data to advertisers (http://www.androidauthority.com/runkeeper-user-location-tracking-data-advertisers-692346/)
Quote
FitnessKeeper, the company behind running app Runkeeper, is in hot water in Europe. The company will receive a formal complaint on Friday from the Norwegian Consumer Council for breaching European data protection laws. It turns out that Runkeeper tracks its users' location all the time – not just when the app is active – and sends that data to advertisers.
The NCC, a consumer rights watchdog, is conducting an investigation into 20 apps' terms and conditions to see if the apps do what their permissions say they do and to monitor data flows. Tinder has already been reported to the Norwegian data protection authority for similar breaches of privacy laws. The NCC's investigation into Runkeeper discovered that user location data is tracked around the clock and gets transmitted to a third party advertiser in the U.S. called Kiip.me.
The NCC's digital policy director, Finn Myrstad, told Ars Technica: "Everyone understands that Runkeeper tracks users while they exercise, but to continue after the training has ended is not okay. Not only is it a breach of privacy laws, we are also convinced that users do not want to be tracked in this way, or for information to be shared with third party advertisers. It is clear that Runkeeper needs to have a good think about how it treats user's data and privacy".
But it doesn't stop there: the investigation reportedly uncovered multiple breaches of user privacy. The NCC now wants Norway's data protection agency to take action on its claims. Unfortunately, because Runkeeper has no European subsidiaries – it's a U.S.-based company – the data protection agency has limited powers to impose sanctions on the company.
This isn't the first time we've heard about apps taking more than they should and trying to make a buck off it. It's good to know that investigations like this are being conducted, if for no other reason than that, armed with the knowledge of what an app's developers are up to, we can decide whether we want to continue supporting them or not.
Does this surprise you? Would you continue to use an app guilty of this?
How the Pentagon punished NSA whistleblowers (http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/22/how-pentagon-punished-nsa-whistleblowers)
Quote
By now, almost everyone knows what Edward Snowden (http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/edward-snowden) did. He leaked top-secret documents revealing that the National Security Agency was spying on hundreds of millions of people across the world, collecting the phone calls and emails of virtually everyone on Earth who used a mobile phone or the internet. When this newspaper began publishing the NSA documents (http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/the-nsa-files) in June 2013, it ignited a fierce political debate that continues to this day – about government surveillance, but also about the morality, legality and civic value of whistleblowing.
But if you want to know why Snowden did it (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance), and the way he did it, you have to know the stories of two other men.
The first is Thomas Drake, who blew the whistle on the very same NSA activities 10 years before Snowden did. Drake was a much higher-ranking NSA (http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/nsa) official than Snowden, and he obeyed US whistleblower laws, raising his concerns through official channels. And he got crushed.
Drake was fired, arrested at dawn by gun-wielding FBI agents, stripped of his security clearance, charged with crimes that could have sent him to prison for the rest of his life, and all but ruined financially and professionally. The only job he could find afterwards was working in an Apple store in suburban Washington, where he remains today. Adding insult to injury, his warnings about the dangers of the NSA's surveillance programme were largely ignored.
"The government spent many years trying to break me, and the more I resisted, the nastier they got," Drake told me.
Drake's story has since been told – and in fact, it had a profound impact on Snowden, who told an interviewer in 2015 that: "It's fair to say that if there hadn't been a Thomas Drake, there wouldn't have been an Edward Snowden (http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/edward-snowden)."
But there is another man whose story has never been told before, who is speaking out publicly for the first time here. His name is John Crane, and he was a senior official in the Department of Defense who fought to provide fair treatment for whistleblowers such as Thomas Drake – until Crane himself was forced out of his job and became a whistleblower as well.
His testimony reveals a crucial new chapter in the Snowden story – and Crane's failed battle to protect earlier whistleblowers should now make it very clear that Snowden had good reasons to go public with his revelations.
During dozens of hours of interviews, Crane told me how senior Defense Department officials repeatedly broke the law to persecute Drake. First, he alleged, they revealed Drake's identity to the Justice Department; then they withheld (and perhaps destroyed) evidence after Drake was indicted; finally, they lied about all this to a federal judge.
The supreme irony? In their zeal to punish Drake, these Pentagon officialsunwittingly taught Snowden how to evade their clutches when the 29-year-old NSA contract employee blew the whistle himself. Snowden was unaware of the hidden machinations inside the Pentagon that undid Drake, but the outcome of those machinations – Drake's arrest, indictment and persecution – sent an unmistakable message: raising concerns within the system promised doom.
"Name one whistleblower from the intelligence community whose disclosures led to real change – overturning laws, ending policies – who didn't face retaliation as a result. The protections just aren't there," Snowden told the Guardian this week. "The sad reality of today's policies is that going to the inspector general with evidence of truly serious wrongdoing is often a mistake. Going to the press involves serious risks, but at least you've got a chance."
Snowden saw what had happened to Drake and other whistleblowers like him. The key to Snowden's effectiveness, according to Thomas Devine, the legal director of the Government Accountability Project (GAP), was that he practised "civil disobedience" rather than "lawful" whistleblowing. (GAP, a non-profit group in Washington, DC, that defends whistleblowers, has represented Snowden, Drake and Crane.)
"None of the lawful whistleblowers who tried to expose the government's warrantless surveillance – and Drake was far from the only one who tried – had any success," Devine told me. "They came forward and made their charges, but the government just said, 'They're lying, they're paranoid, we're not doing those things.' And the whistleblowers couldn't prove their case because the government had classified all the evidence. Whereas Snowden took the evidence with him, so when the government issued its usual denials, he could produce document after document showing that they were lying. That is civil disobedience whistleblowing."
Crane, a solidly built Virginia resident with flecks of grey in a neatly trimmed chinstrap beard, understood Snowden's decision to break the rules – but lamented it. "Someone like Snowden should not have felt the need to harm himself just to do the right thing," he told me.
Crane's testimony is not simply a clue to Snowden's motivations and methods: if his allegations are confirmed in court, they could put current and former senior Pentagon officials in jail. (Official investigations are quietly under way.)
But Crane's account has even larger ramifications: it repudiates the position on Snowden taken by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton – who both maintain that Snowden should have raised his concerns through official channels because US whistleblower law would have protected him.
By the time Snowden went public in 2013, Crane had spent years fighting a losing battle inside the Pentagon to provide whistleblowers the legal protections to which they were entitled. He took his responsibilities so seriously, and clashed with his superiors so often, that he carried copies of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the US constitution in his breast pocket and pulled them out during office conflicts.
Crane's attorneys at GAP – who were used to working with all types of government and corporate whistleblowers – were baffled by him: in their experience, most senior government officials cared little for whistleblowers' rights. So what motivated Crane to keep fighting for the rights of whistleblowers inside the Pentagon, even as his superiors grew increasingly hostile and eventually forced him to resign?
To hear Crane tell it, the courage to stand up and fight runs in his family. He never forgot the story he heard as a child, about his own grandfather, a German army officer who once faced down Adolf Hitler at gunpoint – on the night the future Fuhrer first tried to take over Germany.
A former press aide to Republican members of Congress, John Crane was hired by the Inspector General's office of the Department of Defense in 1988. Within US government agencies, an inspector general serves as a kind of judge and police chief. The IG, as the inspector general is known, is charged with making sure a given agency is operating according to the law – obeying rules and regulations, spending money as authorised by Congress. "In the IG's office, we were the guys with the white hats," Crane said.
By 2004 Crane had been promoted to assistant inspector general. At the age of 48, his responsibilities included supervising the whistleblower unit at the Department of Defense, as well as handling all whistleblower allegations arising from the department's two million employees (by far the largest workforce in the US government), in some cases including allegations originating in the NSA and other intelligence agencies.
By this time, Thomas Drake had proceeded well down the path that would eventually connect him with Crane. Drake's first day as a fully fledged employee of the National Security Agency was 11 September 2001. Although the NSA would balloon in size and budget as the US responded to the September 11 attacks, the agency already ranked as the largest, most lavishly funded spy organisation on Earth. Created in 1952, the NSA was the government's code-breaker and all-hearing global "ear". The NSA intercepted the communications of foreign governments and individuals and translated this raw intelligence into information usable by the CIA, the FBI and kindred government agencies.
Drake, a father of five, had worked for the NSA for 12 years as a private-sector contractor. Now, as a staff member proper, he reported directly to the NSA's third highest ranking official, Maureen Baginski; she headed the NSA's largest division, the Signals Intelligence Directorate, which was responsible for the interception of phone calls and other communications.
Tall, sombre, intense, Drake was a championship chess player in high school whose gift for mathematics, computers and languages made him a natural for foreign eavesdropping and the cryptographic and linguistic skills it required. During the cold war, he worked for air force intelligence, monitoring the communications of East Germany's infamous secret police, the Stasi.
Within weeks of the September 11 attacks, Drake was assigned to prepare the NSA's postmortem on the disaster. Congress, the news media and the public were demanding answers: what had gone wrong at the NSA and other federal agencies to allow Osama bin Laden's operatives to conduct such a devastating attack?
As Drake interviewed NSA colleagues and scoured the agency's records, he came across information that horrified him. It appeared that the NSA – even before September 11 – had secretly revised its scope of operations to expand its powers.
Since its inception, the NSA had been strictly forbidden from eavesdropping on domestic communications. Drake's investigation persuaded him that the NSA was now violating this restriction by collecting information on communications within as well as outside of the United States. And it was doing so without obtaining legally required court orders.
A straight arrow since high school – he once gave the police the names of classmates he suspected of selling pot – Drake told me he felt compelled to act. "I took an oath to uphold and defend the constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic," he explained.
To Drake, the President's Surveillance Program, as it was known inside the George W Bush administration, recalled the mindset of the Stasi. "You don't spend year after year listening to a police state without being affected, you just don't," he told me. "I remember saying to myself, 'Wow, I don't want this to happen in our country!' How could you live in a society where you always have to be looking over your shoulders, not knowing who you could trust, even in your own family?"
Drake's descent into a nightmare of persecution at the hands of his own government began innocently. Having uncovered evidence of apparently illegal behaviour, he did what his military training and US whistleblower law instructed: he reported the information up the chain of command. Beginning in early 2002, he shared his concerns first with a small number of high-ranking NSA officials, then with the appropriate members of Congress and staff at the oversight committees of the US Senate and House of Representatives.
Drake spent countless hours in these sessions but eventually came to the conclusion that no one in a position of authority wanted to hear what he was saying. When he told his boss, Baginski, that the NSA's expanded surveillance following 9/11 seemed legally dubious, she reportedly told him to drop the issue: the White House had ruled otherwise.
John Crane first heard about Thomas Drake when Crane and his colleagues at the Pentagon's Office of the Inspector General received a whistleblower complaint in September 2002. The complaint alleged that the NSA was backing an approach to electronic surveillance that was both financially and constitutionally irresponsible. The complaint was signed by three former NSA officials, William Binney, Kirk Wiebe and Edward Loomis, and a former senior Congressional staffer, Diane Roark. Drake also endorsed the complaint – but because he, unlike the other four, had not yet retired from government service, he asked that his name be kept anonymous, even in a document that was supposed to be treated confidentially within the government.
Binney, Wiebe, Loomis and Roark shared Drake's concerns about the constitutional implications of warrantless mass surveillance, but their complaint focused on two other issues.
The first was financial. The whistleblowers contended that the NSA's surveillance programme, codenamed Trailblazer, was a shameful waste of $3.8 billion – it had been more effective at channelling taxpayer dollars to corporate contractors than at protecting the homeland.
Second, the whistleblowers warned that Trailblazer actually made the US less secure. They acknowledged that Trailblazer had vastly expanded the amount of electronic communications NSA collected. But this avalanche of raw data was too much – it left NSA's analysts struggling to distinguish the vital from the trivial and thus liable to miss key clues.
Drake had discovered a shocking example while researching his postmortem report on the September 11 attacks. Months beforehand, the NSA had come into possession of a telephone number in San Diego that was used by two of the hijackers who later crashed planes into the World Trade Center. But the NSA did not act on this finding.
As Drake later told the NSA expert James Bamford, the NSA intercepted seven phone calls (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/21/missed-calls-nsa-terrorism-osama-bin-laden-mihdhar/) between this San Diego phone number and an al-Qaida "safe house" in Yemen. Drake found a record of the seven calls buried in an NSA database.
US officials had long known that the Yemen safe house was the operational hub through which Bin Laden, from a cave in Afghanistan, ordered attacks. Seven phone calls to such a hub from the same phone number was obviously suspicious. Yet the NSA took no action – the information had apparently been overlooked.
The NSA whistleblowers first sent their complaint to the inspector general of the NSA, who ruled against them. So they went up the bureaucratic ladder, filing the complaint with the Department of Defense inspector general. There, Crane and his staff "substantially affirmed" the complaint – in other words, their own investigation concluded that the NSA whistleblowers' charges were probably on target.
In the course of their investigation, Crane and his colleagues in the inspector general's office also affirmed the whistleblowers' allegation that the Bush administration's surveillance programme violated the fourth amendment of the US constitution by collecting Americans' phone and internet communications without a warrant. "We were concerned about these constitutional issues even before we investigated their complaint," Crane told me. "We had received other whistleblower filings that flagged the issue."
In line with standard procedure, these investigative findings were relayed to the House and Senate committees overseeing the NSA – and this helped nudge Congress to end funding for the Trailblazer programme. But for the NSA whistleblowers, this apparent victory was the beginning of a dark saga that would change their lives for ever.
The Bush administration's mass surveillance efforts were partly exposed in December 2005, when the New York Times published a front page article by reporters James Risen and Eric Lichtblau (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-courts.html), which revealed that the NSA was monitoring international phone calls and emails of some people in the US without obtaining warrants.
Eight years later, that story would be dwarfed by Snowden's revelations. But at the time, the Bush White House was furious – and they were determined to find and punish whoever had leaked the details to the New York Times.
According to Crane, his superiors inside the Pentagon's Inspector General's office were eager to help. Henry Shelley, the general counsel – the office's top lawyer – urged that the IG office should tell the FBI agents investigating the Times leak about Drake and the other NSA whistleblowers.
After all, the NSA whistleblowers' recent complaint had objected to the same surveillance practices described in the Times article – which made them logical suspects in the leak. Crane objected strenuously. Informing anyone – much less FBI investigators – of a whistleblower's name was illegal.
After debating the matter at a formal meeting in the personal office of the inspector general, Shelley and Crane continued arguing in the hallway outside. "I reached into my breast pocket and pulled out my copy of the Whistleblower Protection Act," Crane recalled. "I was concerned that Henry was violating the law. Our voices weren't raised, but the conversation was, I would say, very intense and agitated. Henry [replied] that he was the general counsel, the general counsel was in charge of handling things with the Justice Department and he would do things his way."
Henry Shelley declined my repeated requests for an interview. In an email, he told me, "I am confident when this matter is fully resolved no wrongdoing on my behalf will be identified."
There the disagreement between Crane and Shelley stalled. Or so it seemed until 18 months later. On the morning of 26 July, 2007, FBI agents with guns drawn stormed the houses of Binney, Wiebe, Loomis and Roark. Binney was towelling off after a shower when agents accosted him; he and his wife suddenly found themselves with guns aimed directly between their eyes, the retired NSA man recalled.
Crane smelled a rat. The investigation that his staff had conducted into the whistleblowers' complaint had been highly classified: very few people could have known their names, and they would have been inside the IG's office. After the raids, Crane confronted Shelley and demanded to know whether the IG's office had given the names to the FBI. Shelley refused to discuss the matter, Crane says.
The battle soon escalated. Four months later, FBI agents stormed Drake's house in an early morning raid, as his family watched in shock.
After Drake was indicted in 2010, his lawyers filed a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain documents related to the investigation Crane's office had conducted into the claims of the NSA whistleblowers. According to Crane, he was ordered by his superiors in the IG's office to delay releasing any documents – which could have exonerated Drake – until after the trial, which was expected to take place later in 2010.
Crane alleges that he was ordered to do so by Shelley and Lynne Halbrooks – who had recently been named the principal deputy inspector general (in other words, the second-highest ranking official in the IG's office). Crane protested but lost this skirmish as well. (Halbrooks did not respond to repeated requests for an interview.)
In December 2010, nearly five years after the Pentagon's inspector general's office had apparently given Drake's name to FBI investigators, Drake's lawyers filed a complaint with the inspector general, alleging that Drake had been punished in retaliation for his whistleblowing. According to their complaint, the crimes Drake had been charged with were "based in part, or entirely, on information that Mr Drake provided to the [Pentagon] IG" during its investigation of the NSA whistleblowers.
Crane was at once alarmed and revolted. The complaint from Drake's lawyers seemed to confirm his suspicion that someone in the IG's office had illegally fingered Drake to the FBI. Worse, the indictment filed against Drake had unmistakable similarities to the confidential testimony Drake had given to Crane's staff – suggesting that someone in the IG's office had not simply given Drake's name to the FBI, but shared his entire testimony, an utter violation of law.
Drake's complaint demanded investigation, Crane told Halbrooks. But Halbrooks, joined by Shelley, allegedly rejected Crane's demand. She added that Crane wasn't being a "good team player" and if he didn't shape up, she would make life difficult for him.
But there was even worse to come. As Drake's trial approached in the spring of 2011, Crane knew that the law required the IG's office to answer the retaliation complaint filed by Drake's lawyers. But, Crane says, Shelley now informed him it would be impossible to respond – because the relevant documents had been destroyed. Lower level staff "fucked up", Crane said Shelley told him: they had shredded the documents in a supposedly routine purge of the IG's vast stores of confidential material.
Crane could not believe his ears. "I told Henry that destruction of documents under such circumstances was, as he knew, a very serious matter and could lead to the inspector general being accused of obstructing a criminal investigation." Shelley replied, according to Crane, that it didn't have to be a problem if everyone was a good team player.
On 15 February, 2011, Shelley and Halbrooks sent the judge in the Drake case a letter that repeated the excuse given to Crane: the requested documents had been destroyed, by mistake, during a routine purge. This routine purge, the letter assured Judge Richard D Bennett, took place before Drake was indicted.
"Lynne and Henry had frozen me out by then, so I had no input into their letter to Judge Bennett," Crane said. "So they ended up lying to a judge in a criminal case, which of course is a crime."
With Drake adamantly resisting prosecutors' pressure to make a plea deal – "I won't bargain with the truth," he declared – the government eventually withdrew most of its charges against him. Afterwards, the judgeblasted the government's conduct. It was "extraordinary", he said, that the government barged into Drake's home, indicted him, but then dropped the case on the eve of trial as if it wasn't a big deal after all. "I find that unconscionable," Bennett added. "Unconscionable. It is at the very root of what this country was founded on ... It was one of the most fundamental things in the bill of rights, that this country was not to be exposed to people knocking on the door with government authority and coming into their homes."
When John Crane put his career on the line by standing up for legal treatment of Pentagon whistleblowers, he was following a moral code laid down 80 years before by his German grandfather. Crane grew up in suburban Virginia, but he spent nearly every summer in Germany with his mother's extended family.During these summer sojourns, Crane heard countless times about the moment when his grandfather confronted Hitler. His mother and his grandmother both told the story, and the moral never changed. "One must always try to do the right thing, even when there are risks," Crane recalled being instructed. "And should someone do the right thing, there can of course be consequences."
Crane's grandfather was days shy of turning 40 on the night of Hitler's "Beer Hall Putsch" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/09/hitler-adolf-coup-bavaria-munich-government-german-1923), 8 November, 1923. Plotting to overthrow the Weimar Republic, Hitler and 600 armed members of his fledgling Nazi party surrounded a beer hall in Munich where the governor of Bavaria, Gustav von Kahr, was addressing a large crowd. The rebels burst into the hall, hoping to kidnap Von Kahr and march on Berlin. After his men unveiled a machine gun hidden in the upstairs gallery, Hitler fired his pistol into the air and shouted, "The national revolution has begun!"
Crane's grandfather, Günther Rüdel, was in the hall as part of his military duties, Rüdel recalled in an eight-page, single-spaced, typewritten affidavit that provides a minute-by-minute eyewitness account of the putsch. (Rüdel was later a government witness in the trial that sentenced Hitler to five years in prison, though he was not called to testify.)
The son of a prominent German general, Rüdel had served with distinction in the first world war, earning two Iron Crosses. By 1923, he was serving as chief political aide to General Otto von Lossow, the German army's highest official in Bavaria. As such, Rüdel was the chief liaison between Von Lossow and Von Kahr and privy to the two men's many dealings with Hitler. Suspecting that Hitler and his followers were planning a coup, Lossow and Rüdel had forced their way into the beer hall to monitor developments. The head of Bavaria's state police, Hans Ritter von Seisser, was also there, accompanied by a bodyguard. Rüdel was standing with Lossow and Von Seisser when armed men burst into the hall, with Hitler in the lead.
"Hitler, with pistol held high, escorted on right and left by armed men, his tunic stained with beer, stormed through the hall towards the podium," Rüdel wrote in his affidavit. "When he was directly in front of us, police chief Von Seisser's adjutant gripped [but did not unsheath] his sword. Hitler immediately aimed his pistol at the man's chest. I shouted, 'Mr Hitler, in this way you will never liberate Germany.' Hitler hesitated, lowered his pistol and pushed his way between us to the podium."
In the surrounding chaos, Hitler's men tried to force Von Kahr, Lossow and Von Seisser to join the coup, but their uprising soon fizzled. A few days later, Hitler was arrested and charged with treason. He served a year in jail, where he wrote his autobiography, Mein Kampf.
"We are now becoming a police state," Diane Roark said in a 2014 television interview. Referring to herself and the other NSA whistleblowers, she added, "We are the canaries in the coal mine. We never did anything wrong. All we did was oppose this programme. And for that, they just ran over us."
"They're saying, 'We're doing this to protect you,'" Roark's fellow whistleblower William Binney told me. "I will tell you that that's exactly what the Nazis said in Special Order 48 in 1933 – we're doing this to protect you. And that's how they got rid of all of their political opponents."
These are strong statements – comparing the actions of the US government to Nazi Germany, warning of an emerging "police state" – so it's worth remembering who made them. The NSA whistleblowers were not leftwing peace nuts. They had spent their professional lives inside the US intelligence apparatus – devoted, they thought, to the protection of the homeland and defence of the constitution.
They were political conservatives, highly educated, respectful of evidence, careful with words. And they were saying, on the basis of personal experience, that the US government was being run by people who were willing to break the law and bend the state's awesome powers to their own ends. They were saying that laws and technologies had secretly been put in place that threatened to overturn the democratic governance Americans took for granted and shrink their liberties to a vanishing point. And they were saying that something needed to be done about all this before it was too late.
In Washington, top government officials and politicians still insist that the true villain is Edward Snowden. Former CIA director James Woolsey has called for Snowden to be "hanged by the neck until he's dead, rather than merely electrocuted".
Democrats are less bloodthirsty, but no more forgiving. President Obama and Hillary Clinton argue that Snowden broke the law when he should have trusted it. "He could have gotten all of the protections of being a whistleblower," Clinton said in the first Democratic presidential debate last October. "He could have raised all the issues that he has raised. And I think there would have been a positive response to that."
Tell that to Thomas Drake. Tell it, for that matter, to John Crane.
Halbrooks forced Crane to resign his post in January 2013. After leaving the Pentagon, Crane made his way to the Government Accountability Project, where the erstwhile protector of whistleblowers became a whistleblower himself.
Crane filed a complaint against Shelley and Halbrooks, detailing many more alleged misdeeds than reported in this article. The Office of Special Counsel, the US agency charged with investigating such matters, concluded in March of 2016 that there was a "substantial likelihood" that Crane's accusations were well-founded. The OSC's choice of the term "substantial likelihood" was telling. It could have ruled there was merely a "reasonable belief" Crane's charges were true, in which case no further action would have been required. By finding instead that there was a "substantial likelihood", the OSC triggered a process that legally required secretary of defense Ashton Carter to organise a fresh investigation of Crane's allegations. Because no federal agency is allowed to investigate itself, that inquiry is being conducted by the Justice Department.
Incredible as it may sound, Crane aims to get his old job back. His attorney, Devine, thinks that is a fantasy. In Devine's view, the problems facing whistleblowers are systemic – and the system does not forgive, especially someone who has exposed the system's corruption as devastatingly as Crane has done.
To Crane, however, it is a simple matter of right and wrong. It was not he who broke the law; it was his superiors. Therefore it is not he who should pay the price but they.
"I just want to see the system work properly," he says. "I know the system can fail – world war two, Nazi Germany – but I also know that you need to do what is right. Because the government is so powerful, you need to have it run efficiently and honestly and according to the law."
"What are the odds the system will work properly in your case?" I asked Crane.
"I'm not giving you odds," he replies with a chuckle. "This is just something that I have to do."
This article is adapted from Mark Hertsgaard's new book, Bravehearts: Whistle Blowing in the Age of Snowden (http://skyhorsepublishing.com/titles/416-9781510703377-bravehearts/) (Hot Books/Skyhorse)
On her microphone's secret service: How spies, anyone can grab crypto keys from the air (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/06/04/sidechannel_encryption_theft/)
Quote
Discerning secret crypto keys in computers and gadgets by spying on how they function isn't new, although the techniques used are often considered impractical.
A new paper demonstrates this surveillance can be pretty easy – well, easier than you might imagine – to pull off, even over the air from a few metres away.
We all know that tiny fluctuations in electrical current during encryption routines, or even the sounds made by the system, can be picked up wirelessly to ascertain keys used – just ask the NSA. (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/01/10/nsa_coughs_up_secret_tempest/) However, it usually requires hooking up expensive analysis equipment and takes long periods of time to gather all the bits needed.
Now, in a paper (http://m.cacm.acm.org/magazines/2016/6/202646-physical-key-extraction-attacks-on-pcs/fulltext) published by the Association for Computing Machinery, researchers from Tel Aviv University have detailed how inexpensive kit can be used to harvest 4,096-bit encryption keys from distances of around 10 metres (33 feet).
These are the same boffins who hid a loop of wire and a USB radio dongle in a piece of pita bread (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/20/tempest_radioshack/) last year and used it to steal keys over the air.
In their latest research, the team managed to pick up encryption keys using acoustics. As a computer's processor churns through the encryption calculations, the machine emits a high-frequency "coil whine (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HP73edpQwgc)" from the changing electrical current flowing through its components.
By using a parabolic mic, the team was able to pick up the coil whine from 10 meters (38 feet) away. Trouble is, that mic is a little obvious if you're trying to be sneaky, so they managed to get the same result from a mobile phone's microphone placed 30 centimetres (12 inches) away from the spied-on PC. In both cases it took an hour of listening to get the 4,096-bit RSA key.
On the one hand, this still isn't a very practical attack, and most people shouldn't fear it. You have to train a mic on a device for an hour while it runs cryptographic software over and over, and without background noise ruining the key capture. On the other hand, you may be paranoid enough to consider mitigating it.
To combat this security hole, you need tweak your software, the team suggested. It's possible to use acoustic dampening inside a PC against sound attacks, Faraday cages to block electromagnetic emissions, and insulation of the enclosures of laptops. But this isn't practical in the real world.
Instead, the team recommends encryption software writers build in "blinding" routines that insert dummy calculations into cryptographic operations. After discussions with the team, GNU Privacy Guard (https://www.gnupg.org/) now does this.
So it's not all bad news, but the research does serve as a reminder that you don't just need to check your software for security, but scout around the hardware too for mysterious gadgets. ®
Exclusive: Snowden Tried to Tell NSA About Surveillance Concerns, Documents Reveal (https://news.vice.com/article/edward-snowden-leaks-tried-to-tell-nsa-about-surveillance-concerns-exclusive)
Preveliko je da bi stalo u jedan post, dakle, klikćite.
The inventor of the Web thinks we need a new one that governments can't control (http://thenextweb.com/insider/2016/06/08/inventor-web-thinks-need-new-one-governments-cant-control/)
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Although the internet has created millions of new opportunities for people around the world and made the sum of human knowledge available to anyone with a connection, it's also created problems that seem impossible to solve.
"Edward Snowden showed we've inadvertently built the world's largest surveillance network with the web," said Brewster Kahle (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/technology/the-webs-creator-looks-to-reinvent-it.html), who heads up Internet Archive. And he's not wrong: governments across the globe keep an eye on what their citizens are accessing online and some censor content on the Web in an effort to control what they think.
Sir Tim Berners-Lee, who invented the World Wide Web, believes that the way his creation works in the present day "completely undermines the spirit of helping people create."
To that end, Berners-Lee, Kahle and other pioneers of the modern Web are brainstorming ideas for a new kind of information network that can't be controlled by governments or powered by megacorporations like Amazon and Google.
