ZNAK SAGITE — više od fantastike — edicija, časopis, knjižara...

Koju bre slobodu, manijace?
Povracaj po svome Josipu Brozu, jebo te on sto vas sastavi s nama!
Sto tad niste kuknuli , 45te kad je sve zavrseno, nego ste ko poslednje picke cutali pred zapadnim masonima kao i sada!
I sto taj vas Hrvat nije zivio u Zagrebu, nego doso u Srpske dvore u Beograd?
Seljacino jedna neotesana, posto je ovo topik za sakupljanje podataka, cudi me da ove opste poznate ignororas!

ah tito je znao kako sa srbima, tito, tudjman, kralj aleksandar, hitler...

Quote from: leUsam on 10-08-2013, 17:34:12
ah tito je znao kako sa srbima, tito, tudjman, kralj aleksandar, hitler...

..i ti si svestan sta si sad napiso?

ne manipuliraj cinjenicama! ovo su veliki ljudi!

Quote from: leUsam on 10-08-2013, 17:42:32
ne manipuliraj cinjenicama! ovo su veliki ljudi!

Moram ovo da quotiram da slucajno nekad ne izbrises... 

istina se ne moze izbrisati ma koliko se ti trudio!

Quote from: Ugly MF on 10-08-2013, 16:58:59
Gej parada?

zivjeli slobodni pederi!!!
evo ti, sad pati! ne mozes nista! nemas argumente protiv gejeva!

'VOLIMO SE I ŽELIMO DA SE NAŠA LJUBAV OKONČA BRAKOM' Josip i Luka, gay par o životnom partnerstvu

Quote from: leUsam on 10-08-2013, 18:08:15

Quote from: Ugly MF on 10-08-2013, 16:58:59
Gej parada?

zivjeli slobodni pederi!!!
evo ti, sad pati! ne mozes nista! nemas argumente protiv gejeva!

U Hrvatskoj, sto se mene tice, eto nek svaki muskarac bude Gej!
Ja uopste nisam homofob ili kako vec nazivate normalne ljude,
ja samo kazem da toga ovde nece nikad biti!

Jesam li ti vec rekao da mi se povraca od tebe?!

Quote from: leUsam on 10-08-2013, 18:32:10
Jesam li ti vec rekao da mi se povraca od tebe?!

.. si pozelenio ?...treba ti exorcist, da istera zlo iz tebe, da ti utera dobro...

hm, ne razumijem zasto uporno zelis diskusiju sa mnom. mislis da sam neko ludo, blesavo svorenje? jesi li kad sreo bice izuzetne inteligencije, genijalnog razmisljanja, duha neogranicenih sposobnosti i neoborive logike?
sposobno da ucini sve jednim dodirom tvojih misli, ako udjes u dijalog, pa i natjerati te da se zaljubis u ruznog mehu!
nista nisi naucio u toj poganoj crkvi...

Diskusiju? Ma joook, ja to onako, usput...
Ja kad udjem u diskusiju, ocekujem da izadjem iz nje za mrvu pametniji, da nesto naucim..
u tvom slucaju, bas....

da, ja bih ti sprzio mozak. kojem zlatnom teletu se klanjas ako nije tajna?

Sta li seres, dal' cujes sebe...

skratimo, dosadan si, naporan. tek kad mi odgovoris na sva pitanja dobit ces mehu. prije mi se ne obracaj.

Žena na Novom Zelandu se spori sa svojim poslodavcem oko toga je li legitimno dobila bolovanje ili ne. Poslodavac je otpustio tvrdeći da je uzela nelegitimno bolovanje. Ona putem suda tražila da je vrate na posao. Poslodavac tražio da vidi njene privatne fejsbuk informacije da bi odlučio. Ona odbila. Sud, pak, insistirao da ona poslodavcu pokaže ne samo fejsbuk podatke već i informacije o prometu na njenom bankovnom računu. How much is too much što bi rekao Kevin Martin?

http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9027510/Facebook-used-in-worker-dismissal

QuoteA flight attendant was forced to let her bosses examine her Facebook pages and bank accounts in a stoush over what she was up to on sick leave.
The employment court move signals a future where bosses will increasingly demand access to what most workers regard as private details, says employment lawyer Andrew Scott-Howman. He said the development could be seen as creepy and intrusive.
Gina Kensington was sacked by Air New Zealand earlier this year following a dispute over sick leave she took to care for her sister.
She said she did not misuse sick leave, and went to the Employment Relations Authority (ERA) seeking reinstatement.
Air New Zealand responded by demanding to see her Facebook and bank details.
Kensington refused, saying it did not have that information when it dismissed her and that "it is well accepted in New Zealand there are general and legal privacy expectations about people's personal and financial information".  But the ERA ordered she must hand over details for March 8 and 9 this year - saying they would provide "substantially helpful" evidence.
"The explanation for taking sick leave must be tested for veracity," said ERA member Tania Tetitaha.
Facebook information had been used previously to sack people, but adding bank account data went a step further, Scott-Howman said.
He warned there would be a backlash from workers.
"I don't really know that society has seen this sort of thing previously. But at a time when we think we are behaving privately, or at least within a restricted circle of friends, we are actually effectively on trial."
He said courts always wanted to get "the best evidence".
"And the courts see Facebook as a wonderful asset because all of a sudden not only do we have the potential for pictures and so forth but . . . we can see what time statements were made and pictures were taken."
He said globally, and in New Zealand in relation to the GCSB law changes, people were fighting back against such intrusion.
"Because while this is best evidence . . . doesn't it creep you out a bit? It feels intrusive and just, frankly, wrong."
He said it was a form of spying on staff.
"Sometimes it is actually OK to spy, if you are on my time and you are doing something bad - but the question is where you draw the line."
Scott-Howman said Parliament would be forced to pass laws to stop bosses and the ERA going too far. He said the ERA could simply demand evidence be produced.
The most high-profile Facebook sacking case involves Gisborne man Bruce Taiapa, who applied for a week's unpaid leave in March 2011 to attend a waka ama championship.



He was granted three days, but then took the rest of the week as sick leave, claiming he had an injured leg. He lost his job after his boss saw photos of him on Facebook, taken at the waka ama championships.
The ERA upheld his sacking.
Air New Zealand and Kensington's lawyers declined to comment on her case while it was still before the courts.
A hearing was held last Monday, but the findings are yet to be released.
- © Fairfax NZ News

што би се рекло: shut up slave!

Naš narod bi na ovo rekao: kadija te tuži, kadija ti sudi:

Obama's "reform" panel to be led by Clapper, who denied spying to Congress

Quote
President Obama held a news conference on Friday at which he promised reform—but groups who wanted to see real reform in the surveillance area were understandably skeptical.
Obama made promises that he would "work with Congress" to produce better oversight, but he treated the recent leaks about NSA spying as more of a PR problem than anything else. The leaks had been revealed "in the most sensationalized manner," he stressed. But Obama maintained that the programs were not being abused. Notably, the president didn't suggest he would reduce the amount of surveillance taking place in any way.
But the "high level group of outside experts" that Obama promised to convene is unlikely to change any hearts and minds, unless its composition changes. Today it was announced the "outside" committee would report to James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence—one of the officials most scorned by reformers.
It was Clapper who dissembled in front of a Congressional committee when he was questioned directly by NSA critic Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) back in 2011. Wyden asked if "any kind of data at all" was being collected on millions of Americans. "No sir," said Clapper at the time.
Now, with at least some of the facts about widespread surveillance making headlines, Clapper maintains he thought Wyden was just talking about e-mail and that "mistakes will happen." Wyden's question, of course, was about "any data at all"—which is not only the phrase Wyden used, but the question that was sent to Clapper the day before.
Clapper is even one of four officials named in a new ACLU lawsuit claiming the spying program is unconstitutional.
The review group's job, according to a White House letter published today, is to assess whether the US "employs its technical collection capabilities in a manner that optimally protects our national security and advances our foreign policy while appropriately accounting for other policy considerations, such as the risk of unauthorized disclosure and our need to maintain the public trust."
As Techdirt points out, the group is actually set up to report to Clapper and not directly to the president or Congress. If the president's goal is to make any critics believe he's serious about this reform effort, Clapper is not the right person to put in a command position.

Čisto da ne bude nejasnoća, Clapper je lagao kongres u vezi špijuniranja američkih građana, pod zakletvom, kasnije priznao da je lagao i izvinio se i nikada nije čak ni optužen za ikakav prekršaj.

Vec su demantovali da ce Clapper biti ukljucen.

Pa, da, kad ja postujem tri dana stare vesti koje sam pokupio iz slešdotovog njuzletera...

Jbg, ja se RT feedujem:  #snowden #manningtrial, etc. Citaj: gubim vreme naveliko!

Lep: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/12/george-orwell-s-letter-on-why-he-wrote-1984.html

E, do mojega. U opštem zatvaranju servisa koji vele da ne mogu da rade ako će NSA da im dahće za vratom, zatvara se i esencijalni vebsajt Groklaw...