Along with luminaries like TCP/IP protcol co-creator Vint Cerf, Mozilla Project leader Mitchell Baker and Electronic Frontier Foundation special advisor Cory Doctorow, they've gathered at the Decentralized Web Summit (http://www.decentralizedweb.net/) in San Francisco to discuss how this new kind of internet can be created and sustained.
Participants and speakers also mulled over the use of increased encryption and methods to bring more accountability, as well as to reduce content creators' and publishers' dependence on ad revenue by developing secure, direct cryptocurrency-based payment methods for subscribers.
But while it's comforting to know that such great minds are coming together to address these issues that affect every Web user, it's scary to think that it was us humans that polluted the internet and turned it into what it is today – and in all probability, we'll ruin the next great network too.
The Decentralized Web Summit is on from June 8-9 and you can catch the livestream on the event's ZeroNet site (https://bit.no.com:43110/16Ryx9pbfzaPb1dbttA6DiFojHQGqrMokU).
The Web's creator looks to reinvent it on The New York Times
A vi posle hitajte u EU, nesvesni da stupate u Orvelovski košmar :lol:
EU Exploring the Idea of Using Government ID Cards as Potential Online Logins (http://news.softpedia.com/news/eu-exploring-idea-of-using-government-id-cards-as-mandatory-online-logins-505026.shtml)
QuoteFears that fake online reviews might ruin the consumer market and damage legitimate businesses are making the European Commission consider the idea of forcing online platforms to allow EU citizens to log into online accounts using their government-issued ID cards.
Details about these plans can be found in a proposal named "Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-online-platforms-and-digital-single-market-opportunities-and-challenges-europe)." The document addresses all platforms where users can post product reviews.
According to this document, dated to May 25, 2016, the European Commission is exploring the theoretical possibilities of forcing online review platforms into using government IDs as online identities.
The paragraph that raised the most concerns from privacy and civil groups is on page ten of the aforementioned document:
" It is recognised that a multitude of username and password combinations is both inconvenient and a security risk. [...], in order to keep identification simple and secure, consumers should be able to choose the credentials by which they want to identify or authenticate themselves. In particular, online platforms should accept credentials issued or recognised by national public authorities, such as electronic or mobile IDs, national identity cards, or bank cards. "
Why such an Orwellian clause? If we are to believe the same document, it's because of fake product reviews that might lead EU consumers into making the wrong purchase, as per page eleven of the same document:
" Online ratings and reviews of goods and services are helpful and empowering to consumers, but they need to be trustworthy and free from any bias or manipulation. A prominent example is fake reviews[...] "
The men behind this proposal think that forcing online platforms to allow EU citizens to use their real identities when logging into their online accounts to post reviews will stop people in non-EU countries from posting fake reviews. Because, let's face it, everyone would like to throw away the ability to protect their online identity for the sake of buying the best USB Type-C cable on Amazon. Giving people the option to recognize a real from a fake review based on the identity of the poster does not necessarily stop people from outright lying.Little chance of approval in its current state In its present form, the document has little chance of passing through the European Parliament, being clearly written by a person who didn't take all factors into account.
The document is clearly written for businesses alone and doesn't detail any security measures to protect the online privacy of EU citizens. If approved, EU citizens would be offering more information when logging into a review website than ever before, which could be very easily abused in the case of a data breach.
The European Commission and Andrus Ansip, Vice-President for the Digital Single Market on the European Commission and the man behind this proposal, will have to provide more details regarding the technical implementation of their plan.
Taking into account that the European General Data Protection Regulation (EGDPR) has recently come into effect, being a law that boosts online privacy protections for EU citizens, this proposal goes against the grain of what the EU is trying to accomplish in the long term.
Back in 2011, the US started a process to implement a similar plan called Internet ID, which in 2014 was tested in Michigan and Pennsylvania (http://www.thenewamerican.com/tech/computers/item/18279-obama-s-internet-id-plot-being-tested-in-two-states), with little news about it ever since.
UPDATE: The article's title was updated.
Creepy startup will help landlords, employers and online dates strip-mine intimate data from your Facebook page (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/09/creepy-startup-will-help-landlords-employers-and-online-dates-strip-mine-intimate-data-from-your-facebook-page/)
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There's a scene in the dystopian scifi novel "Ready Player One" in which the protagonist glimpses the dossier of personal information a major tech company has gathered on him. It includes his height and weight, his browser history, his address — even several years of his school transcripts.
We're still several years away from that vision, thankfully, but a new British startup called Score Assured (https://www.scoreassured.com/) has taken a big step in that direction: The company wants to, in the words of co-founder Steve Thornhill, "take a deep dive into private social media profiles" and sell what it finds there to everyone from prospective dates to employers and landlords.
[Everyone you know will be able to rate you on the terrifying 'Yelp for people' — whether you want them to or not (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/09/30/everyone-you-know-will-be-able-to-rate-you-on-the-terrifying-yelp-for-people-whether-you-want-them-to-or-not/)]
Its first product, Tenant Assured (https://www.tenantassured.com/#intro), is already live: After your would-be landlord sends you a request through the service, you're required to grant it full access to your Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and/or Instagram profiles. From there, Tenant Assured scrapes your site activity, including entire conversation threads and private messages; runs it through natural language processing and other analytic software; and finally, spits out a report that catalogues everything from your personality to your "financial stress level."
My personal tenant report includes a list of my closest friends and interests, a percentage breakdown of my personality traits, a list of every time I've tweeted the words "loan" and "pregnant," and the algorithm's confidence that I'll pay my rent consistently.
"If you're living a normal life," Thornhill reassures me, "then, frankly, you have nothing to worry about."
In fact, Thornhill sees his product as empowering both landlords and tenants: the former, to make more informed decisions about whom they rent to and spot lies on applications; the latter, to present a fuller, more accurate picture of themselves than might be available in a credit report or background check.
[No, Facebook doesn't eavesdrop on your phone. But it does spy on you. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/06/no-facebook-doesnt-eavesdrop-on-your-phone-but-it-does-spy-on-you/)]
But I'm still pretty worried. Acutely so.
It's old news, of course, that people in positions of authority — landlords, hiring managers, college admissions counselors, you name it — increasingly scope out social media (https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/more-employers-using-firms-that-check-applicants-social-media-history/2011/07/12/gIQAxnJYGI_story.html) as part of standard background checks. But Score Assured, with its reliance on algorithmic models and its demand that users share complete account access, is something decidedly different from the sort of social media audits we're used to seeing. Those are like a cursory quality-control check; this is more analogous to data strip-mining.
It's not just the amount or detail of data that's problematic, either. Tenant Assured reports include information such as whether you've mentioned a pregnancy and how old you are, which are both protected statuses under U.S. housing discrimination law. ("All we can do is give them the information," Thornhill said. "It's up to landlords to do the right thing.")
Meanwhile, unlike credit reports — which you may, under federal law, request every 12 months — Tenant Assured doesn't give users any way to view their ratings or dispute misleading data.
Make no mistake: The data will mislead. Among the behaviors that count against your Tenant Assured "credit" percentage — i.e., how confident the company is that you'll pay rent — are "online retail social logins and frequency of social logins used for leisure activities." In other words, Tenant Assured draws conclusions about your credit-worthiness based on things such as whether you post about shopping or going out on the weekends.
Thornhill's response to these criticisms is that Tenant Assured asks permission before it does any analysis: In that way, he argues, it's not much different from a background check or credit rating. Of course, we have consumer protection laws to regulate both those things, in large part because they have such an outsize impact on consumers. Regulators also have recognized that although such checks may technically be "opt in," they're effectively not optional for those who don't have the luxury of only choosing landlords, jobs or loans that don't require them, or who work in industries or live in areas where such checks are standard practice.
These are early days, of course, and Tenant Assured is only Source Assured's first product. By the end of July, the company expects to be offering specialized versions of the service to everyone from employers and HR departments to parents shopping around for nannies. Some day, Thornhill imagines, you won't hire a dog sitter or book an Airbnb without first viewing their social media dossier, as compiled by his company.
There is always the possibility that it won't catch on, of course, or that, as has happened when other companies infringed on private online spaces (http://www.wsj.com/articles/lenders-drop-plans-to-judge-you-by-your-facebook-friends-1456309801), consumers will rebel. But Thornhill is pretty unconcerned.
"People will give up their privacy to get something they want," he said.
Spy Tech That Reads Your Mind (http://fortune.com/insider-threats-email-scout/)
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On any given morning at a big national bank or a Silicon Valley software giant or a government agency, a security official could start her day by asking a software program for a report on her organization's staff. "Okay, as of last night, who were the people who were most disgruntled?" she could ask. "Show me the top 10."
She would have that capability, says Eric Shaw, a psychologist and longtime consultant to the intelligence community, if she used a software tool he developed for Stroz Friedberg (https://www.strozfriedberg.com/), a cybersecurity firm. The software combs through an organization's emails and text messages—millions a day, the company says—looking for high usage of words and phrases that language psychologists associate with certain mental states and personality profiles. Ask for a list of staffers who score high for discontent, Shaw says, "and you could look at their names. Or you could look at the top emails themselves."
Many companies already have the ability to run keyword searches of employees' emails, looking for worrisome words and phrases like embezzle and I loathe this job. But the Stroz Friedberg software, called Scout, aspires to go a giant step further, detecting indirectly, through unconscious syntactic and grammatical clues, workers' anger, financial or personal stress, and other tip-offs that an employee might be about to lose it.
To measure employees' disgruntlement, for instance, it uses an algorithm based on linguistic tells found to connote feelings of victimization, anger, and blame. For instance, unusually frequent use of the word me—several standard deviations above the norm—is associated with feelings of victimization, Shaw says. Why me? How can you do that to me? Anger might be signaled by unusually high use of negatives like no, not, never, and n't, or of "negative evaluators" like You're terrible and You're awful at that. There might be heavy use of "adverbial intensifiers" like very, so, and such a or words rendered in all caps for emphasis: He's a ZERO.
It's not illegal to be disgruntled. But today's frustrated worker could engineer tomorrow's hundred-million-dollar data breach. Scout is being marketed as a cutting-edge weapon in the growing arsenal that helps corporations combat "insider threat," the phenomenon of employees going bad. Workers who commit fraud or embezzlement are one example, but so are "bad leavers"—employees or contractors who, when they depart, steal intellectual property or other confidential data, sabotage the information technology system, or threaten to do so unless they're paid off. Workplace violence is a growing concern too.
Though companies have long been arming themselves against cyberattack by external hackers, often presumed to come from distant lands like Russia and China, they're increasingly realizing that many assaults are launched from within—by, say, the quiet guy down the hall whose contract wasn't renewed. The most spectacular examples have been governmental—the massive 2010 data dump of more than 700,000 classified files onto WikiLeaks by Chelsea Manning (then known as Pfc. Bradley Manning) and the leaks by former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden in 2013. While those events were sui generis, they opened the world's eyes to the breathtaking scope of every organization's vulnerability.
About 27% of electronic attacks on organizations—public and private—come from within, according to the latest annual cybercrime survey jointly conducted by CSO Magazine, the U.S. Secret Service, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and the Software Engineering Institute CERT program. (CERT (http://www.cert.org/) is a Defense Department–funded cybercrime research center at Carnegie Mellon University.) About 43% of the 562 participants surveyed said their organizations had endured at least one insider attack in the previous year. Though targets of these assaults often keep the incidents secret, known victims in recent years include Morgan Stanley (http://fortune.com/fortune500/morgan-stanley-78/) MS (http://fortune.com/fortune500/morgan-stanley-78/) -0.23% , AT&T (http://fortune.com/fortune500/att-10/) T (http://fortune.com/fortune500/att-10/) 0.60% , Goldman Sachs (http://fortune.com/fortune500/goldman-sachs-group-74/) GS (http://fortune.com/fortune500/goldman-sachs-group-74/) -0.22% , and DuPont (http://fortune.com/fortune500/dupont-101/) DD (http://fortune.com/fortune500/dupont-101/) -0.68% .
Insider threats are now sufficiently well recognized that their victims—especially financial institutions—may face regulatory sanctions as well as civil liability for not having taken adequate steps to prevent them. In June the Securities and Exchange Commission fined Morgan Stanley $1 million (http://fortune.com/2016/06/08/morgan-stanley-cybersecurity-hack/) for failing to prevent a rogue financial adviser from compromising 730,000 customer accounts, even though the bank itself caught and reported the employee, who later pleaded guilty to a federal crime.
Psycholinguistics: Finding Clues in an Ordinary EmailThis text was adapted from actual emails that a systems administrator, working under contract for a bank, wrote to his supervisor. after the man later lost his position, he sabotaged the bank's servers. The illustration below shows which words Stroz Friedberg's Scout software would pick up and "score," using psycholinguistic principles, if it analyzed the email today. Here's an explanation of why those words raise red flags, especially when they appear unusually frequently. —R.P.
- "Negatives" like no, not, and n't may signal anger, which Scout treats as a component of disgruntlement.
- The word me used in excess can signal victimization, another component of disgruntlement.
- Direct references, especially you, can signal blame, yet another sign of disgruntlement.
- Words in all caps are "intensifiers" and can signal anger. Strong words and phrases (like garbage and screws up) are intensifiers and "negative evaluators," which both signal anger.
- Since much anger and negativity in emails relate to marital conflict, which is often not the employer's concern, Scout uses words and phrases relating to employment, like fire, quit, and root access, as a filter. A client can opt to see only emails that contain such references.
Since 2011, government agencies that handle classified information have been required to have formal insider-threat programs in place. And in May that rule was extended to private contractors who handle such data—some 6,000 to 8,000 companies, according to Randall Trzeciak, who heads CERT's Insider Threat Center. With increasing awareness of the problem, Trzeciak notes, the tools marketed to combat insider risk have proliferated. At the annual RSA conference on security two years ago, he says, only about 20 vendors displayed such wares. At this year's, in February, he counted more than 125.
The vast majority of these tools, known as technical indicators, provide ways to monitor computer networks, prevent data loss, alert security to suspicious conduct, or even record keystrokes and take video of individual computer screens. Such solutions let an organization see, for instance, who's logging onto her computer at odd hours, messing around with electronic tags that demark confidential information, or simply departing from routine in some sudden, marked fashion. (See below, "Tools for Stopping the Enemy Within (http://fortune.com/insider-threats-email-scout/#tools).")
Still other tools are available to comb through employees' emails, looking for keywords. But Scout appears to be the email-scanning tool most specifically and ingeniously tailored to try to sniff out insider threats before they occur.
Scout was soft launched as a client service by Stroz Friedberg in late 2014, though the firm has long used earlier versions for internal investigations. The firm was founded in 2000 by Ed Stroz, a 16-year FBI veteran in Manhattan, and Eric Friedberg, an 11-year Brooklyn federal prosecutor. Each had led his office's computer crime unit. Today, with more than 500 employees in 14 offices, the firm is one of the leading outfits of its kind, with specialties in digital forensics, incident response, and e‑discovery. Though most of its assignments are confidential, it claims to have worked for 30 of the Fortune 50, and publicly identified clients have included Target (http://fortune.com/fortune500/target-38/) TGT (http://fortune.com/fortune500/target-38/) 0.33% and Neiman Marcus (after their massive data breaches), Facebook (http://fortune.com/fortune500/facebook-157/) FB (http://fortune.com/fortune500/facebook-157/) -0.08% , Google (http://fortune.com/fortune500/alphabet-36/) GOOGL (http://fortune.com/fortune500/alphabet-36/) 0.98% , and the Justice Department.
As impressive as Stroz Friedberg's credentials are, discussion of its Scout product must come with caveats. The firm declined to introduce Fortune to a single client using it, notwithstanding our promise to protect the organization's identity. (Companies don't like to discuss their insider-threat programs, in part because doing so makes workers feel mistrusted.) While the firm described instances in which Scout had been used as a forensic tool—say, identifying the sources of anonymous threats—it furnished no specific case in which Scout proactively warded off an insider attack. Stroz Friedberg did cite an instance in which it said that the system had flagged an employee's extreme stress; upon follow-up, officials learned that the person was planning a suicide. They intervened, and Scout may have saved the worker's life.
Ed Stroz acknowledges that Scout does not supplant the many technical tools already available to fight insider threat. But those solutions help only after someone is already "touching, reading, copying, and moving files" he's not supposed to, he says. He likens Scout's aspirations to those of the FBI after the attacks on the World Trade Center. "After 9/11 it became 'disrupt and prevent,' not just 'react and investigate,' " he says. "How do you get in front of something and protect somebody from themselves?" The answer is through language. "Language is being used by everybody," he observes. "Google is using it to sell you jeans." Why not use it to "get to the left" of the actual event—getting ahead of it on a metaphorical timeline, in other words—"so that disasters don't happen?"
Eric Shaw, 63, practices a rare specialty called political psychology. After earning his Ph.D. from Duke, he did a stint with the Central Intelligence Agency, from 1990 to 1992, and then worked as a consultant to other intelligence offices while building a private practice and teaching at George Washington University. (Shaw says he still spends two days a week consulting for an intelligence agency, which he won't identify but which, he says, has installed Scout to monitor its own personnel.)
Political psychologists draw up mental-health profiles of foreign leaders—Kim Jong-Un, say—to assist policymakers at the State and Defense departments, intelligence agencies, and the White House. Is a hostile chief of state a madman, or can he be reasoned with? If the latter, what is the best way to approach him? These psychologists can't examine their patients on the couch. One tool they use instead is language. They look for clues to a leader's personality in his unconscious speech patterns as captured at public appearances.
In the late 1990s, Shaw recounts, the Defense Department asked Shaw to study insider cyberattacks after a couple of alarming incidents, including one in which an administrator at a Navy hospital encrypted patient records and held them for ransom. The FBI computer crime squads had the most experience with such crimes, so Shaw was put in touch with Ed Stroz, who then headed the flagship unit in Manhattan.
The first case file that Stroz showed Shaw involved a systems administrator at a bank who had butted heads with his supervisor. The supervisor eventually terminated him, prompting him to leave behind a "logic bomb" embedded in the network, which exploded and shut down the bank's servers. Shaw examined the email traffic between the disputants prior to the termination and then marked them up by hand to show Stroz the linguistic red flags.
"It was fascinating," recalls Stroz. At the FBI, he focused on white-collar crime, a realm in which the perpetrator's state of mind is often the only contested issue. Shaw's analysis provided entrée into that realm. "At some point," Shaw continues, "[Stroz] is watching me code the emails, and he said, 'You know, we have computers that will do this now.' That was the beginning of the idea of creating this psycholinguistic software."
Stroz left the bureau in 2000 and co-founded Stroz Friedberg. A few months later he contacted Shaw, after receiving client calls that required forensic linguistic expertise. These were often "anonymous author" cases, in which a client was receiving threats or demands. Shaw would try to identify the perpetrator by comparing distinctive aspects of his writing style to those of a series of suspects. He relied in part on traditional forensic techniques—distinctive formatting conventions, odd diction, telltale misspellings—but also on the linguistic principles political psychologists used. In a case written up in the New York Times in 2005, for instance, Shaw's work helped identify a cyberextortionist who had been demanding $17 million from MicroPatent, a patent and trademark company he had hacked. (The perpetrator pleaded guilty and was sentenced to prison.)
To assist in analyzing writings, Stroz and Shaw developed an internal software tool, which they named WarmTouch. "Terrible name," Stroz admits, "but the idea was, the keyboard exists only because human beings need a way to interface with the computer. The human being begins where he touches the keys." Meanwhile, Shaw continued studying insider-risk cases, poring over case files at CERT's Insider Threat Center. He looked for missed warning flags that preceded these crimes and then tried to design features that would enable WarmTouch to pick up the linguistic precursors of bad behavior.
To test and hone his hypotheses, he hid actual emails written by insiders prior to crimes in portions of a large, publicly available database of emails known as the Enron corpus. (The corpus consists of about 600,000 emails written by 175 Enron employees, the vast majority of them innocent of any wrongdoing, whose emails were collected by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission during an investigation of market manipulation.) Shaw then had both human coders and WarmTouch use principles of language psychology to try to filter out red-flag emails without also catching an unmanageable number of false positives. The results, some of which were published in two articles in the peer-reviewed Journal of Digital Forensics in 2013, suggested that WarmTouch could be a useful, if imperfect, filtering tool. By late 2014, Stroz Friedberg was ready to offer the latest version, renamed Scout, to customers.
Scout uses about 60 algorithms and tracks a vocabulary list of about 10,000 words, though that list is fine-tuned for each client. About 50 of the algorithms focus on insider threat. The rest can be used for a variety of purposes, Stroz Friedberg maintains, including some nonforensic ones—like detecting intra-office strife, evaluating managers, and identifying emerging leaders. Scout is typically provided to clients with a service contract, calling for "licensed clinicians"—outside contractors overseen by Shaw—to interpret the results.
To oversee the new product, Stroz Friedberg hired Scott Weber, who had previously been a partner at law firm Patton Boggs and headed the government business at big-data company Opera Solutions. "Scout is not dispositive," Weber admits. "It's not going to say that Carolyn's going to come in tomorrow and steal, or that Scott's going to commit an act of workplace violence." What it does do, he continues, is "take a massive amount of information in an organization and filter it down to an operationally friendly pool."
As an example, Weber displays a PowerPoint slide of Scout's user interface tackling a data set of nearly 51 million emails and text messages from more than 69,000 senders. Weber says this represented, at the time, a full data set from one governmental client. When directed to search for aberrantly high scores across four insider-risk variables, Scout winnowed out just 383 messages from 137 senders, representing 0.0008% of the total data set.
In a real-life case, a human clinician would then pull up the actual emails, via Scout's interface, and examine them individually. He would present any messages judged truly worrisome to the client. The client would then decide what action to take, says Weber, after drawing input from managers and its human resources, legal, and security departments. Scout is currently being used in government and in the financial sector, Weber asserts, and is now being tested by clients in manufacturing, health care, and pharmaceuticals. He declines to give numbers.
Shaw jokes that he originally wanted to call Scout "Big Brother." Doesn't it, in fact, invade employees' privacy?
"It's really very respectful of privacy," Weber insists. He stresses that only a tiny fraction of emails are ever read, and most of those are reviewed only by the outside clinician—never coming to the attention of co-workers or supervisors. From a legal standpoint, Weber explains, in the U.S. a company needs "informed consent" to look at employees' emails. "If you have a policy that informs your employees that it's not their computer, it's not their data, it's subject to search, there's no expectation of privacy—you're covered," he says. (Most large U.S. companies already have such policies in place.)
Weber even argues that privacy concerns cut in favor of Scout. "In many cyberattack cases we're brought into," he says, "privacy is exactly how people were wronged. Intruders went through their network, read stuff, copied things, photographed them, turned on the microphone or the camera inside the computer—those are huge privacy violations."
Against that backdrop, the Stroz Friedberg crew claims that Scout is an enlightened approach to a grave, intractable problem. Clients are saying, " 'I want it to be something I'm not going to be ashamed to be doing, to have it be part of a caring working environment,' " says Stroz. "You have to get to the left of the line so that disasters don't happen. But you have to do it responsibly."
A version of this article appears in the July 1, 2016 issue of Fortune.
MIT Researchers Devise New Anonymity Network Following Tor Bug (http://www.pcmag.com/news/345994/mit-researchers-devise-new-anonymity-network-following-tor-b)
Quote
The system, dubbed Riffle, leverages several existing cryptographic techniques, but combines them in a new way.
Computer scientists at Massachusetts Institute of Technology have devised a new anonymity network they say is more secure than Tor.
For the uninitiated, anonymity networks like Tor (http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2498303,00.asp) let you hide your location and Web activity, offering people living under repressive regimes, for instance, protection from prying eyes monitoring their Internet use. But following the recent discovery of vulnerabilities in Tor (http://www.pcmag.com/news/344425/mozilla-to-fbi-we-want-to-know-about-that-tor-bug), researchers at MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne have been working on a more secure anonymity scheme. Now they say they have succeeded.
The researchers plan to present the new system, dubbed Riffle, at the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (https://petsymposium.org/) later this month in Darmstadt, Germany. They say it leverages several existing cryptographic techniques, but combines them in a new way.
Riffle relies on a series of servers (known collectively as mixnet), each of which "permutes the order in which it receives messages before passing them on to the next," according to a news release. So, if "for instance, messages from senders Alice, Bob, and Carol reach the first server in the order A, B, C, that server would send them to the second server in a different order — say, C, B, A. The second server would permute them before sending them to the third, and so on." As a result, someone tracking the messages would have no idea which was which by the time they exited the last server.
Like Tor, the system also uses onion encryption, wrapping each message in several layers of protection. On top of this, Riffle uses technique called verifiable shuffle to thwart tampering and prevent adversaries from infiltrating servers with their own code — a problem affecting other anonymity networks. Finally, it takes advantage of yet another technique, called authentication encryption, to verify the authenticity of an encrypted message.
The researchers say their system provides strong security while using bandwidth much more efficiently than similar solutions. In fact, in their experiments, anonymous users were able to transfer large files in one-tenth the time, compared to existing systems.
"The initial use case that we thought of was to do anonymous file-sharing, where the receiving end and sending end don't know each other," graduate student Albert Kwon, who helped devise the new system, said in a statement. He added that this could help combat the practice of honeypotting — in which spies offer services through a network like Tor to entrap its users.
"We also studied applications in microblogging, something like Twitter, where you want to anonymously broadcast your messages to everyone," Kwon added.
http://katehon.com/news/pokemon-go-linked-cia
Tuesday, 12 July, 2016 - 12:45
So that's why Pokémon has been plastered all over social media and the television this weekend. Nothing in this world is accidental as Kit Daniels reports:
The 'augmented reality' mobile game Pokémon Go, which uses the player's smartphone camera to 'add' Pokémon to real-world locations, has ties to the CIA.
The developer of Pokémon Go, Niantic, Inc., was founded by John Hanke, who previously received funding from the CIA's venture capital firm In-Q-Tel to develop what eventually became Google Earth.
In-Q-Tel was once described as an "independent strategic investment firm that identifies innovative technology solutions to support the missions of the U.S. Intelligence Community."
It's easy to see why the CIA would have an interest in the software behind Pokémon Go; the game utilizes the player's camera and gyroscope to display an image of a Pokémon as though it were in the real world, such as the player's apartment complex or workplace bathroom.
Software like that could theoretically turn millions of smartphone users into 'Imperial probe droids' who take real-time, ground-level footage of their cities and homes, reaching into dark alleyways and basements which spy satellites and Google cars can't reach.
For example, in the 2008 film The Dark Knight, Bruce Wayne intentionally places a back door into cell phones sold by his company to implement a city-wide sonar grid.
Did that scene from the film reveal the intent behind 'augmented reality' software?
In the early 2000s, In-Q-Tel invested in Keyhole Inc., the company founded by Hanke which developed 3D "flyby" images of buildings and terrain from geospatial data collected by satellites.
The name "Keyhole" was a homage to the KH spy satellites first launched by the American National Reconnaissance Office.
Google later purchased Keyhole in 2004 and rolled its technology into Google Earth.
The CIA established In-Q-Tel in 1999 as its venture capital arm to "identify and invest in companies developing cutting-edge information technologies that serve United States national security interests," according to the firm itself.
"If you want to keep up with Silicon Valley, you need to become part of Silicon Valley," says Jim Rickards, an adviser to the U.S. intelligence community familiar with In-Q-Tel's activities. "The best way to do that is have a budget because when you have a checkbook, everyone comes to you."
Novi pravni presedani u domenu enkripcije i građanskih prava. Naime, do sada je američki pravni sistem funkcionisao po sledećem principu: iako sam osumnjičen za ovaj ili onaj prekršaj (uključujući i terorizam), ne mogu biti legalno nateran da otkrijem pasvord za svoj zaključani telefon ili harddisk jer američki ustav, kao i zakonodavstva mnogih zapadnih zemalja, svojim petim amandmanom veli da se građani ne mogu legalno naterati da pruže dokaze koji bi njih same oštetili pred sudom (i član 33 ustava Srbije ima takvu odrednicu u kojoj se veli da lice okrivljeno ili kome se sudi za krivično delo nije dužno da daje iskaze protiv sebe ili protiv lica bliskih sebi). Međutim, sada se pomalja ideja da mada čovek ne mora da izrecituje pasvord, ako mu se telefon otključava otiskom prsta, možda mora da da otisak prsta. Logika je otprilike da je verbalni iskaz zaštićen ustavom ali da se u praksi otisci prstiju tretiraju kao fizički dokazi pa ih ne štiti peti amandman itd. itd. itd. Propas? Verovatno.
Suspect required to unlock iPhone using Touch ID in second federal case (http://9to5mac.com/2016/07/25/touch-id-fingerprint-fbi-law/)
Quote
A second federal judge has ruled that a suspect can be compelled to unlock their iPhone using their fingerprint in order to give investigators access to data which can be used as evidence against them. The first time this ever happened in a federal case was back in May (http://9to5mac.com/2016/05/02/federal-court-touch-id-fingerprint/), following a District Court ruling in 2014 (http://9to5mac.com/2014/10/31/touch-id-police/).
The latest case involves a suspect accused of particularly unpleasant crimes, reports Ars Technica. (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/07/us-judge-orders-accused-pimp-to-use-his-fingerprint-to-unlock-iphone/)
A Dallas, Texas man accused of prostituting underage girls was secretly ordered by a federal judge to unlock his iPhone using his fingerprint, according to federal court documents that are now unsealed.
The legal position of forcing suspects to use their fingerprints to unlock devices won't be known with certainty until a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, but lower court rulings so far appear to establish a precedent which is at odds with that concerning passcodes ...
Most constitutional experts appear to believe that the Fifth Amendment prevents a suspect from being compelled to reveal a password or passcode, as this would amount to forced self-incrimination – though even this isn't certain (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/05/feds-say-suspect-should-rot-in-prison-for-refusing-to-decrypt-drives/). Fingerprints, in contrast, have traditionally been viewed as 'real or physical evidence,' meaning that police are entitled to take them without permission.
Some legal scholars disagree, however, arguing that the law never envisaged using fingerprints to provide access to data.
In the Texas case, the ruling turned out to be academic: it appears that more than 48 hours had elapsed since the iPhone was last unlocked, so iOS required the passcode to unlock it. Additionally, Apple strengthened the passcode requirement back in May, such that iOS now requires a passcode every six days (http://9to5mac.com/2016/05/19/why-does-my-iphone-keep-asking-for-my-passcode/) if it hasn't been unlocked by Touch ID within the past eight hours.
iOS also only permits (https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf) five Touch ID unlock attempts before the passcode is required, so smart criminals would either register their little finger and use up those attempts with other fingers, or simply avoid using Touch ID at all – but fortunately most criminals aren't smart.
o majko najmilija...
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi63.tinypic.com%2F2a8nt6p.jpg&hash=0eaeae841b43f384280d147ab7fa4c5fa7f64877)
hm, valjda: "... and their hostility to even modest curation has been instrumental in providing legaly usable information in any court of law."?
Da li je informacija dobavljena na nelegalan način uopšte usable in a court of law???
u usa sigurno nije al samo ako je iza wikileaks a ne nsa :lol:
nikako da smirim paranoju da je snowden usa agent :lol: :lol:
al in general, rekla bih da jesu:
http://www.brickcourt.co.uk/news/detail/court-of-appeal-finds-wikileaks-cables-admissible-but-dismisses-chagos-islanders-mpa-challenge
https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup16/Batch%201/20150521_F1955_PUBLIC_TC_Dec_Admis_Docs_Pub_Wikileaks_Website_EN_Web.pdf
a evo i jedan lep radić kako bi trebalo in d fjučr, utopija na sabahu.
http://www.academia.edu/1462817/The_Effect_of_Leaked_Information_on_the_Rules_of_International_Law
This Company Has Built a Profile on Every American Adult (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-05/this-company-has-built-a-profile-on-every-american-adult)
Quote
Forget telephoto lenses and fake mustaches: The most important tools for America's 35,000 private investigators are database subscription services. For more than a decade, professional snoops have been able to search troves of public and nonpublic records—known addresses, DMV records, photographs of a person's car—and condense them into comprehensive reports costing as little as $10. Now they can combine that information with the kinds of things marketers know about you, such as which politicians you donate to, what you spend on groceries, and whether it's weird that you ate in last night, to create a portrait of your life and predict your behavior.
IDI, a year-old company in the so-called data-fusion business, is the first to centralize and weaponize all that information for its customers. The Boca Raton, Fla., company's database service, idiCORE, combines public records with purchasing, demographic, and behavioral data. Chief Executive Officer Derek Dubner says the system isn't waiting for requests from clients—it's already built a profile on every American adult, including young people who wouldn't be swept up in conventional databases, which only index transactions. "We have data on that 21-year-old who's living at home with mom and dad," he says.
Dubner declined to provide a demo of idiCORE or furnish the company's report on me. But he says these personal profiles include all known addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses; every piece of property ever bought or sold, plus related mortgages; past and present vehicles owned; criminal citations, from speeding tickets on up; voter registration; hunting permits; and names and phone numbers of neighbors. The reports also include photos of cars taken by private companies using automated license plate readers—billions of snapshots tagged with GPS coordinates and time stamps to help PIs surveil people or bust alibis.
IDI also runs two coupon websites, allamericansavings.com and samplesandsavings.com, that collect purchasing and behavioral data. When I signed up for the latter, I was asked for my e-mail address, birthday, and home address, information that could easily link me with my idiCORE profile. The site also asked if I suffered from arthritis, asthma, diabetes, or depression, ostensibly to help tailor its discounts.
Users and industry analysts say the addition of purchasing and behavioral data to conventional data fusion outmatches rival systems in terms of capabilities—and creepiness. "The cloud never forgets, and imperfect pictures of you composed from your data profile are carefully filled in over time," says Roger Kay, president of Endpoint Technologies Associates, a consulting firm. "We're like bugs in amber, completely trapped in the web of our own data."
When logging in to IDI and similar databases, a PI must select a permissible use for a search under U.S. privacy laws. The Federal Trade Commission oversees the industry, but PI companies are largely expected to police themselves, because a midsize outfit may run thousands of searches a month.
Dubner says most Americans have little to fear. As examples, he cites idiCORE uses such as locating a missing person and nabbing a fraud or terrorism suspect.
IDI, like much of the data-fusion industry, traces its lineage to Hank Asher, a former cocaine smuggler and self-taught programmer who began fusing sets of public data from state and federal governments in the early 1990s. After Sept. 11, law enforcement's interest in commercial databases grew, and more money and data began raining down, says Julia Angwin, a reporter who wrote about the industry in her 2014 book, Dragnet Nation.
Asher died suddenly in 2013, leaving behind his company, the Last One (TLO), which credit bureau TransUnion bought in bankruptcy for $154 million. Asher's disciples, including Dubner, left TLO and eventually teamed up with Michael Brauser, a former business partner of Asher's, and billionaire health-care investor Phillip Frost. In May 2015, after a flurry of purchases and mergers, the group rebranded its database venture as IDI.
Besides pitching its databases to big-name PIs (Kroll, Control Risks), law firms, debt collectors, and government agencies, IDI says it's also targeting consumer marketers. The 200-employee company had revenue of about $40 million in its most recent quarter and says 2,800 users signed up for idiCORE in the first month after its May release. It declined to provide more recent figures. The company's data sets are growing, too. In December, Frost helped underwrite IDI's $100 million acquisition of marketing profiler Fluent, which says it has 120 million profiles of U.S. consumers. In June, IDI bought ad platform Q Interactive for a reported $21 million in stock.
IDI may need Frost's deep pockets for a while. The PI industry's three favorite databases are owned by TransUnion and media giants Reed Elsevier and Thomson Reuters. "There's no shortage," says Chuck McLaughlin, chairman of the board of the World Association of Detectives, which has about 1,000 members. "The longer you're in business, the more data you have, the better results." He uses TLO and Tracers Information Specialists.
Steve Rambam, a PI who hosts Nowhere to Hide on the Investigation Discovery channel, says marketing data remains a niche monitoring tool compared with social media, but its power can be unparalleled. "You may not know what you do on a regular basis, but I know," Rambam says. "I know it's Thursday, you haven't eaten Chinese food in two weeks, and I know you're due."
Edward Snowden Is Not Dead: 'He's Fine' Says Insider After Cryptic Code Tweet, Dead Man's Switch Scare (http://www.inquisitr.com/3391112/edward-snowden-is-not-dead-hes-fine-says-insider-after-cryptic-code-tweet-dead-mans-switch-scare/)
Nigde više čovek nema svoju intimu....
This sex toy tells the manufacturer every time you use it (http://fusion.net/story/334603/sex-toy-we-vibe-privacy/)
QuoteThe We-Vibe 4 Plus is a rubbery clamp that looks a little like the oversized thumb and forefinger of a Disneyland character pinching down. It comes in black, purple or pink and is billed as the "number one couple's vibrator." It has Bluetooth so that, once inserted into the desired part of your body, you can connect it to your smartphone and then use the We-Vibe app to control the intensity of its vibration.
But you should know a little something about your pleasure toy: it regularly violates the "don't-vibrate-and-tell" rule.
When the device is in use, the We-Vibe 4 Plus uses its internet connectivity to regularly send information back to its manufacturer, Standard Innovations Corporation. It sends the device's temperature every minute, and lets the manufacturer know each time a user changes the device's vibration level. The company could easily figure out some seriously intimate personal information like when you get off, how long it takes, and with what combinations of vibes.
This was revealed on Friday at hacker conference Defcon in Las Vegas by two security researchers, who wish to be called only by their handles @gOldfisk (https://twitter.com/g0ldfisk) and @rancidbacon (https://twitter.com/rancidbacon). The two examined the app's code and the information being sent by the device over Bluetooth.
In a statement sent by email, Standard Innovation Corporation's president Frank Ferrari confirmed that the company collects this information and explained why.
"At We-Vibe, we strive to create innovative products that have our customer's preferences in mind," he said. "We-Vibe collects data on the use of its products in terms of vibration intensity and mode for market research purposes so that we can better understand what settings and levels of intensity are most enjoyed."
Yes, thanks to the connectivity of the internet, your orgasms are now subject to market research.
I asked the company whether it informs customers that data about their sexy times is being collected. When I downloaded the app and looked at the privacy policy, this was not explicitly disclosed. Instead, I found a 2014 boilerplate one that discussed information collected on the website, and promised that the devices would be discreetly shipped.
"While our policy does disclose that we may collect data, we are currently in the process of reviewing our privacy & data collection policy in an effort to provide more transparency for our customers," said Ferrari.
Good idea! "We need companies to treat the privacy and security of people's intimate data seriously," said researcher @g0ldfisk.
Now you may be thinking, "Why even have a vibrator that connects to the internet?" The idea is that a long distance lover could control your experience from afar, which while appealing, might not be worth the privacy trade-off, unless you're a data exhibitionist.
If you're more private about these things, the researchers advise using the device with your smartphone in airplane mode, so that you don't inform the company that 7 minutes in "surf mode" is your ticket to ecstasy.
Here's the full statement from Frank Ferrari, President of the Standard Innovation Corporation.
The safety and security of our customers is of utmost importance. We ensure that all data transmissions are encrypted in transit and protected on secure servers. We conduct regular security audits and address security issues as they are discovered to comply with current best practices and security standards.
At We-Vibe, we strive to create innovative products that have our customer's preferences in mind. We-Vibe collects data on the use of its products in terms of vibration intensity and mode for market research purposes so that we can better understand what settings and levels of intensity are most enjoyed. Our reason for collecting CPU temperature data is purely for hardware diagnostic purposes. Data is only collected when the app is in use.
While our policy does disclose that we may collect data, we are currently in the process of reviewing our privacy & data collection policy in an effort to provide more transparency for our customers.
Malo zastrašujuć video:
http://www.nytimes.com/video/technology/100000004574648/china-internet-wechat.html
the circle (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Circle_(Eggers_novel))
Ričard Stolmn smatra da, umesto da onlajn novine žive od oglasa i špijuniranja svojih čitalaca, treba da uspostave sistem koji omogućava da čitaoci anonimno plaćaju vesti. Ne slučajno, pošto su on i njegova ekipa kreirali baš takav sistem za GNU.
Publishers must let online readers pay for news anonymously (https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/01/online-publishers-readers-ad-block-surveillance-donate-anonymously)
Quote
Online newspapers and magazines have come to depend, for their income, on a system of advertising and surveillance, which is both annoying and unjust.
Readers are rebelling by installing ad blockers, which cut into the publisher's surveillance-based income. And in response, some sites are cutting off access to readers unless they accept being surveilled. What they ought to do instead is give us a truly anonymous way to pay.
Some people use ad blockers because they find the sight of an advertisement offensive. That's purely subjective, and publishers could argue that readers are overreacting. Yet ads on the internet do inconvenience readers too. Adverts increase the amount of data needed to view a page, making it slow to load and expensive on a mobile connection.
At a deeper level, tailored adsalso imply snooping, because the most lucrative, targeted advertising on the internet nowadays is based on tracking people's interests and behaviour.
Tracking, as we know, gives companies and governments dangerous power; the intimidating effect of general surveillance has been measured and is massive. The rate of visits to some Wikipedia pages – those about "al-Qaida", "car bomb" and "Taliban" – declined by one-fifth after Edward Snowden showed us how much the US government spies on our internet activity (https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/new-study-shows-mass-surveillance-breeds-meekness-fear-and-self-censorship/). The thousands of users who were presumably intimidated into not looking up these subjects were not terrorists, but citizens who feared that governments would treat them as terrorists.
I've never been particularly bothered by ads online, but began using anti-surveillance technology because I object to mass surveillance. I understand how surveillance threatens individuals and democracy (https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html). As a side effect, this technology blocks ads that track users.
Use of ad blockers used to be rare, but increased dramatically in 2015. Sites began losing significant tracking-based revenue as substantial fractions of visitors declined to be tracked. Magazines such as Forbes and Wired (http://www.wired.com/how-wired-is-going-to-handle-ad-blocking) began denying access to visitors running ad blockers. It seemed they were saying that if readers don't like ads, and don't want to let ad networks track them, then readers should subscribe to the publisher and let them track their personal interests instead. Yet this "solution" is another form of the problem – no thank you! The Electronic Frontier Foundation is suing the US government over 'unconstitutional' use of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Publishers have been highly critical of ad blockers, which present yet another threat to their diminishing advertising revenues. One company, Adblock+, invites publishers to pay so that their ads won't be blocked. Publishers consider this a kind of extortion. With a free (https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html) (libre (https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html)) ad blocker, users can control what is blocked.
But there is way for publishers to charge readers without monitoring their behaviour: publishers that charge for access should offer the option to pay a small amount anonymously to get an individual story. The system should be unlinkably anonymous, meaning that if you pay for one story today and another story tomorrow, the publisher's site can't tell that those two transactions were both done by the same person. Alternatively, sites could invite the reader to donate the amount they wish each time they read a story. There are many possible variants.
For the system to be ethical, it should avoid other unjust practices. Readers should be able, for example, to pay and download the story while running solely free (libre) software (https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html). In addition, stories should not by afflicted with what the free software movement and digital rights campaigners call "digital restrictions management (https://www.defectivebydesign.org/)" (and what its proponents call "digital rights management"). And the reader should not be required to accept any form of contract (end-user license agreement) about what she is or isn't allowed to do with the articles she downloads. That should be governed by copyright alone.
For the GNU operating system, which was created by the free software movement and is typically used with the kernel Linux (https://gnu.org/gnu/linux-and-gnu.html/), we are developing a suitable payment system called GNU Taler (https://taler.net/) that will allow publishers to accept anonymous payments from readers for individual articles. We hope that publishers will adopt GNU Taler or something equivalent, so they can profit from defending privacy rather than from exposing their readers.
Publishers, please let me pay you – anonymously!
House Committee: Edward Snowden's Leaks Did 'Tremendous Damage' (http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/house-committee-blasts-edward-snowden-n649146)
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The U.S. House intelligence committee on Thursday unanimously approved a blistering report on the activities of Edward Snowden, saying his disclosures of top-secret documents and programs did "tremendous damage" to national security.
"The public narrative popularized by Snowden and his allies is rife with falsehoods, exaggerations, and crucial omissions," said the report by staff members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The report comes amid a renewed push by Snowden's supporters, who urged President Obama this week to pardon him before the president leaves office.
And a largely favorable movie about Snowden (http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/can-oliver-stone-s-snowden-save-real-life-whistleblower-n648166), directed by Oliver Stone, is now in theaters.
Snowden said Wednesday that he would return to the U.S. if he thought he could get a fair trial. But he said federal espionage laws do not recognize a defense of acting in the public interest or as a whistleblower.
Contrary to Snowden's statements that he intended to reveal programs that intruded on the privacy of Americans, the House report concluded that the vast majority of the 1.5 million documents he stole "have nothing to do with programs impacting individual privacy interests. They instead pertain to military, defense, and intelligence programs of great interest to America's adversaries."
Related: Edward Snowden's Motive Revealed: He Can 'Sleep at Night' (http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/edward-snowdens-motive-revealed-he-can-sleep-night-n116851)
Snowden, a former contractor working for the National Security Agency, left the U.S. in May 2013 with a trove of NSA documents that he began passing along to reporters. His disclosures led Congress to eliminate a program (http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/9-11-anniversary/did-patriot-act-change-us-attitudes-surveillance-n641586) that allowed the NSA to store the numbers dialed by U.S. telephone customers.
Blocked later from traveling when the U.S. revoked his passport, Snowden has been living in Russia since shortly after he left.
The report said Snowden did not, as he claimed, try to express his concerns about potentially illegal intelligence gathering in a way that would qualify him as a whistleblower.
"The Committee found no evidence that Snowden took any official effort to express concerns about U.S. intelligence activities — legal, moral, or otherwise — to any oversight officials within the U.S. government, despite numerous avenues for him to do so."
Two weeks before he began to download classified documents at an NSA installation in Hawaii, the report said, he was reprimanded after "engaging in a workplace spat" with managers. And he was repeatedly counseled regarding his behavior at work, it said.
While he has claimed that statements made by U.S. intelligence official James Clapper at a March 2013 congressional hearing amounted to a "breaking point" for him, the report said Snowden began to download classified documents eight months earlier.
Snowden's ACLU-provided attorney, Ben Wizner, disputed the report.
"This is a dishonest report that attempts to discredit a genuine American hero," said Wizner. "But after years of 'investigation,' the committee still can't point to any remotely credible evidence that Snowden's disclosures caused harm."
He added, "The truth is that Edward Snowden and the journalists with whom he worked did the job that the House Intelligence Committee was supposed to do: bring meaningful oversight to the U.S. intelligence community. The did so responsibly and carefully, and their efforts have led to historic reforms."
The Dark Web Is Mostly Full of Garbage (http://gizmodo.com/the-deep-web-is-mostly-full-of-garbage-1786857267)
koga interesuje tematika Crypto Wars Part II http://cdn.media.ccc.de/congress/2015/h264-hd-web/32c3-7386-en-Crypto_Wars_Part_II.mp4 xuser
https://theintercept.com/2016/10/18/study-lack-of-face-recognition-oversight-threatens-privacy-of-millions/ (https://theintercept.com/2016/10/18/study-lack-of-face-recognition-oversight-threatens-privacy-of-millions/)
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A BROAD COALITION of over 50 civil liberties groups delivered a letter to the Justice Department's civil rights division Tuesday calling for an investigation into the expanding use of face recognition technology by police. "Safeguards to ensure this technology is being used fairly and responsibly appear to be virtually nonexistent," the letter stated. The routine unsupervised use of face recognition systems, according to the dozens of signatories, threatens the privacy and civil liberties of millions — especially those of immigrants and people of color.
These civil rights groups were provided with advance copies of a watershed 150-page report detailing — in many cases for the first time — how local police departments across the country have been using facial recognition technology. Titled "The Perpetual Lineup," the report, published Tuesday morning by the Georgetown Center on Privacy & Technology, reveals that police deploy face recognition technology in ways that are more widespread, advanced, and unregulated than anyone has previously reported.
"Face recognition is a powerful technology that requires strict oversight. But those controls by and large don't exist today," said Clare Garvie, one of the report's co-authors. "With only a few exceptions, there are no laws governing police use of the technology, no standards ensuring its accuracy, and no systems checking for bias. It's a wild west."
Of the 52 agencies that acknowledged using face recognition in response to 106 records requests, the authors found that only one had obtained legislative approval before doing so. Government reports have long confirmed that millions of images of citizens are collected and stored in federal face recognition databases. Since at least 2002, civil liberties advocates have raised concerns that millions of drivers license photos of Americans who have never been arrested are being subject to facial searches — a practice that amounts to a perpetual digital lineup. This report augments such fears, demonstrating that at least one in four state or local law enforcement agencies have access to face recognition systems.
Among its findings, the report provides the most fine-grained detail to date on how exactly these face recognition systems might disproportionately impact African-Americans. "Face recognition systems are powerful — but they can also be biased," the coalition's letter explains. While one in two American adults have face images stored in at least one database, African-Americans are more likely than others to have their images captured and searched by face recognition systems.
In Virginia, for instance, the report shows how state police can search a mug shot database disproportionately populated with African-Americans, who are twice as likely to be arrested in the state. Not only are African-Americans more likely to be subject to searches, according to the report, but this overrepresentation puts them at greatest risk for a false match.
These errors could be compounded by the fact that some face recognition algorithms have been shown to misidentify African-Americans, women, and young people at unusually high rates. In a 2012 study co-authored by FBI experts, three algorithms that were tested performed between 5 and 10 percent worse on black faces than on white faces. And the overall accuracy of systems has been shown to decrease as a dataset expands. The Georgetown report interviewed two major facial recognition vendors which said that they did not test for racial basis, despite the fact that systems have been shown to be far from "race-blind."
A slideshow on San Diego's privacy policy obtained by the researchers reveals that people of color in the county are between 1.5 and 2.5 more likely to be targeted by its surveillance systems. San Diego County uses a mugshot-only system, and repeated studies have shown that African-Americans are twice as likely as white people to be arrested and searched by police.
New York Police Department officers watch demonstrator as they lie down on the floor of Gran Central Station in New York on December 6, 2014, as part of a die-in. Protesters in many US cities are demonstrating against the recent decisions by grand juries in New York and Ferguson, Missouri, not to charge police officers involved in the deaths of two African-American men.
First Amendment Concerns
The Georgetown report shows for the first time that at least five major police departments have "run real-time face recognition off of street cameras, bought technology that can do so, or expressed a written interest in buying it." They warn that such real-time surveillance tracking could have serious implications for the right to associate privately.
"This is the ability to conduct a real time digital manhunt on the street by putting people on a watchlist," explained Alvaro Bedoya, the executive director of the Georgetown Center and one of the report's co-authors. "Now suddenly everyone is a suspect." Real-time recognition, he added, could have a chilling effect on people engaging in civil conduct. "It would be totally legal to take picture of people obstructing traffic and identify them."
Indeed, as the ACLU revealed last week, face recognition systems were used to track Black Lives Matter protesters in Baltimore. "There's a question of who is being subjected to this kind of facial recognition search in the first place," David Rocah, a staff attorney at the ACLU of Maryland, told the Baltimore Sun. "Is it only Black Lives Matter demonstrators who get this treatment? Are they drawing those circles only in certain neighborhoods? The context in which it's described here seems quintessentially improper."
Bedoya pointed out that these systems in Baltimore uploaded social media photographs of protestors into these systems to conduct real-time street surveillance. "It turns the premise of the Fourth Amendment on its head," he added.
The Georgetown report shows that some departmental policies allow for face recognition algorithms to be used in the absence of an individualized suspicion, which means the technology could conceivably be used to identify anyone. At least three agencies, according to the report, allow face recognition searches to identify witnesses of a crime in addition to criminal suspects.
As privacy organizations have previously noted, the FBI's federal database includes and simultaneously searches photographic images of U.S. citizens who are neither criminals or suspects. The Georgetown report likewise shows that some state databases include mug shots, while others include both mug shots and driver's license photos.
In a landmark Supreme Court decision on privacy, in which the justices unanimously concluded that the prolonged use of an unwarranted GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Sotomayor wondered whether "people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."
Of the 52 agencies found by the report to have used face recognition, however, only one department's policy explicitly prohibited officers from "using face recognition to track individuals engaging in political, religious, or other protected free speech."
Apart from some news stories focusing on the policies of specific departments, most notably those of San Diego County, reporting on law enforcement's use of face recognition technology has been scarce. Departments themselves have not been forthcoming about their use of the technology to identify suspects on the streets and to secure convictions. And many of the documents obtained by privacy organizations about face recognition programs largely date to 2011, prior to the federal face program's full implementation.
No Oversight, Little Data
This is partly due to how little information is available. There is no national database of departments using these programs, how they work, what policies govern them, who can access them, and how the passive information is being collected and queried. The Georgetown report, compiling tens of thousands of records produced in response to Freedom of Information requests sent to fifty of the largest police departments across the country, provides the most comprehensive snapshot to date of how and on whom face recognition systems are used — and what policies constrain their use, if any. But even this picture continues to be partial, given the continued lack of transparency of several large law enforcement agencies with some of the most advanced systems.
The researchers state that despite several news articles and descriptions of the New York Police Department's face recognition program, the NYPD denied their records request entirely, arguing that the records fell under a "non-routine techniques and procedures" exemption. Likewise, while the Los Angeles Police Department has claimed to use real-time, continuous face recognition and has made decades of public statements about the technology, the department found "no records responsive to [their] request" for information about this or any other face recognition system. "We followed up with a number emails and calls inquiring what that meant," Garvie said. "The final word was that they found no records responsive."
Of the 52 agencies that did provide responsive records to the researchers, at least 24 did not provide a face recognition use policy. Four of those two dozen agencies admitted that they expressly lacked any policy whatsoever to govern their face recognition systems.
Civil rights groups have long described the difficulties of calling for greater oversight for a system whose contours, uses, and abuses are unknown. The amount of up-to-date public records collected by the Georgetown researchers has the potential to change this and spark a national conversation on oversight, Bedoya said.
"I genuinely hope that more and more of the American public has a chance to see what's at stake here," Bedoya said, describing face recognition as "an extraordinarily powerful tool." "It doesn't just track our phones or computers. It tracks our flesh and our bones. This is a tracking technology unlike anything our society has ever seen. You don't even need to touch anything."
No national guidelines, laws, or polices currently regulate law enforcement's use of face recognition technology. To fill this gap, the Georgetown report proposes protective legislation for civil liberties, limits on the amount and types of data stored, and a push for independent oversight and public notice procedures.
Among their recommendations, the Georgetown researchers advise that mug shots, rather than driver's license and ID photos, be used to populate photo databases for face recognition, and for those images to be "periodically scrubbed to eliminate the innocent." They also suggest that financing for police face recognition systems be contingent "on public reporting, accuracy and bias tests, legislative approval—and public posting—of a face recognition use policy."
In Seattle, where a face recognition program was funded by a $1.64 million grant from the Department of Homeland Security, some of these model guidelines are already in place. Only specially trained officers use the software, real-time use is banned, and the software's use is limited to scanning suspicious subjects only.
The ACLU, when it first investigated nascent uses of face recognition technology back in 2002, presciently warned that the "worst-case scenario ... would be if police continue to utilize facial recognition systems despite their ineffectiveness because they become invested in them, attached to government or industry grants that support them, or begin to discover additional, even more frightening uses for the technology."
The Georgetown report offers a glimpse into this worst-case scenario, but Bedoya is hopeful that the Model Face Recognition Act proposed by the report and endorsed by the letter's signatories provides a "deeply reasonable" solution. He pointed to the fact that state legislatures have previously passed laws to limit geolocation technology by police, automatic license plate readers, drones, wiretaps and other surveillance tools. "This is very feasible. It's not about protecting criminals. It's about protecting our values."
Google Has Quietly Dropped Ban on Personally Identifiable Web Tracking (https://www.propublica.org/article/google-has-quietly-dropped-ban-on-personally-identifiable-web-tracking)
AT&T Is Spying on Americans for Profit, New Documents Reveal (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/25/at-t-is-spying-on-americans-for-profit.html)
QuoteThe telecom giant is doing NSA-style work for law enforcement—without a warrant—and earning millions of dollars a year from taxpayers.
On Nov. 11, 2013, Victorville, California, sheriff's deputies and a coroner responded to a motorcyclist's report of human remains outside of town.
They identified the partially bleached skull of a child, and later discovered the remains of the McStay family who had been missing for the past three years. Joseph, 40, his wife Summer, 43, Gianni, 4, and Joseph Jr., 3, had been bludgeoned to death and buried in shallow graves in the desert.Investigators long suspected Charles Merritt in the family's disappearance, interviewing him days after they went missing. Merritt was McStay's business partner and the last person known to see him alive. Merritt had also borrowed $30,000 from McStay to cover a gambling debt, a mutual business partner told police. None of it was enough to make an arrest.Even after the gravesite was discovered and McStay's DNA was found inside Merritt's vehicle, police were far from pinning the quadruple homicide on him.Until they turned to Project Hemisphere.Hemisphere is a secretive program run by AT&T (http://www.thedailybeast.com/content/dailybeast/articles/2016/10/26/the-perils-of-an-at-t-time-warner-merger.html) that searches trillions of call records and analyzes cellular data to determine where a target is located, with whom he speaks, and potentially why.