Za neupućene, ovo je sajt koji je mnogo učinio da i mi koji pojma nemamo o pravnim naukama donekle razumemo intrigantne detalje vezane za brojne sudske afere vezane za intelektualno vlasništvo, patente, kopirajt itd. Užasan bedak.

http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20130818120421175

Quote

Forced Exposure ~pj

Tuesday, August 20 2013 @ 02:40 AM EDT

The owner of Lavabit tells us that he's stopped using email and if we knew what he knew, we'd stop too.  There is no way to do Groklaw without email. Therein lies the conundrum. What to do? What to do? I've spent the last couple of weeks trying to figure it out.  And the conclusion I've reached is that there is no way to continue doing Groklaw, not long term, which is incredibly sad.  But it's good to be realistic.  And the simple truth is, no matter how good the motives might be for collecting and screening everything we say to one another, and no matter how "clean" we all are ourselves from the standpoint of the screeners, I don't know how to function in such an atmosphere.  I don't know how to do Groklaw like this. Years ago, when I was first on my own, I arrived in New York City, and being naive about the ways of evil doers in big cities, I rented a cheap apartment on the top floor of a six-floor walkup, in the back of the building.  That of course, as all seasoned New Yorkers could have told me, meant that a burglar could climb the fire escape or get to the roof by going to the top floor via the stairs inside and then through the door to the roof and climb down to the open window of my apartment. That is exactly what happened.  I wasn't there when it happened, so I wasn't hurt in any way physically.  And I didn't then own much of any worth, so only a few things were taken.  But everything had been pawed through and thrown about.  I can't tell how deeply disturbing it is to know that someone, some stranger, has gone through and touched all your underwear, looked at all your photographs of your family, and taken some small piece of jewelry that's been in your family for generations. If it's ever happened to you, you know I couldn't live there any more, not one night more.  It turned out, by the way, according to my neighbors, that it was almost certainly the janitor's son, which stunned me at the time but didn't seem to surprise any of my more-seasoned neighbors.  The police just told me not to expect to get anything back. I felt assaulted.  The underwear was perfectly normal underwear. Nothing kinky or shameful, but it was the idea of them being touched by someone I didn't know or want touching them. I threw them away, unused ever again. I feel like that now, knowing that persons I don't know can paw through all my thoughts and hopes and plans in my emails with you.    They tell us  that if you send or receive an email from outside the US, it will be read.  If it's encrypted, they keep it for five years, presumably in the hopes of tech advancing to be able to decrypt it against your will and without your knowledge. Groklaw has readers all over the world.  I'm not a political person, by choice, and I must say, researching the latest developments convinced me of one thing -- I am right to avoid it. There is a scripture that says, It doesn't belong to man even to direct his step.  And it's true.  I see now clearly that it's true. Humans are just human, and we  don't know what to do in our own lives half the time, let alone how to govern other humans successfully.  And it shows.  What form of government hasn't been tried?  None of them satisfy everyone.  So I think we did that experiment.  I don't expect great improvement. I remember 9/11 vividly. I had a family member who was supposed to be in the World Trade Center that morning, and when I watched on live television the buildings go down with living beings inside, I didn't know that she had been late that day and so was safe. Does it matter, though, if you knew anyone specifically, as we watched fellow human beings hold hands and jump out of windows of skyscrapers to a certain death below or watched the buildings crumble into dust, knowing there were so many people just like us being turned into dust as well?  I cried for weeks, in a way I've never cried before, or since, and I'll go to my grave remembering it and feeling it.  And part of my anguish was that there were people in the world willing to do that to other people, fellow human beings, people they didn't even know, civilians uninvolved in any  war.   I sound quaint, I suppose. But I always tell you the truth, and that is what I was feeling. So imagine how I feel now, imagining as I must what kind of world we are living in if the governments of the world think total surveillance is an appropriate thing? I know. It may not even be about that.  But what if it is? Do we even know? I don't know. What I do know is it's not possible to be fully human if you are  being surveilled 24/7.     Harvard's Berkman Center had an online class on cybersecurity and internet privacy some years ago, and the resources of the class are still online. It was about how to enhance privacy in an online world, speaking of quaint, with titles of articles like, "Is Big Brother Listening?" And how. You'll find all the laws in the US related to privacy and surveillance there.  Not that anyone seems to follow any laws that get in their way these days.  Or if they find they need a law to make conduct lawful, they just write a new law or reinterpret an old one and keep on going.  That's not the rule of law as I understood the term. Anyway, one resource was excerpts from a book by Janna Malamud Smith,"Private Matters: In Defense of the Personal Life", and I encourage you to read it. I encourage the President and the NSA to read it too. I know.  They aren't listening to me. Not that way, anyhow.  But it's important, because the point of the book is that privacy is vital to being human, which is why one of the worst punishments there is is total surveillance: One way of beginning to understand privacy is by looking at what happens to people in extreme situations where it is absent. Recalling his time in Auschwitz, Primo Levi observed that "solitude in a Camp is more precious and rare than bread." Solitude is one state of privacy, and even amidst the overwhelming death, starvation, and horror of the camps, Levi knew he missed it.... Levi spent much of his life finding words for his camp experience. How, he wonders aloud in Survival in Auschwitz, do you describe "the demolition of a man," an offense for which "our language lacks words."... One function of privacy is to provide a safe space away from terror or other assaultive experiences. When you remove a person's ability to sequester herself, or intimate information about herself, you make her extremely vulnerable.... The totalitarian state watches everyone, but keeps its own plans secret. Privacy is seen as dangerous because it enhances resistance. Constantly spying and then confronting people with what are often petty transgressions is a way of maintaining social control and unnerving and disempowering opposition.... And even when one shakes real pursuers, it is often hard to rid oneself of the feeling of being watched -- which is why surveillance is an extremely powerful way to control people. The mind's tendency to still feel observed when alone... can be inhibiting. ... Feeling watched, but not knowing for sure, nor knowing if, when, or how the hostile surveyor may strike, people often become fearful, constricted, and distracted.  I've quoted from that book before, back when the CNET reporters' emails were read by HP.  We thought that was awful.  And it was. HP ended up giving them money to try to make it up to them.  Little did we know. Ms. Smith continues: Safe privacy is an important component of autonomy, freedom, and thus psychological well-being, in any society that values individuals. ... Summed up briefly,  a statement of "how not to dehumanize people" might read: Don't terrorize or humiliate. Don't starve, freeze, exhaust.  Don't demean or impose degrading submission.  Don't force separation from loved ones.  Don't make demands in an incomprehensible language.  Don't refuse to listen closely.  Don't destroy privacy. Terrorists of all sorts destroy privacy both by corrupting it into secrecy and by using hostile surveillance to undo its useful sanctuary. But if we describe a standard for treating people humanely, why does stripping privacy violate it?  And what is privacy?  In his landmark book, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin names four states of privacy: solitude, anonymity, reserve, and intimacy. The reasons for valuing privacy become more apparent as we explore these states.... The essence of solitude, and all privacy, is a sense of choice and control.  You control who watches or learns about you. You choose to leave and return.  ... Intimacy is a private state because in it people relax their public front either physically or emotionally or, occasionally, both.  They tell personal stories, exchange looks, or touch privately. They may ignore each other without offending.  They may have sex.  They may speak frankly using words they would not use in front of others, expressing ideas and feelings -- positive or negative -- that are unacceptable in public. (I don't think I ever got over his death.  She seems unable to stop lying to her mother. He looks flabby in those running shorts.  I feel horny.  In spite of everything, I still long to see them.  I am so angry at you I could scream.  That joke is disgusting, but it's really funny.)  Shielded from forced exposure, a person often feels more able to expose himself. I hope that makes it clear why I can't continue. There is now no shield from forced exposure.  Nothing in that parenthetical thought list is terrorism-related, but no one can feel protected enough from forced exposure any more to say anything the least bit like that to anyone in an email, particularly from the US out or to the US in, but really anywhere.  You don't expect a stranger to read your private communications to a friend.  And once you know they can, what is  there to say? Constricted and distracted. That's it exactly. That's how I feel.  So. There we are. The foundation of Groklaw is over.  I can't do Groklaw without your input.  I was never exaggerating about that when we won awards. It really was a collaborative effort, and there is now no private way, evidently, to collaborate. I'm really sorry that it's so.  I loved doing Groklaw, and I believe we really made a significant contribution.  But even that turns out to be less than we thought, or less than I hoped for, anyway. My hope was always to show you that there is beauty and safety in the rule of law, that civilization actually depends on it.  How quaint.  If you have to stay on the Internet, my research indicates that the short term safety from surveillance, to the degree that is even possible, is to use a service like Kolab for email, which is located in Switzerland, and hence is under different laws than the US, laws which attempt to afford more privacy to citizens.  I have now gotten for myself an email there, p.jones at mykolab.com  in case anyone wishes to contact me over something really important and feels squeamish about writing to an email address on a server in the US.  But both emails still work. It's your choice. My personal decision is to get off of the Internet to the degree it's possible.  I'm just an ordinary person. But I really know, after all my research and some serious thinking things through, that  I can't stay online personally without losing my humanness, now that I know that ensuring privacy  online is impossible.  I find myself unable to write. I've always been a private person.  That's why I never wanted to be a celebrity and why I fought hard to maintain both my privacy and yours. Oddly, if everyone did that, leap off the Internet,  the world's economy would collapse, I suppose.   I can't really hope for that. But for me, the Internet  is over. So this is the last Groklaw article. I won't turn on comments.  Thank you for all you've done.  I will never forget you and our work together. I  hope you'll remember me too.  I'm sorry I can't overcome these feelings, but I yam what I yam, and I tried, but I can't.

I čisto da se ne zaboravi, evo kolumne urednika Guardiana a povodom toga kako su agenti britanske specijalne, jelte službe, teatralno došli i komisijski im uništili svu opremu na kojoj su čuvani podaci vezani za Snowdenova otkrića.