"Merritt was in a position to access the cellular telephone tower northeast of the McStay family gravesite on February 6th, 2010, two days after the family disappeared," an affidavit for his girlfriend's call records reports Hemisphere finding (PDF (https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3174545/Sbsw-14-1294-Cj-Phone-2-8951.pdf)). Merritt was arrested almost a year to the date after the McStay family's remains were discovered, and is awaiting trial for the murders.
In 2013, Hemisphere was revealed by The New York Times and described only within a Powerpoint presentation made by the Drug Enforcement Administration (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html). The Times described it as a "partnership" between AT&T and the U.S. government; the Justice Department said it was an essential, and prudently deployed, counter-narcotics tool.
However, AT&T's own documentation—reported here by The Daily Beast for the first time—shows Hemisphere was used far beyond the war on drugs to include everything from investigations of homicide to Medicaid fraud.
Hemisphere isn't a "partnership" but rather a product AT&T developed, marketed, and sold at a cost of millions of dollars per year to taxpayers. No warrant is required to make use of the company's massive trove of data, according to AT&T documents, only a promise from law enforcement to not disclose Hemisphere if an investigation using it becomes public.These new revelations come as the company seeks to acquire Time Warner in the face of vocal opposition saying the deal would be bad for consumers (http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-att-time-warner-20161024-snap-story.html). Donald Trump told supporters over the weekend he would kill the acquisition if he's elected president; Hillary Clinton has urged regulators to scrutinize the deal.
While telecommunications companies are legally obligated to hand over records, AT&T appears to have gone much further to make the enterprise profitable, according to ACLU technology policy analyst Christopher Soghoian."Companies have to give this data to law enforcement upon request, if they have it. AT&T doesn't have to data-mine its database to help police come up with new numbers to investigate," Soghoian said.AT&T has a unique power to extract information from its metadata because it retains so much of it. The company owns more than three-quarters of U.S. landline switches, and the second largest share of the nation's wireless infrastructure and cellphone towers, behind Verizon. AT&T retains its cell tower data going back to July 2008, longer than other providers. Verizon holds records for a year and Sprint for 18 months, according to a 2011 retention schedule obtained by The Daily Beast.
The disclosure of Hemisphere was not the first time AT&T has been caught working with law enforcement above and beyond what the law requires.
Special cooperation with the government to conduct surveillance dates back to at least 2003, when AT&T ordered technician Mark Klein to help the National Security Agency install a bug directly into its main San Francisco internet exchange point, Room 641A (https://www.wired.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-klein/). The company invented a programming language (https://www.wired.com/2007/10/att-invents-pro/) to mine its own records for surveillance, and in 2007 came under fire (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/world/americas/09iht-spy.1.7431946.html?_r=0) for handing these mined records over to the FBI. That same year Hemisphere was born.
By 2013, it was deployed to three DEA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers, according to the Times. Today, Hemisphere is used in at least 28 of these intelligence centers across the country, documents show. The centers are staffed by federal agents as well as local law enforcement; one center is the Los Angeles Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse, where Merritt's number was sent for analysis.
Analysis is done by AT&T employees on behalf of law enforcement clients through these intelligence centers, but performed at another location in the area. At no point does law enforcement directly access AT&T's data.A statement of work from 2014 shows how hush-hush AT&T wants to keep Hemisphere.
(OVDE IDE SKEN CELOG DOKUMENTA)
"The Government agency agrees not to use the data as evidence in any judicial or administrative proceedings unless there is no other available and admissible probative evidence," it says.But those charged with a crime are entitled to know the evidence against them come trial. Adam Schwartz, staff attorney for activist group Electronic Frontier Foundation, said that means AT&T may leave investigators no choice but to construct a false investigative narrative to hide how they use Hemisphere if they plan to prosecute anyone.
Once AT&T provides a lead through Hemisphere, then investigators use routine police work, like getting a court order for a wiretap or following a suspect around, to provide the same evidence for the purpose of prosecution. This is known as "parallel construction.""This document here is striking," Schwartz told The Daily Beast. "I've seen documents produced by the government regarding Hemisphere, but this is the first time I've seen an AT&T document which requires parallel construction in a service to government. It's very troubling and not the way law enforcement should work in this country."The federal government reimburses municipalities for the expense of Hemisphere through the same grant program that is blamed for police militarization by paying for military gear like Bearcat vehicles.
"At a minimum there is a very serious question whether they should be doing it without a warrant. A benefit to the parallel construction is they never have to face that crucible. Then the judge, the defendant, the general public, the media, and elected officials never know that AT&T and police across America funded by the White House are using the world's largest metadata database to surveil people," Schwartz said.The EFF, American Civil Liberties Union, and Electronic Privacy Information Center have all expressed concern that surveillance using Hemisphere is unconstitutionally invasive, and have sought more information on the program, with little success. The EFF is currently awaiting a judge's ruling on its Freedom of Information Act suit (https://www.eff.org/press/releases/thursday-hearing-san-francisco-eff-fights-answers-about-massive-government-phone) against the Department of Justice for Hemisphere documentation.
AT&T spokesperson Fletcher Cook told The Daily Beast via an email that there is "no special database," and that the only additional service AT&T provides for Atlanta's intelligence center is dedicated personnel to speed up requests.
"Like other communications companies, if a government agency seeks customer call records through a subpoena, court order or other mandatory legal process, we are required by law to provide this non-content information, such as the phone numbers and the date and time of calls," AT&T's statement said.Soghoian said AT&T is being misleading."They say they only cooperate with law enforcement as required, and frankly, that's offensive when they are mining the data of millions of innocent people, and really built a business and services around the needs of law enforcement," he said.Sheriff and police departments pay from $100,000 to upward of $1 million a year or more for Hemisphere access. Harris County, Texas, home to Houston, made its inaugural payment to AT&T of $77,924 in 2007, according to a contract reviewed by The Daily Beast. Four years later, the county's Hemisphere bill had increased more than tenfold to $940,000.
"Did you see that movie Field of Dreams?" Soghoian asked. "It's like that line, 'if you build it, they will come.' Once a company creates a huge surveillance apparatus like this and provides it to law enforcement, they then have to provide it whenever the government asks. They've developed this massive program and of course they're going to sell it to as many people as possible."
AT&T documents state law enforcement doesn't need a search warrant to use Hemisphere, just an administrative subpoena, which does not require probable cause (https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#1a). The DEA was granted administrative subpoena power in 1970.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1979's Smith v. Maryland that "non-content" metadata such as phone records were like an address written on an envelope, and phone customers had no reasonable expectation that it would be kept private.
AT&T stores details for every call, text message, Skype chat, or other communication that has passed through its infrastructure, retaining many records dating back to 1987, according (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html) to the Times 2013 Hemisphere report. The scope and length (https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/atts_19trillion.html) of the collection has accumulated trillions of records (https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/15/23_xmsj_and_opp_to_msj.pdf) and is believed to be larger than any phone record database collected by the NSA under the Patriot Act, the Times reported.
The database allows its analysts to detect hidden patterns and connections between call detail records, and make highly accurate inferences about the associations and movements of the people Hemisphere is used to surveil. Its database is particularly useful for tracking a subscriber between multiple discarded phone numbers, as when drug dealers use successive prepaid "burner" phones to evade conventional surveillance.Some Hemisphere operations have regionally appropriate nicknames: Atlanta's is "Peach," while Hawaii's has been called "Sunshine." West Allis, Wisconsin, city council minutes (http://www.westalliswi.gov/Archive/ViewFile/Item/836) do not name the contract at all, referring to it only as "services needed for an investigative tool used by each of the HIDTA's Investigative Support Centers from AT&T Government Solutions." In 2014 Cameron County, Texas, Judge Carlos Casco ordered a line item in the commission minutes changed from "Hemisphere Program" to "database analysis services." (https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3174547/UNITEDRENTALS-003.pdf) Casco is now the secretary of State of Texas.
The Florida attorney general's Medicaid Fraud Unit received "Hemisphere Project" training in 2013, according to a report (https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/fl/MEDS-AD/fl-fl-meds-ad-interim-rpt-06272013.pdf) on the unit's data-mining activities. Florida is one of eight states (https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/medicaid-fraud-control-units-mfcu/data-mining.asp) that is allowed to spend federal money on anti-fraud data mining initiatives. Florida Medicaid fraud investigators use such technology to look for suspicious connections between call detail records such as "a provider and a beneficiary with the same phone number or address."
A group of shareholders represented by Arjuna Capital are concerned about the effect of negative press on stock value, and filed a proposal in December 2015 to require the company to issue a statement "clarifying the Company's policies regarding providing information to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, domestically and internationally, above and beyond what is legally required by court order or other legally mandated process."
AT&T contested the proposal and the matter is now before the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Juče sam čitao suludu prognozu na ovu temu. Do sada se mislilo da oni skupljaju podatke o ljudima, jer prate šta rade i onda im poturaju reklamne banere po raznim sajtovima, pretpostavljajući da ako je neko guglo nešto prije tri mjeseca da mu sad treba nabaciti reklamu na istu temu.
I ono, ajd dobro, možda je i korisno... poslije ispade dobro je to i za policiju, ali ne samo u ovakvim slučajevima ubistva, nego npr ako aktivisti organizuju proteste, ovi ih prate, znaju gdje se nalaze, znaju gdje će otići, i sjebu ih pendrecima...
Ajd ono, jebeš i proteste, ali treće ide da će da porede podatke o ponašanju ljudi i onome što ostavljaju onlajn sa njihovim psihofizičkim zdravljem, i tako s informacijama stotina miliona ljudi izvuku obrazac razvoja određenih bolesti. Hm, možda i to može biti korisno, mada sve redom od početka do kraja ima dvije oštrice, da ga jebeš.
I onda dođe naizgled nebitna stavka, ali onda vidiš da si u ovom sistemu totalne kontrole naebo. Ako sazna da si npr. u procesu razvoda, banka će da ti snizi kreditni rejting. Bojim se da pitam šta će da rade ako mi saznaju boju stolice, ili tako nešto.
Ispade da više ne možeš ni pošteno da se isereš, a da te to ne košta slobode i novaca. Big Brada, hir vi kam!
Softver koji pamti sve što ste ikada pogledali putem svog kompjutera i pohranjuje to u kriptovanoj formi na serveru firme koja softver pravi? Da, baš nam to treba u životu.
This search engine remembers literally everything that's been on your computer (http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/02/technology/atlas-recall-productivity-memory/index.html)
S druge strane imamo ovo: dvogodišnja FBI istraga radikalnog hrišćanskog kulta koji podstičena nasilje nad poštovaocima satane oslanjajući se na poznati srednjevekovni traktat Malleus Maleficarum kojim se pozivalo na istrebljenje veštica, a za koji se (kult, ne traktat) ispostavilo da je parodija:
The FBI's years-long investigation into a fictional anti-goth cult (https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/oct/31/fbis-investgation-god-hates-goths/)
Ova priča bi bila manje smešna da na samom sajtu tog, jelte, "kulta", godhatesgoths.com nema uredno napisan disklejmer da je u pitanju satirična parodija.
Britain has passed the 'most extreme surveillance law ever passed in a democracy' (http://www.zdnet.com/article/snoopers-charter-expansive-new-spying-powers-becomes-law/)
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The UK has just passed a massive expansion in surveillance powers, which critics have called "terrifying" (https://www.opendemocracy.net/digitaliberties/julian-huppert/uk-investigatory-powers-bill-becomes-law-terrify-us) and "dangerous" (https://www.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/yes-minister-it-human-rights-issue/urgent-stop-ipb-investigatory-powers-bill-snoopers-charter-human-rights).
The new law, dubbed the "snoopers' charter" (http://www.zdnet.com/article/surveillance-britain-election-conservative-snoopers-charter/), was introduced by then-home secretary Theresa May in 2012, and took two attempts to get passed (http://www.zdnet.com/article/u-k-web-email-snooping-draft-law-dead-at-least-for-now/) into law following breakdowns in the previous coalition government.
Four years and a general election later -- May is now prime minister -- the bill was finalized and passed on Wednesday by both parliamentary houses.
But civil liberties groups have long criticized the bill, with some arguing (https://medium.com/@privacyint/the-database-of-you-2b4347ad74e3#.oz1628md5) that the law will let the UK government "document everything we do online".
It's no wonder, because it basically does.
The law will force internet providers to record every internet customer's top-level web history (http://www.zdnet.com/article/web-snooping-law-moves-ahead-despite-warning-of-suspicionless-surveillance/) in real-time for up to a year, which can be accessed by numerous government departments; force companies to decrypt data on demand (http://www.zdnet.com/article/new-uk-spying-bill-forces-apple-google-to-decrypt-phones-tablets/) -- though the government has never been that clear (http://www.zdnet.com/article/the-governments-encryption-plans-remain-impossible-to-decipher/) on exactly how it forces foreign firms to do that that; and even disclose any new security features in products (http://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-spy-bill-will-force-tech-firms-to-disclose-future-products-before-launch/) before they launch.
Not only that, the law also gives the intelligence agencies the power to hack into computers and devices (http://www.zdnet.com/article/despite-hacking-and-snooping-fears-web-surveillance-legislation-sails-forward/) of citizens (known as equipment interference), although some protected professions -- such as journalists and medical staff -- are layered with marginally better protections.
In other words, it's the "most extreme surveillance law ever passed in a democracy," according to Jim Killock, director of the Open Rights Group.
The bill was opposed by representatives of the United Nations (http://www.zdnet.com/article/now-the-un-slams-web-surveillance-plans-as-disproportionate-and-intrusive/), all major UK and many leading global privacy and rights groups (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/peer-pressure-making-sure-snoopers-charter-doesnt-come-back), and a host of Silicon Valley tech companies alike (http://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-google-microsoft-attack-government-hacking-plans/). Even the parliamentary committee tasked with scrutinizing the bill (http://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-parliament-committee-warns-against-ban-on-strong-encryption/) called some of its provisions "vague".
And that doesn't even account for the three-quarters of people who think privacy, which this law almost entirely erodes, is a human right (http://www.zdnet.com/article/three-quarters-think-web-privacy-should-be-a-right-as-snooping-bill-looms/).
There are some safeguards, however, such as a "double lock" system so that the secretary of state and an independent judicial commissioner must agree on a decision to carry out search warrants (though one member of the House of Lords disputed (https://twitter.com/LordStras/status/793570340144373764) that claim).
A new investigatory powers commissioner will also oversee the use of the powers.
Despite the uproar, the government's opposition failed to scrutinize any significant amendments and abstained from the final vote. Killock said recently (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/18/labour-peers-under-fire-backing-expansion-of-surveillance-investigatory-powers-bill) that the opposition Labour party spent its time "simply failing to hold the government to account".
But the government has downplayed much of the controversy surrounding the bill. The government has consistently argued that the bill isn't drastically new, but instead reworks the old and outdated Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). This was brought into law in 2000, to "legitimize" new powers that were conducted or ruled on in secret, like collecting data in bulk (http://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-spy-agency-gchq-tribunal-on-surveillance-claims-begins/) and hacking into networks (http://www.zdnet.com/article/hacking-carried-out-by-gchq-ruled-not-illegal/), which was revealed during the Edward Snowden affair.
Much of those activities were only possible thanks to litigation by one advocacy group, Privacy International, which helped push these secret practices into the public domain while forcing the government to scramble to explain why these practices were legal (http://www.zdnet.com/article/mass-surveillance-case-against-uk-government-heads-to-europes-highest-court/).
The law will be ratified by royal assent in the coming weeks.
Da se ne opustimo, kod nas je ovo verovatno već praksa, znajući da slično imamo u domenu čuvanja podataka o korišćenju mobilnog telefona.
Dakle, mnogi su se nadali da će Obama, sad kad lagano pakuje kofere da ode iz Bijele Kuće i svestan je da će nova administracija da se pogosti njegovim dostignućima, kao što je Affordable Care Act za koji mnogi brinu da će biti ukinut (a i Tramp je rekao da će da ga ukine i zameni nečim boljimI), kao i da nema neke ambicije da se dalje mnogo bavi politikom, dakle, da će Obama onda makar da do the right thing i javno pomiluje Edwarda Snowdena kako bi bar tu muku skinuo sa vrata čoveku koji je demonstrirao solidan moral i, mada je prekršio zakon, učinio uslugu građanima (i to ne samo američkim) a pritom se držao i patriocke linije i nije predao nikakve strašne tajne američkim neprijateljima...
E, pa...
Obama says he can't pardon Snowden (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/11/obama-says-he-cant-pardon-snowden/)
Quote
Obama replied: "I can't pardon somebody who hasn't gone before a court and presented themselves, so that's not something that I would comment on at this point." He continued:
I think that Mr. Snowden raised some legitimate concerns. How he did it was something that did not follow the procedures and practices of our intelligence community. If everybody took the approach that I make my own decisions about these issues, then it would be very hard to have an organized government or any kind of national security system.
At the point at which Mr. Snowden wants to present himself before the legal authorities and make his arguments or have his lawyers make his arguments, then I think those issues come into play. Until that time, what I've tried to suggest -- both to the American people, but also to the world -- is that we do have to balance this issue of privacy and security.
Ovo je problematično iz barem dva razloga.
Prvi je da je Snowden mnogo puta rekao da će rado doći u Ameriku da mu se sudi, ako tužilaštvo pristane da to bude javno suđenje. Što se, razume se, neće desiti jer bi se njemu sudilo po zakonu o špijunaži koji podrazumeva zatvoreno suđenje bez ikakvog prisustva javnosti na kome bi, naravno, tužilac i sudija samo pričali viceve jedan drugom i na kraju bi Snowden popio 6-7 doživotnih robija, versus suđenja pred novinarima gde bi Edward, bez obzira što bi svejedno otišao u zatvor, barem američkoj javnosti mogao mnogo toga da kaže.
Drugi problem se navodi i u samom tekstu. Obamino objašnjenje da ne možeš, kad si precednik, da pomiluješ osobu koja nije izašla pred sud jer, eto, to je tako, nekakav proceduralni problem, to objašnjenje je bizarno neistinito i sramota je da ga izgovara jedan ipak pravnik. Čak i mi ovde znamo da je Džerald Ford pomilovao Niksona "za sva sagrešenja koja je počinio ili je mogao počiniti protiv SAD" iako se Nikson nikada nije pojavio pred sudom, a to daleko da je bio prvi primer takvog milovanja u američkoj istoriji (http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/07/preemptive_presidential_pardons.html)....
Thanks, Obama!
Exclusive: Face-to-face with Edward Snowden in Moscow on Trump, Putin and dwindling hopes of a presidential pardon (https://www.yahoo.com/katiecouric/exclusive-face-to-face-with-edward-snowden-in-moscow-on-trump-putin-and-dwindling-hopes-of-a-presidential-pardon-100117331.html)
Ima i video, a ovo je samo siže:
Quote
In an exclusive interview in Russia with Yahoo Global News Anchor Katie Couric, Edward Snowden, the fugitive whistleblower who leaked information about U.S. surveillance activities, says he is "kind of encouraged" by the idea that Russian President Vladimir Putin might return him to the U.S. to stand trial because that would show the world he's not a spy and Russia "doesn't own me."
But he also acknowledged he isn't eager to return home to face U.S. justice, saying such a prospect "would be a threat to my liberty and to my life."
Speaking for 90 minutes in a Moscow hotel room, Snowden — calm and completely unrepentant — also took new swipes at top U.S. intelligence officials, claiming they have accused him of damaging national security only because they were "embarrassed" by his disclosures of classified National Security Agency documents and worried about their "reputations."
Those comments drew an angry rebuke Sunday from the Obama administration's former top counterterrorism official. "Snowden is delusional," said Matt Olsen, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, when read excerpts of the interview.
"It wasn't so many years ago that people were saying, 'This guy's a Russian spy,'" said Snowden when asked by Couric how "nervous" he was about the possibility of losing his Russian sanctuary and being sent home to face criminal charges of theft of government property and violations of the Espionage Act.
"But countries don't give up their spies. And if my recent criticism of the Russian government's Internet policies, criticisms of their human rights record, have been so severe that even my greatest critics in the intelligence community are now saying, 'Oh, yeah, he's a liability, they wanna get him out of there,' that's a vindication."
"Vindication of what?" Couric asked him.
"The fact that I'm independent, the fact that I have always worked on behalf of the United States, and the fact that Russia doesn't own me," Snowden replied. "In fact, the Russian government may see me as sort of a liability."
"So you wouldn't mind if Putin extradited you and said, 'Here you go, President Trump'?" asked Couric.
"Well, who wouldn't?" Snowden answered. "I mean, that would obviously be something that would bother me. That would obviously be something that would be a threat to my liberty and to my life. ... What I'm proud of is the fact that every decision that I made I can defend."
There is no evidence that Putin is considering such a move. But Snowden's fate is very much uncertain: His comments come at a crucial moment for him, three and a half years after he deserted his job as an NSA contractor in Hawaii and fled, initially to Hong Kong, with a thumb drive of highly classified documents that he began disclosing to journalists.
Facing what is expected to be an unyielding hard line from the new Trump administration — Kansas Congressman Mike Pompeo, who is designated to be Trump's CIA director, has called him a "traitor" (https://reason.com/blog/2016/11/18/watch-trumps-reported-pick-to-run-the-ci) who should be subject to the death sentence — Snowden and his allies in the United States are mounting an aggressive public campaign for a pardon by President Obama. "Time is running out," reads one of the headlines on the campaign's website (https://pardonsnowden.org), which also cites sympathetic comments by former Attorney General Eric Holder that Snowden "performed a public service" by triggering a debate about U.S. surveillance programs that led to reforms, including the end of the bulk collection of U.S. phone records by the NSA.
But Obama has made clear (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/edward-snowden-pardon-barack-obama-mike-pompeo-execute-nsa-surveillance-a7425821.html), as recently as last month, that he won't consider a pardon until after Snowden returns and his case is adjudicated. And even Snowden acknowledged he's not expecting one. "Well, I'm not counting on it," he told Couric when asked about a pardon.
In the meantime, Snowden's lawyers and defenders are privately seeking to open discussion of a possible plea bargain that would allow him to return home without facing a trial that could result in a long prison sentence. A letter (https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/news/Snowden_memo_cover_letter.pdf) to Obama and Attorney General Loretta Lynch from the Pardon Snowden campaign, signed by 15 former staff members of the Church Committee — which exposed abuses by the FBI and CIA in the 1970s — urged "leniency" for Snowden, while avoiding any mention of a pardon.
In the interview, Snowden seemed to draw a parallel between the information he leaked to journalists in 2013 and the findings of the committee (headed by the late Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho), including how U.S. intelligence agencies "were secretly administering psychedelic drugs to college students to see the impacts they would have." Snowden went on: "They [the CIA] were engaging in assassination operations that were contrary to both American and international law, all kinds of crazy things. And these individuals who [signed the letter] are experts in what's going on in intelligence at the classified level, who worked for the government, right? These aren't sort of hippie reformers or anything like that. They argued that President Obama should seriously consider leniency in this case. He said that — or they said — that this case has caused far more benefits to American society, which I think is uncontroversial at this point, than any claimed harms for which we've never seen evidence."
"If you had one minute to make your case face-to-face to President Obama, what would you say to convince him to pardon you?" Couric asked.
"I wouldn't," Snowden replied. "I would respectfully say to the president, 'I understand you have an incredibly difficult job. No one wants to be a whistleblower. This is something that's hard to do. It's hard enough to stand up to a bully in your life, to your boss in the office, much less the combined might of the National Security Agency, the FBI and, you know, the apparatus of government."
But any consideration of leniency for Snowden will run into fierce resistance from the U.S. intelligence community, which continues to view the former NSA contractor as an untrustworthy renegade who deceived his colleagues and endangered national security. This week, U.S. intelligence officials told Yahoo News, the office of the director of national intelligence is planning to declassify new portions of a highly critical 36-page report by the House Intelligence Committee that concluded Snowden was a "serial fabricator" who stole more than 1.5 million documents — 90 percent of which were military and defense secrets unrelated to the surveillance programs involving the privacy of U.S. citizens.
Snowden, for his part, casually dismissed claims that his disclosures to journalists did any damage to U.S. national security at all.
"Do you really think if the government can show somebody was hurt, a program was damaged, we've gone dark and can't track dangerous people, they wouldn't leak that criticism?" Snowden replied to Couric when asked about claims that the information he disclosed made it harder for U.S. agencies to monitor terrorists. "That wouldn't be on the front page of the New York Times by the end of the day? I don't think so. And I hope, maybe in time, you'll think the same."
Couric noted that even former Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on NSA documents he received from Snowden, recently wrote (https://tcf.org/content/commentary/house-intelligence-committees-terrible-horrible-bad-snowden-report/): "I do not share the view of some of his fans that he did no damage at all."
"Can you at least acknowledge that damage might have been done as a result of your disclosures?" Couric asked Snowden.
"I don't agree with him in that regard," he replied about Gellman's comment. "What I will say is this. Whenever we're talking about damage without evidence — this is an intentional effort to change the conversation from the concrete harms of these programs that violated the rights of every man, woman and child in the United States and people around the world... What Barton Gellman was acknowledging there was that, yes, it's possible that officials could have been embarrassed by this. Reputations could have been damaged by this. And the intelligence community considers this to be a matter of national security. But I would argue there's more to national security than reputations."
Couric pressed: "But aren't we talking, in fairness, more than simply reputations or being embarrassed? Virtually every U.S. security official, current and former, agrees that these disclosures made it more difficult to track the movements of organizations like ISIS and other terrorist groups."
"I don't agree with that," Snowden responded. "Terrorists read the newspaper too. But I'll tell you, terrorists already knew the NSA was coming after them. And what we saw in the newspaper wasn't anything that they didn't already understand. What was revealed in the newspaper was only a surprise to Americans and ordinary citizens."
It was these comments that drew a sharp response from Olsen, the former Obama administration counterterrorism director, who has said he watched in 2013 as terrorist operatives grew "dark" and changed their communication methods after the Snowden disclosures.
"Regardless of his motivation, the fact is that his theft and release of an unprecedented amount of classified information have directly aided terrorists, Russian intelligence services, and other US adversaries," Olsen wrote Sunday in an email to Yahoo News. "His actions have resulted in the loss of intelligence sources that have saved American lives around the world."
Olsen added: "Snowden disclosed specific information about how the US collects intelligence, who we work with, and where we have operations. These are activities that are entirely lawful and most have nothing to do with the privacy of Americans. These facts are not disputed, except by Snowden himself and perhaps his Russian hosts, with whom he has shared intelligence."
Snowden, for his part, denied sharing any information with the Russian intelligence services. He also denied the assertion by U.S. intelligence officials that he visited the Russian Consulate in Hong Kong before flying to Moscow — en route, he claims, to Ecuador, only to be "trapped" in Russia because the U.S. had revoked his passport.
Snowden's comments about U.S. intelligence officials being "embarrassed" by his disclosures weren't his only remarks in the interview that have triggered sharp responses. Former U.S. intelligence officials and national security experts sought to debunk his assertion (https://www.yahoo.com/katiecouric/exclusive-snowden-says-petraeus-disclosed-far-more-highly-classified-information-than-i-ever-did-115212222.html), published by Yahoo News on Sunday, that former CIA Director David Petraeus had disclosed "far more highly classified information than I ever did." Petraeus, who is said to be under consideration for secretary of state in the Trump administration, shared top-secret information with his lover and biographer. He was forced to resign and pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of mishandling classified information.
"I am not in any way defending Petraeus, but I don't think many intelligence experts would agree with this," tweeted (https://twitter.com/TVietor08/status/805479748272930816) Tommy Vietor, a former national security spokesman for the Obama White House.
"Snowden is apparently taking a play from Trump's book on how to reinvent facts," Mark Zaid, a prominent national security lawyer, wrote in a Facebook posting. "It is absurd to claim Petraeus' actions were worse or more damaging than his. Other than giving classified information to his mistress, which is totally unacceptable (even though she had a security clearance), the information was neither stolen nor compromised. Moreover, it was never published. To the contrary, Snowden stole highly classified information and DELIBERATELY compromised it by allowing the world, which includes our enemies, to see it."
While insisting on his independence from Putin, Snowden seemed to echo the Russian government's line regarding charges that its intelligence services hacked into Democratic Party campaign committees to influence the 2016 election. Moscow says the Obama administration has failed to give evidence for these allegations.
While conceding it was "possible" that the Russians had hacked the Democrats, Snowden added: "What bothers me about this kind of conversation is that the last time there was a significant hack that affected the United States that we believed had an association to a nation-state, it was the Sony hack, which we said North Korea was behind. The FBI immediately released evidence that they believed proved that they were behind that attack. We haven't seen that here. And I think if we're gonna have this conversation, it should be evidence-based."
Snowden deflected most questions about his activities that led up to his flight to Moscow. He refused, for example, to identify any of the 10 NSA colleagues and superiors to whom he has said he raised concerns about U.S. surveillance before he began disclosing classified documents. Asked why he has been unable to produce a single email in which he raised such concerns, Snowden replied: "I'm not an email administrator" and "These aren't things you put in writing at NSA. Saying, 'I think the NSA is breaking the law. I think maybe this program is violating the Constitution' is a career-ending move. And the people that I talked to first, my supervisor, said, 'You know, hey, we can talk about this, but you shouldn't rock the boat, and don't write this down.'" (The only email (http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/edward-snowdens-e-mail-to-nsa-counsel/1071/) that has surfaced, released by the NSA, shows that Snowden asked one of the agency's lawyers in April, 2013 to "clarify" an issue about legal authorities in an agency training manual, but expresses no concern about surveillance practices.)
"Why hasn't anyone come forward, though?" Couric retorted. "Why haven't you given any names to corroborate the fact that you did, in fact, try to go through the so-called proper channels?"
"Because if I did that, they would end the careers of these individuals, right? If these individuals spoke on their own without waiting for me, they would go to jail."
Snowden — who has consistently asserted he shared documents only with "responsible" journalists who worked for publications he knew would carefully vet them — was also challenged on why he revealed highly classified information about NSA hacking in China to a journalist for the South China Morning Post while he was in Hong Kong. He defended the disclosure, saying the institutions being hacked by the NSA were not "valid intelligence targets" but civilian ones, such as hospitals and universities. He said for the first time that he didn't know that the reporter to whom he gave this information, Lana Lam, worked for the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (although she was identified as one of the paper's correspondents on its website); he says he understood she was a "freelancer" from Australia.
"So you didn't even know that it was going to be in a newspaper in China?" Couric asked him.
"I knew it would be in a newspaper," he said. "I didn't know what newspaper. This was not my concern."
Brian Rhoads, managing editor of the South China Post, said in an email to Yahoo News Monday that the paper's reporter, Lam, "made clear her status and who she was working for" when she interviewed Snowden in Hong Kong. "She was a full-time staff member of the South China Morning Post at the time, and represented herself as full-time staff throughout the interview process. We asked Snowden and the lawyers follow up questions and communicated with them about dates we were planning publication of the material." Rhoads, also emphasized that the South China Post is an independent publication that "is not controlled by China" and does not share information with the country's government.
Snowden, who lives with his longtime girlfriend, Lindsay Mills, in a Moscow apartment, and says he walks freely throughout the city unmolested and for the most part unrecognized, was asked by Couric at one point what he misses most about the United States.
"Family, of course," he replied. "That's always the thing. You know, they can come and see me, but you've got all these travel arrangements and logistics, you've got to go on an airplane ride. Who doesn't miss that?"
"When you look back at the last three years, was it worth it?" Couric asked. "Absolutely. I would do it again."
"No regrets?"
"No regrets at all."
Ultrasound Tracking Could Be Used to Deanonymize Tor Users (https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ultrasound-tracking-could-be-used-to-deanonymize-tor-users/)
Quote
Ultrasounds emitted by ads or JavaScript code hidden on a page accessed through the Tor Browser can deanonymize Tor users by making nearby phones or computers send identity beacons back to advertisers, data which contains sensitive information that state-sponsored actors can easily obtain via a subpoena.
This attack model was brought to light towards the end of 2016 by a team of six researchers, who presented their findings at the Black Hat Europe (https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-16/materials/eu-16-Mavroudis-Talking-Behind-Your-Back-Attacks-And-Countermeasures-Of-Ultrasonic-Cross-Device-Tracking.pdf) 2016 security conference in November and the 33rd Chaos Communication Congress (https://c3subtitles.de/talk/746/) held last week.
Attack relies on ultrasound cross-device tracking (uXDT)
Their research focuses on the science of ultrasound cross-device tracking (uXDT), a new technology that started being deployed in modern-day advertising platforms around 2014 (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/11/beware-of-ads-that-use-inaudible-sound-to-link-your-phone-tv-tablet-and-pc/).
uXDT relies on advertisers hiding ultrasounds in their ads. When the ad plays on a TV or radio, or some ad code runs on a mobile or computer, it emits ultrasounds that get picked up by the microphone of nearby laptops, desktops, tablets or smartphones.
These second-stage devices, who silently listen in the background, will interpret these ultrasounds, which contain hidden instructions, telling them to ping back to the advertiser's server with details about that device.
Advertisers use uXDT in order to link different devices to the same person and create better advertising profiles so to deliver better-targeted ads in the future.
Ultrasounds can be reliably used to deanonymize Tor users
Speaking at last week's 33rd Chaos Communication Congress, Vasilios Mavroudis, one of the six researchers, detailed a deanonymization attack on Tor users that leaks their real IP and a few other details.
The attack that the research team put together relies on tricking a Tor user into accessing a web page that contains ads that emit ultrasounds or accessing a page that contains hidden JavaScript code that forces the browser to emit the ultrasounds via the HTML5 Audio API.
If the Tor user has his phone somewhere nearby and if certain types of apps are on his phone, then his mobile device will ping back one or more advertisers with details about his device, so the advertiser can build an advertising profile on the user, linking his computer with his phone.
According to Mavroudis, the mobile phone must have an app installed that has embedded one of the many advertising SDKs that include support for uXDT.
At this stage, the state-sponsored actor can simply subpoena a short list of advertisers that engage in this practice and get details about the user's real-world identity. In tests carried out by Mavroudis, the researcher has intercepted some of the traffic these ultrasound beacons trigger on behalf of the phone, traffic which contains details such as the user's real IP address, geo-location coordinates, telephone number, Android ID, IMEI code, and device MAC address.
Multiple ways to deliver the attack
According to Mavroudis, there are multiple ways to deliver these attacks other than social-engineering Tor users to access certain URLs, where these ultrasound beacons can be served.
Researchers say that an attacker can use XSS (cross-site scripting) vulnerabilities to inject the malicious JavaScript code on websites that contain XSS flaws.
Similarly, the attackers could also run a malicious Tor exit node and perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack, forcibly injecting the malicious code that triggers uDXT beacons in all Tor traffic going through that Tor node.
A simpler attack method would also be to hide the ultrasounds, which are inaudible to human ears, inside videos or audio files that certain Tor users might be opening.
The FBI might be very interested in this method and could deploy it to track viewers of child pornography videos on the Tor network, just like it previously did in Operation Playpen (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/09/playpen-story-fbis-unprecedented-and-illegal-hacking-operation), where it used a Flash exploit.
Some mitigations to fight uXDT advertising
Currently, the practice of uXDT is not under any regulation. While the FTC is currently evaluating the impact of uXDT ads (https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/11/cross-device-tracking), the research team has proposed a series of mitigations that could restrict the free reign this type of advertising currently enjoys.
First and foremost, the team created a Chrome browser extension named SilverDog (http://ubeacsec.org/) that filters all the HTML5 audio played through the browser and removes ultrasounds.
Unfortunately, this extension doesn't work with sounds played back via Flash, and can't protect Tor Browser users, a browser based on Firefox.The researchers also propose a medium-term solution such as the introduction of a new query in the Android permissions model that explicitly informs users that an app might listen to ultrasounds.
This permission would allow users to revoke or deny this right from existing or new Android apps they're installing on their smartphone.For long-term solutions, the research team advocates for a standardized format for these ultrasound advertising beacons, and OS-level APIs for discovering and managing ultrasound beacons. The Tor Project has also been notified (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20214) of this issue a few months back.
Below is Mavroudis presenting his findings at the 33rd Chaos Communication Congress held last week in Germany.
https://youtu.be/ffFk0E7E7ek (https://youtu.be/ffFk0E7E7ek)
Na linku imaju i slike.
Haha ludlo nači sad more i bez kabla
Sve u svemu, još par torent godina za nas
Evo, ko ima vremena, sad ima i šta da čita:
CIA releases 13m pages of declassified documents online (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38663522)
Russia Considers Returning Snowden to U.S. to 'Curry Favor' With Trump: Official (http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/russia-eyes-sending-snowden-u-s-gift-trump-official-n718921?cid=sm_npd_nn_tw_ma)
Now sites can fingerprint you online even when you use multiple browsers (https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/02/now-sites-can-fingerprint-you-online-even-when-you-use-multiple-browsers/)
Pamela Anderson's New Crusade Is Inspired by Rumored Boyfriend Julian Assange (https://www.yahoo.com/celebrity/pamela-andersons-new-crusade-is-inspired-by-rumored-boyfriend-julian-assange-191621792.html)
The New Tech That Could Turn Police Body Cams Into Nightmare Surveillance Tools (http://gizmodo.com/new-ai-could-turn-police-body-cams-into-nightmare-surve-1792224538)
да не остане незабележено - директно са извора
Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed (https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/)
не бих сад цитирао цео текст овде пошто у оквиру извештаја, анализе и примера, имате линкове које можете следити ка изворним подацима
Može i gore:
The House GOP is pushing a bill that would let employers demand workers' genetic test results (http://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/www.businessinsider.com/house-gop-employers-demand-workers-genetic-test-results-2017-3?r=UK&IR=T)
I gore:
How the UK police can coerce journalists into surrendering photographs (https://citytog.wordpress.com/2017/03/06/how-the-uk-police-can-coerce-journalists-into-surrendering-photographs/)
Podsjeti me Palmer s dataminingom
https://wiki.digitalmethods.net/Dmi/ToolDmiTcat
Može li ovo prosječna osoba da instalira i upotrebi?
To jest, osoba koja ni ne zna šta je source code koji nude za download
Koliko vidim ovo je open source, i koristi tvitove kao data set, tj. bazu koju može da koristiš za analitiku. Možeš da je skineš i koristiš kod sebe na lokalnom serveru. Znači da pristupaš preko svog google chroma, u suprotonom bi morao kod njihna sajtu da koristiš. E sad zbog privatnosti ne znam da li možeš da koristiš twiter ako nisi istraživač tj. u cilju istraživačkog rada. Ovde je dokumentacija https://github.com/digitalmethodsinitiative/dmi-tcat, valja je pročešljati malo. Deluje zanimljivo.
Koliko sam shvatio to vrši search svakih 10-15 min i skuplja tvitove s traženom riječi, dakle, privatnost nije problem, ne traži se arhiva Twitter-a, baš zato cirkuliše svakih 10 min
Zanimalo me kako se političari kotiraju, možda bi svašta ispalo :)
Izgleda da je ovo za linux
https://github.com/digitalmethodsinitiative/dmi-tcat/wiki
The Justice Department today indicted two Russian spies, along with two criminal hackers, for attacking the accounts of 500 million Yahoo users in 2014.
The spies are officers of FSB, a successor organization to Russia's KGB.
http://deadline.com/2017/03/justice-department-russian-spies-led-2014-yahoo-hack-1202043784/
Eo video uputstava za programe praćenja tvitera, yt, fb, wikipedije...
https://m.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKzQwIKtJvv9lwyYxh4708Nqo6YC6-YH4&itct=CBoQojAYASITCPvOg_m39tICFVafVQodm0kLLw%3D%3D&gl=BA&client=mv-google&hl=en
Congress Just Gave Internet Providers the Green Light to Sell Your Browsing History Without Consent (http://gizmodo.com/congress-just-gave-internet-providers-the-green-light-t-1793698939)
Leaked: The UK's secret blueprint with telcos for mass spying on internet, phones – and backdoors (https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/04/uk_bulk_surveillance_powers_draft/?mt=1493974720916)
Quote
The UK government has secretly drawn up more details of its new bulk surveillance powers – awarding itself the ability to monitor Brits' live communications, and insert encryption backdoors by the backdoor.
In its draft technical capability notices paper (https://regmedia.co.uk/2017/05/04/technical-notices-draft-ipa.pdf) [PDF], all communications companies – including phone networks and ISPs – will be obliged to provide real-time access to the full content of any named individual within one working day, as well as any "secondary data" relating to that person.
That includes encrypted content – which means that UK organizations will not be allowed to introduce true end-to-end encryption of their users' data but will be legally required to introduce a backdoor to their systems so the authorities can read any and all communications.
In addition, comms providers will be required to make bulk surveillance possible by introducing systems that can provide real-time interception of 1 in 10,000 of its customers. Or in other words, the UK government will be able to simultaneously spy on 6,500 folks in Blighty at any given moment.
According to the draft, telcos and other comms platforms must "provide and maintain the capability to disclose, where practicable, the content of communications or secondary data in an intelligible form and to remove electronic protection applied by or on behalf of the telecommunications operator to the communications or data."
The live surveillance of individuals will require authorization from secretaries of state, overseen by a judge (https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/03/uks_first_investigatory_powers_commissioner_lord_justice_fulford/) appointed by the prime minister. And there are a few safeguards (https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/11/30/investigatory_powers_act_backdoors/) built into the system following strong opposition (https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_powers_to_ban_endtoend_encryption/) to earlier drafts (https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/08/19/bulk_powers_review_investigatory_powers_bill/) of the Investigatory Powers Act.
Closed doors What will concern many, however, is how the draft paper and its contents are being handled.
The technical capability notices paper has only been provided to a select few companies – mostly ISPs and telcos – on a short four-week consultation, but a copy of the draft found its way to the Open Rights Group, which popped it online (https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/home-office-consultation:-investigatory-powers-%28technical-capability%29-regulations-2017) today.
According to the document, it has already passed through the UK's Technical Advisory Board (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/technical-advisory-board/about/membership), which comprises six telco representatives – currently O2, BT, BSkyB, Cable and Wireless, Vodafone and Virgin Media – plus six people from the government's intercepting agencies, and a board chairman.
That means that the contents have already been largely agreed to by most of the organizations that have been included in the closed consultation.
It is unclear whether the Home Office intends to make it available for public comment after that time or whether it will seek to push it through the legislature before anyone outside the consultation group has an opportunity to review it.
The rules will have to be formally approved by both houses of Parliament before becoming law.
You ain't see me, right? The process and the approach seem to be purposefully obscure. The rules come under Section 267(3)(i) of the Investigatory Powers Act – a one paragraph section that refers back to Section 253, which covers "Technical capability notices."
There is no mention of the technical capability notices paper existing either on the Home Office website or on the Gov.uk consultation website. And the only reason we know about it is presumably because someone at one of the few companies that have been sent the draft rules decided to tell Open Rights Group about it.
But what the nine-page document does is provide the government with the legal authority to monitor anyone in the UK in real time, as well as effectively make strong and unbreakable encryption illegal.
This act of stripping away safeguards on people's private data is also fantastic news for hackers, criminals, and anyone else who wants to snoop on Brits. The seals are finally coming off.
"This lays bare the extreme mass surveillance this Conservative government is planning after the election," Liberal Democrat President Sal Brinton told us in a statement.
"It is a full frontal assault on civil liberties and people's privacy. The security services need to be able to keep people safe. But these disproportionate powers are straight out of an Orwellian nightmare and have no place in a democratic society."
The Home Office's private consultation is open until 19 May. If you would like the UK government to know your views, then email investigatorypowers@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk. ®
PS: The Home Office ran a short public consultation (https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/investigatory-powers-act-2016-codes-of-practice) earlier this year on a code of conduct for government snoops.
234 Android Applications Are Currently Using Ultrasonic Beacons to Track Users (https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/234-android-applications-are-currently-using-ultrasonic-beacons-to-track-users/)
Quote
A team of researchers from the Brunswick Technical University in Germany has discovered an alarming number of Android applications that employ ultrasonic tracking beacons to track users and their nearby environment.
Their research paper focused on the technology of ultrasound cross-device tracking (uXDT) that became very popular in the last three years.
uXDT is the practice of advertisers hiding ultrasounds in their ads. When the ad plays on a TV or radio, or some ad code runs on a mobile or computer, it emits ultrasounds that are picked up by the microphone of nearby laptops, desktops, tablets or smartphones.
SDKs embedded in apps installed on those devices relay the beacon back to the online advertiser, who then knows that the user of TV "x" is also the owner of smartphone "Y" and links their two previous advertising profiles together, creating a broader picture of the user's interests, device portfolio, home, and even family members.
uXDT trackers found at four stores in the EU
SDKs created by Shopkick, Lisnr, or SilverPush provide most of today's support for embedding ultrasonic beacons inside web and classic media streams.
In research sponsored by the German government, a team of researchers conducted extensive tests across the EU to better understand how widespread this practice is in the real world.
Their results revealed Shopkick ultrasonic beacons at 4 of 35 stores in two European cities. The situation isn't that worrisome, as users have to open an app with the Shopkick SDK for the beacon to be picked up.
In the real world, this isn't an issue, as store owners, advertisers, or product manufactures could incentivize users to open various apps as a way to get discounts.
No uXDT beacons found in TV streams — for now
The only good news found in this research was that after searching TV streams from seven different countries, researchers failed to discover any ultrasonic beacons, meaning uXDT is not as widespread in television ads as some might have believed.
But researchers don't feel that safe about their findings. "[E]ven if the tracking through TV content is not actively used yet, the monitoring functionality is already deployed in mobile applications and might become a serious privacy threat in the near future," researchers said.
Their worries are based on a scan of 1,3 million applications, which unearthed that 234 Android apps are already using uXDT beacons.
uXDT is spreading in Android apps
This number is up from previous scans. For example, a scan of the same data set in April 2015 found only 6 apps using uXDT beacons, while another scan in December 2015, found 39 apps.
The jump from 39 to 234 is staggering, to say the least, especially since some of these apps have millions of downloads and belong to reputable companies, such as McDonald's and Krispy Kreme.
Earlier this year, researchers showcased a method of tracking and unmasking Tor users (https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ultrasound-tracking-could-be-used-to-deanonymize-tor-users/) using uXDT ultrasonic beacons.
The team's research is entitled Privacy Threats through Ultrasonic Side Channels on Mobile Devices (http://christian.wressnegger.info/content/projects/sidechannels/2017-eurosp.pdf).
Dobro, će skupljaju podatke i to, al ima li tekstova šta rade s tim?
Pa piše šta rade:
Quote
SDKs embedded in apps installed on those devices relay the beacon back to the online advertiser, who then knows that the user of TV "x" is also the owner of smartphone "Y" and links their two previous advertising profiles together, creating a broader picture of the user's interests, device portfolio, home, and even family members.
Malo mi je to!
Pazi šta sam ja nalazio, da nadziranje Twittera bolje prognozira širenje epidemije gripa od Svjetske zdravstvene organizacije. Banke smanjuju kreditni limit korisnicima na osnovu nekih podataka. Takođe, predviđa se ponašanje na berzama, o javnom mnjenju i podršci kandidatima da ne govorimo.
Prosto, kad kažu "broader picture" ne odnosi se samo na advertising. Ko zna koje organizacije i zbog čega ovo koriste.
Zamisli umjesto gripa uzmu neke druge bolesti da proučavaju. Ono dođu do zaključka ko tvituje noću više od tri tvita o video igrama, stripovima i vegetarijanstvu ima deset puta veće šanse da oboli od shizofrenije :)
Nači, inkvizicija is coming.
Šizofrenija ne postoji, medicina poznaje disocijativni poremećaj ličnosti, a on ne izgleda onako zanimljivo kao na filmu :lol:
I drugo, vidiš šta je ova studija istraživala, ne možemo od nje tražiti da da odgovor na sve to što želiš. Mada je legitimno sve to što ti pitaš pitati i ispitati. Meni je ova vest prevashodno bila zanimljiva zbog te integracije relativno "stare" tehnologije (ultrazvučni signal) sa modernim big data stremljenjima.
Zato i pitam imal drugih tekstova! Otprilike sam shvatio koje podatke mogu da skupljaju, ali ne i koje korelacije stvaraju i koja im je svrha.
Prmarna svrha je navedena u tekstu, a da li ima još neka... tko zna...
Čelsi Mening bi trebalo da izađe iz zatvora:
WikiLeaks source Chelsea Manning set to be released (https://www.yahoo.com/news/wikileaks-source-chelsea-manning-set-released-024428820.html)
QuoteFort Leavenworth (United States) (AFP) - Chelsea Manning, the transgender army private jailed for one of the largest leaks of classified documents in US history, is set to walk out of a military prison Wednesday after seven years behind bars.
In July 2010, Manning -- then a male soldier known as Bradley -- was arrested over the release of a huge trove of more than 700,000 classified military and diplomatic documents via WikiLeaks.
On Wednesday, Manning will leave the prison barracks at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas -- the only maximum-security facility run by the Pentagon -- thanks to a commutation of her sentence by President Barack Obama before he left office.
Without Obama's parting gift, Manning, who served as an intelligence official in Iraq, would have remained behind bars until 2045, after serving a 35-year sentence.
Supporters of Manning -- who attempted suicide twice last year alone -- said they feared she would not have been able to survive the long sentence. Now, she can complete her transition as a free, openly transgender woman.
"Two more days until the freedom of civilian life," Manning tweeted Monday. "Now hunting for private #healthcare like millions of Americans."
Manning, now 29, also went on a hunger strike during her detention to denounce the disciplinary measures to which she was subjected -- including stints in solitary confinement.
"For the first time, I can see a future for myself as Chelsea. I can imagine surviving and living as the person who I am and can finally be in the outside world," she wrote last week.
- Quiet release -
Manning's defense team is intent on protecting her.
The Oklahoma native had a difficult childhood. After her parents' divorce, Manning moved with her mother to Wales, where she repressed her sexuality and was mocked for her effeminate ways.
The military is therefore keen on keeping her release low-key. No press conference is planned and media massing at the military installation may be hard-pressed to even catch a glimpse of Manning.
"To ensure the privacy and security of Inmate Manning, no further information concerning the release will be provided," US Army spokesman Dave Foster said in a statement.
Manning, of whom few photographs are publicly available, could find refuge at an aunt's home in the Washington region.
- Unwanted fame -
Virtually unknown at the time of her arrest, Manning today is a well-known figure around the world.
Labeled a traitor by President Donald Trump, she has gained the support of celebrities and is seen by many Americans as a courageous rights activist who was handed an unfair sentence for revealing civilian deaths caused by US bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan.
She wasn't able to flee abroad like Edward Snowden, who in 2013 released documents showing that the NSA was sweeping up US citizens' communications metadata.
Ahead of Manning's release, a group of musicians released a compilation album with all proceeds to go to the former soldier as she starts a new life.
"Hugs for Chelsea," a digital album available for a $25 donation, features tracks by artists known for their left-wing activism including Rage Against the Machine guitarist Tom Morello and Sonic Youth co-founder Thurston Moore.
- Trans icon -
Manning has also surreptitiously become an icon for transgender activists.
"The first thing Chelsea always says when we talk about her freedom is that she wants to give back to the trans community," said Chase Strangio, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer who is himself transgender.
Manning was able to start hormonal treatment in prison to begin transitioning toward her female identity. This transition is certain to speed up outside a prison environment Manning said denied her "right to exist."
While Manning's sentence was commuted, her conviction remains intact. Manning, who will turn 30 in December, has appealed.
She is also still employed by the army, and retains its insurance coverage.
"Manning is statutorily entitled to medical care while on excess leave in an active duty status, pending final appellate review," said Foster, the Army spokesman.
Putin says Snowden no 'traitor' in Oliver Stone interviews (https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-says-snowden-no-traitor-oliver-stone-interviews-101250421.html)
Obama's secret struggle to punish Russia for Putin's election assault (https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/national-security/obama-putin-election-hacking/?tid=sm_tw&utm_term=.910403037d04)
This covert technology listens for gunshots 24/7 and calls the police on its own (http://www.businessinsider.com/how-shotspotter-works-microphones-detecting-gunshots-2017-6)
Germany's facial recognition pilot program divides public (http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-facial-recognition-pilot-program-divides-public/a-40228816)
How the NSA identified Satoshi Nakamoto (https://medium.com/@amuse/how-the-nsa-caught-satoshi-nakamoto-868affcef595)
Oko 100.000 ljudi pod nadzorom državnih organa Srbije (http://novaekonomija.rs/vesti-iz-zemlje/oko-100000-ljudi-pod-nadzorom-dr%C5%BEavnih-organa-srbije)
The IRS Is Mining Taxpayer Data On Social Media In Violation Of Federal Privacy Law (http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/08/the-irs-is-mining-taxpayer-data-on-social-media-in-violation-of-federal-privacy-law.html)
Amerika stvarno ima problem da izađe na kraj sa konceptom uzbunjivača. Čelsi Mening je pre neki dan dobila poziv da bude gostujući nekakav predavač na Harvardu, u okviru njihove svakegodišnje akcije da pokupe ljude sa različitih pozicija u društvu i sa razlčitim političkim i aktivističkim bekgraundom i daju im pare da drže predavanja studentima, a sve u naporu da studenti budu izloženi različitim pogledima itd. Plemenito. Onda se narod pobunio da osoba osuđena za odavanje državnih tajni ne treba da bude na taj način podržana od strane prestižne (privatne, naravno) obrazovne institucije i Harvarđani su, ko neki početnici, pogli glavu i povukli poziv. Ne kažem da me nužno potresa da Meningova neće pričati studentima o sebi i sebi važnim temama ali Harvardov potez je u najmanju ruku amaterski, neočekivano jadnjikav uzimajući u obzir da ih mi smatramo ozbiljnom institucijom i da bi gostovanje Meningove upravo podstaklo diskusiju o tome šta je u korenu njenog postupka, da li državu treba štititi od nje same ili ona mora građanima da bude odgovorna i otvorena itd.
Kritički tekst o ovome:
The irrational disdain for Chelsea Manning (https://theoutline.com/post/2259/the-irrational-disdain-for-chelsea-manning)
Wikileaks releases documents it claims detail Russia mass surveillance apparatus (https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/19/wikileaks-releases-documents-it-claims-detail-russia-mass-surveillance-apparatus/)
Davno, kažu bajke, postojala je sloboda govora i mišljenja... Onda su došli mangupi.
http://www.b92.net/tehnopolis/vesti.php?yyyy=2017&mm=10&nav_id=1310033 (http://www.b92.net/tehnopolis/vesti.php?yyyy=2017&mm=10&nav_id=1310033)
"Ko bude gledao klipove ISIS-a, u zatvor na 15 godina"
Ljudi koji često budu gledali teroristički sadržaj sa svojih kompjutera mogli bi da se suoče sa kaznom zatvora od 15 godina, navela je britanska ministarka unutrašnjih poslova Amber Rud.
Da, to se najavljuje već izvesno vreme. Videćemo, naravno, da li će britanski parlament to zaista i izglasati, ali ovo podseća da nije Orvel baš slučajno svoj najpoznatiji literarni rad smestio baš nabritansko ostrvlje.
Poznati su britanski cenzori, i mada je kazna nenormalno visoka i neprimerena, generalno podržavam ideju da se ne dele i gledaju takve stvari.
A sloboda? Mene bi, recimo, zanimalo da bacim pogled na ISIS sajt, ponekad. :lol:
Ako sam čitao hrvatski zakon o braniteljima, valjda bih mogao i ovo! Doduše, kod Hrvata nema uputstva za sklapanje bombe...
"Ponekad" ne bi bio problem u duhu ove vrste regulacije. Ovo je pokušaj da se protiv terorizma dela preventivno, dakle, da se neko ko se "pravi na teroristu" tako što redovno upija propagandu i uputstva kako da dela, strpa u zatvor pre nego što se zaleti kombijem u masu na Trafalgvar skveru ili napravi uradi-sam-bombu pa se zatrči u decu koja izlaze iz obdaništa. Naravno, ne deluje kao da je ovo pravi put, ali nije da nema na tom nekom zapadu presedana, pa Nemačka i dan-danas zabranjuje isticanje nacističkih simbola a za Majn Kampf je tek prošle godine istekla zabrana publikovanja.
Quote from: varvarinA sloboda?
(Delimično) suspendovana, baš zbog terorizma. A i inače, sloboda nije besplatna.
Tako lako se (delimično) suspenduje. Tu je problem.
Liječimo simptome a ne bolest
US-UK plan would share tech companies' data with both governments (https://www.engadget.com/2017/10/25/us-uk-share-tech-companies-data-both-governments/)
Over 400 of the World's Most Popular Websites Record Your Every Keystroke, Princeton Researchers Find (https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/59yexk/princeton-study-session-replay-scripts-tracking-you)
China's big brother: how artificial intelligence is catching criminals and advancing health care (http://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/2123415/doctor-border-guard-policeman-artificial)
Beijing bets on facial recognition in a big drive for total surveillance (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-china-facial-recognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance/?utm_term=.fd4a80d17509)
Kineski fejs rekognishn program!