Zanimljivo je da Amerikanci i Britanci tako često dele drugima lekcije o neprikosnovenoj slobodi medija - bez obzira da li je u pitanju državni stok u srpskim medijskim kućama ili Čavezov nalog da se TV stanici koja je javno pozivala na atentat na njega ne obnovi licenca - a onda posegnu za macolom... Sramota do neba.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/19/david-miranda-schedule7-danger-reporters

QuoteIn a private viewing cinema in Soho last week I caught myself letting fly with a four-letter expletive at Bill Keller, the former executive editor of the New York Times. It was a confusing moment. The man who was pretending to be me – thanking Keller for "not giving a shit" – used to be Malcolm Tucker, a foul-mouthed Scottish spin doctor who will soon be a 1,000-year-old time lord. And Keller will correct me, but I don't remember ever swearing at him. I do remember saying something to the effect of "we have the thumb drive, you have the first amendment".
The fictional moment occurs at the beginning of the DreamWorks film about WikiLeaks, The Fifth Estate, due for release next month. Peter Capaldi is, I can report, a very plausible Guardian editor.
This real-life exchange with Keller happened just after we took possession of the first tranche of WikiLeaks documents in 2010. I strongly suspected that our ability to research and publish anything to do with this trove of secret material would be severely constrained in the UK. America, for all its own problems with media laws and whistleblowers, at least has press freedom enshrined in a written constitution. It is also, I hope, unthinkable that any US government would attempt prior restraint against a news organisation planning to publish material that informed an important public debate, however troublesome or embarrassing.
On Sunday morning David Miranda, the partner of Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald, was detained as he was passing through Heathrow airport on his way back to Rio de Janeiro, where the couple live. Greenwald is the reporter who has broken most of the stories about state surveillance based on the leaks from the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Greenwald's work has undoubtedly been troublesome and embarrassing for western governments. But, as the debate in America and Europe has shown, there is considerable public interest in what his stories have revealed about the right balance between security, civil liberties, freedom of speech and privacy. He has raised acutely disturbing questions about the oversight of intelligence; about the use of closed courts; about the cosy and secret relationship between government and vast corporations; and about the extent to which millions of citizens now routinely have their communications intercepted, collected, analysed and stored.
In this work he is regularly helped by David Miranda. Miranda is not a journalist, but he still plays a valuable role in helping his partner do his journalistic work. Greenwald has his plate full reading and analysing the Snowden material, writing, and handling media and social media requests from around the world. He can certainly use this back-up. That work is immensely complicated by the certainty that it would be highly unadvisable for Greenwald (or any other journalist) to regard any electronic means of communication as safe. The Guardian's work on the Snowden story has involved many individuals taking a huge number of flights in order to have face-to-face meetings. Not good for the environment, but increasingly the only way to operate. Soon we will be back to pen and paper.
Miranda was held for nine hours under schedule 7 of the UK's terror laws, which give enormous discretion to stop, search and question people who have no connection with "terror", as ordinarily understood. Suspects have no right to legal representation and may have their property confiscated for up to seven days. Under this measure – uniquely crafted for ports and airport transit areas – there are none of the checks and balances that apply once someone is in Britain proper. There is no need to arrest or charge anyone and there is no protection for journalists or their material. A transit lounge in Heathrow is a dangerous place to be.
Miranda's professional status – much hand-wringing about whether or not he's a proper "journalist" – is largely irrelevant in these circumstances. Increasingly, the question about who deserves protection should be less "is this a journalist?" than "is the publication of this material in the public interest?"
The detention of Miranda has rightly caused international dismay because it feeds into a perception that the US and UK governments – while claiming to welcome the debate around state surveillance started by Snowden – are also intent on stemming the tide of leaks and on pursuing the whistleblower with a vengeance. That perception is right. Here follows a little background on the considerable obstacles being placed in the way of informing the public about what the intelligence agencies, governments and corporations are up to.
A little over two months ago I was contacted by a very senior government official claiming to represent the views of the prime minister. There followed two meetings in which he demanded the return or destruction of all the material we were working on. The tone was steely, if cordial, but there was an implicit threat that others within government and Whitehall favoured a far more draconian approach.
The mood toughened just over a month ago, when I received a phone call from the centre of government telling me: "You've had your fun. Now we want the stuff back." There followed further meetings with shadowy Whitehall figures. The demand was the same: hand the Snowden material back or destroy it. I explained that we could not research and report on this subject if we complied with this request. The man from Whitehall looked mystified. "You've had your debate. There's no need to write any more."
During one of these meetings I asked directly whether the government would move to close down the Guardian's reporting through a legal route – by going to court to force the surrender of the material on which we were working. The official confirmed that, in the absence of handover or destruction, this was indeed the government's intention. Prior restraint, near impossible in the US, was now explicitly and imminently on the table in the UK. But my experience over WikiLeaks – the thumb drive and the first amendment – had already prepared me for this moment. I explained to the man from Whitehall about the nature of international collaborations and the way in which, these days, media organisations could take advantage of the most permissive legal environments. Bluntly, we did not have to do our reporting from London. Already most of the NSA stories were being reported and edited out of New York. And had it occurred to him that Greenwald lived in Brazil?
The man was unmoved. And so one of the more bizarre moments in the Guardian's long history occurred – with two GCHQ security experts overseeing the destruction of hard drives in the Guardian's basement just to make sure there was nothing in the mangled bits of metal which could possibly be of any interest to passing Chinese agents. "We can call off the black helicopters," joked one as we swept up the remains of a MacBook Pro.
Whitehall was satisfied, but it felt like a peculiarly pointless piece of symbolism that understood nothing about the digital age. We will continue to do patient, painstaking reporting on the Snowden documents, we just won't do it in London. The seizure of Miranda's laptop, phones, hard drives and camera will similarly have no effect on Greenwald's work.
The state that is building such a formidable apparatus of surveillance will do its best to prevent journalists from reporting on it. Most journalists can see that. But I wonder how many have truly understood the absolute threat to journalism implicit in the idea of total surveillance, when or if it comes – and, increasingly, it looks like "when".
We are not there yet, but it may not be long before it will be impossible for journalists to have confidential sources. Most reporting – indeed, most human life in 2013 – leaves too much of a digital fingerprint. Those colleagues who denigrate Snowden or say reporters should trust the state to know best (many of them in the UK, oddly, on the right) may one day have a cruel awakening. One day it will be their reporting, their cause, under attack. But at least reporters now know to stay away from Heathrow transit lounges.

Sreća pa ima i ljudi koji su u stanju da mi ulepšaju jutro: http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/3792770

Borat-lajk al ima nekog sarma: http://boingboing.net/2013/09/01/hello-nsa-i-have-lost-an-e.html

Rojters javlja:

U.S. spied on presidents of Brazil, Mexico: report

Quote



SAO PAULO (Reuters) - The U.S. National Security Agency spied on the communications of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico, a Brazilian news program reported, a revelation that could strain U.S. relations with the two biggest countries in Latin America.
The report late Sunday by Globo's news program "Fantastico" was based on documents that journalist Glenn Greenwald obtained from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Greenwald, who lives in Rio de Janeiro, was listed as a co-contributor to the report.
"Fantastico" showed what it said was an NSA document dated June 2012 displaying passages of written messages sent by Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who was still a candidate at that time. In the messages, Pena Nieto discussed who he was considering naming as his ministers once elected.
A separate document displayed communication patterns between Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and her top advisers, "Fantastico" said, although no specific written passages were included in the report.
Both documents were part of an NSA case study showing how data could be "intelligently" filtered, Fantastico said.
Justice Minister Jose Eduardo Cardozo told O Globo newspaper that the contents of the documents, if confirmed, "should be considered very serious and constitute a clear violation of Brazilian sovereignty."
"This (spying) hits not only Brazil, but the sovereignty of several countries that could have been violated in a way totally contrary to what international law establishes," Cardozo said.
Cardozo traveled last week to Washington and met with U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and other officials, seeking more details on a previous, seemingly less serious set of disclosures by Snowden regarding U.S. spying in Brazil.
Rousseff is scheduled to make a formal state visit in October to meet U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington, a trip intended to illustrate the warming in Brazil-U.S. relations since she took office in 2011.
A spokesman for Rousseff would not comment on the new spying allegations. Officials at Mexico's presidential palace did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Snowden, an American who worked as a contractor for the NSA before leaking the documents, currently lives in asylum in Russia. "Fantastico" said it contacted Snowden via Internet chat, and that Snowden said he could not comment on the content of the report because of his asylum agreement with Russian authorities.
(Reporting by Brian Winter; editing by Jackie Frank)

Vašington post otkriva da je u 2011. godini Amerika izvršila 231 ofanzivnu sajber akciju... Četri strane teksta, da ne kopiram sve, ima šta da se pročita.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html

Old news!!!!

Evo nešto još older, DEA ima sa AT&T-om prijateljsku saradnju koja podrazumeva pristup bazi telefonskih poziva koja seže unatrag do 1987. godine 

Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.'s

Quote

For at least six years, law enforcement officials working on a counternarcotics program have had routine access, using subpoenas, to an enormous AT&T database that contains the records of decades of Americans' phone calls — parallel to but covering a far longer time than the National Security Agency's hotly disputed collection of phone call logs.