E, taj je najmerodavniji!!!
Ja ne bi ni uposlio nekog drugog to da pravi osim azijata!
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 15-01-2018, 08:48:46
Beijing bets on facial recognition in a big drive for total surveillance (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-china-facial-recognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance/?utm_term=.fd4a80d17509)
које је говно постао пост...мајко моја...директно у кофер са куриром и информером...буквално ми се физички гади..демокрацз диес ин даркнес..само да више цркну заједно са верзијом 'демократије' коју заступају
Naslov su malo promašili, trebalo je: Zašto Kinezi rade ono što mi odavno radimo
Man removes feds' spy cam, they demand it back, he refuses and sues (https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/02/rancher-finds-creepy-and-un-american-spy-cam-tied-to-his-tree-sues-feds/)
How Conservative Activists Catfished Twitter (http://gizmodo.com/how-conservative-activists-catfished-twitter-1823533394)
'They'll squash you like a bug': how Silicon Valley keeps a lid on leakers (https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/16/silicon-valley-internal-work-spying-surveillance-leakers)
Ministar protivustavnim naređenjem zastrašuje pripadnike Vojske (http://www.bezbednost.org/Saopstenja/6741/Ministar-protivustavnim-naredjenjem-zastrasuje.shtml)
"da im u slučaju unošenja informaciono-telekomunikacijskih uređaja u prostorije MO i VS u kojima je to usmeno ili pismeno zabranjeno uređaji budu privremeno oduzeti"
ne vidim problem
"i da njihova sadržina bude pregledana"
to se podrazumijeva. unio si tel gdje ne treba, zašto?
Bilo špijuna i devedesetih u vojsci, a ne sada
to je takav poso, oćeš da radiš, nema foliranja da će neko da gleda tvoje gole slike
Ja sad treba da citiram ceo tekst???
Dok je i u drugim vojskama uobičajena praksa ostavljanje telefona na ulasku u objekte koji su prethodno vidljivo određeni kao zaštićeni, kao i procesuiranje onih koji prekrše pravila zaštite tajnosti, nije dozvoljeno da se automatski daje pristup sadržaju privatne komunikacije bez odluke suda.
Naređenje ministra odbrane je u suprotnosti sa članom 41 Ustava kojim se garantuje tajnost pisama i drugih sredstava komuniciranja. Pripadnici Vojske Srbije nikako nisu izuzeti od uživanja ovog prava. Odstupanja su dopuštena samo na određeno vreme, isključivo na osnovu odluke suda i jedino ako su neophodna radi zaštite bezbednosti ili vođenja krivičnog postupka, na način predviđen zakonom.
Hajde, ne lupetaj, molim te. Nigde ne piše da službe odbrane i bezbednosti nisu izuzete.
moš da citiraš šta oćeš, na ovom topiku smo već utvrdili da te formalnosti oko zakonitosti praćenja nemaju nikakve veze sa praksom
jedino ako tvrdiš da srpska vojska svoje pripadnike mnogo više kontroliše i prati no strane vojske
a za to ako nađeš link svaka čast
čisto sumnjam da postoji igdje privatnost vojnog osoblja na najosjetljivijim položajima
uostalom, padale su glave zbog špijuna prije neku deceniju, stvarno me liberalisanje ne brine uopšte
čak i po Ustavu prava mogu da budu ograničena pod određenim uslovima
Baš da vidim taj sud koji će da osudi starešinu jer je proveravao sadržaj telefona nekog vojnika ili pripadnika policije, pod sumnjom da je snimao zvučni ili video zapis bilo čega unutar vojnog ili policijskog objekta gde je to izričito zabranjeno, pa makar to bila i klonja. U bilo kojoj državi.
US visa applications may soon require five years of social media info (https://www.engadget.com/2018/03/29/us-visa-applications-require-social-media-info/)
Russian ships are skulking around undersea cables that power the internet, causing the US to worry the Kremlin is finding a new way to spy (http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-could-enemies-sabotage-undersea-cables-linking-the-world-2018-3)
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/all-the-data-facebook-google-has-on-you-privacy?CMP=share_btn_tw
https://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/srbin-u-srcu-svetskog-skandala-ekskluzivno-za-blic-koliko-su-ljudi-iz-srbije-ugrozeni/fyd9tvz
A wanted man in China has been caught because of facial recognition software (https://www.fastcompany.com/40558057/a-wanted-man-in-china-has-been-caught-because-of-facial-recognition-software)
Ne znam gde biste vi ovo smestili, ali ja imam problem sa Windows 10. Pre dva dana mi je dva sata nešto apdejtovao, a sad stalno insistira da mi aktivira "doterano". Pošto najpre treba da mu dam broj telefona, mobilnog i svašta nešto još, odložim davanje i čekam da ga prođe. Ali, jadac. Sve se mislim da će sutra da mi traži broj tekućeg računa, štedne knjižice i ponudi savete kako da oblikujem svoja uverenja, kako najbolje da uložim u biznis, koristim blokčejn i kupim svoj prvi bitkoin.
Ja sam ga apdejtovao noćas (na poslu) i vidim da je prijavio da je po defaultu uključena puna dijagnostika, pa je možda to vezano za ovo tvoje? Idi na settings, pa diagnostics & feedback pa promeni na basic, pa vidi menja li se nešto.
To je to. Ali, ja nemam ni mobilni, pa sve ignorišem. Živcira me što nudi i da me obavesti o "nedavnim dostignućima" sa spajder soliterom koji drndam kad mi zafali koncentracija. :lol:
прошли печ ми је ужасно успорио рачунар (1709) па сам му поискључивао све живо што сам прочитао да може да се искључи и блокирао му апдејтове, тако бих се радо вратио на седмицу, али мој процесор ради само под 10...
Da ti ne pričam da mene od jutros maltretira ovako: svaki put kad isključim skener, podigne se windows image acquisition servis koji mi troši 30% CPU kapaciteta, ventilator luduje, povremeno se sve zablokira. Problem poznat bar 3-4 godine unazad, ali me nije pogađao do ovog apdejta... Kod kuće sam na sedmici i nemam nikakvu nameru da to skoro menjam...
Moj usud je da sam kupio novi lap top sa sve W10. Pratim ZS i FB, drljam po Google. Najvažniji mi je Word, a i tamo sam tek sinoć otkrio gde mi je go to page. Ni novi Skupe nisam aktivirao jer mi traži lične podatke da bi me "bolje uslužio". Mora da su frustrirani jer nisam dobra roba za trgovinu. Ne kupujem online, jer su mi priju, pre mesec dana orobili za 20000$ dok je shvatli da su joj maznuli podatke. I NE OSEĆAM SE BEZBEDNO SA INTERNETOM.
Sasvim ispravno ti je osećanje.
Meni je Skajp kao da gledam, kako se ono kaže "trainwreck in slow motion". Moram da ga koristim službeno ali godinama gledam kako postaje sve neupotrebljiviji. Poslednjih godinu dana me moli da ga apdejtujem, što sam bar tri puta učinio, da bi on postao sporiji a onda se sam od sebe posle par sati vratio na staru verziju. Više i ne pokušavam...
Eto, dijalog je moguć.
Ali putem Skajpa sve manje moguć :lol: :lol: :lol:
јасно је да је мајкрософтова политика да све производе које су направили или купили учине неупотребљим, малтене од тренутка кад их пошаљу на тржиште или купе (буквално сваки апдејт 10ке је био гори од претходног што се тиче перформанси процесора/меморије)...није ми само јасно зашто то раде...
а скајп сам престао да користим још пре неколико година, управо због спорости које је тад почео да показује са сваким апдејтом
стварно размишљам да ли да спречим апдејт 10ке или да ризикујем и да се опет бакћем са искључивањем сервиса...
Ima tu jedna zvrčka, naime sad ih zeza problem u Intelovim čipovima. Pošto je problem hardverske prirode Mikrosoft ne može da ga reši na zadovoljavajuć način, ali može da pokuša bar nešto. E to "bar nešto" za efekat može da ima usporavanje mašine, jer je problem i nastao kao efekat Intelovog pokušaja da ubrza mašinu. Ovaj probem sigurno ne pokriva svo usporenje na Windowsu, ali učestvuje nekako.
ја немам интел, никада га нисам ни имао...не интересују ме њихови проблеми и ни мало не верујем ономе што кажу...једноставно није логично...мој ризен неће да ради без 10ке и осећам се уцењеним (додуше ко ми је крив што нисам пажљиво читао кад сам бирао процесор)
I AMD ima slične probleme, samo ih ima nešto manje. Kad su se pravili procesori nigde se nije razmišljalo o tome što je sad postalo problem. Da se neko dosetio onda bi na sva zvona reklamirao svoje bezbedno rešenje, pa bi ga konkurencija stigla za godinu dana, ali ove hardverske probleme vučemo godinama.
мек+иОС раде прилично лепо, нисам приметио никаква успоравања са апдејтима (ако изузмемо телефоне), ни било какве проблеме које имам од кад сам инсталирао 10ку...еплу очигледно не сметају хардверска ограничења толико...но овде више причамо о апдејтима него о самим оперативним системима а они већ дуго из итерације у итерацију видно успоравају машине у односу на основну верзију ОСа који само купили (пиратизовали, добили...)
Министарство одбране поступило по решењу повереника којим се забрањује обрада података у приватним информационо-телекомуникационим средствима без судског налога (https://www.poverenik.rs/sr/%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%88%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%9A%D0%B0/2870-%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%88%D0%B5%D1%9A%D1%83-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%98%D0%B8%D0%BC-%D1%81%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%9A%D1%83%D1%98%D0%B5-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D1%83-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BC-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BC-%D1%81%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B7-%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B4%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B01.html)
ако сте мислили да ће да вас капуљача сакрије од ока великог брата, погрешили сте...
Quote
This AI Knows Who You Are by the Way You Walk (https://gizmodo.com/this-ai-knows-who-you-are-by-the-way-you-walk-1826368997)
Our individual walking styles, much like snowflakes, are unique. With this in mind, computer scientists have developed a powerful new footstep-recognition system using AI, and it could theoretically replace retinal scanners and fingerprinting at security checkpoints, including airports.
Neural networks can find telltale patterns in a person's gait that can be used to recognize and identify them with almost perfect accuracy, according to new research (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8275035/) published in IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence. The new system, called SfootBD, is nearly 380 times more accurate than previous methods, and it doesn't require a person to go barefoot in order to work. It's less invasive than other behavioral biometric verification systems, such as retinal scanners or fingerprinting, but its passive nature could make it a bigger privacy concern, since it could be used covertly.
"Each human has approximately 24 different factors and movements when walking, resulting in every individual person having a unique, singular walking pattern," Omar Costilla Reyes, the lead author of the new study and a computer scientist at the University of Manchester, said in a statement.
To create the system, Reyes compiled a database consisting of 20,000 footstep signals from more than 120 individuals. It's now the largest footsteps database in existence. Each gait was measured using pressure pads on the floor and a high-resolution camera. An artificially intelligent system called a deep residual neural network scoured through the data, analyzing weight distribution, gait speed, and three-dimensional measures of each walking style. Importantly, the system considers aspects of the gait, rather than the shape of the footprint.
"Focusing on non-intrusive gait recognition by monitoring the force exerted on the floor during a footstep is very challenging," said Reyes. "That's because distinguishing between the subtle variations from person to person is extremely difficult to define manually, that is why we had to come up with a novel AI system to solve this challenge from a new perspective."
Previous attempts at footstep recognition involved the scanning of individuals without their shoes on (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2944246/), and a 3D-imaging technique (https://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/research/gait_biometrics) that compared a person's walking style to CCTV footage. The new technique is more accurate than both, though it does require the use of special floor pads.
To test the SfootBD system, Reyes' team monitored participants in three different scenarios: airport security checkpoints, workplaces, and homes. The researchers also tested a control group of imposters to see if the AI could tell when someone was trying to fake another person's gait (which it could). Results showed that, on average, the system was 100 percent accurate in identifying individuals, with an error rate of just 0.7 percent. That's obviously an impressive result, and a sign that the technology could be effective in real-world situations.
This new system does have some limitations. As noted, SfootBD requires the use of floor pads and a high-res camera, so this form of surveillance and identification can't be used just anywhere. What's more, the tool is only as powerful as its database; the only individuals who can be identified are those whose distinctive gaits have been previously recorded and cataloged in the system. This approach is probably not very scalable, since collecting everyone's walking style is an order of magnitude more difficult than, say, collecting photos for facial recognition. Finally, there are also issues of privacy and consent to consider, as this technology could be used surreptitiously.
So it's a neat advance, but only time will tell how practical this method is for the real world.
[IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8275035/)]
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 30-05-2018, 13:10:02
Министарство одбране поступило по решењу повереника којим се забрањује обрада података у приватним информационо-телекомуникационим средствима без судског налога (https://www.poverenik.rs/sr/%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%88%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%9A%D0%B0/2870-%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%88%D0%B5%D1%9A%D1%83-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%98%D0%B8%D0%BC-%D1%81%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%9A%D1%83%D1%98%D0%B5-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D1%83-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BC-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BC-%D1%81%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B7-%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B4%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B01.html)
Ministarstvo uzvraća:
Саопштење (http://www.mod.gov.rs/cir/12637/saopstenje-12637)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-gave-some-companies-access-to-additional-data-about-users-friends-1528490406
Smart-home technology becomes the newest tool of domestic abusers
(https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/smart-home-technologybecomes-the-newest-tool-of-domestic-abusers/)
A ima i ovo:
The Wiretap Rooms (https://theintercept.com/2018/06/25/att-internet-nsa-spy-hubs/)
Ecuador Will Imminently Withdraw Asylum for Julian Assange and Hand Him Over to the U.K. What Comes Next? (https://theintercept.com/2018/07/21/ecuador-will-imminently-withdraw-asylum-for-julian-assange-and-hand-him-over-to-the-uk-what-comes-next/)
E, aj mala digresija,
koji je najbolji app na ovim telefonima da instaliramo klinac žena i ja da si mož' pratimo po guglemapsi jedan drugoga i trećega?
Quote from: Ugly MF on 18-08-2018, 23:14:03
E, aj mala digresija,
koji je najbolji app na ovim telefonima da instaliramo klinac žena i ja da si mož' pratimo po guglemapsi jedan drugoga i trećega?
Koj će ti moj to? Mada, koliko znam, da bi te pratili, i ti da bi pratio fontele, na istom mora da bidne uključen GPS, a ako nije, jedini način je da se konektuješ na internet. Ako nisi konektovan, ne mož da te ufate. Ono, mogu, ali ti treba rut pristup. Što se tiče aplikacije, imaš hindi, kinesko, arapske prevare koje ti kao prate telefon koji tražiš da ti prate, pa ti posle traže pare, i u stvari ili prate tebe i sakupljaju podatke. Imaš gugletovu opciju find my phone, koji ti u milimetar pokaže kude ti je telefon, na gugle mape. Ako baš oćeš da pratiš ženu, decu, sebe, instaliraj android device manager.
Android device manager? Tenkju probaću sjutra.
jel ko čito ovo
https://www.laguna.rs/n3531_knjiga_zlocini_buducnosti_laguna.html
realno, bio sam sumnjičav jerbo laguna, ali ovo je u stvari prilično super
za sada na početku obrađuje ono što se trenutno već dešava, a onda kreće futuristika, to koje još nisam stigo
najjače je opisao Gugl, napravili su Android jer vas premalo prate samo dok ste na desktopu ili laptopu, a mob nosite svuda sa sobom
i postoji opcija da vaše razgovore prate čak i tako što identifikuju zvuk u pozadini, pa ako kojim slučajem slušate Šabana će vam srede baner ili neki propagandni email letak s narodnjacima
ispade da sve što vam daju besplatno, od gmaila pa nadalje, služi samo da im vi šaljete podatke, a oni to prodaju oglašivačima
a ovo je tek prvih 80 strana
Ian Bogost:
Welcome to the Age of Privacy Nihilism (https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/08/the-age-of-privacy-nihilism-is-here/568198/)
inače, da potvrdim da je Gudmenova knjiga vrhunska, pogotovo dva poglavlja o tome šta korporacije rade
totalni, ama baš totalni Karl Šmit
jebasmo ježa
Google China Prototype Links Searches to Phone Numbers (https://theintercept.com/2018/09/14/google-china-prototype-links-searches-to-phone-numbers/)
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-18/china-social-credit-a-model-citizen-in-a-digital-dictatorship/10200278?pfmredir=sm
Vratiti ustavnu garanciju u Zakon o zaštiti podataka o ličnosti (https://vesti.istinomer.rs/vesti/2018/10/19/vratiti-ustavnu-garanciju-u-zakon-o-zastiti-podataka-o-licnosti/?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=always_on&utm_content=shareconference_%20pravno_ogranicenje)
Tizer:
QuotePravno ograničenje kojim se policiji, obaveštajnim agencijama ili privatnim kompanijama omogućava da zadiru u privatnost građana samo kada je to propisano zakonom izbrisano je iz Predloga zakona o zaštiti podataka o ličnosti koji je trenutno u skupštinskoj proceduri
Ministarstvo pravde uzvraća udarac. Ili bar pojašnjava da nema mesta uznemirenju:
Ministarstvo pravde: Privatnost građana nije ugrožena (https://vesti.istinomer.rs/vesti/2018/10/25/ministarstvo-pravde-privatnost-gradana-nije-ugrozena/?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=always_on&utm_content=ministarstvo_pravde_saopstilo)
bre, pa vi ste već na spisku donatora organa a brinete za internet privatnost... Neoliberalizam
Deljenje organa koji nam više ne trebaju je plemenito! A to da neko može da vidi, npr. tvoju privatnu komunikaciju bez da je to odobrio sud jeste malo da se zabrineš i to je osnova jedne od popularnih neoliberalnih industrija - big date.
Pa čak i big data. Big date je industrija budućnosti, u kojoj će nam na osnovu big data neoliberalni algoritmi pronalaziti idealne partnere.
Opt-out politika donacije organa nije neoliberalna, jer tu ne postoji tržište i razmena dobara. Svi želimo da živimo, a ne samo neoliberali. Opt-out politika nam to omogućava.
Eh, pa ja sam big data stavio u padež, otud "big date".
Mada mi je sad slatko da razmišljam o neoliberalnoj industriji romantičnih sastanaka. :lol:
ma big date su već okupirali
https://socialistpassions.com/
ovdje niko ne čita Ayn Rand :D
a naravno da je predaja tvojih organa na izvolte tržište, postoji i ponuda, a postoji i potražnja
čak te niko ni ne pita nego si automatski proglašen za davaoca, a onda kao imaš pravo da zahtijevaš da budeš sklonjen s liste
zna li Truman ovo
Za tržište je potrebna robno-novčana razmena. Ovde nema novca, a i nazvati organ robom je već nategnuto. Ako nazivaš organ robom onda si neoliberal.
Quote from: Pizzobatto on 25-10-2018, 11:36:42
ovdje niko ne čita Ayn Rand :D
Pa, ovde dolazi pristojan svet.
Mada, je i fakat da je Ayn Rand pisala neku vrstu fantastike. Atlas Shrugged ima elemente naučne fantastike.
Apropo organa, postoji tržište na kome se oni mogu prodati, i to ne samo crno tržište gde se valjaju oteti bubrezi. U SAD se legalno može prodavati (svoja) krv, pa imamo taj primer.
Ali ovo da se po difoltu posthumno stavljaju na raspolaganje javnim institucijama nije baš to...
Da, taj detalj sam izostavio. Dakle, za tržište je potrebna robno-novčana razmena, a ovde ne može biti razmene, jer je hipotetički primalac dobrobiti te razmene upravo preminuo.
Se pravimo blesavi? Ima ko naplati.
Okej, ko? Od koga ide novac, i kome ide novac?
A mogao si svojim postom odmah da navedeš ko. Ovako se samo dodatno vijamo po temi.
mislio sam na onu šalu kako Randova služi selekciji partnera
elem, za tržište nije potrebna robno-novčana razmjena nego samo razmjena
npr, razmjena ideja je tržište ideja, a postoji i takozvano bračno tržište
postoji potražnja za partnerom s određenim karakteristikama, a postoji i ponuda takve kategorije, pa ako se poklope
naravno, big data će to sve "pomoći"
rekoh da čitaš Bekera, mac, tamo je sve tržište
uostalom, Fridman i drugari smatraju da se jezik tržišno razvio
Quote from: mac on 25-10-2018, 12:17:12
Okej, ko? Od koga ide novac, i kome ide novac?
A mogao si svojim postom odmah da navedeš ko. Ovako se samo dodatno vijamo po temi.
Što bih se ja vijao sa tobom? Čitaj, gledaj, uči. Nema dobre ideje koja nije zloupotrebljena.
Pričamo o neoliberalnom tržištu. Tu negde mora biti novca valjda, ali moguće je da grešim. I dalje ostaje poenta turanja neoliberalizma u sve. Sam si rekao, i u Staljinovom SSSR postojalo je tržište. Dakle, pokaži mi neoliberalno tržište u opt-out politici donacija organa.
Scallope nisi konstruktivan, pa će te neoliberalno tržište ovog foruma izignorisati. A posle se pitaš što te ljudi ignorišu. Dakle, budi konstruktivan. Iznesi korisne informacije.
eno ti btw Beker na topiku o neoliberalizmu
ne slušaš, tržište je po definiciji mjesto susreta ponude i potražnje
ko kaže da mora da postoji novac na tom mjestu?
Uostalom, ideja jeste roba, sve materijalno i nematerijalno može da bude tretirano kao roba
Hanibal Lektor kad priča sa Klaris u Kad jaganjci utihnu traži od nje razmjenu, on odgovori na jedno pitanje pa ona na njegovo
i tako dalje
mjesto ponude i potražnje, i svuda primjenjivo
zato neoliberali ne iskorjenjuju kriminal, jer ponuda kriminala ne mora biti nula, niti potražnja za nekom robom treba da bude potpuno zabranjena. Tako i policijska potražnja za kriminalom nikad nije apsolutna!
Zato i imamo ludačke kaznene sistem koji ništa ne kažnjavaju niti iskorjenjuju, kad neoliberali ne vjeruju niti podržavaju iskorijenjivanje ponude!
inače, Beker apsolutno podržava tržište organa, mada koliko se sjećam govori da bi organi bili daleko kvalitetniji ako bi se naplaćivali, jer bi bili prihvatani samo očuvani iz srednje klase, i oni mogu dobrovoljno da ih prodaju i za života
ovaj naš neoliberalizam za siromašne je svakako odnos naše ponude i potražnje, ali u startu ukida tvoje pravo na sopstvenu svojinu, pri čemu je i tijelo tvoja svojina
Ti ne možeš toga da se odrekneš ni po Ustavu
I dalje mi nisi pokazao tržište. Pričamo o našem konkretnom slučaju , a ne o nečemu što je neko rekao. U našem konkretnom slučaju svi su davaoci organa, osim onih koji traže da ne budu. I ne daješ organe za života, nego kad umreš. I niti ti niti tvoja tvoja porodica ne dobija nikakvu kompenzaciju za tvoje automatsko davanje organa.
Pokaži mi tržište. SHOW ME THE MONEY! (ne hvataj se za ovo "money", to je citat iz filma. uzdrži se od nebitnog i pokaži mi tržište)
I to ne bilo kakvo tržište davalaca organa nego NEOLIBERALNO tržište davalaca organa. Jer o tome pričamo.
Quote from: mac on 25-10-2018, 12:47:34
Scallope nisi konstruktivan, pa će te neoliberalno tržište ovog foruma izignorisati. A posle se pitaš što te ljudi ignorišu. Dakle, budi konstruktivan. Iznesi korisne informacije.
Mene ne ignorišu pametni. Trgovanje ljudskim organima ne smatram neoliberalnom praksom, pa o tome trtljaj sa Batom.
naravno da dobijaju kompenzaciju
prvo, i oni su potencijalni korisnici organa drugih, jer nikad se ne zna
drugo, dobijaju psihološku satisfakciju, feel good human momenat itd
treće, za neoliberale svaki susret ponude i potražnje je tržište, pa makar bio to neki lingvistički ili romantični fenomen
tako da samim tim što tražimo ne-finansijsko tržište mi tražimo neoliberalno
kao što je Wikipedija za Bekera tržište, jelte
Quote from: scallop on 25-10-2018, 13:05:00
Quote from: mac on 25-10-2018, 12:47:34
Scallope nisi konstruktivan, pa će te neoliberalno tržište ovog foruma izignorisati. A posle se pitaš što te ljudi ignorišu. Dakle, budi konstruktivan. Iznesi korisne informacije.
Mene ne ignorišu pametni. Trgovanje ljudskim organima ne smatram neoliberalnom praksom, pa o tome trtljaj sa Batom.
al baš ne djeluje pametno reći da ovdje iko priča o trgovini organima
Kakvo uopštavanje. Dakle Hamurabi i Solon su bili neoliberali, jer su doneli zakone na tržišt javnog reda i mira. Hoćeš red i mir? Onda budi redan i miran. Neoliberalizam!
Ako su donijeli zakone kojim prčkaju po tijelu
Ali sve je tržište. Zašto stati na telu. I osećaj bezbednosti je roba. Nemoj sad da staješ. Dakle, neoliberal Hamurabi je uveo ideju da ako želiš da budeš bezbedan onda moraš da radiš bezbedne stvari. Ako kradeš bićeš ubijen. Ako digneš ruku na oca odseče ti se ruka. Uostalom eto ti prčkanja po telu, ode ruka jbg.
Malo se ovde sad opet gubi fokus: neoliberalno tržište je, hipotetički, tržište bez sistemske regulative (ili sa njenim najnižim teorijskim nivoom) - barem po uobičajenom shvatanju neoliberalizma. Tako da bi, kako ja to shvatam, ovo za organe bilo neoliberalno tržište kada bismo Bata i ja mogli slobodno, bez ikakvih propisa koji nas ograničavaju, pregovarali o tome da ja njemu dam bubreg ili on meni pola kile krvi, u zamenu za opet regulativom i propisima ne-ograničenu dogovorenu kompenzaciju. Ako postoje propisi kojima se ovakva razmena ograničava ili uređuje, to nije neoliberalni ideal slobodnog tržišta.
Naravno, kad Bata kaže "neoliberalizam" on misli na nešto dalje od pukog slobodnog tržišta kao jedinog priznatog sistema za redistribuciju vrednosti, poštujemo, ali u ovom slučaju potrebno je konkretnije objašnjenje. Samo postojanje potražnje za organima i potencijalne ponude još uvek ne čini ovu vrstu razmene neoliberalnom, bar ne u jednom koraku. Dajte da čujemo te izmeđne korake.
Pa ako moram da naglašavam da neoliberalizam nije slobodno tržište i da broj intervencija i kontrola može biti veći no u staljinizmu, i to oni sami tako kažu, onda nismo mrdnuli s početka.
Ili da su tijelo i rad kod neoliberala ljucki kapital.
Kakve uopšte detalje hoće Mac, uređen sistem razmjene bilo čega za bilo šta je neoliberalno tržište.
Npr jezik, širenje šatrovačkog se objašnjava tržišnim mehanizmom a para niđe.
A ovdje te nitko ni ne pita dal hoćeš da daš organe, što je monstruozno
Uostalom, može nekog da buni čuven praksa javno-privatnog partnerstva, koja je moguća i u slučaju monopol i državnog prrduzeća.
Dakle, jedino demokratizovano pitanje administriranja organa bi ispalo iz matrice tržišta.
A ovo te bukvalno uvlači i tjera da reaguješ traženjem povratka onog što već imaš u stavom garantovanih pravs
Prevazišli smo monstruozno odavno, otprilike od razdvajanja crkve i države i uvođenja građanskog braka. Uzgred, ne znam šta je tu monstruozno, ali znam da spasava živote, kao i da imaš pravo da se za života deklarišeš da nisi donor, ako to zaista želiš. Koje to čudovište ti dozvoljava da joj izmakneš? Mora da je neko neoliberalno.
Nisu samo telo i rad kapital, nego je sve resurs i to i sam kažeš već u sledećoj rečenici. Ne sviđa vam se gamifikacija odlaska u Madrid, a sviđa vam se gamifikacija javnog reda i mira, gde onaj ko poštuje zakon ne bude kažnjen po tom zakonu. Quid pro quo. Sve su to neoliberali zakuvali još u Vavilonu.
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fokuzz.com%2Fmedia%2F26293%2Fgladijatorska-medicina-3-c99.jpg&hash=485551a95c8db1ca31318f68c96f6b475d302039)
Stvarno ne znam kakvu analogiju bacaš čitavo vrijeme jer ovo nije kazna, nije negativna no pozitivna vrsta zakona. Al zato i jesi neoliberal kad ne razlikuješ.
Drugo, ja ne moram da se trudim i gubim svoje vrijeme za procedure koje nisam ni započeo nego su mi nametnute. I baš će milioni ljudi da prate šta se dešava i kakve se zloupotrebe mogu desiti.
Klasična stupica nazovi humanizma. Učinimo dobro djelo, uz kupovinu starbaks kafe dolar ide crncima iz Konga.
To je kupovina kukavičluka i kozmetičkih maski, uz opasnost da se u svakom trenutku komercijalizuje.
Zdravstvo sve gore, dajte mu još je tri bubrega i kolača, još tržišta i biće bolje.
Smijurija
Pozitivno/negativno, sad izmišljaš novotarije koje do sad nikad nisi spomenuo. Važno je da je osećanje bezbednosti jedan resurs, a naše akcije koje doprinose osećanju bezbednosti drugih sugrađana je drugi resurs, i ti ovim drugim resursom plaćaš za ovaj prvi. Znači tržište, znači Hamurabi neoliberal.
Dodao bih sad još nešto, ali ne želim da se hvataš za to drugo, dok ne završimo s neoliberalom Hamurabijem.
Meni se isto čini da Bata sve što nije komunizam, dakle, potpuno centralno kontrolisana redistribucija, proglašava neoliberalizmom. A to je suviše grubo.
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 25-10-2018, 14:27:44
neoliberalno tržište je, hipotetički, tržište bez sistemske regulative
Omakne se tebi dobra rečenica. Ponekad, Slučajno. xfrog
Ali ne preterano informativna. Šta je onda neoliberalno u gamifikaciji odlaska u Madrid? Jer tu je sve fino regulisano.
Pa to sam tamo objasnio - neoliberali vole da sve kvantifikuju i ocenjuju i - gistro - nagrađuju po učinku, a glavno je to što uvodiš određenu vrstu "nagrađivanja" na poslu koja nema veze sa time da ćeš dobiti opipljivu naknadu za rad, tj. novac. Kao što je recimo "neoliberalno" to da se na posao mora dolaziti u odelu sa kravatom ali petkom može i u farmerkama i polo-majici jer postoji "Casual Friday". I sad je to kao stimulans za radnika iako nema veze sa onim zbog čega on radi - novcem, na kraju dana. ne tvrdim da je to primer neoliberalnog tržišta, naravno, već samo da su ovakve stvari karakteristične za neoliberalni pristup društvenom odnosu razmene rada za, jelte, druge vrednosti, tj. da se u takvom pristupu stalno pokušava uvesti to da je radnik - dakle onaj ko DECIDNO nije vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju - na neki način učini tobož partnerom sa onim ko jeste vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju kroz razne veštačke situacije u kojima se kreira privid da radnik ima povlastice koje je, kao, možda i zaradio nekakvim isticanjem na poslu (skupljanjem poena itd.) i to je, kao, kolektiv prepoznao, a sve je to zamena za stvarnu razmenu u kojoj će dobiti ili više novca zbog koga radi, ili mogućnost da učestvuje u odlučivanju na smislen način (koliko će mu biti radno vreme, kakva naknada, osiguranje, bezbednosni standardi itd.).
Ne, ne, ne! Samo ona jedna rečenica.
I, zašto vršljate po ovom topiku? Nije špijuniranje, nije gaming, nije o korišćenju organa, nije o neolibveralizmu... Svi bi da nešto objasnite, a niko nikog ne zarezuje. :evil:
Pa nije u pitanju nagrađivanje, zar nisam to već rekao. Ti kažeš to je nagrađivanje. Ja kažem to nije nagrađivanje. Mogu ponovo da objasnim zašto to nije nagrađivanje (i zato što nema veze sa samim poslodavcem), nego raspodela ograničenih resursa, kojom upravljaju sami učesnici. Ali ako ćeš posle mesec dana opet da kažeš da je to nagrađivanje, onda jbg čemu sve ovo...
Dobro, druga tema onda:
How a 19th-Century Teenager Sparked a Battle Over Who Owns Our Faces (https://gizmodo.com/how-a-19th-century-teenager-sparked-a-battle-over-who-o-1829572319)
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 25-10-2018, 22:22:32
Pa to sam tamo objasnio - neoliberali vole da sve kvantifikuju i ocenjuju i - gistro - nagrađuju po učinku, a glavno je to što uvodiš određenu vrstu "nagrađivanja" na poslu koja nema veze sa time da ćeš dobiti opipljivu naknadu za rad, tj. novac. Kao što je recimo "neoliberalno" to da se na posao mora dolaziti u odelu sa kravatom ali petkom može i u farmerkama i polo-majici jer postoji "Casual Friday". I sad je to kao stimulans za radnika iako nema veze sa onim zbog čega on radi - novcem, na kraju dana. ne tvrdim da je to primer neoliberalnog tržišta, naravno, već samo da su ovakve stvari karakteristične za neoliberalni pristup društvenom odnosu razmene rada za, jelte, druge vrednosti, tj. da se u takvom pristupu stalno pokušava uvesti to da je radnik - dakle onaj ko DECIDNO nije vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju - na neki način učini tobož partnerom sa onim ko jeste vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju kroz razne veštačke situacije u kojima se kreira privid da radnik ima povlastice koje je, kao, možda i zaradio nekakvim isticanjem na poslu (skupljanjem poena itd.) i to je, kao, kolektiv prepoznao, a sve je to zamena za stvarnu razmenu u kojoj će dobiti ili više novca zbog koga radi, ili mogućnost da učestvuje u odlučivanju na smislen način (koliko će mu biti radno vreme, kakva naknada, osiguranje, bezbednosni standardi itd.).
i kako je to onda tržište bez regulative kad si upravo opisao jedan od oblika HR menadžmenta?
Inače, neoliberalizam je svako tržište sistematski regulisano sa ciljem pojačanja efikasnosti tržišta
tržište koje je regulisano sa ciljem ispravljanja grešaka tržišta već nije neoliberalizam, jer neoliberali ne vjeruju u intervencionizam tipa nacionalizacije ili rada države na proizvodnji masovnog zapošljavanja - to je welfare state intervencionizam
i na kraju, neregulisano, tzv laissez faire tržište je klasični liberalizam
ono bi globalno postojalo npr kada ne bi postojale svecka banka, svecka trgovinska organizacija, međunarodni monetarni fond. Npr
A pošto ta sistematska regulativa itekako postoji, itekako disciplinuje i postrojava države, ne uvijek u interesu tih država nego u okviru svog neokolonijalnog pristupa, onda je valjda normalno zaključiti da je to regulisano neoliberalno tržište
dakle, summa summarum, imaš neoliberalizam kao regulisano tržište sa ciljem pojačanja efikasnosti tržišta (npr intenzifikacijom konkurencije), imaš velferizam kao regulisano tržište da se spriječe ekscesi, da država pospješuje masovno zapošljavanje, da socijalna politika bude povezana sa ekonomskom itd, i na kraju imaš slobodno tržište klasičnih liberala
i pored toga imaš plansku ekonomiju kao četvrtu
Ok, krećemo se konačno u razumnom smeru.
E, sad, kako se ovo transplantuje na zaveštanje organa?
Quote from: mac on 25-10-2018, 19:51:40
Pozitivno/negativno, sad izmišljaš novotarije koje do sad nikad nisi spomenuo. Važno je da je osećanje bezbednosti jedan resurs, a naše akcije koje doprinose osećanju bezbednosti drugih sugrađana je drugi resurs, i ti ovim drugim resursom plaćaš za ovaj prvi. Znači tržište, znači Hamurabi neoliberal.
Dodao bih sad još nešto, ali ne želim da se hvataš za to drugo, dok ne završimo s neoliberalom Hamurabijem.
otkad su to novotarije? Negativno orijentisan zakon se odnosi na kažnjavanje ako ga prekršiš. Kakve veze ima s tim bilo koji zakon koji nastoji da proizvede nešto, koji ima projekat u svojoj osnovi?
resursi se mogu koristiti na tržišni način a mogu i na državni način. Pri čemu šta može biti resurs može da se odluči dijalogom, javnom raspravvom, što je suština demokratije. A kad pitanje nije demokratizovano no je prosto proglašeno stanje, onda je jasno da dijaloga nije bilo, nego su potezom ruke i potpisom svi postali XXXX
XXXX može biti podanici, davaoci organa, vojni regruti, pokusni kunići, preduzetnici, šta god. Al oni nisu tako odlučili.
Praktično, kao što jedan kritičar neoliberalizma kaže, njima je naređeno da budu slobodni
a ovdje čak nije oksimoronski naređena sloboda nego je određeno ko je vlasnik njihovih organa pod klauzulom 6, tačka 3 kroz 8
Orvel se zaebo
za početak, postoje samo dvije vrste odlučivanja, putem dijaloga ili putem tržišta
pošto se prvo nije desilo zasigurno se desilo drugo
pošto je to ipak razmjena "robe", njena izvandemokratska regulacija očigledno može da bude samo neoliberalna ili planska
no, pošto nas neoliberali uče da ni u SSSR nije se moglo bez tržišta, da su i krompir kupovali na crnom tržištu jer nisu mogli do njega da dođu kroz plansku distribuciju, sasvim je jasno da se ovo ne može drugačije sprovoditi
štaviše, socijalisti i nemaju sopstveni sistem vrijednosti, to jest nemaju sopstveni način upravljanja
oni su podjednako utilitaristi kao i kapitalisti ili kao mac neoliberal
a utilitarizam kreće od procjene koristi, te zaključuje da organ treba da dobije onaj kome najviše koristi. U tom smislu, šljakaće apsolutno kao tržište, uz znatnu dozu korupcije
a u stvari, ne-neoliberalan državnik neće procjenjivati korist odnosno neće biti preduzetnik u oblasti transplantacije organa. Samo izjednačavanje državnika i preduzetnika, tako da oni donose maltene istovjetne odluke - jeste neoliberalizam
u stvari, državnik mora da ima sasvim drugačiju teoriju vrijednosti kojom treba da se vodi
sama ideja automatskog davaoca organa to upravo nije. Ona je u startu utilitaristička
dokažite da nije pa ste dokazali da to nije tržište
Koju vrstu odlučivanja od dve navedene je koristio Hamurabi kad je stvarao svoj zakonik? Da li je moguće da postoji još neka vrsta odlučivanja pored dve navedene?
Sad se pazi, Bato. Taman si im delimično objasnio i ima da te razvuku na doniranje organa i Hamurabijev takon. xrofl xrofl xrofl xrofl xrofl xrofl xrofl xrofl
Quote from: Pizzobatto on 26-10-2018, 11:57:43
a utilitarizam kreće od procjene koristi, te zaključuje da organ treba da dobije onaj kome najviše koristi. U tom smislu, šljakaće apsolutno kao tržište, uz znatnu dozu korupcije
Ali tu tom slučaju je i "svakome prema potrebama", dakle, polovina Marksove komunističke krilatice takođe "tržište" a time, izgleda, automatski neoliberalizam. Što meni ne deluje uverljivo. Neoliberalno tržište, kako kažeš, je tržište regulisano sa ciljem povećanja efikasnosti tržišta (što, pretpostaviću, a ispravi me ako grešim, treba da znači da je redistribucija brža i efikasnija u cilju dalje oplodnje investiranog kapitala) dok "tržište koje je regulisano sa ciljem ispravljanja grešaka tržišta već nije neoliberalizam", takođe po tvojim rečima. Ako odluku o dodeli organa ne donosimo po osnovi poboljšanja efikasnosti tržišta (recimo, ne biramo primaoca po tome koliko je spreman da plati ili koliko brzo može da plati), da li se onda to uklapa u gornje definicije neoliberalnog i ne-neoliberalnog pristupa redistribuciji?
nisam gugl pa da znam šta je pisao Hamurabi
dao sam ti sve što je potrebno da sam primijeniš na njegovom zakoniku
uostalom, naravno da je u Mesopotamiji nastalo prvo razvijeno tržište i naravno da skoro svi zakoni štite svojinu, kažnjavaju prestupnike koji su ugrozili tržišni proces itd
da nije Hamurabi možda ukinuo svojinu? Proglasio jednakost? Itd...
gradio čoek bolnice i školetine, domove kulture, a zatvori ovolicni
ti nam istraži Hamurabija pa javi
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 26-10-2018, 12:14:47
Quote from: Pizzobatto on 26-10-2018, 11:57:43
a utilitarizam kreće od procjene koristi, te zaključuje da organ treba da dobije onaj kome najviše koristi. U tom smislu, šljakaće apsolutno kao tržište, uz znatnu dozu korupcije
Ali tu tom slučaju je i "svakome prema potrebama", dakle, polovina Marksove komunističke krilatice takođe "tržište" a time, izgleda, automatski neoliberalizam. Što meni ne deluje uverljivo. Neoliberalno tržište, kako kažeš, je tržište regulisano sa ciljem povećanja efikasnosti tržišta (što, pretpostaviću, a ispravi me ako grešim, treba da znači da je redistribucija brža i efikasnija u cilju dalje oplodnje investiranog kapitala) dok "tržište koje je regulisano sa ciljem ispravljanja grešaka tržišta već nije neoliberalizam", takođe po tvojim rečima. Ako odluku o dodeli organa ne donosimo po osnovi poboljšanja efikasnosti tržišta (recimo, ne biramo primaoca po tome koliko je spreman da plati ili koliko brzo može da plati), da li se onda to uklapa u gornje definicije neoliberalnog i ne-neoliberalnog pristupa redistribuciji?
potreba i korist nisu isto. Pojedinac može da ne zna koje su njegove potrebe, al baš tu se Marks i slupao, jer pojedinca baš briga koje su njegove potrebe.
Želja i korist imaju prvenstvo i zato neoliberalizam dominira, on prosto ne civilizuje ljude no im udovoljava.
Šta je efikasno tržište u ovom slučaju - pa tržište radne snage. Za neoliberale zdravstveni sistem služi produžavanju radne sposobnosti a ne dužem životu. Bitnije je da šljakaš kao konj s tri jetre do XX godine života, poslije nije bitno
Lijekovi služe održavanju radne snage do penzije, nakon penzije nisi tolko bitan, još da ti plaćaju penziju 20-30 godina, pa na gubitku su odma
vrlo primaljiva ponuda, hajde da svi budemo zdravi i što zdraviji, ali začkoljica stoji u pozadini, zašto zdraviji, u kom smislu zdraviji, za šta zdraviji i do kada zdraviji
a pretpostavljati da će ovo da služi nekoj raji a ne Rokfeleru za osmo srce da ga dignu iz groba, i to treba uzeti u obzir.
dakle, prvenstveni cilj jeste efikasnost u ovom slučaju, nije valjda zdravlje ljudi prvenstveni cilj? Ko to kaže, Aleksandar Martinović koji je donio zakon u skupštini?
pa dokažite da je to cilj. Ja ne vidim kako je to trenutno cilj.
Ko digne ruku na oca odseći će mu se ruka. Ko je usvojen i kaže za svoje roditelje da mu nisu otac i majka odseći će mu se jezik. Ovde se ne štiti nikakva svojina, nego samo vrsta javnog reda i mira, kakvom su je videli u ono doba. Nema tržišta, osim tržišta javnog reda i mira. Ali Hamaurabi nije dijalogovao, jer je kralj. Stoga je štitio tržište javnog reda i mira, stoga je Hamurabi prvi neoliberal?
Quote from: Pizzobatto on 26-10-2018, 12:27:57
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 26-10-2018, 12:14:47
Quote from: Pizzobatto on 26-10-2018, 11:57:43
a utilitarizam kreće od procjene koristi, te zaključuje da organ treba da dobije onaj kome najviše koristi. U tom smislu, šljakaće apsolutno kao tržište, uz znatnu dozu korupcije
Ali tu tom slučaju je i "svakome prema potrebama", dakle, polovina Marksove komunističke krilatice takođe "tržište" a time, izgleda, automatski neoliberalizam. Što meni ne deluje uverljivo. Neoliberalno tržište, kako kažeš, je tržište regulisano sa ciljem povećanja efikasnosti tržišta (što, pretpostaviću, a ispravi me ako grešim, treba da znači da je redistribucija brža i efikasnija u cilju dalje oplodnje investiranog kapitala) dok "tržište koje je regulisano sa ciljem ispravljanja grešaka tržišta već nije neoliberalizam", takođe po tvojim rečima. Ako odluku o dodeli organa ne donosimo po osnovi poboljšanja efikasnosti tržišta (recimo, ne biramo primaoca po tome koliko je spreman da plati ili koliko brzo može da plati), da li se onda to uklapa u gornje definicije neoliberalnog i ne-neoliberalnog pristupa redistribuciji?
potreba i korist nisu isto. Pojedinac može da ne zna koje su njegove potrebe, al baš tu se Marks i slupao, jer pojedinca baš briga koje su njegove potrebe.
Želja i korist imaju prvenstvo i zato neoliberalizam dominira, on prosto ne civilizuje ljude no im udovoljava.
Šta je efikasno tržište u ovom slučaju - pa tržište radne snage. Za neoliberale zdravstveni sistem služi produžavanju radne sposobnosti a ne dužem životu. Bitnije je da šljakaš kao konj s tri jetre do XX godine života, poslije nije bitno
Lijekovi služe održavanju radne snage do penzije, nakon penzije nisi tolko bitan, još da ti plaćaju penziju 20-30 godina, pa na gubitku su odma
vrlo primaljiva ponuda, hajde da svi budemo zdravi i što zdraviji, ali začkoljica stoji u pozadini, zašto zdraviji, u kom smislu zdraviji, za šta zdraviji i do kada zdraviji
a pretpostavljati da će ovo da služi nekoj raji a ne Rokfeleru za osmo srce da ga dignu iz groba, i to treba uzeti u obzir.
dakle, prvenstveni cilj jeste efikasnost u ovom slučaju, nije valjda zdravlje ljudi prvenstveni cilj? Ko to kaže, Aleksandar Martinović koji je donio zakon u skupštini?
pa dokažite da je to cilj. Ja ne vidim kako je to trenutno cilj.
Ovde ima mnogo pretpostavki koje nismo u stanju da potvrdimo pa mislim da moramo da se složimo da se ne slažemo, odnosno da mene ova argumentacija nije ubedila.
troluješ, naravno
elem, ne treba zaboraviti da prije klasičnog liberalizma dijete je vlasništvo roditelja i može biti prodato kao i ostatak životinjskog carstva na farmi
ali to je prije bila vlast nad smrću nego vlast nad životom
odscijecanje ruku, egzekucije, dželat je bio centralna institucija
nikakve veze s današnjim neoliberalizmom nema jer ne cilja na očuvanje radne snage
Nastavićete vi svaki svoju verziju, a ja ću naglasiti gde je razlika između Bate i mene. Bata bi više da se bavi korenjem pojave, a pošto ne jedemo samo šargarepe i rotkve, ja sam više za priču o nadzemnim plodovima, odnosno kad je na Zapadu neoliberalizam postao politički dominantan proces ili kako bih ja rekao od prelomne tačke (tipping point). Regan je dolazkom na vlast u SAD skinuo poreze bogatima sa 70% na 28%, a povećao ih na ličnu imovinu, štedne uloge i nasledne takse. Tako je dao vetar u leđa svima sklonim kockanju i zelenašenju.
Bata je propustio da definiše karakter planske privrede, zanemarujući osnovne razlike. Najbitnija je da se neoliberalizmu ne jebe za svetske resurse, pa nije jasno kako se istovremeno zalažete za tu politiku i očuvanje biodiverziteta. Sa druge strane ja ciljeve planske privrede prevashodno vidim kao napor ostvarenja samodovoljne društvene ekonomije. Upravo zbog nje smo mogli da preživimo sve neljudske pritiske kojima smo bili izloženi devedesetih, tehnološki sposobni da proizvedemo gotovo sve. Ono u šta nas danas guraju, da proizvodimo maline i slične zavisne poljoprivredne kulture, smešta nas u "banana države", pa vi vidite.
Meho, sve je ok kad me uvjeriš u to da cilj nije održavanje efikasnosti čitave populacije u mentalnom i fizičkom smislu
ovo je sve posljedica generalnog tretiranja društva kao opšte liječene sredine, iz neke terapeutske perspektive da, kad smo već kratko na Zemlji, hajde da budemo i očajnici pride
agnostičko-nihilistički pristup i traženje medicinskog smisla u svemu je naravno trenutak kada se falsifikuje potreba, to je ono što sada imamo
izmišljanje da nam je potrebno šta - dokažite da nije efikasnost radne snage, ubacite neke humanizme i empatijizme
mislim da treba gutati plave pilule, tako je Morpheus reko u Matrixu
uostalom, mene živo zanima gdje je još donesen ovakav zakon koji automatski nekog registruje kao davaoca, jel to već prekomorska europejska praksa?
Vikipedija navodi da od 2010. godine imaš 24 takve zemlje samo u EU, pa onda svašta po latinskoj Americi itd:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organ_donation#Opt-in_versus_opt-out
E, sad, pošto dosta vremena na poslu provodim u javnozdravstvenoj sferi, mogu da kažem da se praktično nigde i nikada ne pominje efikasnost radne snage kao motiv za poboljšanje javnog zdravstva. Obično se govori o dobrobiti kao najosnovnijoj vrednosti, a ona uključuje i psihološke, da ne kažem filozofske elemente kao što je "dostojanstvo". Moguće je da je u korenu toga delom neoliberalna zavera, ali mi se čini suviše udaljenim da bismo povlačili tako tvrde znake jednakosti.
to da se transplantacije organa dešavaju u jednom neljuckom socioekonomskom kontekstu je tek posebna priča, iznova i iznova valja naglašavati da najveći klijenti države nisu siromašni niti generalno niži slojevi, i vjerovati u neku besprekornu bezličnu objektivnu organizaciju transplantacija je naivno
a pritom kršenjem ustava u startu, jer po ustavu ne možeš da se odrekneš sopstvenih prava na tijelo niti bilo kog drugog prava, čak i da potpišeš neki posrani papir ustav taj papir anulira, a ovdje zakon anulira ustav... pa čak u tako neoliberalnom kontekstu, zar stvarno neko misli da će ovo biti nešto više od mesare gdje neki dobiju iznutrice a neki ružu
Ovo za ustav bi mogao da bude dobar argument (ne za potvrdu neoliberalne teze, već za potvrdu da se ovde zakoni donose bez ozbiljne pravne analize i poštovanja postojećeg zakonodavstva) jer se zaista može argumentovati da je opt out varijanta u suprotnosti sa članom 25 našeg ustava.
No, samo da skrenem pažnju na drugi pasus nanovijeg Skalopovog posta na ovom topiku jer ga treba upamtiti u kasnijim raspravama o tome kako privreda treba da se razvija, šta je njen cilj u kakvom društvu i zašto neoliberalizam nadilazi nacionalne, regionalne i druge barijere svojim korozivnim delovanjem.
pa ova wikipedija je hit!
Registering to become an organ donor heavily depends on the attitude of the individual; those with a positive outlook might feel a sense of altruism towards organ donation
što reče mac, što ubacujem te negativne/pozitivne termine! :)
al ne, ovo je vrhunac
Legalization of the organ trade carries with it its own sense of justice as well.
ne, ček, zaebo sam se, ovo je hit nad hitovima
Legalization of the international organ trade could lead to increased supply, lowering prices so that persons outside the wealthiest segments could afford such organs as well.
internacionalizacija transplantacije organa hahahahah
možda i siormašni zakače koji bubreg, epohalne stvari!
The New Cannibalism is a phrase coined by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes in 1998 for an article written for The New Internationalist. Her argument was that the actual exploitation is an ethical failing, a human exploitation; a perception of the poor as organ sources which may be used to extend the lives of the wealthy.[112]
Economic drivers leading to increased donation are not limited to areas such as India and Africa, but also are emerging in the United States. Increasing funeral expenses combined with decreasing real value of investments such as homes and retirement savings which took place in the 2000s have purportedly led to an increase in citizens taking advantage of arrangements where funeral costs are reduced or eliminated.
(https://scontent-frx5-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t1.15752-9/44824206_499180610548102_7507405028689182720_n.png?_nc_cat=102&_nc_ht=scontent-frx5-1.xx&oh=ddb03306f38fba83d5b4ecaa1b49ffa1&oe=5C3E8164)
da ne zatrpavam dalje, ali to vam je budućnost
To se zna.
Ali je li to neoliberalizam ili prosta potvrda da bogatiji uvek ekploatišu siromašne???
Ali u našem slučaju i donori i primaoci su i bogati i siromašni, i to bez novčane kompenzacije pokojniku ili pokojnikovoj porodici. Bata argumentuje protiv nečega o čemu ovde nije ni reč.
u našem slučaju već sada pacijenti nisu jednaki, o čemu ti mače
a pritom ne posmatraš faze i normalne pretpostavke šta će se desiti u budućnosti
jesam ti dao onaj tekst Mirovskog o open science, pa čak i tu kaže prvo će da je "otvore", onda će da zaključe da je tako otvorenu najbolje tržište održava, i lijepo prognozira uberizaciju nauke do 2030. godine i to putem podrške naivnih macova
na sf forumu nimalo futurističkog dara
Kapital je oduvijek u rukama bogatih i to nije promijenjeno, al neoliberalizam mu daje formu posljednjih decenija i usmjerava ga
Ako bude bilo problema rešićemo ih demokratski. To je valjda ono što želiš, zar ne? Daj da ne deljemo apokaliptični kolac dok je zec još u šumi.
A šta ti znači to da pacijenti već sad nisu jednaki. Hoćeš da kažeš da bogatom i siromašnom pacijentu treba jetra, i umre donor s jetrom i bogati dobije jetru preko reda? Ne brate, jetru dobije onaj ko je pre došao u spisak primalaca jetre. Ko rearanžira spisak biva predmet procesuiranja organa gonjenja.
Šta se ikada rešilo demokratski? Daj ne zamlaćuj nas svojim idealizmom.
Ali i Bata hoće demokratijom protivu neoliberalizma. Znači i on se zamlaćuje.
Neće. On postavlja dijagnozu. Ne insistira da bude terapeut.
Pa gore je napisao da postoje samo dve vrste odlučivanja: putem dijaloga i putem tržišta. Pošto se protivi odlučivanju putem tržišta, kao i svaka pristojna osoba, pretpostavka je da se zalaže za odlučivanje putem dijaloga. "Dijalog" ne mora da bude demokratski u društvu, naravno, ali verovatno je to dovoljno blisko ovome o čemu pričamo da mi se čini da mac ima pravo.
Možete da se slikate i ti i Mac. Dijalog nije demokratija. Evo, ja sam za dijalog, a vi biste da nametnete svoj stav i usput ga proglašavate za demokratiju.
Ma ne preteruj, ko ti šta nameće?? Pričamo. Naravno, sama priča nije demokratija, ali videti šta sam već gore napisao (odlučivanje kroz dijalog = dovoljno blisko demokratiji).
Ma, nije. Dijalog nije ni približan demokratiji. Vodimo mi dijalog i sa Šiptarima i ni traga demokratije. Pita mene žena šta ćemo sutra za ručak, ja kažem šta bih, ona demokratski skuva nešto treće i posle, bio dijalog. Ovaj internet uopšte nije demokratski. Neko se uporno trudi da te prevari i sve proglasi demokratijom ako uspe. Ako ne uspe, onda si bot, jedeš tuđe sendviče, proglase te populistom, komunjarom, nacistom... Jebeš demokratiju u kojoj je svako u pravu. Stari Grci, oni pametni, omalovažavali su demokratiju i nazivali je vladavinom rulje. Zato je tamo trajala samo jedan vek.
pa dobro, neću valjda da kažem pa pored dijaloga i tržišta postoji i treća ilegalna teroristička organizacija? :evil:
elem, samo mislim da događaji poput revolucija ne mijenjaju suštinu, i dalje neće uspjeti stvar ako nije vođena deliberativno, iliti putem demokrackog dijaloga
ali ne kao kod maca, koji vjerovatno razdijeli društvo na a, b, c, č, ć trideset polja i onda kaže eo dž, ž i lj za dijalog a m, n i p za tržište
to su ti njegovi zecovi u šumi koje šuma pojede
nego lijepo od a do ž, a ponekad i do š - sve deliberacija
u protivnom, ni ne počinji
"Ako bude bilo problema rešićemo ih demokratski."