The Hemisphere Project, a partnership between federal and local drug officials and AT&T that has not previously been reported, involves an extremely close association between the government and the telecommunications giant.       
The government pays AT&T to place its employees in drug-fighting units around the country. Those employees sit alongside Drug Enforcement Administration agents and local detectives and supply them with the phone data from as far back as 1987.       
The project comes to light at a time of vigorous public debate over the proper limits on government surveillance and on the relationship between government agencies and communications companies. It offers the most significant look to date at the use of such large-scale data for law enforcement, rather than for national security.       
The scale and longevity of the data storage appears to be unmatched by other government programs, including the N.S.A.'s gathering of phone call logs under the Patriot Act. The N.S.A. stores the data for nearly all calls in the United States, including phone numbers and time and duration of calls, for five years.
Hemisphere covers every call that passes through an AT&T switch — not just those made by AT&T customers — and includes calls dating back 26 years, according to Hemisphere training slides bearing the logo of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. Some four billion call records are added to the database every day, the slides say; technical specialists say a single call may generate more than one record. Unlike the N.S.A. data, the Hemisphere data includes information on the locations of callers.       
The slides were given to The New York Times by Drew Hendricks, a peace activist in Port Hadlock, Wash. He said he had received the PowerPoint presentation, which is unclassified but marked "Law enforcement sensitive," in response to a series of public information requests to West Coast police agencies.       
The program was started in 2007, according to the slides, and has been carried out in great secrecy.       
"All requestors are instructed to never refer to Hemisphere in any official document," one slide says. A search of the Nexis database found no reference to the program in news reports or Congressional hearings.       
The Obama administration acknowledged the extraordinary scale of the Hemisphere database and the unusual embedding of AT&T employees in government drug units in three states.       
But they said the project, which has proved especially useful in finding criminals who discard cellphones frequently to thwart government tracking, employed routine investigative procedures used in criminal cases for decades and posed no novel privacy issues.       
Crucially, they said, the phone data is stored by AT&T, and not by the government as in the N.S.A. program. It is queried for phone numbers of interest mainly using what are called "administrative subpoenas," those issued not by a grand jury or a judge but by a federal agency, in this case the D.E.A.       
Brian Fallon, a Justice Department spokesman, said in a statement that "subpoenaing drug dealers' phone records is a bread-and-butter tactic in the course of criminal investigations."       
Mr. Fallon said that "the records are maintained at all times by the phone company, not the government," and that Hemisphere "simply streamlines the process of serving the subpoena to the phone company so law enforcement can quickly keep up with drug dealers when they switch phone numbers to try to avoid detection."       
He said that the program was paid for by the D.E.A. and the White House drug policy office but that the cost was not immediately available.
Officials said four AT&T employees are now working in what is called the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, which brings together D.E.A. and local investigators — two in the program's Atlanta office and one each in Houston and Los Angeles.       
Daniel C. Richman, a law professor at Columbia, said he sympathized with the government's argument that it needs such voluminous data to catch criminals in the era of disposable cellphones.       
"Is this a massive change in the way the government operates? No," said Mr. Richman, who worked as a federal drug prosecutor in Manhattan in the early 1990s. "Actually you could say that it's a desperate effort by the government to catch up."



But Mr. Richman said the program at least touched on an unresolved Fourth Amendment question: whether mere government possession of huge amounts of private data, rather than its actual use, may trespass on the amendment's requirement that searches be "reasonable." Even though the data resides with AT&T, the deep interest and involvement of the government in its storage may raise constitutional issues, he said.



Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, said the 27-slide PowerPoint presentation, evidently updated this year to train AT&T employees for the program, "certainly raises profound privacy concerns."       
"I'd speculate that one reason for the secrecy of the program is that it would be very hard to justify it to the public or the courts," he said.
Mr. Jaffer said that while the database remained in AT&T's possession, "the integration of government agents into the process means there are serious Fourth Amendment concerns."       
Mr. Hendricks filed the public records requests while assisting other activists who have filed a federal lawsuit saying that a civilian intelligence analyst at an Army base near Tacoma infiltrated and spied on antiwar groups. (Federal officials confirmed that the slides are authentic.)       
Mark A. Siegel, a spokesman for AT&T, declined to answer more than a dozen detailed questions, including ones about what percentage of phone calls made in the United States were covered by Hemisphere, the size of the Hemisphere database, whether the AT&T employees working on Hemisphere had security clearances and whether the company has conducted any legal review of the program       
"While we cannot comment on any particular matter, we, like all other companies, must respond to valid subpoenas issued by law enforcement," Mr. Siegel wrote in an e-mail.       
Representatives from Verizon, Sprint and T-Mobile all declined to comment on Sunday in response to questions about whether their companies were aware of Hemisphere or participated in that program or similar ones. A federal law enforcement official said that the Hemisphere Project was "singular" and that he knew of no comparable program involving other phone companies.       
The PowerPoint slides outline several "success stories" highlighting the program's achievements and showing that it is used in investigating a range of crimes, not just drug violations. The slides emphasize the program's value in tracing suspects who use replacement phones, sometimes called "burner" phones, who switch phone numbers or who are otherwise difficult to locate or identify.       
In March 2013, for instance, Hemisphere found the new phone number and location of a man who impersonated a general at a San Diego Navy base and then ran over a Navy intelligence agent. A month earlier the program helped catch a South Carolina woman who had made a series of bomb threats.       
And in Seattle in 2011, the document says, Hemisphere tracked drug dealers who were rotating prepaid phones, leading to the seizure of 136 kilos of cocaine and $2.2 million.       

Bruce Scheiner ima izvrstan blog koji se bavi bezbednošću (digitalnom i drugom), a ovaj tekst koji govori o tome kako je svet (zapadni, pre svega) počeo da se plaši rizika više nego ičega je veoma dobar:

Our Newfound Fear of Risk

Quote

We're afraid of risk. It's a normal part of life, but we're increasingly unwilling to accept it at any level. So we turn to technology to protect us. The problem is that technological security measures aren't free.  They cost money, of course, but they cost other things as well. They often don't provide the security they advertise, and -- paradoxically -- they often increase risk somewhere else. This problem is particularly stark when the risk involves another person: crime, terrorism, and so on. While technology has made us much safer against natural risks like accidents and disease, it works less well against man-made risks.
Three examples:

   
• We have allowed the police to turn themselves into a paramilitary organization. They deploy SWAT teams multiple times a day, almost always in nondangerous situations. They tase people at minimal provocation, often when it's not warranted. Unprovoked shootings are on the rise. One result of these measures is that honest mistakes -- a wrong address on a warrant, a misunderstanding -- result in the terrorizing of innocent people, and more death in what were once nonviolent confrontations with police.
• We accept zero-tolerance policies in schools. This results in ridiculous situations, where young children are suspended for pointing gun-shaped fingers at other students or drawing pictures of guns with crayons, and high-school students are disciplined for giving each other over-the-counter pain relievers. The cost of these policies is enormous, both in dollars to implement and its long-lasting effects on students.
• We have spent over one trillion dollars and thousands of lives fighting terrorism in the past decade -- including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- money that could have been better used in all sorts of ways. We now know that the NSA has turned into a massive domestic surveillance organization, and that its data is also used by other government organizations, which then lie about it. Our foreign policy has changed for the worse: we spy on everyone, we trample human rights abroad, our drones kill indiscriminately, and our diplomatic outposts have either closed down or become fortresses. In the months after 9/11, so many people chose to drive instead of fly that the resulting deaths dwarfed the deaths from the terrorist attack itself, because cars are much more dangerous than airplanes.

There are lots more examples, but the general point is that we tend to fixate on a particular risk and then do everything we can to mitigate it, including giving up our freedoms and liberties.
There's a subtle psychological explanation. Risk tolerance is both cultural and dependent on the environment around us. As we have advanced technologically as a society, we have reduced many of the risks that have been with us for millennia. Fatal childhood diseases are things of the past, many adult diseases are curable, accidents are rarer and more survivable, buildings collapse less often, death by violence has declined considerably, and so on. All over the world -- among the wealthier of us who live in peaceful Western countries -- our lives have become safer.
Our notions of risk are not absolute; they're based more on how far they are from whatever we think of as "normal." So as our perception of what is normal gets safer, the remaining risks stand out more. When your population is dying of the plague, protecting yourself from the occasional thief or murderer is a luxury. When everyone is healthy, it becomes a necessity.
Some of this fear results from imperfect risk perception. We're bad at accurately assessing risk; we tend to exaggerate spectacular, strange, and rare events, and downplay ordinary, familiar, and common ones. This leads us to believe that violence against police, school shootings, and terrorist attacks are more common and more deadly than they actually are -- and that the costs, dangers, and risks of a militarized police, a school system without flexibility, and a surveillance state without privacy are less than they really are.
Some of this fear stems from the fact that we put people in charge of just one aspect of the risk equation. No one wants to be the senior officer who didn't approve the SWAT team for the one subpoena delivery that resulted in an officer being shot. No one wants to be the school principal who didn't discipline -- no matter how benign the infraction -- the one student who became a shooter. No one wants to be the president who rolled back counterterrorism measures, just in time to have a plot succeed. Those in charge will be naturally risk averse, since they personally shoulder so much of the burden.
We also expect that science and technology should be able to mitigate these risks, as they mitigate so many others. There's a fundamental problem at the intersection of these security measures with science and technology; it has to do with the types of risk they're arrayed against. Most of the risks we face in life are against nature: disease, accident, weather, random chance. As our science has improved -- medicine is the big one, but other sciences as well -- we become better at mitigating and recovering from those sorts of risks.
Security measures combat a very different sort of risk: a risk stemming from another person. People are intelligent, and they can adapt to new security measures in ways nature cannot. An earthquake isn't able to figure out how to topple structures constructed under some new and safer building code, and an automobile won't invent a new form of accident that undermines medical advances that have made existing accidents more survivable. But a terrorist will change his tactics and targets in response to new security measures. An otherwise innocent person will change his behavior in response to a police force that compels compliance at the threat of a Taser. We will all change, living in a surveillance state.
When you implement measures to mitigate the effects of the random risks of the world, you're safer as a result. When you implement measures to reduce the risks from your fellow human beings, the human beings adapt and you get less risk reduction than you'd expect -- and you also get more side effects, because we all adapt.
We need to relearn how to recognize the trade-offs that come from risk management, especially risk from our fellow human beings. We need to relearn how to accept risk, and even embrace it, as essential to human progress and our free society. The more we expect technology to protect us from people in the same way it protects us from nature, the more we will sacrifice the very values of our society in futile attempts to achieve this security.
This essay previously appeared on Forbes.com.

<div>опет гардијан (е јебеш овај привју, више не можеш да средиш страницу како треба)</div><div>NSA and GCHQ unlock privacy and security on the internet</div><div>
</div><div>- NSA and GCHQ unlock encryption used to protect emails, banking and medical records</div><div>- $250m-a-year US program works covertly with tech companies to insert weaknesses into products - Security experts say programs 'undermine the fabric of the internet'</div><div>
</div><div>у суштини, представили су енкрипцију као аномалију и објавили јој рат &nbsp;</div><div>
</div><div>

QuoteUS and British intelligence agencies have successfully cracked much of the online encryption relied upon by hundreds of millions of people to protect the privacy of their personal data, online transactions and emails, according to top-secret documents revealed by former contractor Edward Snowden.</div><div>Through these covert partnerships, the agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities – known as backdoors or trapdoors – into commercial encryption software...идт

</div>

опет гардијан (е јебеш овај привју, више не можеш да средиш страницу како треба)
NSA and GCHQ unlock privacy and security on the internet

- NSA and GCHQ unlock encryption used to protect emails, banking and medical records
- $250m-a-year US program works covertly with tech companies to insert weaknesses into products - Security experts say programs 'undermine the fabric of the internet'

у суштини, представили су енкрипцију као аномалију и објавили јој рат

QuoteUS and British intelligence agencies have successfully cracked much of the online encryption relied upon by hundreds of millions of people to protect the privacy of their personal data, online transactions and emails, according to top-secret documents revealed by former contractor Edward Snowden.
Through these covert partnerships, the agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities – known as backdoors or trapdoors – into commercial encryption software...идт

е средите ово са прегледом, постало је бесмислено

Novi teški udarci na američki ponos i privatnost: NSA neke podatke deli sa Izraelom. Mislim, ima to logike ako uzmemo u obzir logiku da su teroristi = Arapi, ali, naravno, Amere će ovo samo još više da zaboli kad shvate da nekakvi Izraelci sad prebiraju po njihovoj intimi. Gardijan, a kroz prste Glena Grinvalda veli:

NSA shares raw intelligence including Americans' data with Israel

Quote

• Secret deal places no legal limits on use of data by Israelis
• Only official US government communications protected
• Agency insists it complies with rules governing privacy
• Read the NSA and Israel's 'memorandum of understanding'


The National Security Agency routinely shares raw intelligence data with Israel without first sifting it to remove information about US citizens, a top-secret document provided to the Guardian by whistleblower Edward Snowden reveals.
Details of the intelligence-sharing agreement are laid out in a memorandum of understanding between the NSA and its Israeli counterpart that shows the US government handed over intercepted communications likely to contain phone calls and emails of American citizens. The agreement places no legally binding limits on the use of the data by the Israelis.
The disclosure that the NSA agreed to provide raw intelligence data to a foreign country contrasts with assurances from the Obama administration that there are rigorous safeguards to protect the privacy of US citizens caught in the dragnet. The intelligence community calls this process "minimization", but the memorandum makes clear that the information shared with the Israelis would be in its pre-minimized state.
The deal was reached in principle in March 2009, according to the undated memorandum, which lays out the ground rules for the intelligence sharing.
The five-page memorandum, termed an agreement between the US and Israeli intelligence agencies "pertaining to the protection of US persons", repeatedly stresses the constitutional rights of Americans to privacy and the need for Israeli intelligence staff to respect these rights.
But this is undermined by the disclosure that Israel is allowed to receive "raw Sigint" – signal intelligence. The memorandum says: "Raw Sigint includes, but is not limited to, unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content."
According to the agreement, the intelligence being shared would not be filtered in advance by NSA analysts to remove US communications. "NSA routinely sends ISNU [the Israeli Sigint National Unit] minimized and unminimized raw collection", it says.
Although the memorandum is explicit in saying the material had to be handled in accordance with US law, and that the Israelis agreed not to deliberately target Americans identified in the data, these rules are not backed up by legal obligations.
"This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights and shall not be construed to be either an international agreement or a legally binding instrument according to international law," the document says.
In a statement to the Guardian, an NSA spokesperson did not deny that personal data about Americans was included in raw intelligence data shared with the Israelis. But the agency insisted that the shared intelligence complied with all rules governing privacy.
"Any US person information that is acquired as a result of NSA's surveillance activities is handled under procedures that are designed to protect privacy rights," the spokesperson said.
The NSA declined to answer specific questions about the agreement, including whether permission had been sought from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (Fisa) court for handing over such material.
The memorandum of understanding, which the Guardian is publishing in full, allows Israel to retain "any files containing the identities of US persons" for up to a year. The agreement requests only that the Israelis should consult the NSA's special liaison adviser when such data is found.
Notably, a much stricter rule was set for US government communications found in the raw intelligence. The Israelis were required to "destroy upon recognition" any communication "that is either to or from an official of the US government". Such communications included those of "officials of the executive branch (including the White House, cabinet departments, and independent agencies), the US House of Representatives and Senate (member and staff) and the US federal court system (including, but not limited to, the supreme court)".
It is not clear whether any communications involving members of US Congress or the federal courts have been included in the raw data provided by the NSA, nor is it clear how or why the NSA would be in possession of such communications. In 2009, however, the New York Times reported on "the agency's attempt to wiretap a member of Congress, without court approval, on an overseas trip".
The NSA is required by law to target only non-US persons without an individual warrant, but it can collect the content and metadata of Americans' emails and calls without a warrant when such communication is with a foreign target. US persons are defined in surveillance legislation as US citizens, permanent residents and anyone located on US soil at the time of the interception, unless it has been positively established that they are not a citizen or permanent resident.
Moreover, with much of the world's internet traffic passing through US networks, large numbers of purely domestic communications also get scooped up incidentally by the agency's surveillance programs.
The document mentions only one check carried out by the NSA on the raw intelligence, saying the agency will "regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of US persons' identities". It also requests that the Israelis limit access only to personnel with a "strict need to know".
Israeli intelligence is allowed "to disseminate foreign intelligence information concerning US persons derived from raw Sigint by NSA" on condition that it does so "in a manner that does not identify the US person". The agreement also allows Israel to release US person identities to "outside parties, including all INSU customers" with the NSA's written permission.
Although Israel is one of America's closest allies, it is not one of the inner core of countries involved in surveillance sharing with the US - Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This group is collectively known as Five Eyes.
The relationship between the US and Israel has been strained at times, both diplomatically and in terms of intelligence. In the top-secret 2013 intelligence community budget request, details of which were disclosed by the Washington Post, Israel is identified alongside Iran and China as a target for US cyberattacks.
While NSA documents tout the mutually beneficial relationship of Sigint sharing, another report, marked top secret and dated September 2007, states that the relationship, while central to US strategy, has become overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel.
"Balancing the Sigint exchange equally between US and Israeli needs has been a constant challenge," states the report, titled 'History of the US – Israel Sigint Relationship, Post-1992'. "In the last decade, it arguably tilted heavily in favor of Israeli security concerns. 9/11 came, and went, with NSA's only true Third Party [counter-terrorism] relationship being driven almost totally by the needs of the partner."
   
In another top-secret document seen by the Guardian, dated 2008, a senior NSA official points out that Israel aggressively spies on the US. "On the one hand, the Israelis are extraordinarily good Sigint partners for us, but on the other, they target us to learn our positions on Middle East problems," the official says. "A NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] ranked them as the third most aggressive intelligence service against the US."
Later in the document, the official is quoted as saying: "One of NSA's biggest threats is actually from friendly intelligence services, like Israel. There are parameters on what NSA shares with them, but the exchange is so robust, we sometimes share more than we intended."
   
The memorandum of understanding also contains hints that there had been tensions in the intelligence-sharing relationship with Israel. At a meeting in March 2009 between the two agencies, according to the document, it was agreed that the sharing of raw data required a new framework and further training for Israeli personnel to protect US person information.

It is not clear whether or not this was because there had been problems up to that point in the handling of intelligence that was found to contain Americans' data.
However, an earlier US document obtained by Snowden, which discusses co-operating on a military intelligence program, bluntly lists under the cons: "Trust issues which revolve around previous ISR [Israel] operations."
   
The Guardian asked the Obama administration how many times US data had been found in the raw intelligence, either by the Israelis or when the NSA reviewed a sample of the files, but officials declined to provide this information. Nor would they disclose how many other countries the NSA shared raw data with, or whether the Fisa court, which is meant to oversee NSA surveillance programs and the procedures to handle US information, had signed off the agreement with Israel.
In its statement, the NSA said: "We are not going to comment on any specific information sharing arrangements, or the authority under which any such information is collected. The fact that intelligence services work together under specific and regulated conditions mutually strengthens the security of both nations.
"NSA cannot, however, use these relationships to circumvent US legal restrictions. Whenever we share intelligence information, we comply with all applicable rules, including the rules to protect US person information."

pocela sam da verujem u teorije zavere, mislim, sadasnja obamina administracija il je bahata il maliciozna ili prosto glupa. a henlon je odavno objasnio.

Da, možda je zaista Henlon odgovor na sve ovo. Na primer, Marisa Majer veli da se Jahu sudio povodom - po njihovom mišljenju nezakonitih - zahteva za isporučivanjem privatnih podataka i da je presuđeno kako je  odbijanje da se podaci daju - izdaja. Zanimljivo je kako se najveća, jelte, svecka demokratija oslanja na tajna suđenja...:

Marissa Mayer: 'It's Treason' For Yahoo To Disobey The NSA

QuoteMarissa Mayer was on stage on Wednesday at the TechCrunch Disrupt conference  when Michael Arrington asked her about NSA snooping.

He wanted to know what would happen if Yahoo just didn't cooperate. He wanted  to know what would happen if she were to simply talk about what was happening,  even though the government had forbidden it.
"Releasing classified information is treason. It generally lands you  incarcerated," she said, clearly uncomfortable with the turn of the  conversation.
She also explained that when the government comes calling wanting information  on Yahoo users, the company scrutinizes each request and "we push back a lot on  requests." But "we can't talk about those things because they're classified,"  she said.
This has been going on long before her reign, too, she said:
"I'm proud to be part of an organization that from the very beginning in  2007, with the NSA and FISA and PRISM, has been skeptical and has scrutinized  those requests. In 2007 Yahoo filed a lawsuit against the new Patriot Act, parts  of PRISM and FISA, we were the key plaintiff. A lot of people have wondered  about that case and who it was. It was us ... we lost. The thing is, we  lost and if you don't comply it's treason."

Hihihi, keith Alexander ispade gik  našao je holivudskog scenografa da mu dizajnira  NSA "Information Dominance Center" po uzoru na Star Trek.

Inside the mind of NSA chief Gen Keith Alexander

Quote

It has been previously reported that the mentality of NSA chief Gen. Keith Alexander is captured by his motto "Collect it All". It's a get-everything approach he pioneered first when aimed at an enemy population in the middle of a war zone in Iraq, one he has now imported onto US soil, aimed at the domestic population and everyone else.
But a perhaps even more disturbing and revealing vignette into the spy chief's mind comes from a new Foreign Policy article describing what the journal calls his "all-out, barely-legal drive to build the ultimate spy machine". The article describes how even his NSA peers see him as a "cowboy" willing to play fast and loose with legal limits in order to construct a system of ubiquitous surveillance. But the personality driving all of this - not just Alexander's but much of Washington's - is perhaps best captured by this one passage, highlighted by PBS' News Hour in a post entitled: "NSA director modeled war room after Star Trek's Enterprise". The room was christened as part of the "Information Dominance Center":

"When he was running the Army's Intelligence and Security Command, Alexander brought many of his future allies down to Fort Belvoir for a tour of his base of operations, a facility known as the Information Dominance Center. It had been designed by a Hollywood set designer to mimic the bridge of the starship Enterprise from Star Trek, complete with chrome panels, computer stations, a huge TV monitor on the forward wall, and doors that made a 'whoosh' sound when they slid open and closed. Lawmakers and other important officials took turns sitting in a leather 'captain's chair' in the center of the room and watched as Alexander, a lover of science-fiction movies, showed off his data tools on the big screen.
"'Everybody wanted to sit in the chair at least once to pretend he was Jean-Luc Picard,' says a retired officer in charge of VIP visits."

Numerous commentators remarked yesterday on the meaning of all that (note, too, how "Total Information Awareness" was a major scandal in the Bush years, but "Information Dominance Center" - along with things like "Boundless Informant" - are treated as benign or even noble programs in the age of Obama).
But now, on the website of DBI Architects, Inc. of Washington and Reston, Virginia, there are what purports to be photographs of the actual Star-Trek-like headquarters commissioned by Gen. Alexander that so impressed his Congressional overseers. It's a 10,740 square foot labyrinth in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The brochure touts how "the prominently positioned chair provides the commanding officer an uninterrupted field of vision to a 22'-0" wide projection screen":
The glossy display further describes how "this project involved the renovation of standard office space into a highly classified, ultramodern operations center." Its "primary function is to enable 24-hour worldwide
visualization, planning, and execution of coordinated information operations for the US Army and other federal agencies." It gushes: "The
futuristic, yet distinctly military, setting is further reinforced by the Commander's console, which gives the illusion that one has boarded
a star ship":
 

Other photographs of Gen. Alexander's personal Star Trek Captain fantasy come-to-life (courtesy of public funds) are here. Any casual review of human history proves how deeply irrational it is to believe that powerful factions can be trusted to exercise vast surveillance power with little accountability or transparency. But the more they proudly flaunt their warped imperial hubris, the more irrational it becomes.

Glen Grinvold nastavlja. U ovom nastavku: kako NSA identifikuje ljude koji koriste TOR:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption

Ričard Stalman u Vajrdu:

Stallman: How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?

Quote

Editor's Note: Given Richard Stallman's longtime role in promoting software that respects user freedom (including GNU, which just turned 30), his suggested "remedies" for all the ways technology can be re-designed to provide benefits while avoiding surveillance — like the smart meters example he shares below — seem particularly relevant.
The current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. To recover our freedom and restore democracy, we must reduce surveillance to the point where it is possible for whistleblowers of all kinds to talk with journalists without being spotted. To do this reliably, we must reduce the surveillance capacity of the systems we use.
Using free/libre software, as I've advocated for 30 years, is the first step in taking control of our digital lives. We can't trust non-free software; the NSA uses and even creates security weaknesses in non-free software so as to invade our own computers and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers, but that won't protect our privacy once we set foot on the internet.
Bipartisan legislation to "curtail the domestic surveillance powers" in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers. That won't suffice to protect whistleblowers if "catching the whistleblower" is grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go further.
Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, sources, and journalists provides confirmation. We need to reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is the maximum tolerable level of surveillance, beyond which it becomes oppressive? That happens when surveillance interferes with the functioning of democracy: when whistleblowers (such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.
Don't Agree We Need to Reduce Surveillance? Then Read This Section First If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the last shred of effective control over our government and institutions. That's why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has talked with a reporter is too much surveillance — too much for democracy to endure.
An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in 2011 that the U.S. would not subpoena reporters because "We know who you're talking to." Sometimes journalists' phone call records are subpoena'd to find this out, but Snowden has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of everyone in the U.S., all the time.
Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated the U.S. government's systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups on the pretext that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.
Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was unable to effectively hold the NSA accountable.) Suspicion of a crime will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of "espionage", finding the "spy" will provide an excuse to access the accumulated material.
The state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for personal reasons too. Some NSA agents used U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers — past, present, or wished-for — in a practice called "LoveINT." The NSA says it has caught and punished this a few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught. But these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have long used their access to driver's license records to track down someone attractive, a practice known as "running a plate for a date."
Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the possibility of access to it, it may misuse that data in dreadful ways.
Total surveillance plus vague law provides an opening for a massive fishing expedition against any desired target. To make journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily accessible to the state.
Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose a set of legal principles designed to prevent the abuses of massive surveillance. These principles include, crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic freedoms — if adopted completely and enforced without exception forever.
However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or ignored.
Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a handful of people, will give them an opportunity.
If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become available for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by companies, for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won't exist, and there will be no way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only collect data starting at that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.
We Must Design Every System for Privacy If we don't want a total surveillance society, we must consider surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental impact of physical construction.
For example: "Smart" meters for electricity are touted for sending the power company moment-by-moment data about each customer's electric usage, including how usage compares with users in general. This is implemented based on general surveillance, but does not require any surveillance. It would be easy for the power company to calculate the average usage in a residential neighborhood by dividing the total usage by the number of subscribers, and send that to the meters. Each customer's meter could compare her usage, over any desired period of time, with the average usage pattern for that period. The same benefit, with no surveillance!
We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems.

Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to privacy. The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where someone reported a crime. It would not be feasible to physically collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them.
Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are connected to the internet so recordings can be collected in a data center and saved forever. This is already dangerous, but it is going to get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see who they talk with.
Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security themselves, so anyone could watch what the camera sees. To restore privacy, we should ban the use of internet-connected cameras aimed where and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people. Everyone must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the systematic accumulation of such data on the internet must be limited.
Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance Most data collection comes from people's own digital activities. Usually the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes to the threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a business, because the data that the companies collect is systematically available to the state.
The NSA, through PRISM, has gotten into the databases of many large internet corporations. AT&T has saved all its phone call records since 1987 and makes them available to the DEA to search on request. Strictly speaking, the U.S. government does not possess that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it.
The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires that we reduce the data collected about people by any organization, not just by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they do not accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data about our transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more than a short time beyond what is inherently necessary for their dealings with us.
One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the internet is that sites are financed through advertising based on tracking users' activities and propensities. This converts a mere annoyance — advertising that we can learn to ignore — into a surveillance system that harms us whether we know it or not. Purchases over the internet also track their users. And we are all aware that "privacy policies" are more excuses to violate privacy than commitments to uphold it.
We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous payments — anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don't want the payee to dodge taxes.) Bitcoin is not anonymous, but technology for digital cash was first developed 25 years ago; we need only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct them.
A further threat from sites' collection of personal data is that security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes customers' credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end this danger: a security hole in the site can't hurt you if the site knows nothing about you.
Remedy for Travel Surveillance We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems recognize all license plates, and the data can be kept indefinitely; they should be required by law to notice and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.
The U.S. "no-fly" list must be abolished because it is punishment without trial.
It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage will be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to be enough for all legitimate purposes.
Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel associated with each card. Together they amount to massive surveillance. This data collection must be reduced.
Navigation services do surveillance: the user's computer tells the map service the user's location and where the user wants to go; then the server determines the route and sends it back to the user's computer, which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records the user's locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This surveillance is not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it: free/libre software in the user's computer could download map data for the pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the route, and display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is or wants to go.
Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the borrower's identity is known only inside the station where the item was borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is "out", so when the user returns it at any station (in general, a different one), that station will know where and when that item was borrowed. It will enform the other station that the item is no longer "out". It will also calculate the user's bill, and send it (after waiting some random number of minutes) to headquarters along a ring of stations, so that headquarters would not find out which station the bill came from. Once this is done, the return station would forget all about the transaction. If an item remains "out" for too long, the station where it was borrowed can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the borrower's identity immediately.
Remedy for Communications Dossiers Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc).  With mobile phones, they also record the user's physical location. They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&T.  Soon they will even record the user's body activities. It appears that the NSA collects cell phone location data in bulk.
Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and phone companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very long, in the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.
This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't physically stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as it is generated — which is what the U.S. does with some or all phone companies. We would have to rely on prohibiting that by law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the relevant law (the PATRIOT Act) does not clearly prohibit the practice.  In addition, if the government did resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about everyone's phone calls made prior to that time.
But Some Surveillance Is Necessary For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court order. With the internet, the power to tap phone conversations would naturally extend to the power to tap internet connections. This power is easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary. Fortunately, this won't make it possible to find whistleblowers after the fact.
Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have their own jargon term for perjury, "testilying," since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and photographers.) One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all the time found their use of force fell by 60%. The ACLU is in favor of this.
Corporations are not people, and not entitled to human rights. It is legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational (e.g., DRM) or political (e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of terrorism.
However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when it is carried out as part of a business.
***
Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the level of surveillance of our' movements, actions, and  communications. It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s, and far more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced in the 1980s, and would still be far more even with additional legal limits on state use of the accumulated data.
Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.

Glen Grinvold napušta Guardian da krene sa sopstvenim sajtom za vesti...

Glenn Greenwald announces departure from the Guardian

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Journalist who broke stories about widespread NSA surveillance leaving to pursue 'once-in-a-career journalistic opportunity'

Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who broke a string of stories about widespread electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency based on files leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, has announced that he is leaving the Guardian.
In a statement posted on his blog, Greenwald said: "My partnership with the Guardian has been extremely fruitful and fulfilling. I have high regard for the editors and journalists with whom I worked and am incredibly proud of what we achieved.
"The decision to leave was not an easy one, but I was presented with a once-in-a-career opportunity that no journalist could possibly decline.
"Because this news leaked before we were prepared to announce it, I'm not yet able to provide any details of this momentous new venture, but it will be unveiled very shortly."
A Guardian spokesperson said: "Glenn Greenwald is a remarkable journalist and it has been fantastic working with him. Our work together over the past year has demonstrated the crucial role that responsible investigative journalism can play in holding those in power to account.
"We are, of course, disappointed by Glenn's decision to move on, but can appreciate the attraction of the new role he has been offered. We wish him all the best."
Greenwald joined the Guardian in 2012 from Salon. He is a former constitutional lawyer, a best-selling author, and the recipient of the first annual IF Stone award for independent journalism.

jel' to on najzad pokrenuo onaj ultraskupi projekat sa onim kako-se-zvase eBay bajom?

Ne kaže, ali znaćemo uskoro. Evo svežijeg napisa iz Vošington posta:

Why Glenn Greenwald's new media venture is a big deal

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Glenn Greenwald, who has published many of the most important scoops from the Edward Snowden leaks, is leaving The Guardian and setting up a new media venture with long-time journalist Laura Poitras and Jeremy Scahill from The Nation. The venture is being funded by eBay founder Pierre Omidyar, who has suggested that he's prepared to invest more than $250 million in the new venture.
This is big news for journalism. It's also big news for people interested in the relationship between information technology and politics. Martha Finnemore and I drafted a paper a couple of years ago about how Wikileaks-type organizations were changing the relationship between knowledge, politics  and hypocrisy. Our ideas about hypocrisy led to an article on the true consequences of the Snowden leaks, which is coming out in the next issue of Foreign Affairs. Our ideas about knowledge and politics maybe tell us something about the consequences of the new venture (but bear with me — our argument is a little complicated).
Fundamentally, we think that much of the commentary about Wikileaks and Snowden's revelations are wrong. Most people think that Wikileaks, Snowden etc. are politically important because they reveal secret information that was hitherto unknown. Many of Wikileaks' defenders, including, initially, Julian Assange himself, thought that the organization would change politics and bring down corrupt regimes by revealing information that the government wanted to hide. The critics of Snowden and Wikileaks actually agree — they argue that they have hurt America (and perhaps the world) by revealing information that should have stayed secret.
Neither are right. Neither Wikileaks or Snowden has revealed any truly surprising and damaging information. European and South American governments already knew that the U.S. was spying on them. China was certainly aware that U.S.  agencies were trying to hack into its systems. On the other hand, Assange's initial hope that he could change the world through publishing damaging information turned out to be completely unfounded. Wikileaks had a very frustrating time trying to get anyone except bloggers to pay attention to their early revelations. No one seemed to care.
The reason why is important. There's too much information out there for most people to pay attention to, let alone figure out whether they believe it or not. Hence, most people rely on other institutions such as media organizations to tell them which information is worth caring about. Not only do people not pay much attention to information until it gets the stamp of approval from some authoritative institution, but this information is transformed, because everybody knows that everybody else is paying attention to it. It stops being mere information, and becomes knowledge — generally accepted facts that people use to build their understanding of what everybody knows about politics.
Established newspapers like the New York Times, The Washington Post and the Financial Times play a crucial sociological role in deciding which information is important and trustworthy, and which is not. When one of these newspapers publishes information, it is legitimated as knowledge — which people are not only more likely to take seriously themselves, but may have to take seriously, because they know that other people are taking it seriously. European Union governments knew perfectly well that the U.S. had been tapping communications in their building (and if you read specialist sources, you knew about this, too). However, these governments found it more politically convenient to ignore U.S. spying than to make a big fuss. When this information became knowledge — when it was published and treated as authoritative by major newspapers — it became impossible to ignore any longer.
Assange and Wikileaks figured out some version of this early on. This is why they started working together with major newspapers such as the Guardian and New York Times — because this was the only way that they could get people to systematically pay attention to the information they had uncovered, and to turn that information into knowledge that everyone accepted. Unsurprisingly, however, this relationship turned out to be very difficult. Newspapers — even the most pioneering ones — have political relationships with governments, which make them nervous about publishing (and hence validating) certain kinds of information. This also helps explain the awkwardness that many journalists express toward Greenwald. While they recognize that he has uncovered many valuable scoops, they don't see him as bounded by the same rules as they are.
On the one hand, people like Assange, Greenwald and Snowden need newspapers or similar media outlets. Without some such outlet, they are voices in the wilderness. On the other hand, exactly because newspapers play a crucial political role in validating knowledge, they have complicated relationships with governments and politicians. This leads them to actions which people like Assange and Greenwald are likely to see as compromises with power.
And this is why the new venture is so interesting. It will likely shape up as a serious journalistic enterprise. Capital of USD $250 million can hire some very good people. The venture has the potential to become the kind of news source that can turn information into knowledge. Yet it doesn't sound as if it'll be bound by the kinds of political relationships that most newspapers are embedded in. The Columbia Journalism Review gets this best when it describes the venture as I.F. Stone's Weekly, if it had been lavishly funded by a friendly billionaire.
If this works, it is likely to change the relationship between information, knowledge and politics in some very interesting ways. Most obviously, it will make it even harder for the U.S. government to control the politics of leaks by pressuring newspapers not to publish stories that it thinks hurt the national interest. Former New York Times editor Bill Keller describes how:

The tension between our obligation to inform and the government's obligation to protect plays out in a set of rituals. As one of my predecessors, Max Frankel, wrote...: "For the vast majority of 'secrets,' there has developed between the government and the press (and Congress) a rather simple rule of thumb: The government hides what it can, pleading necessity as long as it can, and the press pries out what it can, pleading a need and a right to know. Each side in this 'game' regularly 'wins' and 'loses' a round or two. Each fights with the weapons at its command. When the government loses a secret or two, it simply adjusts to a new reality.

It's difficult to imagine Greenwald (or Poitras) having any interest in engaging in these rituals. If governments start to lose control over public knowledge in the information age, it won't be because information "wants to be free." It'll be because of the creation of new ventures like this, that create public knowledge without adhering to the old rules about how government has a voice in deciding what gets published and what doesn't.

NSA asked Japan to tap regionwide fiber-optic cables in 2011

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The U.S. National Security Agency sought the Japanese government's cooperation in 2011 over wiretapping fiber-optic cables carrying phone and Internet data across the Asia-Pacific region, but the request was rejected, sources said Saturday.
The agency's overture was apparently aimed at gathering information on China given that Japan is at the heart of optical cables that connect various parts of the region. But Tokyo turned down the proposal, citing legal restrictions and a shortage of personnel, the sources said.
The NSA asked Tokyo if it could intercept personal information from communication data passing through Japan via cables connecting it, China and other regional areas, including Internet activity and phone calls, they said.
Faced with China's growing presence in the cyberworld and the need to bolster information about international terrorists, the United States may have been looking into whether Japan, its top regional ally, could offer help similar to that provided by Britain, according to the sources.
Based on documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, British newspaper The Guardian reported that the agency had been sharing data intercepted by Britain's spy agency, GCHQ, through transatlantic cables since 2011.
But Tokyo decided it could not do so because under current legislation, it cannot intercept such communications even if the aim is to prevent a terrorist act. Japan also has a substantially smaller number of intelligence personnel, compared with the NSA's estimated 30,000 employees, the sources said.
A separate source familiar with intelligence activities of major nations said the volume of data that would need to be intercepted from fiber-optic cables would require a massive number of workers and the assistance of the private sector.

Spies worry over "doomsday" cache stashed by ex-NSA contractor Snowden

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(Reuters) - British and U.S. intelligence officials say they are worried about a "doomsday" cache of highly classified, heavily encrypted material they believe former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden has stored on a data cloud.

The cache contains documents generated by the NSA and other agencies and includes names of U.S. and allied intelligence personnel, seven current and former U.S. officials and other sources briefed on the matter said.

The data is protected with sophisticated encryption, and multiple passwords are needed to open it, said two of the sources, who like the others spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters.

The passwords are in the possession of at least three different people and are valid for only a brief time window each day, they said. The identities of persons who might have the passwords are unknown.

Spokespeople for both NSA and the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.

One source described the cache of still unpublished material as Snowden's "insurance policy" against arrest or physical harm.

U.S. officials and other sources said only a small proportion of the classified material Snowden downloaded during stints as a contract systems administrator for NSA has been made public. Some Obama Administration officials have said privately that Snowden downloaded enough material to fuel two more years of news stories.

"The worst is yet to come," said one former U.S. official who follows the investigation closely.

Snowden, who is believed to have downloaded between 50,000 and 200,000 classified NSA and British government documents, is living in Russia under temporary asylum, where he fled after traveling to Hong Kong. He has been charged in the United States under the Espionage Act.

Cryptome, a website which started publishing leaked secret documents years before the group WikiLeaks or Snowden surfaced, estimated that the total number of Snowden documents made public so far is over 500.

Given Snowden's presence in Moscow, and the low likelihood that he will return to the United States anytime soon, U.S. and British authorities say they are focused more on dealing with the consequences of the material he has released than trying to apprehend him.

It is unclear whether U.S. or allied intelligence agencies - or those of adversary services such as Russia's and China's -

know where the material is stored and, if so, have tried to unlock it.

One former senior U.S. official said that the Chinese and Russians have cryptographers skilled enough to open the cache if they find it.

Snowden's revelations of government secrets have brought to light extensive and previously unknown surveillance of phone, email and social media communications by the NSA and allied agencies. That has sparked several diplomatic rows between Washington and its allies, along with civil liberties debates in Europe, the United States and elsewhere.

Among the material which Snowden acquired from classified government computer servers, but which has not been published by media outlets known to have had access to it, are documents containing names and resumes of employees working for NSA's British counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), sources familiar with the matter said.

The sources said Snowden started downloading some of it from a classified GCHQ website, known as GC-Wiki, when he was employed by Dell and assigned to NSA in 2012.

Snowden made a calculated decision to move from Dell Inc to another NSA contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, because he would have wide-ranging access to NSA data at the latter firm, one source with knowledge of the matter said.

"EXTREME PRECAUTIONS"

Glenn Greenwald, who met with Snowden in Hong Kong and was among the first to report on the leaked documents for the Guardian newspaper, said the former NSA contractor had "taken extreme precautions to make sure many different people around the world have these archives to insure the stories will inevitably be published."

"If anything happens at all to Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them to get access to the full archives," Greenwald said in a June interview with the Daily Beast website. He added: "I don't know for sure whether has more documents than the ones he has given me... I believe he does."

In an email exchange with Reuters, Greenwald, who has said he remains in contact with Snowden, affirmed his statements about Snowden's "precautions" but said he had nothing to add.

Officials believe that the "doomsday" cache is stored and encrypted separately from any material that Snowden has provided to media outlets.

Conservative British politicians, including Louise Mensch, a former member of parliament, have accused the Guardian, one of two media outlets to first publish stories based on Snowden's leaks, of "trafficking of GCHQ agents' names abroad."

No names of British intelligence personnel have been published by any media outlet. After U.K. officials informed the Guardian it could face legal action, the newspaper disclosed it had destroyed computers containing Snowden material on GCHQ, but had provided copies of the data to the New York Times and the U.S. nonprofit group ProPublica.

Sources familiar with unpublished material Snowden downloaded said it also contains information about the CIA - possibly including personnel names - as well as other U.S. spy agencies such as the National Reconnaissance Office and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which operate U.S. image-producing satellites and analyze their data.

U.S. security officials have indicated in briefings they do not know what, if any, of the material is still in Snowden's personal possession. Snowden himself has been quoted as saying he took no such materials with him to Russia.

(Editing by Warren Strobel and Tim Dobbyn)

Ameri dočekali da malo oni potkače Francuze glede prisluškivanja:


France Broadens Its Surveillance Power

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PARIS — For all their indignation last summer, when the scope of the United States' mass data collection began to be made public, the French are hardly innocents in the realm of electronic surveillance. Within days of the reports about the National Security Agency's activities, it was revealed that French intelligence services operated a similar system, with similarly minimal oversight.       

And last week, with little public debate, the legislature approved a law that critics feared would markedly expand electronic surveillance of French residents and businesses.       
The provision, quietly passed as part of a routine military spending bill, defines the conditions under which intelligence agencies may gain access to or record telephone conversations, emails, Internet activity, personal location data and other electronic communications.       
The law provides for no judicial oversight and allows electronic surveillance for a broad range of purposes, including "national security," the protection of France's "scientific and economic potential" and prevention of "terrorism" or "criminality."       
In an unusual alliance, Internet and corporate groups, human rights organizations and a small number of lawmakers have opposed the law as a threat to business or an encroachment on individual rights.       
The government argues that the law, which does not take effect until 2015, does little to expand intelligence powers. Rather, officials say, those powers have been in place for years, and the law creates rules where there had been none, notably with regard to real-time location tracking.       
While conceding that the new law "does effectively expand the existing regime to adapt it to the missions and reality of our intelligence services," Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told the Senate that "it especially reinforces oversight as compared with the current situation."
In effect, analysts say, the government has either staked out rights to a vast new range of surveillance practices, or acknowledged that it has already been collecting far more data, under far less regulated circumstances, than people realized.       
Neither prospect is terribly comforting to the law's opponents.       
"We feel that anything can be placed under the heading 'national security,' " said Clémence Bectarte, a lawyer for the International Federation for Human Rights. The law, she said, expanded the list of state administrations authorized to request electronic surveillance, for example to include the budget ministry.       
"There should have been a parliamentary commission and a real public debate," she said.       
French intelligence agencies have little experience publicly justifying their practices. Parliamentary oversight did not begin until 2007.
The Association des Services Internet Communautaires, or @sic, an advocacy group whose members include AOL, eBay, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and several top French Internet companies, discovered the new legislation essentially by chance.       
"There was no consultation at all," said Giuseppe de Martino, @sic's director and an executive at Dailymotion, a French online video service. "No one said anything about it to us."       
The National Commission for Information Technology and Freedoms, a state administration meant to protect the rights and privacy of citizens, said it was not consulted on the contentious elements of the bill, though it was asked to review other provisions.       
The government denied any effort to shield the law from public scrutiny. The bill went through four votes in Parliament, noted one government official. "Not exactly discreet, as maneuvers go," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly.
@sic said the law could give the authorities blanket rights to seize "all documents stocked in a 'cloud' service subscribed by a given Internet user," for instance. Currently, such a seizure would require a warrant, the group argued.       
"We don't know what this is going to mean in practice," Mr. de Martino said. "But now the doors are open."       
French intelligence services are already reputed to be rapacious collectors of foreign industrial secrets, and there is some concern the law could discourage international investment. Internet service companies worry that users may begin to turn away from the Internet or share their personal information less freely.       
But Jean-Pierre Sueur, a senator from President François Hollande's Socialist Party, said identical provisions have been in place since the passage of an electronic intercepts law in 1991.       
"If they're angry about this, they ought to have been angry for 23 years," Mr. Sueur said. The new law created "only additional guarantees," he said, and stricter rules for the 200,000 or so intercept operations conducted by French intelligence services each year.       
He rejected calls for judicial oversight, saying, "In the context of the antiterror fight, day to day, it's impossible."       
Alain Juillet, president of the Academy of Economic Intelligence and a former intelligence director for France's foreign intelligence service, said the law's value was "that it puts a framework where there wasn't one before. Before, there was nothing; it was total freedom," he said.
Laurent Borredon, a reporter for Le Monde, qualified that endorsement.       
"If one can reproach the parliamentarians for something," he wrote last week, "it's to have regulated the tip of an iceberg whose depth we're only barely beginning to measure today."       

NSA umiruje naciju (i posredno svet) i objašnjava da svo ovo prisluškivanje o kome se priča zapravo nije tako obimno. Evo sižea sa slešdota:

QuoteThis week CBS New's 60 Minutes program had a broadcast segment devoted to the NSA, and additional online features.  It revealed that the first secret Snowden stole was the test and answers for a technical examination to get a job at NSA.  When working at home, Snowden covered his head and screen with a hood so that his girlfriend couldn't see what he was doing.  NSA considered the possibility that Snowden left malicious software behind and removed every computer and cable that Snowden had access to from its classified network, costing tens of millions of dollars.  Snowden took approximately 1.7 million classified documents.  Snowden never approached any of multiple Inspectors General, supervisors, or Congressional oversight committee members about his concerns.  Snowden's activity caught the notice of other System Administrators.  There were also other interesting details, such as the NSA has a highly competitive intern program for High School students that are given a Top Secret clearance and a chance to break codes that have resisted the efforts of NSA's analysts — some succeed. The NSA is only targeting the communications, as opposed to metadata, of less than 60 Americans.  Targeting the actual  communications of Americans, rather than metadata, requires a probable cause finding and a specific court order.  NSA analysts working with metadata don't have access to the name, and can't listen to the call.  The NSA's work is driven by requests for information by other parts of the government, and there are about 31,000 requests.  Snowden apparently managed to steal a copy of that document, the 'crown jewels' of the intelligence world. With that information, foreign nations would know what the US does and doesn't know, and how to exploit it.

A evo i reportaže:

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-speaks-out-on-snowden-spying/

мислим да је једина истинска вредност емисије прво појављивање цифре узетих докумената

QuoteSnowden took approximately 1.7 million classified documents.

осталим причама могу поверовати само обамаботи и њихови републикански пандани

http://www.collegehumor.com/video/6942530/google-is-going-to-blackmail-you