Problem je već nastao kršenjem ustava i nepostojanjem deliberativnog procesa do dana današnjega. Tako da "ako bude problema" fraza nema smisla
Zdravstveni podaci na izvol'te (https://www.istinomer.rs/clanak/2487/Zdravstveni-podaci-na-izvolte?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=always_on&utm_content=slucaj_violete_cvetkovic)
QuoteSlučaj Kragujevčanke Violete Cvetković još jednom je otvorio ozbiljnu dilemu o zaštiti ličnih, pre svega, zdravstvenih podataka. Bojazan je tim veća jer se pokazalo da žrtva slabosti sistema može postati bilo ko i da na naslovnim stranicama tabloida mogu da osvanu najintimniji detalji iz života baš svakog građanina Srbije.
Kad telefon zazvoni (https://pescanik.net/kad-telefon-zazvoni/)
šta mu znači kad umjesto zemlje iz koje dolazi ip adresa piše Europe?
Apple FaceTime bug lets you listen in on people you call, even if they haven't picked up their iPhone (https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/28/apple-facetime-bug-lets-you-listen-even-if-someone-doesnt-answer.html?__source=yahoo%7Cfinance%7Cheadline%7Cstory%7C&par=yahoo&yptr=yahoo)
Prisons Across the U.S. Are Quietly Building Databases of Incarcerated People's Voice Prints (https://theintercept.com/2019/01/30/prison-voice-prints-databases-securus/)
The Lucrative Government Spyware Industry Has a New 'One-Stop-Shop' for Hacking Everything (https://gizmodo.com/the-lucrative-government-spyware-industry-has-a-new-one-1832568791)
Chinese company leaves Muslim-tracking facial recognition database exposed online (https://www.zdnet.com/article/chinese-company-leaves-muslim-tracking-facial-recognition-database-exposed-online/)
You Give Apps Sensitive Personal Information. Then They Tell Facebook. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-give-apps-sensitive-personal-information-then-they-tell-facebook-11550851636)
Ekvadorska ambasada u Londonu okružena policijom - priča se da večeras hapse Asanža i šalju za SAD - čisto da se malo zataška vest da Milerov izveštaj nije na kraju ni jednog jedinog američkog građanina nije optužio za saradnju sa Rusima oko nameštanja izbora...
Ništa od hapšenja Asanža :lol: :lol: :lol:
Nego, ovaj tekst nekako prirodno ide na ovaj topik. Kamere po Beogradu:
Javno snimanje tajnim kamerama (https://pescanik.net/javno-snimanje-tajnim-kamerama/)
Uhapsili ga ipak danas:
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange arrested at London's Ecuadorian embassy – live updates (https://www.theguardian.com/media/live/2019/apr/11/wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-arrested-at-the-ecuadorean-embassy-live-updates)
Čomski u video izjavi o Asanžu:
https://twitter.com/i/status/1119587224826327042 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1119587224826327042)
Quote from: Meho Krljic on 20-04-2019, 16:42:17
Čomski u video izjavi o Asanžu:
https://twitter.com/i/status/1119587224826327042 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1119587224826327042)
to je to što je pričao kod amy goodman pre neki dan.
i really love that man. :lol:
i ovo dole bi trebalo da se podrazumeva al svedoci smo da nije baš tako:
(https://www.znaksagite.com/diskusije/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi68.tinypic.com%2F2s9y7u0.png&hash=ccc884f9249a77f071ef1baa89f734eac53e338c)
Chinese hackers were using NSA malware a year before Shadow Brokers leak (https://www.zdnet.com/article/chinese-hackers-were-using-nsa-malware-a-year-before-shadow-brokers-leak/)
Chelsea Manning Has Been Released From Jail (https://gizmodo.com/chelsea-manning-has-been-released-from-jail-1834656732)
Mada, naravno, pustili su je jer je istekao sudski poziv, a novi je već podnesen što znači da naredne nedelje mogu ponovo da je pozovu i pritvore... Jebalo ih njihovo sudstvo.
Google uses Gmail to track a history of things you buy — and it's hard to delete (https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/17/google-gmail-tracks-purchase-history-how-to-delete-it.html)
Newly Released Amazon Patent Shows Just How Much Creepier Alexa Can Get (https://www.sciencealert.com/creepy-new-amazon-patent-would-mean-alexa-records-everything-you-say-from-now-on)
Quote
A newly revealed patent application filed by Amazon is raising privacy concerns over an envisaged upgrade to the company's smart speaker systems. This change would mean that, by default, the devices end up listening to and recording everything you say in their presence.
Neviđena tortura nad Julianom Assangeom (https://www.portalnovosti.com/nevidjena-tortura-nad-julianom-assangeom)
Quote
U 20 godina rada s progonjenima nisam doživio slučaj da se skupina demokratskih država udružila da bi namjerno izolirala, demonizirala i zlostavljala jednog pojedinca toliko dugo vremena, rekao je UN-ov specijalni izvjestitelj Nils Melzer
Videh ovo pre neki dan al zaboravio da postujem.
Popular Soccer App Spied on Fans Through Phone Microphone to Catch Bars Pirating Game Streams (https://gizmodo.com/popular-soccer-app-spied-on-fans-through-phone-micropho-1835448306)
Sad se ja osećam kao nešto superiorno jer ne pratim fudbal...
This $3.2 Billion Industry Could Turn Millions of Surveillance Cameras Into an Army of Robot Security Guards (https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/32-billion-industry-could-turn-millions)
QuoteWe are surrounded by surveillance cameras that record us at every turn. But for the most part, while those cameras are watching us, no one is watching what those cameras observe or record because no one will pay for the armies of security guards that would be required for such a time-consuming and monotonous task.
But imagine that all that video were being watched — that millions of security guards were monitoring them all 24/7. Imagine this army is made up of guards who don't need to be paid, who never get bored, who never sleep, who never miss a detail, and who have total recall for everything they've seen. Such an army of watchers could scrutinize every person they see for signs of "suspicious" behavior. With unlimited time and attention, they could also record details about all of the people they see — their clothing, their expressions and emotions, their body language, the people they are with and how they relate to them, and their every activity and motion.
That scenario may seem far-fetched, but it's a world that may soon be arriving. The guards won't be human, of course — they'll be AI agents.
Ovo je naravno Vajs pa sve treba uzeti sa dosta rezerve:
China Is Forcing Tourists to Install Text-Stealing Malware at its Border (https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7xgame/at-chinese-border-tourists-forced-to-install-a-text-stealing-piece-of-malware)
Monitorišu muslimane. Sprečavaju kosovski scenario.
Inače, "Kosovski scenario" bi mogao biti dobar naslov za film u kome se pojavljuju isti likovi koji su se javljali u "Srpskom filmu"...
Hacked Border Surveillance Firm Wants To Profile Drivers, Passengers, and Their "Likely Trip Purpose" In New York City (https://theintercept.com/2019/07/09/surveillance-perceptics-new-york-city-drivers/)
Google contractors are secretly listening to your Assistant recordings (https://thenextweb.com/google/2019/07/10/google-contractors-are-secretly-listening-to-your-assistant-recordings/)
Pobogu...
Kazakhstan government is now intercepting all HTTPS traffic (https://www.zdnet.com/article/kazakhstan-government-is-now-intercepting-all-https-traffic/)
Quote
Starting Wednesday, July 17, 2019, the Kazakhstan government has started intercepting all HTTPS internet traffic inside its borders.
Local internet service providers (ISPs) have been instructed by the local government to force their respective users into installing a government-issued certificate (http://qca.kz/) on all devices, and in every browser.
The certificate, once installed, will allow local government agencies to decrypt users' HTTPS traffic, look at its content, encrypt it again with their certificate, and send it to its destination.
Mda, to je problem koji može jedino embargom da se reši. Ostatak interneta bi morao da odbije svu komunikaciju iz Kazahstana dok se stvari ne vrate na staro. Verovatnoća da se to desi u Trampovoj eri je minimalna.
Uzgred, internet embargo je tehnički moguć. Kad je Jugoslavija devedesetih bila pod embargom to je uključivalo i internet. Stanovništvo to nije osetilo jer nije bilo internet korisnika tada, ali akademska mreža je postojala i imala je problem. Problem je ublažen tako što je sva pošta išla preko nekog servera u Grčkoj.
Pentagon testing mass surveillance balloons across the US (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/02/pentagon-balloons-surveillance-midwest)
Researchers Show How Europe's Data Protection Laws Can Dox People (https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwe8wz/researchers-show-how-europes-data-protection-laws-can-dox-people)
Kada je Orvel pisao svoj kapitalni roman o državi prismotre i, jelte, lažnih vesti, njegova premisa je bila da će prismotra biti organizovana i upravljana isključivo od strane državnog aparata. Ovaj etatistički model društva panoptikona danas deluje skoro romantično jer se ispostavlja da je u međuvremenu prismotra postala element privatnog biznisa i da su veze između države i korporacija ono što ih čini uspešnim (utoliko što građani zapravo voljno saučestvuju u prismotri, bez očiglednih represivnih mehanizama poput onih u "Mi" ili "1984"):
Amazon's Ring Is a Perfect Storm of Privacy Threats (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/amazons-ring-perfect-storm-privacy-threats/)
Why phones that secretly listen to us are a myth (https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49585682)
Ovaj članak kao da je pisao pametni telefon koji nas prisluškuje sve vreme!!!!!!
South African government admits conducting mass surveillance on all communications (https://reclaimthenet.org/south-african-government-admits-conducting-mass-surveillance-on-all-communications/)
Facebook, WhatsApp Will Have to Share Messages With U.K. Police (https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/facebook-whatsapp-will-have-to-share-messages-with-u-k-police-1.1323301)
QuoteSocial media platforms based in the U.S. including Facebook and WhatsApp will be forced to share users' encrypted messages with British police under a new treaty between the two countries, according to a person familiar with the matter.The accord, which is set to be signed by next month, will compel social media firms to share information to support investigations into individuals suspected of serious criminal offenses including terrorism and pedophilia, the person said.
Велики брат - на 800 локација у Београду биће постављене камере (http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/438932/Na-800-lokacija-u-Beogradu-bice-postavljene-kamere)
QuoteСистем видео надзора у оквиру пројекта ,,Безбедан град", који се спроводи у циљу повећања безбедности грађана, ни на који начин не може угрозити приватност грађана и апсолутно је заштићен од било какве врсте злоупотреба.
Ово је изјавио Слободан Недељковић, помоћник министра и начелник Сектора за аналитику, телекомуникационе и информационе технологије МУП-а Србије.
Недељковић у изјави Танјугу истиче да се овом видео надзору не може приступити путем интернета, као и да сваки полицијски службеник овом систему приступа са посебном персонализованом картицом, тако да се у сваком моменту зна ко му је, када и због чега приступио.
Он је објаснио да се пројекат ,,Безбедан град" спроводи у две фазе, да су у првој фази камере на постојећих 60 локација у Београду, које су постављене за потребе Универзијаде 2009. године, замењене савременим камерама високе резолуције и да то једини систем видео надзора који тренутно користи београдска полиција.
У другој фази пројекта која је у току, како је навео, биће постављене камере на око 800 локација у Београду.
Истакавши да систем видео надзора користе све савремене полиције света, Недељковић је објаснио да је београдска полиција први систем видео надзора са 24 камере успоставила још давне 1978. године, а да је 2009. године за потребе Универзитетских спортских игара постављено 60 камера.
,,Након случаја 'Кантримен', установљено је да ове камере нису довољно добре резолуције и да је 60 камера мали број за потребе јавне безбедности Београда. Кроз пројекат 'Безбедан град' одлучено је да је 800 камерних места са више камера довољно како би се унапредила безбедност грађана", рекао је Недељковић.
Према његовим речима, овај систем видео надзора, који је веома поуздан и врхунског је и доброг квалитета, биће изузетно значајан за рад београдске полиције у откривању најтежих кривичних дела.
,,Постоје неки злонамерни коментари да систем није довољно безбедан, односно да ће моћи да му се приступи путем интернета и тиме наруши безбедност грађана. То је апсолутно немогућа опција, јер је систем спроведен оптичком мрежом која је потпуно изолована од интернета и у власништву је Министарства унутрашњих послова", истакао је Недељковић.
Он је додао да полицијски службеници, такође, не могу злоупотребити податке добијене путем видео надзора, јер је приступ систему могућ само путем посебне картице која персонализује одговорност и у сваком тренутку се зна, ко је, када и због чега приступио систему.
Недељковић је додао да се пројекат ,,Безбедан град" спроводи са компанијом ,,Хуавеј", која има системе видео надзора у више од 120 држава света, од којих су неке чланице Европске уније попут Италије, Немачке, Мађарске, Пољске и Шпаније.
Nije da je ovo sad neko iznenađenje:
Alexa and Google Home abused to eavesdrop and phish passwords (https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/10/alexa-and-google-home-abused-to-eavesdrop-and-phish-passwords/)
Cops put GPS tracker on man's car, charge him with theft for removing it (https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/11/man-charged-with-theft-for-removing-police-gps-tracker-from-his-car/)
Priča je malo komplikovanija od naslova, ali ima ovde harlanelisonovskih vajbova.
Dvogodišnje istraživanje ruskih botova od strane dva američka profesora:
That Uplifting Tweet You Just Shared? A Russian Troll Sent It (https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/russia-troll-2020-election-interference-twitter-916482/)
All new cell phone users in China must now have their face scanned (https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614781/all-new-cellphone-users-in-china-must-now-have-their-face-scanned/)
What does your car know about you? We hacked a Chevy to find out. (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/what-does-your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-a-chevy-to-find-out/)
The CIA secretly bought a company that sold encryption devices across the world. Then its spies sat back and listened. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/national-security/cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/)
Tekst je ogroman, pa ko ima vremena...
Naravno, sad bi rekli upućeni, pošto tehnologija za nadzor nije oruđe namenjeno borbi protiv kriminala već pacifikovanju običnih građana kroz potencijal permanentne ucene:
Cute videos, but little evidence: Police say Amazon Ring isn't much of a crime fighter (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/all/cute-videos-little-evidence-police-say-amazon-ring-isn-t-n1136026)
Growth in surveillance may be hard to scale back after pandemic, experts say (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/14/growth-in-surveillance-may-be-hard-to-scale-back-after-coronavirus-pandemic-experts-say)
The Panopticon Is Already Here (https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/)
Naravno da tekst govori o Kini. Ali pominje i Srbijicu :lol:
Police use of facial recognition violates human rights, UK court rules (https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/08/police-use-of-facial-recognition-violates-human-rights-uk-court-rules/)
Cory Doctorow: How to Destroy Surveillance Capitalism (https://onezero.medium.com/how-to-destroy-surveillance-capitalism-8135e6744d59)
Ovo nije samo još jedan Doktorovljev kvalitetni esej, nego čitava knjiga koja je publikovana na webu za besplatan, slobodan pristup. Pa, pristupite ako ste voljni.
Čomski:
Julian Assange is not on trial for his personality – but here's how the US government made you focus on it (https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/julian-assange-trial-us-trump-chelsea-manning-chomsky-walker-b420930.html)
At this point, 5G is a bad joke (https://www.computerworld.com/article/3575510/at-this-point-5g-is-a-bad-joke.html)
I nešto malo bliže temi topika (SIC!!!!):
Facebook Accused of Watching Instagram Users Through Cameras (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-18/facebook-accused-of-watching-instagram-users-through-cameras)
Nema više ko nas ne špijunira pa zašto ne i Kinezi:
China's 'hybrid war': Beijing's mass surveillance of Australia and the world for secrets and scandal (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-14/chinese-data-leak-linked-to-military-names-australians/12656668)
ICO's final report into Cambridge Analytica invites regulatory questions (https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/10/06/1602008755000/ICO-s-final-report-into-Cambridge-Analytica-invites-regulatory-questions/)
Quote
A key controversy surrounding Cambridge Analytica has been the degree to which the company continued to rely on controversial data sets it acquired from Facebook, even after Facebook had asked them to delete them.
The original Facebook data was sourced from Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, an academic at Cambridge university, who had developed the psychographic techniques which Cambridge Analytica had become known for. While Kogan's models were informed by data samples generated from a personality test he ran on Facebook with the permission of users, it later transpired the data also included information scraped about the friends of users without permission.
The ICO's report, however, found that Cambridge Analytica had made efforts to delete the data when Facebook requested it to do so in 2016. The authority also noted the company had begun efforts to replicate the Kogan data on a fully independent and permissioned basis as far back as 2015.
Bizarni Francuzi. A kad ja kažem da treba da ih bombardujemo odmah skoče na mene, kao, to su nam istorijski saveznici, kao, zar opet da udarimo na NATO pakt itd.
Five bar and cafe owners arrested in France for running no-log WiFi networks (https://www.zdnet.com/article/five-bar-and-cafe-owners-arrested-in-france-for-running-no-log-wifi-networks/)
O recentnom otkriću vezanom za Appleove sisteme:
Your Computer Isn't Yours (https://sneak.berlin/20201112/your-computer-isnt-yours/)
Kazakhstan government is intercepting HTTPS traffic in its capital (https://www.zdnet.com/article/kazakhstan-government-is-intercepting-https-traffic-in-its-capital/)
Quote
Under the guise of a "cybersecurity exercise," the Kazakhstan government is forcing citizens in its capital of Nur-Sultan (formerly Astana) to install a digital certificate on their devices if they want to access foreign internet services.
Once installed, the certificate would allow the government to intercept all HTTPS traffic made from users' devices via a technique called MitM (Man-in-the-Middle) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack).
Džulijan Asanž je uspešno dodžovao ekstradiciju u SAD. Za sada, naravno. SAD će sada da uloži žalbu itd. No, dobra vest za sada, mada moram da priznam da argumentacija da će čovek izvršiti samoubistvo ako ga izruče deluje kao izvrdavanje priznanja da SAD traže stranog državljanina koji je obelodanio njihove prljave tajne...
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange cannot be extradited to U.S., judge rules (https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/04/wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-cannot-be-extradited-to-us-judge-rules.html)
naravno da je izvrdavanje, i naravno da je sutkinja embecil, al, sve u svemu, prva dobra vest u 2021.
EFF o cenzuri na internetu i ipasnostima prepuštanja privatnim kompanijama kontrole nad velikim delom javnog diskursa:
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/01/beyond-platforms-private-censorship-parler-and-stack (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/01/beyond-platforms-private-censorship-parler-and-stack)
Opinion: The FBI just got permission to break into private computers without consent so it can fight hackers (https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-fbi-just-got-permission-to-break-into-private-computers-without-consent-so-it-can-fight-hackers-11619449844?siteid=yhoof2)
Apple confirms it will begin scanning iCloud Photos for child abuse images (https://techcrunch.com/2021/08/05/apple-icloud-photos-scanning/)
'Every message was copied to the police': the inside story of the most daring surveillance sting in history (https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/11/inside-story-most-daring-surveillance-sting-in-history)
Šta je sve sporno u Nacrtu zakona o unutrašnjim poslovima? (https://www.istinomer.rs/analize/analize-analize/sta-je-sve-sporno-u-nacrtu-zakona-o-unutrasnjim-poslovima/)
Quote
Naš sagovornik ističe da je sada postavljeno preko hiljadu kamera, a da je u planu da ceo sistem ima minimum osam hiljada kamera nabavljenih samo od Huawei-a, pri tome je zakon propisao da moraju da se koriste i kamere drugih preduzeća.
,,Osnovno pitanje ovde je zašto odjednom od grada koji je imao desetine kamera samo na glavnim mestima, postajemo grad koji će imati preko osam hiljada kamera i još se koriste napredni alati za analitiku da bi mogao da se prati svako", ističe Krivokapić.
Još 2017. godine prethodni ministar unutrašnjih poslova Nebojša Stefanović potpisao je Sporazum o saradnji sa predsednikom kompanije Huawei Davidom Tangom. Ova saradnja bi prema Stefanovićevim rečima trebalo da doprinese modernizaciji i efikasnijem radu srpske policije. (Izvor: mup.rs - Sporazum MUP i Huawei, uvođenje eLTE tehnologije, 03. Februar 2017. godine)
Krivokapić ističe da je ovo zadiranje u privatnost u suprotnosti i sa evropskim, ali sa domaćim zakonima, jer ne postoji neophodnost i propocionalnost pri primeni:
,,Naravno da će tako neke stvari pomoći policiji u nekom poslovima, ali pomoglo bi im i kada bi mogli da prisluškuju svakoga ili da uđu u svačiji stan bez odluke suda, ali postoje neka ograničenja da bi to bilo proporcionalno."
Neko dobija proviziju, ništa drugo.
Well, Britanija je odlučila da Asanža izruči SAD, tako da... neprijatne vesti.
https://twitter.com/alinautrata/status/1485194962027388929?s=21
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/amazon-privacy-lobbying
Elon Musk Offered 19 Year-Old $5,000 To Stop Stalking His Private Jet On Twitter (https://9gag.com/hot/arnoPBK)
Ovaj klinja našao način kako udariti na 1% bogatih koji imaju u vlasništvu 99% kapitala :D :D :D
Teen Who Tracked Elon Musk's Private Jet Now Exposing Movements Of Other Billionaires (https://www.unilad.co.uk/news/teen-tracked-elon-musks-private-jet-exposing-movements-billionaires-20220201)
Police Records Show Women Are Being Stalked With Apple AirTags Across the Country (https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3vj3y/apple-airtags-police-reports-stalking-harassment)
UK gov't approves extradition of Assange; appeal possible (https://apnews.com/article/politics-wikileaks-julian-assange-extradition-73e20b56c6e947967c1827370f814be3)
Biometrija ponovo u Nacrtu zakona o unutrašnjim poslovima (https://www.sharefoundation.info/sr/biometrija-ponovo-u-nacrtu-zakona-o-unutrasnjim-poslovima/)
Scientists Can Now Use WiFi to See Through People's Walls (https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a42575068/scientists-use-wifi-to-see-through-walls/)
Informaciona bezbednost Srbije: Gde curi? (https://birn.rs/informaciona-bezbednost-srbije/)
Označili ga kao ,,škaljarca" i zagorčali mu život, fotografija dostavljena iz BIA (https://n1info.rs/vesti/oznacili-ga-kao-skaljarca-i-zagorcali-mu-zivot-fotografija-dostavljena-iz-bia/)
Ajde što služba prati sve i svakog al što je još komično nekompetentna...
Google's Cookie Killing Tech Is Now on Almost Every Chrome Browser (https://gizmodo.com/google-privacy-sandbox-now-on-every-chrome-browser-1850812404)
Ovo ipak zvuči kao korak u dobrom smeru, da ne grešim dušu.
Kolko kontam, Gugl samo eliminiše konkurenciju
To im je svakako primarni motiv, ali makar su naši podaci dostupni manjem broju stranaka...
Sajber rat protiv civila (https://pescanik.net/sajber-rat-protiv-civila/)
Milica Jovanović o nadzoru nad članovima ovdašnjeg civilnog društva.
EFF je objavio zanimljiv predlog:
Privacy First: A Better Way to Address Online Harms (https://www.eff.org/wp/privacy-first-better-way-address-online-harms)
Kome je to mnogo teksta, Cory Doctorow ga je sažvakao u malo manje:
https://pluralistic.net/2023/12/06/privacy-first/#but-not-just-privacy
Wikileaks javlja:
Quote
BREAKING: Julian Assange granted leave to appeal extradition to the US
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange expected to plead guilty, avoid further prison time as part of deal with US (https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-expected-plead-guilty-us/story?id=111380617)
Kada svoj biznis zasnivaš na trgovanju privatni podacima svojih "korisnika", ubeđujućih ih da poštuješ najviše bezbednosne standarde (šatro) a onda na kraju ti korisnici najebu zato što si, naravno, koristio usluge trećeg lica :
AT&T says criminals stole phone records of 'nearly all' customers in new data breach (https://techcrunch.com/2024/07/12/att-phone-records-stolen-data-breach/)
Derek sa Veritasium jutjub kanala i Linus sa Linus Tech Tips kanala demonstriraju kako je lako pratiti nekog preko mobilnog telefona. Ako to mogu nemački amaterski hakeri zamisli samo šta mogu državne tajne službe. Promovišu 4G i 5G kao rešenje.
Exposing The Flaw In Our Phone System (https://youtu.be/wVyu7NB7W6Y)
Srbija uvozi opremu za masovni nadzor mobilnih komunikacija (https://birn.rs/keceri-za-masovni-nadzor-mobilnih-telekomunikacija/)
QuoteTokom protekle decenije, Srbija je uvezla više od 20 IMSI kečera, uređaja koji omogućavaju prikupljanje podataka sa svih mobilnih telefona u određenom području. Stručnjaci upozoravaju da njihova upotreba nije zakonski regulisana
Ali JEBOTE, koliko para ovaj režim troši da špijunira novinare i aktivista civilnog društva. A vi se, deco, lečite SMS-ovima... Naravo, posle im lik koga nadziru godinama dođe do žandarma ispred izraelske ambasade i gađa ga iz samostrela iz blizine pošto, jelte, mora da se špijuniraju seljaci, prioriteti su bitni...
Državni nadzor: Novinaru tajno instaliran špijunski softver u telefon tokom ispitivanja u policijskoj stanici (https://raskrikavanje.rs/page.php?id=Drzavni-nadzor-Novinaru-tajno-instaliran-spijunski-softver-u-telefon-tokom-ispitivanja-u-policijskoj-stanici-1427)
Šabić:
Srpski panoptikon (https://pescanik.net/srpski-panoptikon/)
Novi pritisak na Vučića iz centara moći koji su mu, čekajte da proverim, a, da, donirali softver za špijuniranje:
Grupa evroposlanika uputila pismo Srbiji: Prestanite sa upotrebom špijunskih softvera (https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/grupa-evroposlanika-uputila-pismo-srbiji-prestanite-sa-upotrebom-spijunskih-softvera/)
Milica Jovanović na Peščaniku fino sumira celu aferu:
Srbija, digitalni zatvor (https://pescanik.net/srbija-digitalni-zatvor/)
The Astronomer CEO's Coldplay Concert Fiasco Is Emblematic of Our Social Media Surveillance Dystopia (https://www.404media.co/the-astronomer-ceos-coldplay-concert-fiasco-is-emblematic-of-our-social-media-surveillance-dystopia/)
Srpska obaveštajna služba počela nabavku kontroverznog softvera za nadzor još pre 10 godina (https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/softver-nadzor-bia-srbija/33485961.html)
Nije da smo iznenađeni. Al eto, lepo da se zna.
Džejk (Man Carrying Thing) nastavlja da prožima:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elUsfWBf9QQ
telefonirao sa amazonom dva sata. i dva sata si ponavljam, ne postoji varijanta da mi pokvare raspolozenje. ali osmi telefonista...
Šta je bilo s osmim? Neki jukom bandit?
toliko jos nisu propali da zaposljavaju bas takvu stoku. po naglasku svih osam+ azijati, kojih mi je realno zao.
ali kad ni jedan ni poslije dva sata objasnjavanja da su mi kod narudzbe zaracunali dvostruko ambalazu, 15 eura previse, da to zelim da mi vrate, kad ni jedan uopce nije mogao ni u primisli dokuciti o cemu pricam i sta hocu, a osmi zatrazio da im za nekakvu "provjeru" (na amazonu sam od kad postoji amazon) posaljem izvod mog racuna iz banke, onda je krenula zabava. :cry:
dobro, bar su mi na amazon konto vratili 37 umjesto 15. osmi 15+5, deveti 11, deseti 6 eura.
Njih više košta da se preganjaju s tobom, nego da ti prosto daju pare. Treba to iskoristiti. Pređi na bizant stranu...
ti kao da nisi citao alan forda. to bi doslo po prilici kao kad je debeli sef krao kupus.
pravedno je da su srazmjerno platili napad gluposti, glumu institucije (zbog skupljanja podataka) koju smatram vrhunskim bezobrazlukom. ali aktualno je to moderno i ocigledno postoji mnogo teladi koja zauzme stav mirno kad neki koncern tako iskoraci.
A PRIVACY NIGHTMARE: UNDERSTANDING SPYWARE
https://sharefoundation.info/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Spyware.pdf
Čime se, jelte, bavi naša služba:
BIA tri i po meseca prisluškivala prostorije PSG-a, a onda slučajno snimila novosadske aktiviste (https://www.insajder.net/vesti/bia-tri-i-po-meseca-prisluskivala-prostorije-psg-a-a-onda-slucajno-snimila-novosadske-aktiviste)
Pošto nam je zemlja bušna kao rešeto, skoro da se više ni ne osvrćemo na curenje ličnih podataka. Ali Share fondacija se osvrće:
Analiza procurele baze podataka pretplatnika m:SAT TV – šta se nalazi u podacima, koliko ih je i kako sve to utiče na građane Srbije. (https://sharefoundation.info/tvoji-podaci-njihov-nemar/)
Gde je ta baza, da vidim da li me imaju?
Sigurno na Dark Webu :lol:
Gde ćeš veće curenje podatka od činjenice da Udba ima sve tvoje podatke, od dana unosa? :( :cry: